DAIRYLAND Power COOPERATIVE · P.O. BOX 817 · 2615 EAST AV SOUTH · LA CROSSE, WISCONSIN 54601
(608) 788-4000

October 27, 1982

In reply, please
refer to LAC-8675

DOCKET NO. 50-409

Mr. James G. Keppler, Regional Administrator
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Directorate of Regulatory Operations
Region III
799 Roosevelt Road
Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137

SUBJECT: DAIRYLAND POWER COOPERATIVE
LA CROSSE BOILING WATER REACTOR (LACBWR)
PROVISIONAL OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-45
REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE NO. 82-19

REFERENCES: (1) LACBWR Technical Specifications, Section 6.9.1.9.a

Dear Mr. Keppler:

In accordance with Reference 1, this is to inform you of reactor protection system instruments found to be operating nonconservatively, but which did not prevent the fulfillment of the required protective function of the affected system.

During power escalation following the 1982 refueling outage which concluded on September 27, 1982, it was noticed that Water Level Safety Channel 3 and the narrow range water level recorder were indicating approximately five inches above Water Level Safety Channels 1 and 2. During an unplanned reactor shutdown on October 12, the water level channels were investigated. It was determined that Channels 1 and 2 were indicating approximately 5 inches below actual water level. Water Level Channels 1 and 2 were recalibrated and tested with satisfactory results.

While the two water level channels were indicating lower than actual water level, they were performing conservatively with respect to a low water level transient, since a low water level scram would have occurred at about six inches below normal water level, rather than the Technical Specificaiton limit of -12 inches. The two channels were operating nonconservatively with respect to a high water level transient, however, since a high water level scram would have occurred at an actual twenty-three inches above normal water level versus the +19 inch Technical Specification limit. No water level transient occurred during the time period the two channels were out of calibration.

The water level transmitters for Channels 1 and 2 had been replaced during the refueling outage with NRC-required environmentally qualified transmitters. The new nuclear grade transmitters were Foxboro, Model N-E13DH-HAMI-CHL. It

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is believed the new transmitters experienced a break-in period during which change in pressure caused drifting of the transmitters. Though the transmitters had been supplied calibrated, they had had to be recalibrated both on the bench and in place prior to plant startup, which supports the idea that the transmitters were drifting during a break-in period. The water level channels will be monitored for further signs of unacceptable drifting.

A Licensee Event Report (Reference: Regulatory Guide 1.16, Revision 4) is enclosed.

If there any questions, please contact us.

Yours truly,

DAIRYLAND POWER COOPERATIVE

Frank Linder, General Manager

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Enclosure

cc: Document Control Desk
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NRC Resident Inspector