



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

OCT 2 1982

Docket Nos.: 50-443
and 50-444

MEMORANDUM FOR: Janis D. Kerrigan, Acting Chief, Licensing Branch No. 3, DL
FROM: L. L. Wheeler, Project Manager, Licensing Branch No. 3, DL
SUBJECT: NOTICE OF MEETING REGARDING OPEN ITEMS IN THE SAFETY REVIEW

DATE & TIME: October 19, 1982 through November 30, 1982
Specific dates and times as required

LOCATION: Phillips Building
Bethesda, Maryland

PURPOSE: Determine what staff requirements remain to be met prior
to publication of the Safety Evaluation Report.

AGENDA: As required, applicant representatives meet with the Project
Manager to determine what actions must be completed before
the SER can be published. Discussions will be held with staff
reviewers to clarify NRC requirements. The applicant will
forward by letter or FSAR amendment all information generated
as a result of these meetings.

PARTICIPANTS: NRC Staff
L. Wheeler, et. al.
PSCNH
K. Kiper, A. Legendre, S. Floyd, et. al.

Louis L. Wheeler
Louis L. Wheeler, Project Manager
Licensing Branch No. 3
Division of Licensing

cc: See next page

NOTE: NRC meetings are open to interested members of the public to attend
as observers. Members of the public who wish to attend these meetings
must contact L. Wheeler (301-492-7792) no later than 3:45 pm, October 18,
1982.

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The subject draft analysis is primarily a reiteration of the design features at Seabrook that have been discussed with the applicant. These design features are being evaluated by the staff and their status is reported in the following section's of this report:

- (a) Section 8.3.1.8, Automatic Transfer of Loads and Electrical Interconnections Between Redundant Divisions,
- (b) Section 8.3.3.3.c, Identification of Safety-Related Associated Circuits, and
- (c) Section 8.3.3.3.a (concern 2 above), Use of Protective Devices.

The applicant in their draft analysis has indicated that if one postulates the failure of a Non-Class 1E circuit's protective device and its load (but not its power supply) then the circuit's cable may fail with possible consequential degradation of Class 1E circuits. Based on the design features at Seabrook discussed above, the applicant feels that the potential for degradation of Class 1E circuits is practically non-existent and even if degradation should occur within one separation group there would be no effect on the other redundant separation group. Thus, the applicant has implied that the plant can be safely shutdown.

The applicant has not provided sufficient justification in the following areas:

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- a. Based on design features and concerns stated above, the practically non-existent potential for degradation of Class 1E circuit has not been substantiated. The applicant needs to provide the necessary substantiation.

- b. The safe shutdown of the plant is based on the implied availability of train B assuming failure of train A due to the adverse effects from Non-Class 1E associated circuits. This implication does not consider a single failure which could occur in train B. It is the staff's concern that the plant may be left without the capability for safe shutdown. The applicant needs to provide sufficient justification to show that the reliability of train A has not been compromised due to the large number of associated non-Class 1E circuits that are routed with train A circuits and subject to the effects of design basis events.

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MEETING SUMMARY

NOV 8 1982

Document Control (50-443/444)

NRC PDR

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LB#3 Reading

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E. L. Jordon

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PARTICIPANTS (NRC):

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