



Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box E Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038

Salem Generating Station

October 20, 1982

Mr. R. C. Haynes
Regional Administrator
USNRC
Region 1
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Dear Mr. Haynes:

LICENSE NO. DPR-75
DOCKET NO. 50-311
REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 82-114/03L

Pursuant to the requirements of Salem Generating Station Unit No. 2, Technical Specifications, Section 6.9.1.9.b, we are submitting Licensee Event Report for Reportable Occurrence 82-114/03L. This report is required within thirty (30) days of the occurrence.

Sincerely yours,

H. J. Midura
General Manager -
Salem Operations

RH:ks

PSJ
CC: Distribution

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PDR ADOCK 05000311
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The Energy People

IEU

Report Number: 82-114/03L
Report Date: 10-20-82
Occurrence Date: 09-27-82
Facility: Salem Generating Station, Unit 2
Public Service Electric & Gas Company
Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

Radiation Monitoring System - Channels R11A, R12A, R12B - Inoperable.

This report was initiated by Incident Report 82-309.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

Mode 1 - Rx Power 82% - Unit Load 910 MWe.

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

At 0956 hours, September 27, 1982, during performance of routine maintenance, a technician discovered that the Containment Radiation Monitoring System (RMS) APD drive unit was broken. The RMS Channels R11A, R12A, and R12B were declared inoperable, and Limiting Condition for Operation Action Statement 3.3.3.1 Actions 24 and 25, were entered at 0956 hours.

DESIGNATION OF APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:

Investigation revealed that the pin which attaches the solenoid arm to the ratchet cog had slipped out of position, disconnecting the ratchet cog from the solenoid arm. The pin had been installed through the bottom instead of the top of the connecting sleeve.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

The Containment Radiation Monitoring System (RMS) provides indication of the concentration of radioactive gas and particulates in the containment atmosphere for the purpose of detecting reactor coolant system leakage. It is also used to ensure that the release rate during purging or pressure relief is maintained below limits specified in the Technical Specifications. A high radiation level initiates automatic closure of the containment purge duct and pressure relief isolation valves. Redundant Reactor Coolant System (RCS) leak detection capability is provided by the Containment Sump Monitoring System.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE: (continued)

Backup for the containment purge and pressure relief radiation monitoring function is provided by the Plant Vent Effluent Monitor 2R16, and relies on operator action to isolate the vent path. Failure of the Containment Radiation Monitoring System, therefore, constitutes operation in a degraded mode permitted by a Limiting Condition for Operation and is reportable in accordance with Technical Specification 6.9.1.9.b. The containment purge and pressure relief isolation valves were maintained closed, and backup monitoring capability was maintained. Therefore, this occurrence involved no risk to the health and safety of the general public.

Limiting Condition for Operation 3.3.3.1.b Action 24 requires:

With only two of the RCS leakage detection systems operable, operation may continue for up to 30 days provided grab samples of the containment atmosphere are obtained and analyzed at least once per 24 hours when the required gaseous and or particulate monitoring system is inoperable; otherwise be in at least hot standby within the next 6 hours and in cold shutdown within the following 30 hours.

Action 25 requires:

With the containment purge and pressure vacuum relief isolation system inoperable, close each of the purge and pressure relief penetrations providing direct access from the containment to the outside atmosphere.


CORRECTIVE ACTION:

The pin was reinstalled in the connecting sleeve from the top down, and the unit was tested satisfactorily. Therefore, at 1115 hours, September 27, 1982, RMS Channels R11A, R12A, and R12B were declared operable, and Limiting Condition for Operation Action Statement 3.3.3.1.b Actions 24 and 25 were terminated.

FAILURE DATA:

Not Applicable.

Prepared By R. Heller


General Manager -
Salem Operations

SORC Meeting No. 82-94B