Certified By mer

PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY
Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station
R.D. 1, Delta, Pennsylvania
17314

October 28, 198

Mr. R. C. Haynes
Administrator
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region I
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, PA 19406

SUBJECT: REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE - PROMPT NOTIFICATION

Confirming William Widener's conversation with R. Blough, Region I, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission on 10/24/82.

Reference: Docket No. 50-277
Peach Bottom Unit 2
Technical Specification - None
Reported in accordance with letter from Eisenhut dated May 7, 1980

Report No. 2-82-36/1P
Occurrence Date: 10/24/82

Identification of Occurrence:

During startup of Unit 2, the 71J safety/relief valve opened when reactor pressure reached 832 psig during a reactor startup program.

Conditions Prior to Occurrence:

Unit 2 had been shutdown on October 23, 1982, to add oil to the lower reservoir of the 2A recirc pump motor. Unit 2 was being returned to power operation following this outage. Reactor power at the time of occurrence was approximately 1%.

Apparent Cause of Occurrence:

Unknown at this time. The relief valve will be sent to a vendor to determine the cause of this spurious opening.

Analysis of Occurrence:

Following a maintenance shutdown on October 23, 1982, Unit 2 was being started up. Primary coolant pressure was being increased in accordance with normal startup procedures. At approximately 3:07 PM on October 24, when the primary coolant pressure reached 832 psig, the 71J relief valve opened. Reactor power at the time was approxima 1%.

IE21

Opening of the relief valve immediately reduced pressure resulting in swell of reactor water level which tripped the operating reactor feed pump. Before the reactor feed pump could be recovered, reactor level reduced to approximately zero inches and the reactor scrammed. The HPCI system was manually started to recover reactor level to nor Minimum level reached during this transient was approximately minus 10 inches.

Since there was minimal decay heat in the reactor at this time, pres and temperature reduction were rapid. The normal cooldown rate of 100°F was exceeded during this blowdown event.

The relief valve remained open until primary coolant pressure reduce to 80 psig at 3:58 PM on 10/24/82. During this transient, the torus level increased slightly above the maximum Technical Specification limit of 14.90 feet. Maximum indicated torus level was 14.96 feet. Following closure of the relief valve, steps were taken to pump down the torus to normal level.

In accordance with the site emergency plan, an unusual event was declared and proper notifications were made. The unusual event was terminated when the relief valve reseated.

During the above transient, all ECCS systems operated properly and all parameters responded as expected. No release of activity occurr during this event. Safety significance is therefore minimal.

Corrective Action:

The 71J relief valve was replaced. An inspection of the downstream piping was conducted and no discrepancies identified. Preliminary data indicated that the 71J valve had operated numerous times. Fatigue analysis was performed by Bechtel and a determination made that the downstream piping was not overstressed. The vacuum breaker on the downcomer from this valve and a second valve which had been operated manually during the transient were inspected. Both valves h some binding on the hinge pin such that normal spring pressure was insufficient to close the valve. The two vacuum breakers were repla Corrective actions have therefore been completed with the exception our continued investigation into the original cause of the valve ope

Previous Occurrence:

Upset Report 2-81-4 dated 6/20/81
2-76-47/1P
2-76-77/1P
2-77-4/1P
3-76-53/1P
3-76-56/1P
3-79-13/1P

Very truly yours,

W. T. Ullrich