14 NRC FORM 366 U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (7.77) LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION) ](1) CONTROL BLOCK: 034 10 010 0 0 1 - 10 0 111 1 1 0 0 NYI JA F1 (2) 0 1 LICENSE NUMBER LICENSEE CODE CON'T 3011010171 8 2 8 1 8 0 2 7 REPORT LIGIOI 3131 (9) 51010101 0 1 SOURCE 61 DOCKET NUMBER EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10) |During normal full power operation, a reactor scram occurred as the 0 2 result of a blockage of the 'D' Main Steam Line. Subsequent investi-0 3 gation revealed the 'D' inboard Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) had 0 4 its disc separated from the stem. The reactor protective system functioned normally and the event did not affect the health and safety 0 6 of the public. 0 COMP SYSTEM CAUSE CAUSE VALVE B 13 E COMPONENT CODE SUBCODE F 15 BI V LIV 1 E X 1(14 AI (16) 9 REVISION OCCURRENCE SEQUENTIAL REPORT CODE NO. TYPE REPORT NO LER RO 1812 10 1417 01 3 L 0 REPORT NUMBER 28 SUPPLIER COMPONENT NPRD-4 SUBMITTED EFFEC SHUTDOW TAKEN ACTION HOURS (22) FORM SUB 314 R 0 (26) N (24 N (25 2 6 6 Y (23 (18) CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27 The anti-rotation pin in the MSIV disc sheared allowing the pilot disc 1 0 to unscrew and part from the stem. The MSIVs are Rockwell-Edward Flite Flow balanced stop valves, Type 1612Y. A new stem and pilot. diec assembly were installed with two anti-rotation pins installed 90 degreek apart with specific attention in ensuring an interference fit 1 4 80 METHOD OF FACILITY (30) DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32) OTHER STATUS % POWER NA A (31 Observati E (28) 1 0 0 Operator 5 80 CONTENT ACTIVITY LOCATION OF RELEASE (36 AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35) RELEASED O OF RELEASE NA Z 34 NA 6 80 PERSONNEL EXPOSURES DESCRIPTION 39 Z 38 NUMBER 01(37 0 80 PERSONNEL INJURIES DESCRIPTION (41) NUMBER 0 (40) 0 NA 80 LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43) DESCRIPTION TYPE Z (42) NA 80 NRC USE ONLY PUBLICITY DESCRIPTION (45 N (44 NA 0 69 80 8211060360 821027 PDR ADOCK 05000333 PHONE:-PDR S

## POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT

## DOCKET NO. 50-333

# ATTACHMENT TO LER 82-047/03L-0

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#### EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES

At 1143, on October 7, 1982, a reactor scram occurred as the result of high neutron flux on the power range monitors. Safeguard systems operated normally during and after the transient. The plant entered the cold shutdown condition at 0115 on October 8, 1982.

During the investigation for the cause of the scram, the following information was noted:

Reactor power as displayed on the recorders for the Power Range Monitors, spiked to 123 to 125 percent of rated on all six power range monitors. Reactor pressure as displayed on a control room narrow range recorder spiked from 1005 to a peak of about 1025 psig. Process computer post trip logs indicated reactor pressure increased to 1015 psig and remained constant for five seconds following the full scram signals. During the same time frame, steam flow and steam line pressure decreased.

The reactor pressure and power transients observed during the event are much less severe than either a generator load reject or MSIV closure, both analyzed abnormal operational transients. As such, the event did not degrade the health and safety of the public.

### CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTION

Based upon the above information, a blockage of the main steam line, probably at the MSIVs, was suspected of causing the scram. During the plant cool down using the main condenser, steam line and reactor pressure were monitored while closing three of the four outboard MSIVs. With the 'D' line as the only line in service, reactor pressure increased and steam line pressure decreased thereby indicating this line was blocked. Valve disassembly showed that the 'D' inboard MSIV had its stem separated from the pilot disc allowing the main disc to drop to the closed position. The stem disc pin, part 36 shown on Rockwell drawing PD-420097 RWD, an anti-rotation device, was sheared allowing the pilot disc to unscrew.

A new stem and pilot disc assembly were installed with two anti-rotation pins 90 degrees apart. Specific attention was paid to ensuring an interference fit of the pins. The valve was reassembled and leak tested satisfactorily.

During the next refueling outage the remaining MSIV anti-rotation devices will be inspected.