

Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box E. Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038

Salem Generating Station

October 20, 1982

Mr. R. C. Haynes Regional Administrator USNRC Region 1 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Dear Mr. Haynes:

LICENSE NO. DPR-75 DOCKET NO. 50-311 REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 82-115/03L

Pursuant to the requirements of Salem Generating Station Unit No. 2, Technical Specifications, Section 6.9.1.9.b, we are submitting Licensee Event Report for Reportable Occurrence 82-115/03L. This report is required within thirty (30) days of the occurrence.


Sincerely yours,

N.J. Suficilium

H. J. Midura General Manager -Salem Operations

RF:ks 94

CC: Distribution



The Energy People

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Report Number:	82-115/03L
Report Date:	10-20-82
Occurrence Date:	09-28-82
Facility:	Salem Generating Station, Unit 2 Public Service Electric & Gas Company Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

No. 2A Emergency Diesel Generator - Inoperable.

This report was initiated by Incident Report 82-312.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

Mode 1 - Rx Power 82% - Unit Load 900 MWe.

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

At 0230 hours, September 28, 1982, during the performance of Surveillance Procedure SP(0)4.8.1.1.2, an operator discovered service water leakage emanating from the piping on No. 2A Emergency Diesel Generator oil cooler. The diesel was declared inoperable and Technical Specification Action Statement 3.8.1.1.b was entered. Operability of the redundant AC power sources was demonstrated by satisfactorily performing surveillance as required by the Technical Specifications.

DESIGNATION OF APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:

The leakage was emanating from a hole in a pipe cap. The failure of the cap apparently involved accelerated erosion resulting from silt in the service water. No previous problems of this type have been noted, and the occurrence was assumed to be of an isolated nature.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

The operability of AC power sources ensures that power will be available to supply safety related equipment required for safe shutdown of the facility and mitigation of accidents considered in the FSAR. As noted, redundant AC power sources were operable, and the incident involved no risk to the health or safety of the public. The occurrence constituted operation in a degraded mode permitted by a limiting condition for operation and is reportable in accordance with Technical Specification 6.9.1.9.b.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE: (continued)

Action Statement 3.8.1.1.a requires:

With either an AC offsite source to the vital bus system or diesel generator inoperable, demonstrate the operability of the remaining AC sources by performing Surveillance Requirements 4.8.1.1.1.a and 4.8.1.1.2.a.2 within one hour and at least once per 8 hours thereafter; restore at least two offsite circuits and three diesel generators to operable status within 72 hours or be in at least hot standby within the next 6 hours and in cold shutdown within the following 30 hours.

CORRECTIVE ACTION:

As notel, the surveillances of redundant power sources were performed, in compliance with the action statement. The failed pipe cap was replaced, the leakage was eliminated, and the diesel was satisfactorily tested. No. 2A Emergency Diesel Generator was declared operable at 0610 hours, September 28, 1982, and Action Statement 3.8.1.1.b was terminated. In view of the nature of the problem, no further action was deemed necessary.

FAILURE DATA:

Not Applicable.

Prepared By P. Frahm

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General Manager -Salem Operations

SORC Meeting No. 82-94B