



**Entergy  
Operations**

Entergy Operations, Inc.  
317 Baronne St.  
New Orleans, LA 70112  
Tel 504-595-2805  
Tel 504-739-6774

**Raymond F. Burski**  
Manager  
Safety & Regulatory Affairs

**W3P90-1912  
A4.05  
QA**

December 27, 1990

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
ATTN: Document Control Desk  
Washington, D.C. 20555

Subject: Waterford 3 SES  
Docket No. 50-382  
License No. NPF-38  
NRC Inspection Report 90-20  
Reply to Weakness

Gentlemen:

In accordance with 10CFR2.201, Entergy Operations, Inc. hereby submits in Attachment 1 the response to the weakness identified in Appendix A of the subject Inspection Report.

If you have any questions concerning this response, please contact F.J. Englebracht at (504) 739-6607.

Very truly yours,

*Raymond F. Burski*  
RFB/TWG/ssf  
Attachment

cc: Messrs. R.D. Martin, NRC Region IV  
D.L. Wigginton, NRC-NRR  
E.L. Blake  
R.B. McGehee  
NRC Resident Inspectors Office

9101030366 901227  
PDR ADOCK 05000382  
PDR

*JEOL  
11*

ATTACHMENT 1  
ENTERGY OPERATIONS, INC. RESPONSE TO THE WEAKNESS IDENTIFIED IN  
APPENDIX A OF INSPECTION REPORT 90-20

Weakness No. 9020-01

Unnecessary Delays of Vital Repair Actions Caused by Health Physics Technicians

The Health Physics Technicians (HPTs) caused several delays which diminished the effectiveness of the in-plant team assigned to gag the main steam line valve. For example, the HPTs in the -4 level control point were not ready at the time the in-plant team arrived. A second delay occurred because two HPTs assigned to the in-plant repair team were not present during the team briefing conducted at the -4 level. Another delay occurred because the HPTs were not aware that the self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBAs) kits contained gas bottles

RESPONSE

Analysis of Weakness/Schedule of Corrective Action

Entergy Operations, Inc. admits this weakness and believes that the root cause of the events that delayed the repair team's entry into the plant was a failure by control point personnel to fully anticipate the needs of the repair team and then establish appropriate priorities to ensure their timely processing.

Entergy Operations believes that this weakness is not indicative of any programmatic failure but rather, because several other teams were successfully processed into the plant, an isolated occurrence. To that end, Entergy Operations intends to target this particular issue by means of additional training which focuses on timely in-plant repair activities and identifying methods where economies of time and resources can be realized. The 1991 drill program will also target this issue.

Entergy Operations, Inc. will update lesson plans for Health Physics Technicians, Radiological Controls Coordinators, Operational Support Center (OSC) Supervisors, and OSC manpower personnel to address the delays observed in the annual exercise and ways to eliminate them as lessons learned. Special training seminars will be conducted for Radiological Controls Coordinators and Health Physics Technicians to address ways to improve processing repair teams through the -4 MSL control point. The lesson plan updates will be completed by March 1, 1991. The special training seminars will be completed by September 1, 1991. In addition, methods for improved coordination and response for repair team activities will be emphasized in the Waterford 3 drill program for 1991. This action will be completed prior to the 1991 Annual Exercise.