

October 28, 1982

In reply, please
refer to LAC-8678

DOCKET NO. 50-409

Mr. James G. Keppler, Regional Administrator
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Directorate of Regulatory Operations
Region III
799 Roosevelt Road
Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137

SUBJECT: DAIRYLAND POWER COOPERATIVE
LA CROSSE BOILING WATER REACTOR (LACBWR)
PROVISIONAL OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-45
REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE NO. 82-18

REFERENCES: (1) LACBWR Technical Specifications, Section 6.9.1.9.b
(2) LACBWR Technical Specifications, Section 4.0.1
(3) LACBWR Technical Specifications, Section 4.2.1.1(a)
(4) LACBWR Technical Specifications, Section 2.1.2.1
(5) DPC Letter, LAC-7851, Linder to Keppler,
dated October 7, 1981

Dear Mr. Keppler:

In accordance with Reference 1, this report is notification of operation in a degraded mode permitted by a limiting condition for operation.

Reference 3 requires that containment integrity be maintained during reactor operation. One of the conditions for containment integrity to exist is that each airlock is operable (Reference 2). Reference 4 contains the specifications for the personnel and emergency airlocks. One of the specifications is that, "The doors of each airlock shall be mechanically interlocked so that one door must be completely closed and sealed before the other door can be opened."

Contrary to this requirement, at 1135 on October 1, 1982, with the reactor at 57% Rated Thermal Power, a condition existed which could have allowed one door of the personnel airlock to be opened before the other door was completely closed and sealed. At no time, though, during this incident were both doors open and unsealed simultaneously. Containment integrity was not breached. Either personnel were posted or the exterior door was padlocked shut until maintenance was completed.

The keys on the beveled gears (Refer to attached drawing, Part "S") on the interior personnel airlock door were found almost sheared. The keys were replaced and the linkage adjusted. The interlock was tested with satisfactory results.

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Following previous problems with the personnel airlock (Ref: R.O. 81-10 and 80-09), Chicago Bridge & Iron, the manufacturer, was contacted. Their representative recommended that the airlock be overhauled. The work has been scheduled for the 1983 refueling outage due to the lead time involved. Due to this incident, a review will be conducted to determine if any of the rework can be performed during plant operation, without affecting containment integrity.

It is believed that the rapid transfer of a barrel reading 20 R/hr on contact through the airlock shortly before the condition of the interlock was discovered may have been a contributing factor. Due to the wear the airlock doors operating mechanism is demonstrating, more care than normal is needed when operating the doors. Therefore, a memo has been sent to all LACBWR staff members asking that the airlock be treated carefully and that any malfunction be reported to the Shift Supervisor promptly. In addition, a sign has been posted at the airlock entrance with cautionary instructions.


This report also serves as an updated report to Reference 5, which covered R.O. 81-10.

A Licensee Event Report (Reference: Regulatory Guide 1.1^e Rev. 4) is enclosed. An updated Licensee Event Report is also enclosed for R.O. 81-10.

If there are any questions, please contact us.

Yours truly,

DAIRYLAND POWER COOPERATIVE



Frank Linder, General Manager

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Enclosure

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