

OCT 29 1982

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Docket No. 50-461

Mr. George Muller
 Supervisor - Licensing
 Illinois Power Company
 500 South 27th Street
 Decatur, Illinois 62525

Dear Mr. Muller:

Subject: Questions Relating to the Loose Parts Monitoring System
 and IE Bulletin 80-06

Clinton SER confirmatory issue number 50 deals with the loose parts monitoring system. FSAR Amendment 15 provided a response to this issue. The staff has found that Amendment 15 does not provide sufficient information to evaluate conformance with Regulatory Guide 1.133. Enclosure 1 "Summary of Review of Clinton LPMS" lists our findings on the areas conforming to the Guide and the areas where additional information (those with symbol I or NI) is required. Please provide the identified information for staff review.

Clinton SER outstanding issue number 12 is associated with engineered safety features reset controls (IE Bulletin 80-06). Your response to this issue was provided in letters dated December 1, 1981 and May 17, 1982. The staff has determined that additional information is required to complete the review of this issue. Please provide a response to the questions listed in Enclosure 2.

The reporting and/or recordkeeping requirements contained in this letter affect fewer than ten respondents; therefore, OMB clearance is not required under P.L. 96-511.

For planning purposes, we would appreciate a schedule for responding to these questions. If you have any questions, please call J. H. Williams at (301) 492-9777.

Sincerely,

Original Signed by:

Cecil O. Thomas, Acting Chief
 Standardization & Special
 Projects Branch
 Division of Licensing

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Enclosures: As Stated

OFFICE	CC: ..	DL:SSPB	DL:SSPB	DL:SSPB		
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DATE		10/29/82	10/24/82	10/29/82		

Illinois Power Company

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ENCLOSURE 1

SUMMARY OF REVIEW OF CLINTON LPMS

RG 1.133 Section	CLINTON LPMS
C.1 System Characteristics	
a. Two sensors at each natural collection region	C
b. Sensitivity of 0.5 ft-lb within 3 ft of sensor	C
c. Physical separation of instrumentation channels	C
d. Automatic data acquisition (tape recorder)	C
e. Automatic comparison of signal to an alert level	C
f. Periodic system operational verification and calibration	C
g. Ability to function after seismic event	C
h. Quality of system components	NI
i. Ease of repair to minimize radiation exposure	C

* Symbols explained in KEY on final page

C.2. Establishing the Alert Level

- a. Logic to recognize LP in presence of noise
- b. Override of noise caused by control rod movement, etc.
- c. Alert level a function of plant operating conditions
- d. Compensation for different background noise on sensors

C
NI
NI
C.

C.3. Using the Data Acquisition Modes

a. Manual Mode

- (1) Pre-op tests to establish alert level
- (2) Startup and power operation
 - a. Submit alert level within 90 days after startup
 - b. Perform channel check each 24 hours
 - c. Listen to audio output each 7 days
 - d. Perform functional test each 31 days
 - e. Verify background noise each 92 days

NI
NA
NI
NI
NI
NI

(3) Verify channel calibration each 18 months	C
b. Automatic data recording when alert level is exceeded	C
C.4. Content of Safety Analysis Reports	
a. Sensor type, location, mounting, and criteria for these	C
b. Description of data acquisition, recording, and calibration	I
c. Major sources of extraneous noise	C
d. Quality assurance of data	NI
e. Description of alert level determination and alert logic	NI
f. Reference to technical specification	NI
g. Description of diagnostic procedures used to confirm loose part	NI
h. Channel check procedures	NI
i. Maintenance procedures to minimize radiation exposure	NI
j. Training program	C
k. Verification that LPMS will function after a seismic event	NI

RG 1.133 Section

CLINTON LPMS

C.5. Technical Specification for Loose-Part
Detection System

NI

C.6. Notification of a Loose Part

NA

- KEY: C - Conformance with RG 1.133
 NC - Nonconformance with RG 1.133
 I - Insufficient information provided
 NI - No information provided
 NA - Not applicable at this time

CLINTON POWER STATION UNIT 1ESF RESET CONTROLS (IE BULLETIN 80-06)REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

1. Item 4f of letter U-0481 dated May 17, 1982 indicates that the RCIC inboard/outboard isolation valves (1E51-F063 and 1E51-F064) reopen on a RCIC isolation signal reset. Will these valves be modified to require operator action to open them subsequent to the reset of a RCIC isolation signal (consistent with the LRG-II response to item 4-ICSB; Volume 4 of the LRG-II Position Papers dated March 12, 1982)? If not, justify the existing design.
2. Why is it acceptable for RCIC suppression pool suction valve 1E51-F031 to reopen on a RCIC isolation reset?
3. The LRG-II response to item 4-ICSB identifies valves E12-F060A, B and E12-F075A, B (RHR Sample Line Valves) and B33-F019 and B33-F020 (Reactor Water Sample Valves) as reopening on an isolation signal reset. The LRG-II position is to modify the subject valve control circuits to require operator action to reopen these valves following a reset. These same valves exist at Clinton. Describe the corrective actions planned to modify these valves or justify the existing design.
4. Item 5 (BOP ESF) of letter U-0481 indicates that BOP safety-related equipment which has a prescribed mode during normal conditions may revert to this mode upon the ESF actuation condition returning to normal and the ESF actuation signal being reset. The staff is concerned that the protective actions of this equipment may be compromised once the associated actuation signal is reset. For example, although an initiating parameter may return to normal

following an accident condition, equipment which changes state automatically on a reset could still lead to an unsafe condition. Therefore, identify each case where safety-related BOP equipment reverts to its normal mode on an ESF reset and either propose corrective actions to require operator action to realign this equipment following the reset, or justify the existing design.