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December 20, 1990

RBG+34191 File Nos. G9.5, G9.25.1.3

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555

Gentleman:

## River Bend Station - Unit 1 Docket No. 50-458

Please find enclosed Licensee Event Report No. 90-045 for River Band Station - Unit 1. This report is being submitted pursuant to 10CFR50.73.

Sincerely,

Manager-Oversight River Bend Muclear Group

E/PDG/GAB/JCM/WJT/pg

cc: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 1000 Arlington, TX 76011

> NRC Resident Inspector P.O. Box 1051 St. Francisville, 1A 70775

INPO Records Center 1100 Circle 75 Parkway Atlanta, GA 30339-3064

Mr. C. R. Oberg Public Utility Commission of Texas 7800 Shoal Creek Blvd., Suite 400 North Austin, TX 78757

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The HPCS suction path automatic transfer function performed designed. Therefore, there was no adverse impact on the health a safety of the public or the safe operation of the plant as a result this event.	ture e to pass pool path the ally STP. l to auto All tion as and

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#### REPORTED CONDITION

At 1310 on 11/21/90 with the unit at 0 percent power in Operational Condition 4 (cold shutdown), an unplanned engineered safety feature (ESF) actuation occurred when the suppression pool water level rose to 20 feet 4 inches during surveillance testing of the drywell bypass leakage rate. This caused the valve (\*20\*) isolating the suppression pool from the high pressure core spray (HPCS) system (\*BG\*) suction path (1E22\*MOVF015) to stroke open. When this valve was fully open, the HPCS suction path from the condensate storage tank (\*KA\*) was automatically isolated by the closure of valve 1E22\*MOVF001 (\*20\*).

This condition is considered reportable pursuant to 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv) since the actuation of the HPCS suction path automatic transfer constitutes an ESF actuation.

#### INVESTIGATION

The normal HPCS system alignment is designed to provide reactor grade water from the condensate storage tank. Two level-transmitters (\*LT\*), 1E22\*LISN655C and 1E22\*LISN655G, monitor the suppression pool water level. Either of these transmitters, which have a set point of 20 feet 4 inches, can initiate the opening of the suppression pool suction valve to the HPCS pump. To prevent losing suction to the HPCS pump, the condensate storage tank and the suppression pool suction valves are interlocked so that one suction path must be open before the other closes.

At the time of the actuation, the unit was in the latter stages of Refueling Outage 3 (RF-3) and Surveillance Test Procedure (STP) 057-3603, Rev. 4A, "Drywell Bypass Leakage Rate Test," was being performed. At 1623 on 11/19/90 in support of prerequisite 6.11 of STP-057-3603, Operations began raising the suppression pool water level via the makeup water system (MWS). The HPCS system was in a normal system alignment with pump suction from the condensate storage tank (1E22\*MOVF001 open and 1E22\*MOVF015 closed). When the suppression pool water level reached 20 feet 4 inches, the "HPCS SUCTION XFER SUP PL LEVEL HIGH" alarm was received and the automatic suction transfer occurred. Operations personnel responded to the annunciator and verified the transfer was completed as required.

Review of STP-057-3603 revealed that there were no precautions or steps for operations personnel to align the HPCS suction to the suppression pool. The cause of the incident was inadequate procedural steps in STP+057-3603. A review of previous River Bend Station LERs found no similar events.

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STP-057-3603, "Drywell Bypass Leakage Rate Test," has been revised to include a step for operations personnel to align the HPCS suction path to the suppression pool to prevent auto transfer when the suppression pool water level is increased. System Operating Procedure (SOP) 008, "Condensate Storage, Makeup and Transfer," has been revised to caution operations personnel about the actuation of the HPCS suction path automatic transfer when raising the suppression pool water level above the normal operating level for testing. All Operations personnel will review this event during re-gualification training.

### SAFETY ASSESSMENT

The HPCS suction path automatic transfer function performed as designed. Therefore, there was no adverse impact on the health and safety of the public or the safe operation of the plant as a result of this event.

NOTE: Energy Industry Identification System Codes are identified in the text as (\*XX\*).