



Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box E Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038

Salem Generating Station

October 20, 1982

Mr. R. C. Haynes
Regional Administrator
USNRC
Region 1
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Dear Mr. Haynes:

LICENSE NO. DPR-70
DOCKET NO. 50-272
REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 82-077/03L

Pursuant to the requirements of Salem Generating Station Unit No. 1, Technical Specifications, Section 6.9.1.9.b, we are submitting Licensee Event Report for Reportable Occurrence 82-077/03L. This report is required within thirty (30) days of the occurrence.

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "H. J. Midura".

H. J. Midura
General Manager -
Salem Operations

RF:ks *702*

CC: Distribution

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PDR ADOCK 05000272
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The Energy People

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Report Number: 82-077/03L

Report Date: 10-20-82

Occurrence Date: 10-02-82

Facility: Salem Generating Station, Unit 1
Public Service Electric & Gas Company
Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

No. 15 Containment Fan Coil Unit - Inoperable.

This report was initiated by Incident Report 82-325.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

Mode 1 - Rx Power 99% - Unit Load 1118 MWe.

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

At 0700 hours, October 2, 1982, during routine operation, the Control Room Operator noticed that the service water flow indication for No. 15 Containment Fan Coil Unit (CFCU) was erratic. The unit was declared inoperable, and Technical Specification Action Statement 3.6.2.3.a was entered. Both containment spray systems and the redundant CFCU groups were operable throughout the occurrence.

DESIGNATION OF APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:

The erratic service water indication was due to silt plugging the flow transmitter sensing lines. The silt is carried by the service water and deposited in portions of the system where flow velocity is reduced.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

The CFCU's operate in conjunction with the containment spray systems to remove heat and radioactive contamination from the containment atmosphere in the event of a design basis accident. Operability of either all fan coil groups or of both containment spray systems is necessary to ensure offsite radiation dose is maintained within the limits of 10CFR100.

Because redundant cooling capability was provided by the containment spray systems and redundant CFCU's, no risk to the health or safety of the public was involved. The occurrence constituted operation in a degraded mode permitted by a limiting condition for operation, and is reportable in accordance with Technical Specification 6.9.1.9.b.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE: (continued)

Action Statement 3.6.2.3.a requires:

With one group of containment cooling fans inoperable, restore the inoperable group of cooling fans to operable status within the next 7 days, or be in at least hot standby within the next 6 hours and in cold shutdown within the following 30 hours.

CORRECTIVE ACTION:


The plugged sensing lines were blown down to remove the accumulated silt. The transmitter was returned to service, and the CFCU was satisfactorily tested. No. 15 CFCU was declared operable, and at 0845 hours, October 2, 1982, Action Statement 3.6.2.3.a was terminated.

A program to blow down the transmitters weekly was already in effect at the time of the occurrence, and has successfully reduced the frequency of plugged sensing lines.

FAILURE DATA:

This is the second instance this year of silt plugging transmitter sensing lines (see LER 82-061/03L).

Prepared By R. Frahm



General Manager -
Salem Operations

SORC Meeting No. 82-94B