GULF STATES UTILITIES COMPANY

RIVER BEND STATION POST OFFICE BOX 220 ST. FRANCISVILLE, LOUISIANA 70775

AREA CODE 504 635-6094 345-8651

December 20, 1990
RBG-34191
File Nos. G9.5, G9.25.1.3

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Gentlemen:

River Bend Station - Unit 1
Docket No. 50-458

Please find enclosed Licensee Event Report No. 90-045 for River Bend Station - Unit 1. This report is being submitted pursuant to 10CFR50.73.

Sincerely,

W. H. Odell
Manager-Oversight
River Bend Nuclear Group

LAE/PDG/GAB/JCM/WJT/pg

cc: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 1000
Arlington, TX 76011

NRC Resident Inspector
P.O. Box 1051
St. Francisville, LA 70775

INPO Records Center
1100 Circle 75 Parkway
Atlanta, GA 30339-3064

Mr. C. R. Oberg
Public Utility Commission of Texas
7800 Shoal Creek Blvd., Suite 400 North
Austin, TX 78757

IE22
1/1

NRC FORM 366 (6-89)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104
EXPIRES 4/30/92
ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-530), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	PAGE (3)
RIVER BEND STATION	0 5 0 0 0 4 5 8	1 OF 0 3

TITLE (4): High Pressure Core Spray Suction Path Transfer to Suppression Pool due to Inadequate Procedural Steps in a Surveillance Test Procedure

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)				REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR		SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES	DOCKET NUMBER(S)
1 1	2 1	9 0	9 0	-	0 4 5	- 0 0	1 2	2 0	9 0		0 5 0 0 0
											0 5 0 0 0

OPERATING MODE (9)	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)			
4	20.402(b)	20.405(c)	[X] 50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)
POWER LEVEL (10): 0 0 0	20.405(a)(1)(i)	50.36(c)(1)	50.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(c)
	20.405(a)(1)(ii)	50.36(c)(2)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)
	20.405(a)(1)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	
	20.405(a)(1)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	
	20.405(a)(1)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(x)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER
L. A. England, Director-Nuclear Licensing	AREA CODE: 5 0 4 — 3 8 1 - 4 1 4 5

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

[ ] YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)

[X] NO

EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15): MONTH | DAY | YEAR

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

At 1310 on 11/21/90 with the unit at 0 percent power in Operational Condition 4 (cold shutdown), an unplanned engineered safety feature (ESF) actuation occurred when the suppression pool water level rose to 20 feet 4 inches during surveillance testing of the drywell bypass leakage rate. This caused the valve isolating the suppression pool from the high pressure core spray (HPCS) system suction path (1E22*MOVF015) to stroke open. When this valve was fully open, the HPCS suction path from the condensate storage tank was automatically isolated by the closure of valve 1E22*MOVF001.

The cause of the incident was inadequate procedural steps in an STP. The STP has been revised to include a step for operations personnel to align the HPCS suction path to the suppression pool to prevent auto transfer when the suppression pool water level is increased. All operations personnel will review this event during re-qualification training.

The HPCS suction path automatic transfer function performed as designed. Therefore, there was no adverse impact on the health and safety of the public or the safe operation of the plant as a result of this event.

REPORTED CONDITION

At 1310 on 11/21/90 with the unit at 0 percent power in Operational Condition 4 (cold shutdown), an unplanned engineered safety feature (ESF) actuation occurred when the suppression pool water level rose to 20 feet 4 inches during surveillance testing of the drywell bypass leakage rate. This caused the valve (*20*) isolating the suppression pool from the high pressure core spray (HPCS) system (*BG*) suction path (1E22*MOVF015) to stroke open. When this valve was fully open, the HPCS suction path from the condensate storage tank (*KA*) was automatically isolated by the closure of valve 1E22*MOVF001 (*20*).

This condition is considered reportable pursuant to 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv) since the actuation of the HPCS suction path automatic transfer constitutes an ESF actuation.

INVESTIGATION

The normal HPCS system alignment is designed to provide reactor grade water from the condensate storage tank. Two level-transmitters (*LT*), 1E22*LISN655C and 1E22*LISN655G, monitor the suppression pool water level. Either of these transmitters, which have a set point of 20 feet 4 inches, can initiate the opening of the suppression pool suction valve to the HPCS pump. To prevent losing suction to the HPCS pump, the condensate storage tank and the suppression pool suction valves are interlocked so that one suction path must be open before the other closes.

At the time of the actuation, the unit was in the latter stages of Refueling Outage 3 (RF-3) and Surveillance Test Procedure (STP) 057-3603, Rev. 4A, "Drywell Bypass Leakage Rate Test," was being performed. At 1623 on 11/19/90 in support of prerequisite 6.11 of STP-057-3603, Operations began raising the suppression pool water level via the makeup water system (MWS). The HPCS system was in a normal system alignment with pump suction from the condensate storage tank (1E22*MOVF001 open and 1E22*MOVF015 closed). When the suppression pool water level reached 20 feet 4 inches, the "HPCS SUCTION XFER SUP PL LEVEL HIGH" alarm was received and the automatic suction transfer occurred. Operations personnel responded to the annunciator and verified the transfer was completed as required.

Review of STP-057-3603 revealed that there were no precautions or steps for operations personnel to align the HPCS suction to the suppression pool. The cause of the incident was inadequate procedural steps in STP-057-3603. A review of previous River Bend Station LERs found no similar events.

CORRECTIVE ACTION

STP-057-3603, "Drywell Bypass Leakage Rate Test," has been revised to include a step for operations personnel to align the HPCS suction path to the suppression pool to prevent auto transfer when the suppression pool water level is increased. System Operating Procedure (SOP) 008, "Condensate Storage, Makeup and Transfer," has been revised to caution operations personnel about the actuation of the HPCS suction path automatic transfer when raising the suppression pool water level above the normal operating level for testing. All Operations personnel will review this event during re-qualification training.

SAFETY ASSESSMENT

The HPCS suction path automatic transfer function performed as designed. Therefore, there was no adverse impact on the health and safety of the public or the safe operation of the plant as a result of this event.

NOTE: Energy Industry Identification System Codes are identified in the text as (*XX*).