

NORTHEAST UTILITIES



The Connecticut Light And Power Company
Western Massachusetts Electric Company
Holyoke Water Power Company
Northeast Utilities Service Company
Northeast Nuclear Energy Company

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December 21, 1990
MP-90-1330

Re: 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(ii)

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555


Reference: Facility Operating License No. DPR-65
Docket No. 50-336
Licensee Event Report 90-010-01

Gentlemen:

This letter forwards updated Licensee Event Report 90-010-01 required to be submitted pursuant to paragraph 50.73(a)(2)(ii).

Very truly yours,

NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY


Stephen E. Scace
Director, Millstone Station

SES/PHB:ljs

Attachment: LER 90-010-01

cc: T. T. Martin, Region I Administrator
W. J. Raymond, Senior Resident Inspector, Millstone Unit Nos. 1, 2 and 3
G. S. Vissing, NRC Project Manager, Millstone Unit No. 2

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

Estimated burden per response to comply with this information collection request: 50 (1) hrs. Forward comments regarding burden estimate to the Records and Reports Management Branch (p-530), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, and to the Paperwork Reduction Project (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1) Millstone Nuclear Power Station Unit 2	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 3 3 6 1	PAGE (3) OF 0 2
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TITLE (4)
High Energy Line Break Door Discrepancy

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)		
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES		
0 6	2 1	9 0	9 0	0 1 0	0 1	1 2	2 1	9 0	0 5 0 0 0		

OPERATING MODE (9) 1	THIS REPORT IS BEING SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR § (Check one or more of the following) (11):										
POWER LEVEL (10) 1 0 0	20.402(b)	20.402(c)	50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)							
	20.405(a)(1)(i)	50.36(c)(1)	50.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(c)							
	20.405(a)(1)(ii)	50.36(c)(2)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below, and in Text, NRC Form 366A.)							
	20.405(a)(1)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)								
	20.475(b)(1)(iv)	X 50.73(a)(2)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)								
20.405(a)(1)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(ix)									

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME Philipp H. Baumann Jr., Ext. 5211	TELEPHONE NUMBER AREA CODE 2 0 3 4 4 7 - 1 7 0 1
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COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPPDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPPDS
		D/R		N					

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

YES (if yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	X NO	EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
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ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

With the plant at 100% power; during a High Energy Line Break (HELB) Review/Walkdown on June 20, 1990 a door was identified as being in a configuration not consistent with Bechtel's design drawings. The door is a double door on the north side of the 4160V switchgear room on the 56'-6" elevation of the turbine building. Subsequent investigation led to the determination that the double door did not meet the HELB requirements of the original Bechtel analysis. On June 21, at 1430 hours, Engineering initiated work to reinforce these doors to meet the HELB requirements. The turbine building rollup door was fully opened to ensure that the turbine building would not become overpressurized in the event of a HELB. Work was immediately initiated to design reinforcements for the door and the installation of strongbacks was initiated. Temporary reinforcement of the door was completed on June 22, 1990. Permanent reinforcement of the door was completed during the 1990 refuel outage.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION

Estimated burden per response to comply with this information collection request: 50.0 hrs. Forward comments regarding burden estimate to the Records and Reports Management Branch (p-530), U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, and to the Paperwork Reduction Project (3150-010R), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1) Millstone Nuclear Power Station Unit 2	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 3 3 6 9 0 -	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	
		0 1 0	-	0 1	0 2 OF 0 2

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

I. Description of Event

On June 21, 1990, with the plant in mode 1, 100% power, the unit's Engineering Department was informed that the double door on the north side of the 56'-6" elevation 4160V switchgear room was in a configuration which did not meet the assumptions made in the original HELB analysis. The 4160V room contains breakers for one train of safety related components. Initial operator action was to red-tag the Turbine Building rollup door in the open position. This was the only operator required action. This allowed for a release path to atmosphere to ensure that turbine building internal pressure could be relieved through the rollup door. Work was immediately initiated to reinforce the door to withstand a HELB. Reinforcement of the doors by the installation of strongbacks was completed on the following day. Permanent reinforcement of the door was completed during the 1990 refuel outage. There were no automatic or manually initiated safety system responses as a result of this event.

II. Cause of Event

At some time after initial construction the door was modified (most likely to remove a large piece of equipment from the room) and never restored to its original design. The root cause of the event is a lack of knowledge of the HELB requirements for the area.

III. Analysis of Event

This report is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A & B) "Any event or condition during operation that results in a condition of the nuclear power plant, including its principal safety barriers, being seriously degraded; or results in the nuclear power plant being: a. In an unanalyzed condition that significantly compromises plant safety; b. In a condition that is outside the design basis of the plant." In evaluating the safety consequences of this event the Bechtel analysis assumes that there will be no failures of safety related equipment during a HELB. If a HELB were to occur and this door failed, one train of safety related components would be affected. The turbine building rollup door was immediately fully opened to provide a steam release path to ensure that the doors would not fail in the event of a HELB.

IV. Corrective Action

In order to protect the equipment in the 4160V room from a HELB, the double door was reversed and reinforced with a permanent structural support. This modification is designed to prevent the door from falling open when exposed to the accident pressure of 0.5 PSIG. Further updates pertaining to HELB reviews and corrective actions will be issued under LER 90-005.

V. Additional Information

Similar LER's: 90-005-00

EIIS Component Code: Door - DR