


POWER & LIGHT / P.O. BOX 6008 . NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA 70174 . (504) 366-2345

October 29, 1982 L.V. MAURIN Vice President Nuclear Operations

> W3P82-3312 Q-3-A35.07.64

Mr. John T. Collins, Regional Administrator, Region IV U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 1000 Arlington, Texas 76012



SUBJECT: Waterford SES Unit No. 3 Docket No. 50-382 Significant Construction Deficiency Report No. 64 "Safety Injection Tanks, Discharge Flow Rates" First Interim Report

Reference: Telecon - M. A. Livesay (LP&L) to L. Martin (NRC) on 9-28-82

Dear Mr. Collins:

In accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.55(e), we are hereby providing two copies of the interim report on Significant Construction Deficiency No. 64, "Safety Injection Tanks, Discharge Flow Rates". This item way originally identified as PRD #88.

Very truly yours,

namin L. V. Mauria

LVM/MAL/pco


cc (w/i5 copies): Director

Office of Inspection & Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.G. 20555

se (v/1 copy):

Director Office of Management Information and Program Control U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, L.C. 20555

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## INTERIM REPORT SIGNIFICANT CONSTRUCTION DEFICIENCY NO. 64 SAFETY INJECTION TANKS, DISCHARGE FLOW RATES

## Introduction

This report is submitted pursuant to '0 CFR 50.55(e). It describes a condition relative to the rate of blowdown for Safety Injection tanks 1A, 1B and 2B encountered during preoperational testing. The blowdown rates fell below the minimum predicted rate established by Combustion Engineering. This problem is considered reportable under the requirements of 0 CFR 50.55(e). To the best of our knowledge, this problem has not been identified to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission pursuant to 10 CFR 21.

## Description

During preoperational testing the duration of blowdown for Safety Injection tanks 1A, 1B and 2B was approximately 137 seconds for each tank. The maximum predicted duration of blowdown was approximately 101 seconds. Safety Injection Tank 2A performed within the acceptable range of blowdown. This deviation is attributed to the installation of spring loaded check valves installed in the vertical portion of the discharge piping on all three (3) tanks. The high flow resistance of these valves resulted in the extended duration of blowdown. The fourth tank did not require a spring loaded check valve since the check valve was installed in a horizontal pipe run, and thus a conventional swing check valve with a lower flow resistance was installed.

# Safety Implications

Preliminary analysis by Combustion Engineering indicates that the extended blowdown times for these three (3) tanks would not impact on plant safety. However, portions of the plant safety analyses must be reperformed to establish a maximum allowable PLHR. The extent of this analysis is significant.

#### Corrective Action

As noted above, Combustion Engineering will be directed to reperform the plant safety analysis. The results of this analysis will reestablish the acceptability of the present system design.

## Final Report Submittal Date

It is anticipated that Combustion Engineering's analysis will be completed and the Final Report submitted by March 28, 1983.