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December 27, 1990

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
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
Gentlemen:

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY - SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 - DOCKET  
NO. 50-327 -- FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR-77 - LICENSEE EVENT REPORT  
(LER) 50-327/90029

The enclosed LER provides details concerning the failure to perform a technical specification surveillance requirement (weekly verification of diesel generator battery operability) within the specified time interval as the result of inappropriate personnel actions. This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) as an operation prohibited by technical specifications.

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

  
J. R. Bynum

Enclosure

cc: See page 2

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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
December 27, 1990

cc (Enclosure):

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 DOCKET NUMBER (2) PAGE (3)  
050003 27 10F 04

TITLE (4) Surveillance requirement interval exceeded because of inappropriate personnel actions.

EVENT DAY (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)		
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES - Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Unit 2			DOCKET NUMBER (5)
11	28	90	029	00	12	27	90				05000328

OPERATING MODE (9) THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 5: (Check one or more of the following)(11)

1	20.402(b)	20.405(c)	50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)
POWER LEVEL (10)	20.405(a)(1)(i)	50.36(c)(1)	50.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(c)
1	20.405(a)(1)(ii)	50.36(c)(2)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)
0	20.405(a)(1)(iii)	X 50.73(a)(2)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	
0	20.405(a)(1)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	
0	20.405(a)(1)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(x)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER
Russell R. Thompson, Compliance Licensing Engineer	615 843-7470

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	X	NO	EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
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ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On November 28, 1990, with Units 1 and 2 in Mode 1, it was discovered that a technical specification surveillance requirement (SR) had not been performed within the required surveillance interval. The surveillance instruction, which verifies diesel generator battery operability, in accordance with SR 4.8.1.1.3.a on a weekly basis, was not completed for the week of November 19, 1990, because of inappropriate personnel actions. The surveillance was successfully performed on November 12, 1990, and again on November 26, 1990, without deficiencies. A programmatic method of reviewing surveillance instruction (SI) performance for weekly or more frequently performed SIs is being developed.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)  
TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)					
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	1	2	3	4		
Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Unit 1	0501032179	0	2	9	0	0	0	2	0	4

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

Description of Event

On November 28, 1990, at 1245 Eastern standard time (EST) with Unit 1 in Mode 1 (100 percent power, reactor coolant system [RCS] pressure at 2,235 pounds per square inch gage [psig], and RCS average temperature at 578 degrees Fahrenheit [F]), and Unit 2 in Mode 1 (32 percent power, RCS pressure at 2,238 psig, and RCS average temperature at 555 degrees F), it was discovered that the weekly verification of diesel generator battery (EIS Code EK) operability required by Surveillance Requirement (SR) 4.8.1.1.3.a was not completed as required on November 19, 1990, as the result of inappropriate personnel actions. No formal program exists to track surveillance instructions (SIs), which have a frequency of weekly or less, and the package was not turned over to the oncoming shift. It was concluded that the batteries were capable of performing their design functions because the surveillances were satisfactorily completed on November 12 and November 26, 1990, with no deficiencies.

On November 19, 1990, two electrical maintenance electricians were given SI-100.1, "Vital Battery System Weekly Inspection," SI-238.1, "Diesel Generator Battery System Weekly Inspection," and Preventative Maintenance (PM) 1062, "Weekly Pilot Cell Check on Fifth Diesel Generator Battery Bank." The work packages were started late in the shift and only the SI-100.1 and the PM-1062 had been completed by shift change. All three work packages were given to the crew foreman. Because the event occurred on November 19, 1990, the crew foreman was unsure whether or not the incomplete SI-238.1 was given to the general foreman responsible for conducting shift turnover; however, the crew foreman knew the SI-238.1 was not completed on his shift. The general foreman who conducted shift turnover had made an entry in the turnover log that SI-238.1 was a priority job for day shift, but had not marked it complete as is normally the case. If an entry is made in the turnover log for a given shift and it completes on that shift, normally the entry is statused correctly before shift turnover; otherwise, the status is given verbally. The SI-100.1 entry was statused complete. The PM was not statused.

The foreman's daily schedule sheet for day shift was correctly marked that work was in progress on day shift, but not statused as complete. The computer program that generates the foreman's daily schedule automatically removes weekly SIs at the end of their projected duration without any manual input to the schedule; therefore, the SI-238.1 did not reappear on the foreman's daily schedule sheet on November 20, 1990.

The incomplete SI-238.1 package was discovered on a shelf on the foreman's desk on November 28, 1990, at 1245. The shift operations supervisor (SOS) was notified. Considering that SI-238.1 had been successfully performed on November 12, 1990, and November 26, 1990, the SOS determined that an immediate operability concern did not exist.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)  
TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	
		NUMBER	NUMBER	NUMBER	
Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Unit 1	01500003	79	029	00	03 of 04

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

Cause of Event

The cause of this event was inappropriate personnel actions in that the SI-238.1 was not transferred to the oncoming shift to complete. The three battery test packages were started late on day shift, and SI-100.1 and PM-1062 were completed. At the end of the shift, the packages were given to the crew foreman with the status of each package. The turnover meeting was conducted by the responsible general foreman, but SI-238.1 was not given to the oncoming shift to complete.

A contributing cause is the lack of a formal tracking system for SRs with performance frequencies of weekly or less. For most SIs, an Attachment 4 from SI-1, "Surveillance Program," is transmitted to the Work Control Group to document and track the completion of SIs. However, because of the short time between tests, and the short duration of the SR 4.0.2, 25 percent extension, Attachment 4s are not used for weekly or more frequent SIs.

Analysis of Event

This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) as an operation prohibited by technical specifications.

As previously stated, SI-238.1 demonstrates the operability of the diesel generator batteries. As described in Section 8.3.1.1 of the SQN Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, the diesel generator batteries are part of the 125-volt direct-current (DC) system, which provides control power and excitation current for the diesel generator. The surveillance was performed on November 12, 1990, and again on November 26, 1990. In each performance, the batteries were demonstrated to be operable with no deficiencies; therefore, it is concluded that the batteries would have performed their function as designed. There were no adverse affects on the public or plant personnel.

Corrective Action

The importance of timely completion of the weekly SIs was discussed with the Electrical Maintenance personnel involved with this event.

A review of SI-238.1 performances before and after this event indicated that the diesel generator batteries were operable and capable of performing their design function.

Electrical Maintenance will initiate a site maintenance management directive, which directs personnel to continue to work on weekly SIs on all shifts until completed. The turnover will be documented in the shift turnover log.

To prevent recurrence, a daily work list Electrical Maintenance SI list will be routinely generated and distributed by the Work Control Group. This list will be statused during the shift turnovers. This list is similar to the one used by Operations for monitoring SIs with short surveillance intervals, which has been effective. A review of plant sections with responsibility for weekly or more frequent SIs determined that Electrical Maintenance was the only remaining section that required a separate list of SIs to separate the SIs from the rest of their scheduled work activities.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)  
TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)				PAGE (3)	
		YEAR	NUMBER	REVISION	NUMBER	OF	PAGE
Sequoyah Nuclear Plant Unit 1		1990	029	00	04	04	04

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

Additional Information

A review of LERs has revealed several instances where SP intervals have been exceeded. LER 50-327/86034 specifically reported a failure to perform SI-238.1 within the required timeframe. Corrective action from this occurrence consisted of verbal warnings to the Electrical Maintenance personnel involved, but did not institutionalize actions to prevent recurrence. Other reported events were associated with SIs longer surveillance intervals. Corrective actions for these events were associated with the formal tracking and statusing program implemented by the Work Control Group.

Commitments

1. A daily work list Electrical Maintenance SI list will be routinely generated and distributed by the Work Control Group. This list will be discussed during the shift turnover meetings. This will be initiated by January 7, 1991.
2. Electrical Maintenance will initiate a site maintenance management directive, which directs personnel to continue work on weekly SIs on all shifts until completed. The directive will be issued by January 7, 1991.

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