

DMB

October 28, 1982

Docket No. 50-263

Northern States Power Company
ATTN: Mr. Dennis E. Gilberts
Sr. Vice President
Power Supply
414 Nicollet Mall
Minneapolis, MN 55401

Gentlemen:

We have received the attached Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) letter dated August 5, 1982, and associated final exercise evaluations on the offsite emergency preparedness exercises conducted on March 2, 1982, by the State of Minnesota and Sherburne and Wright Counties. These final exercise evaluations list some recommendations (which are referred to in the FEMA letter and attachments as deficiencies) regarding the offsite emergency response plans for the area around the Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant. The response of the State of Minnesota to the reported recommendations is also attached.

We fully recognize that the recommendations to be implemented may involve actions by several governmental agencies which are not under your control. Nonetheless, we expect the subject of offsite preparedness for the area around the Monticello facility to be addressed by you as well as others.

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PDR ADOCK 05000263
F PDR

18:35

In accordance with 10 CFR Part 2.790 of the Commission's regulations a copy of this letter and the enclosures will be placed in the NRC's Public Document Room.

Sincerely,

J. A. Hind
J. A. Hind, Director
Division of Emergency Preparedness
and Operational Support

Enclosures: As stated

cc w/encls:

W. A. Shamla, Plant Manager
DMB/Document Control Desk (RIDS)
Resident Inspector, RIII Monticello
Resident Inspector, RIII Prairie
Island
John W. Ferman, Ph.D.,
Nuclear Engineer, MPCA

cc w/o encls:

Mr. E. N. Hakala, Deputy
Regional Director
FEMA, Region V

RIII *[Signature]*
Patterson/sv
10/16/82

RIII *[Signature]*
A. Nelson

RIII *[Signature]*
Papariello

RIII *[Signature]*
Little
[Signature]

RIII *[Signature]*
Hind
10/27/82



Federal Emergency Management Agency

Washington, D.C. 20472

AUG 5 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: Brian Grimes
 Director
 Division of Emergency Preparedness
 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

FROM: *Richard W. Krimm*
 Richard W. Krimm
 Assistant Associate Director
 Office of Natural and Technological
 Hazards

263

| PRINCIPAL STAFF | |
|-----------------|-----------------|
| RA | <i>Law</i> |
| D/RA | |
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| DE/REP | ISLO |
| DEBTP | |
| ML | |
| OL | FILE <i>Law</i> |

SUBJECT: Evaluation of the Offsite Emergency Preparedness Exercise
 at the Monticello Nuclear Power Plant

Attached is a copy of the Final Report prepared by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Region V, on the March 2, 1982, full-scale exercise at the Monticello Nuclear Power Plant. As indicated in the exercise evaluation, the State of Minnesota and Sherburne and Wright Counties demonstrated an overall adequate level of preparedness to protect the health, safety, and property of the population in the affected area. Discrepancies noted during the exercise are discussed in detail in the report.

A copy of this report was forwarded to the State of Minnesota with a request for them to respond to FEMA Region V with a schedule of corrective actions. Attached is the reply from the State of Minnesota with corrective action taken or planned on the significant deficiencies noted in the exercise report. The State response to the significant deficiencies indicates that implementation of corrective actions and essential training will be completed by February 28, 1983, the date of the next full-scale exercise at Monticello. The State's progress will be monitored by FEMA Region V.

Attachment
 As stated



Federal Emergency Management Agency

Region V 300 South Wacker, 24th Floor, Chicago, IL 60606 (312) 353-1500

JUL 12 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Associate Director, Office of Natural
and Technological Hazards
Attn: Megs Hepler

FROM: Chairman, Regional Advisory Committee

SUBJECT: Monticello Final Exercise Report

The following statement was inadvertently left out of the Monticello Final Exercise Report.

"As the report indicates, the State of Minnesota and Sherburne and Wright Counties demonstrated an overall adequate level of preparedness to protect the health, safety, and property of the population in the 'affected' area."

The report does discuss in detail certain discrepancies that will need correction. These corrections should serve to improve the overall capability to implement their emergency plans.

for Dan Bement
Edwin W. Hakala

Handwritten: file

DIVISION OF EMERGENCY SERVICES
85 - STATE CAPITOL
(612) 296-2233



STATE OF MINNESOTA
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY
SAINT PAUL 55155

June 25, 1982

Mr. Edwin Hakala, Chrmn.
Regional Advisory Committee
Federal Emergency Management Agency
Federal Center
Battle Creek, MI 49016

Dear Mr. Hakala:

Your letter dated June 2, 1982, requested a response to the State of Minnesota, Sherburne and Wright Counties deficiencies, as identified during the March 2, 1982 Monticello site-specific, off-site exercise. These deficiencies are listed in Parts IV and V of the Final Report for that exercise.

In accordance with our understanding of the current requirements, we are submitting the enclosed corrective action information for each of the deficiencies identified in the Final Report.

Sincerely,

Handwritten signature: Kenneth A. Parsch

Kenneth A. Parsch
Acting Director

enclosures

KAP:JS:ch

Vertical stamp: JUN 28 2 22 PM '82

DIVISION OF EMERGENCY SERVICES
85 - STATE CAPITOL
(612) 296-2233



file

CORRECTION TO LETTER
DATED JUNE 25, 1982,
RE: "significant
deficiencies".

STATE OF MINNESOTA
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY
SAINT PAUL 55155

June 28, 1982

Mr. Edwin Hakala, Chrmn.
Regional Advisory Committee
Federal Emergency Management Agency
Federal Center
Battle Creek, MI 49016

Attention: Gordon Wenger

Gentlemen:

Your letter dated June 2, 1982, requested a response to the State of Minnesota, Sherburne and Wright Counties deficiencies, as identified during the March 2, 1982 Monticello site-specific, off-site exercise. These deficiencies are listed in Parts IV and V of the Final Report for that exercise.

In accordance with our understanding of the current requirements, we are submitting the enclosed corrective action information for each of the "significant deficiencies" identified in the Final Report.

Sincerely,

Kenneth A. Parsch

Kenneth A. Parsch
Acting Director

enclosure

KAP:JS:ch

RECEIVED
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STATE OF MINNESOTA RESPONSE TO THE
FINAL REPORT FOR THE MONTICELLO SITE-
SPECIFIC OFF-SITE EXERCISE OF MARCH 2,
1982, SIGNIFICANT DEFICIENCIES

1. G3a*

Comment for the State of Minnesota:

The JPIC has not been fully implemented as a single point of media contact. A single media center should be designated; PIOs from the utility, State, and two counties should be assigned to it.

Response:

The criteria referenced reads as follows:

"Each principal organization shall designate the points of contact and physical locations for use by news media during an emergency."

As explained in our response to the Prairie Island "Final Report", we feel the requirement as stated in NUREG 0654 has been met.

2. J10a

Comment for the State of Minnesota:

Maps of relocation centers and shelter areas were not available in the EOC; these additional resources should be provided.

Sherburne County:

Maps of evacuation routes, relocation and shelter areas, and population by sector were missing. Available maps were placed on chairs against the walls, obstructing EOC traffic. A full set of required maps should be obtained for the county and municipal EOCs; these maps should be wall-mounted.

Response:

Additional maps showing relocation centers and population distribution will be provided to each EOC. Appropriate mountings will be installed in the Sherburne County EOC before the next exercise.

* The references that precede each deficiency correspond to evaluation criteria from NUREG 0654/FEMA REP-1, Part II.

3. A 1d

Comment for Sherburne County:

Clear control and coordination by a single individual of emergency response activities were not established. The civil defense director did not hold staff meetings or oral briefings. Almost all activities were simulated; little attempt was made to coordinate emergency response activities. Additional training and drills of emergency response personnel is recommended.

Response:

The next Monticello Exercise is scheduled for February 23, 1983. This exercise will be "Full Scale" for the State agencies, as well as for the counties. All major components of the emergency response plan will be exercised. Clear command and coordination by a single county operations chief will be shown and staff briefings will be conducted periodically.

4. E6

Comment for Sherburne and Wright Counties:

Compliance of the prompt alerting and notification system with NUREG 0654 criteria cannot be established until the system is evaluated by FEMA.

Response:

Training of county staff members and a public information program is proceeding to insure accomplishment of the 15-minute time limit for notification to the public. As required, the Prompt Alerting and Notification System (PANS) will be activated during the February 23, 1983 exercise. It would be appropriate for the FEMA evaluation and certification to be done at that time.

5. F2

Comment for Sherburne County:

Communications with fixed and mobile medical support facilities were not established; this function should be demonstrated at a future exercise.

Response:

During the February 23, 1983, Monticello Exercise, communication with fixed and mobile medical support facilities will be established.

6. K3b

Comments for Sherburne County:

Emergency workers had dosimeters. However, dose records for emergency workers were not maintained. It is important that dose record cards be obtained, and that staff be trained in their use.

K5a

Although Big Lake EOC staff had been exposed to the passing plume, no attempt was made to monitor or decontaminate them at the county EOC. Training and drills for EOC staff in handling potentially contaminated persons are required.

Response:

Training for emergency workers and the County Radiological Defense Officer will be conducted prior to the February 23, 1983 Monticello exercise. This training will include maintenance of dose records, personnel monitoring and decontamination procedures.

7. M1

Comment for Sherburne County:

Re-entry and recovery activities were not seriously attempted. Training and drills in this function should be provided.

Response:

Training in this function will be conducted for the Sherburne County EOC staff during the "dry run" exercise which precedes the February 23, 1983 exercise. Additional emphasis will be put on the re-entry and recovery phase of the exercise scenario in order to strengthen this portion of the county's response.

8. N1a

Comment for Sherburne County:

The decision in Sherburne County to simulate most activities negated the potential benefit of this exercise for emergency response. Full participation by Sherburne County in future exercises is required.

Response:

During the February 23, 1983 Monticello exercise, emergency response personnel will be fully activated.



Federal Emergency Management Agency

Region V 300 South Wacker, 24th Floor, Chicago, IL 60606 (312) 353-1500

Mailing Address: Federal Center, Battle Creek, Michigan 49016

June 2, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Associate Director
Office of Natural and Technological Hazards

FROM: Chairman, Regional Advisory Committee, Region V

SUBJECT: Final Report--Monticello REP Exercise,
March 2, 1982

In accordance with Lee Thomas' draft memorandum, subject: Exercise Evaluation, the Final Report of the Monticello Nuclear Power Plant Exercise of March 2, 1982, is submitted.

A copy of this report has been forwarded to the State of Minnesota, with a request for them to respond to FEMA Region V with their schedule of corrective actions. Upon receipt of the schedule, we will forward a copy to you to keep you informed as to how the corrective actions will be implemented.

For Edwin W. Hakala
Edwin W. Hakala

Attachment

PART I
FINAL REPORT

on the
MONTICELLO NUCLEAR POWER PLANT
FULL-SCALE JOINT EMERGENCY EXERCISE
March 2, 1982

Exercise Participants

Number of Evaluators

| | | |
|--------------------------------|-----------|------------|
| State of Minnesota | 3 Federal | 0 Contract |
| Sherburne County | 1 Federal | 1 Contract |
| Wright County | 3 Federal | 1 Contract |
| Roving Observers | 3 Federal | 0 Contract |
| Monticello Nuclear Power Plant | Unknown | Unknown |

April 12, 1982

Technological Hazards Branch
Natural and Technological Hazards Division
Federal Emergency Management Agency, Region V
Federal Center
Battle Creek, Michigan 49016

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Attachment A

Full-Scale Monticello Exercise
Objectives and Scenario

PART II

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report contains the findings of Region V, Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and its Regional Advisory Committee (RAC) concerning the performance of the State of Minnesota and Sherburne and Wright Counties during the full -scale exercise of the Monticello Nuclear Power Plant (MNPP), March 2, 1982. This report is based on the observations and evaluations of 12 Federal evaluators .

Federal evaluators were assigned to two emergency operations centers (EOCs) adjacent to the 10-mile plume emergency planning zone (LPZ), in Sherburne and Wright Counties and to two facilities at the State Capitol, the State EOC, and the Joint Press Information Center (JPIC).

All evaluators received advance information materials, along with a copy of the exercise scenario, evaluator exercrit forms and assignment sheets. (A copy of the exercise scenario is appended to this report.) A pre-exercise briefing was held on March 1, 1982. This is a second-round exercise; the first exercise of MNPP was conducted on January 7, 1981. All evaluators were in place prior to the activation of the EOCs on exercise day.

The exercise events began at 8:00 a.m. on March 2, 1982, with a notification of an unusual event at MNPP. The exercise was terminated at 3:00 p.m. the same day.

The simulated accident at the MNPP involved an offsite release of radioactive material, requiring simulated protective actions by the State of Minnesota and county and municipal emergency response agencies in the plume EPZ. Following the exercise, each team leader met with his/her team members to consolidate their observations into a composite exercrit. Subsequently, the team leaders presented their findings to the RAC Chairman. The RAC Chairman presented his post-exercise critique to State and county officials and exercise participants on March 3, 1982. A public meeting was not required as the Minnesota Radiological Emergency Response Plan (MRERP) had not been significantly revised since the public meeting held on January 8, 1981. The results of this report constitute the most current assessment of offsite preparedness for a radiological emergency at MNPP, and will be a major basis for the Regional Director's evaluation.

This section addresses the strengths and weaknesses of offsite preparedness for a radiological emergency at the MNPP, as demonstrated at the full-scale exercise conducted on March 2, 1982. Exercise participants included the State of Minnesota, Sherburne and Wright Counties, three municipalities within the plume EPZ, and Northern States Power Company (NSP), the operator of MNPP.

The Region III, Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), evaluated onsite preparedness; those findings are not a part of this report.

FEMA Region V and its RAC evaluated offsite emergency preparedness. FEMA evaluators observed activities of the State, Sherburne County, and Wright County EOCs, the JPIC, and a reception center in Wright County.

This portion of the Final Exercise Report constitutes the 10 functional areas observed during the exercise and cites the activities of participating offsite State and local jurisdictions.

I. EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITIES & RESOURCES
(Working space, internal communications and displays, communications, security)

State. Emergency operations facility was excellent. Both primary and backup communications were utilized. Status displays were effectively used and updated. Maps were generally good. However, no maps showing relocation centers or shelter areas were available or displayed in the EOC. Security was good.

Local. EOC facilities and resources at Wright and Sherburne Counties were adequate. Recommend additional backup phones at Wright. Security good at both counties. Maps and displays, generally, were good. It was noted that Sherburne County EOC displays did not include evacuation and shelter maps. Sherburne County EOC location used differed from that indicated in the plan. Some deficiency noted in communications between utility and the Sherburne EOC. Radio backup at the Sherburne EOC was not used enough.

II. ALERTING AND MOBILIZATION OF OFFICIALS AND STAFF
(Staffing, 24-hour Capability, Alerting Timeliness)

State. Minnesota showed strong capability to alert and mobilize State staff. Within 35 minutes, 16 representatives from 6 key agencies were in place at the State EOC. A partial shift change was demonstrated. A complete shift change is recommended in the next exercise.

Local. Alerting and mobilization at the local level was timely. Sherburne County did not demonstrate a shift change. Communications with fixed and mobile medical facilities were not exercised. Recommend this be exercised during the next exercise to demonstrate capability in this area.

III. EMERGENCY OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT

(Organization, control, leadership, support by officials, information flow between levels and organizations, decisionmaking, checklists and procedures)

State. Emergency operations management was effective. Regular briefings and status updates were conducted. Emergency classification system was used properly. Support by officials was obvious, with the presence of the Governor during the afternoon.

Local. Emergency operations management at Wright and Sherburne Counties was also effective. Regular briefings and status updates by county agencies at Sherburne County are recommended. Support by officials was obvious by the presence of the county board chairman and commissioners during the exercise. The emergency classification system was used properly. Responsibility of the Sherburne County EOC seemed to be shared. A specific individual, by title, needs to be in charge of the EOC.

IV. PUBLIC ALERTING AND NOTIFICATION

(Means of notification, e. g., sirens, vehicles, or other systems, notification timeliness)

State. The siren system within the 10-mile EPZ was exercised March 3, 1982. It is recommended that the siren system be tested during the exercise. EBS was activated by the State's contacting the National Weather Service who then activated the EBS system. Recommend consideration be given to activating EBS directly from the State EOC. Information messages on EBS for the public contained appropriate information. Recommend that the siren system within the 10-mile EPZ be tested during the exercise.

Local. Siren system within 10-mile EPZ had been installed and tested on January 29, 1982, and again the day after the exercise, March 3, 1982. Recommend that the siren system be tested during an exercise. Effectiveness of system cannot be determined until FEMA conducts a system evaluation, which will take place in the near future.

V. PUBLIC AND MEDIA RELATIONS

(Publications, press facilities, media briefings, news release coordination)

State. Press facilities were established at the State Capitol, NSP headquarters, and the Counties of Wright and Sherburne. This could result in confusion by news releases not being coordinated. Press facility at State EOC did have spokesperson

from NSP and various State agencies but not from the counties. Recommend consideration be given to establishing a joint media facility to include spokespersons from counties. There was very little press interest in this exercise. Press interest should be encouraged to test its capability fully.

Local. There was very little press interest at the local level, to test its capability. Press releases at the county level were copies of the releases issued by the State and did not include county information. State releases were datafaxed to Wright County. Wright County, in turn, read the releases to Sherburne County.

VI. ACCIDENT ASSESSMENT

(Staff and field operations, monitoring, adequacy of equipment, technical calculations, use of PAGs, issuance of timely recommendations)

State. State Health Department demonstrated good capability to analyze field data. Two State Health Department monitoring teams were deployed to the field, but the Federal evaluator was not able to locate the communications van and evaluate the field monitoring teams. This capability (though) was evaluated in previous exercises. The previous federal evaluation of the State field monitoring teams was good. The State requested Department of Energy (DOE) assistance and properly utilized release data from the utility and State field monitoring teams. It was felt a long period of time was taken by the State to verify utility protection action guides. Recommend that the State re-examine its decision making process to reduce this time during crucial phases of an exercise or accident.

Local. This is basically a function of the State. Civil defense monitoring instruments were used by the EOC staff and emergency workers. These instruments should not be relied upon to measure low-level radioactive releases. TLDs were not utilized. Use of PAGs was properly utilized. Recommendations by State were acted on by the counties in a timely manner.

VII. ACTIONS TO PROTECT THE PUBLIC

(Sheltering, evacuation, reception and care, transportation)

State. The State demonstrated a capability to protect the public during a radiological emergency through implementation of PAGs. Action was taken to protect the livestock and food chains. Evacuation of the institutionally impaired was simulated. Impediments to evacuation of personnel were not part of the scenario.

Local. Evacuation was simulated. Big Lake EOC (Sherburne County) misdirected a simulated bus filled with evacuated school children to the Whitney Senior Center, rather than to the State fairgrounds where the State had directed parents to meet the children. The mistake was corrected by Sherburne County in a timely manner. Evacuation and shelter maps in the Sherburne County EOC would have been helpful. Wright County demonstrated capability to register, house, and provide health care for evacuees by activating the reception and care facility in Buffalo (King's House of Retreats). This facility, though, is too close to the 10-mile EPZ. Planning Guide, J. 10. h., indicates the relocation center should be 5-10 miles outside of the 10-mile EPZ. This facility, also, could have been overcrowded. Also, there was a lack of supplies and equipment at the reception center. Staffing was adequate and shift change was demonstrated. No individual was designated as the supervisor/center coordinator.

VIII. HEALTH, MEDICAL, AND EXPOSURE CONTROL MEASURES
(Access control, adequacy of equipment and supplies, dosimetry, use of KI, decontamination, medical facilities and treatment)

State. Measures taken regarding health, medical, and exposure control were largely simulated. The decision process for the use of KI for emergency workers was demonstrated and completed in a timely manner. Restriction of access to evacuated area was simulated but communications with State Patrol was good. Periodic estimates of total population exposure was demonstrated but limited due to small releases in the scenario. Medical facilities and treatment was not a part of the scenario.

Local. Measures taken were largely simulated. Decontamination was not demonstrated. Big Lake evacuees from the Big Lake EOC were not monitored and decontaminated, if necessary, before they entered the Sherburne County EOC. The KI within Sherburne County for emergency workers was outdated. Dosimetry was used, but individual records were not maintained by EOC staff in either Wright or Sherburne Counties. Recommend emergency workers and EOC staff become familiar with levels requiring decontamination and maintain records on individuals.

IX. RECOVERY AND REENTRY OPERATIONS

State. Demonstrated excellent capability in recovery and reentry operation. As the incident was deescalated, each response organization was notified. Reentry back into previously evacuated areas was authorized only after the State assessment teams verified that the radiation levels were back to normal background. There was some confusion at Wright County as to when reentry should begin.

Local. Procedures were demonstrated at Wright County for reentry and recovery but reentry procedures were initiated prior to the time authorized by the State. This apparently was due to confusion among State officials. Maps showing evacuation routes and relocation centers were used for reentry but security was not maintained by Wright County in the evacuated areas while reentry was in process. Re-entry was not adequately demonstrated at Sherburne County. Some personnel necessary for reentry activities departed the EOC; security also was not continued. Classification downgrading by State was posted on a status board.

X. RELEVANCE OF THE EXERCISE EXPERIENCE
(Benefit to participants, adequacy of the scenario)

The exercise seemed to be a benefit to participants. Although the scenario simulated much, participants showed general enthusiasm and dedication. The scenario exercised State and local integrated capabilities and resources to respond as evidenced by generally smooth operations within the EOCs. One scenario objective called for counties to demonstrate sampling techniques. State Plan indicates this is a responsibility of the State. Objectives should not be listed that won't be exercised or are not consistent with State/local plans.

PART III

DETAILED DISCUSSION

This detailed discussion follows the format of the composite exercrit for each jurisdiction evaluated during this exercise. The team leader, using input from team members, prepares the consolidated exercrit for the site being evaluated. Comments will be made for each element listed in the consolidated exercrit, even if no deficiency is noted. Each State and locality will be treated separately.

A. State of MinnesotaSUMMARY I.

EMERGENCY OPERATIONS, FACILITIES & RESOURCES (Space, Internal Comm., Displays, Security)

Emergency facilities contained in the State EOC were excellent. Communications equipment, including dedicated telephone lines, radios, and commercial telephone lines were all used effectively in contacting response organizations, county EOCs and the utility. Status displays were effectively used and updated throughout the exercise. Maps, indicating sampling points, evacuation routes, and population distribution were posted and clearly labelled. However, no maps showing relocation centers or shelter areas were available or displayed in the EOC.

F 1b ADEQUACY OF COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS (PRIMARY AND BACKUP WITH CONTIGUOUS STATE/LOCAL GOVERNMENTS WITHIN THE EPZs

State EOC had dedicated telephones as primary contact with contiguous jurisdictions. Radio backup communications were used in contacting State Patrol and can also contact directly Wright County and point-to-point for Sherburne County. Regular phones also serve as backup capabilities.

F 1c ADEQUACY OF COMMUNICATIONS, AS APPROPRIATE, WITH FEDERAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE ORGANIZATIONS.

Communications with DOE would be by radio through State Patrol or available telephone to EOC.

F 1d ADEQUACY OF COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS BETWEEN THE NUCLEAR FACILITY AND NEAR-SITE EOF, AND STATE AND FOR LOCAL EOCs

State EOC used dedicated phone line to contact licensee EOF and a separate dedicated line to both county EOCs.

C 1c ADEQUACY OF SPECIFIC STATE OR LOCAL RESOURCES NEEDED TO SUPPORT FEDERAL RESPONSE

Not observed.

ADEQUACY OF EOC WORKING SPACE AND AMENITIES

EOC working space, lighting, facilities, ventilation, and noise levels were all adequate to perform emergency operations. Smoking should not be permitted.

ADEQUACY OF EOC INTERNAL COMMUNICATIONS, INCLUDING EQUIPMENT, DISPLAYS, AND MESSAGE-HANDLING PROCEDURES

Displays were well used and properly demonstrated for status of all key activities, organized by functions performed.

ADEQUACY OF EOC SECURITY MEASURES

All individuals entering EOC were required to sign in and receive visitor ID badges to be worn. Crowding was observed and delays due to inexperience of security officer.

H 3 OVERALL ADEQUACY OF THE EMERGENCY OPERATING CENTER (EOC)

EOC was adequate to perform emergency operations functions. A permanent facility has been established for emergency use in State Capitol.

J 10a ADEQUATE MAPS DISPLAYED SHOWING EVACUATION ROUTES, SAMPLING POINTS, RELOCATION CENTERS AND SHELTER AREAS

EOC displayed a sampling point map, and an evacuation route map. No maps showing relocation centers or shelter areas were in evidence.

J 10b ADEQUATE MAPS DISPLAYED SHOWING POPULATION DISTRIBUTION NEAR NUCLEAR FACILITY BY EVACUATION AREAS

A population distribution map was clearly posted in EOC. It showed population located within the 10-mile EPZ divided by sectors A through R.

SUMMARY II.

ALERTING AND MOBILIZATION OF OFFICIALS AND STAFF
(STAFFING, 24-HOUR CAPABILITY, ALERTING TIMELINESS)

The State demonstrated a strong capability of alerting and mobilizing State staff to the EOC following the alert declaration. Within 35 minutes, 16 representatives from 6 key agencies were functioning and in place. A partial shift change of personnel from several agencies was accomplished to demonstrate a capability for continuous emergency response operations. A complete shift change would be beneficial in future exercises. Emergency response communications equipment was effectively used and included dedicated and commercial telephone lines and radio.

A 1e CAPABILITY FOR 24-HOUR INITIAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE AND MANNING OF COMMUNICATIONS

The Duty Officer phone is forwarded to home of Duty Officer for after-hours notification.

A 4 CAPABILITY FOR 24-HOUR CONTINUOUS EMERGENCY RESPONSE OPERATIONS

Shift changes were demonstrated on a partial basis. Double shifts were present in the EOC for most organizations.

E 1 ADEQUACY OF PROCEDURES USED FOR NOTIF. OF EMER. RESPONSE ORGANIZATIONS Including Means for Verification of Messages

At 8:26 a.m. and 9:05 a.m., NUE and alerts received and verified. Key organizations were called by Duty Officer within 10 minutes of each notice. SAE declared at 9:50 a.m., general emergency declared at 11:12 a.m. Notification based on emergency classification level

E 2 ADEQUACY OF PROCEDURES USED FOR ALERTING, NOTIFYING AND MOBILIZING EMERGENCY RESPONSE PERSONNEL

At 9:05 a.m., following alert declaration, response personnel were told to report to EOC which was being activated. Personnel were told EOC was activated which is understood to mean personnel should report to EOC.

C 2a IF APPROPRIATE, TIMELY DISPATCH OF A REPRESENTATIVE TO LICENSEE'S NEAR-SITE EOF

Utility representative dispatched to State EOC at 9:14 a.m., and arrived at 9:50 a.m. Plan does not provide for State representative in EOF and none was dispatched.

F 1a ADEQUACY OF EMERGENCY RESPONSE COMMUNICATIONS
EQUIPMENT USED WITH PROMPT ACTIVATION

Equipment includes dedicated lines from EOC to both counties and EOF, radio to counties, telephones to counties and EOF. Demonstrated their adequate use during exercise. D.O. system assures 24-hour staff notification.

F 1e ADEQUACY OF COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT USED FOR ALERTING
AND ACTIVATING EMERGENCY RESPONSE PERSONNEL

D.O. telephone was utilized to alert and activate personnel. No problems were experienced in such usage other than some delays experienced in locating personnel. Should split notice function among two callers.

F 2 CAPABILITY TO COMMUNICATE WITH FIXED AND MOBILE MEDICAL
SUPPORT FACILITIES

Local civil defense directors and State Patrol have radio capability to communicate with mobile ambulances and rescue squads. Hospitals are contacted by telephone.

H 4 DEMONSTRATION OF TIMELY AND EFFICIENT ACTIVATION
AND STAFFING OF EOCs AND OTHER FACILITIES

Within 10 minutes of EOC activation (alert declaration) all key officials were told to report to EOC. Within 35 minutes, 16 personnel from State Patrol, Health, DOT, DPW, and Admin. were present in the EOC. Plan estimated 30 minutes.

SUMMARY III.

EMERGENCY OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT (ORGANIZATION,
CONTROL, LEADERSHIP, SUPPORT BY OFFICIALS, DECISION
MAKING)

Management of emergency operations was very effective, indicating the professional qualifications of the State staff represented at the EOC. Each organization was present in the EOC and performed its respective functions well. The operations chief conducted regular briefings of the status of State activities, plant conditions, and actions taken. Briefings were effective in coordinating activities among State agencies. The emergency classification system was properly used and was consistent with that of the utility's. The Governor's brief presence in the EOC was evidence of his support of and his concern with the exercise events.

A 1a EVIDENCE THAT SPECIFIC ORGANIZATIONS HAVE BEEN ADEQUATELY ESTABLISHED AS PART OF OVERALL RESPONSE

The plan discussed each organization's responsibilities as part of the overall response. Each organization was represented and performed its required functions.

A 1d DEMONSTRATION THAT A SPECIFIC INDIVIDUAL, BY TITLE, WAS EFFECTIVELY IN CHARGE OF EMERGENCY RESPONSE

The Director, Division of Emergency Services, was in charge of emergency response. The EOC Director was the DES operations chief.

A 2a DEMONSTRATION THAT PRIMARY & SUPPORT FUNCTIONS & RESPONSIBILITIES HAVE BEEN ASSIGNED TO SPECIFIC ORGANIZATIONAL ELEMENTS

Primary and support functions were demonstrated by each organization represented in the EOC. Plan provides a summary of primary and support responsibilities of each agency by function.

C 1a EVIDENCE THAT A SPECIFIC PERSON HAS BEEN AUTHORIZED TO REQUEST FEDERAL ASSISTANCE (STATE ONLY)

RAD Chief is authorized in plan to request Federal assistance. DOE monitoring teams requested to assist Health Dept. through DES contact. RAD Chief did authorize such assistance.

D 3 AN EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM WAS EFFECTIVELY USED AND WAS CONSISTENT WITH THAT OF THE UTILITY

At each classification stage, current status EAL was posted visibly in the EOC. State of Emergency declared by Governor for both counties at 10:00 a.m. System was consistent with licensee's.

D 4 ADEQUATE WRITTEN PROCEDURES ARE USED FOR EMERGENCY ACTIONS CONSISTENT WITH FACILITY RECC AND LOCAL OFFSITE CONDITIONS

Plan provides procedures for protective actions to be taken consistent with utility classifications and recommendations. Actions were taken in accordance with offsite conditions.

DEMONSTRATION OF EFFECTIVE COORD. BETWEEN EMERGENCY RESPONSE DIR. & STAFF, THRU ORAL BRIEFINGS, STAFF MEETINGS, ETC.

Operations Director regularly announced status of activities, plant conditions, and actions taken.

ADEQUACY OF SUPPORT AND/OR PARTICIPATION BY ELECTED OFFICIALS

Governor declared State of Emergency for Wright and Sherburne Counties at 10:00 a.m. Governor entered EOC at 1:10 p.m. for briefings of State activities by key State personnel.

SUMMARY IV.

PUBLIC ALERTING & NOTIFICATION (MEANS OF NOTIFICATION-SIRENS, VEHICLES, OR OTHER SYSTEMS)

Information received from the utility was disseminated to the public through the EBS by way of the NWS. It may be preferable to contact EBS directly. Although, siren systems are in place around the power facility, for notification and relaying instructions to the public, their use was simulated for the exercise. Accordingly, this capability as not demonstrated and should have been. Instructional messages for the public which are used with the EBS were prepared in advance, used properly, and contained the appropriate information. The NRC approved the siren exercise for 3/3/82

- E 5 EVIDENCE OF A RELIABLE SYSTEM FOR DISSEMINATION TO THE PUBLIC OF APPROPRIATE INFO RECEIVED FROM THE LICENSEE, E.G., EBS

Messages as received from the utility are received at the EOC (or duty officer, depending on emergency classification) per a prepared message (fill-in-the-blank style). This information is then transmitted to NWR/NWS which is then transmitted over EBS.

- E 6 ADEQUACY OF MEANS USED FOR NOTIFICATION & PROMPT INSTRUCTION TO THE PUBLIC IN THE PLUME EPZ (WITHIN 15 MINUTES)

Activation of siren system was simulated capabilities of weather radios in homes in EPZ, again simulated. Siren system exercised 3/3/82.

- E 7 EFFECTIVE USE OF INSTRUCTIONAL MESSAGES FOR THE PUBLIC IN AFFECTED AREAS

Messages for release to the public have been prepared in advance (and included in the State Plan) with fill-in-the-blank format for release to NWS/NWR.

J 10c ADEQUACY OF MEANS USED FOR NOTIFYING ALL SEGMENTS
OF TRANSIENT AND RESIDENT POPULATION

Siren system is in place. Activation will not be tested for this exercise. Simulation of activation was demonstrated, followed up by EBS announcements.

SUMMARY V.

PUBLIC AND MEDIA RELATIONS (PUBLICATIONS, PRESS FACILITIES, MEDIA BRIEFINGS, RELEASE COORDINATION)

Short press briefings were held on a frequent basis and several formal briefings were held involving all concerned State agencies and the utility. The press releases were well written and contained necessary and comprehensive information. An area of concern is timeliness--recommend that verbal briefings be given followed by release of hard copy, therefore, eliminating the time lag that it takes to prepare hard copy. The State had one spokesperson who had direct access to the EOC and who was well informed, and could adequately answer all questions. The State Departments of Health, Agriculture, and Welfare and the Highway Patrol had knowledgeable spokespersons at the briefings as did the utility. Graphics and visuals were well done and were used to illustrate information given at the briefings. It is clear that the State has the capability to provide the public with adequate information.

The main areas of concern are the number of contact points for the media--the JPIC in the State Capitol, NSP Headquarters and the two counties. This could result in confusion to the media and makes coordination of releases difficult. Recommend that the State and utility provide information at one locality only. If the county has a media center, it is critical that the only information released at the counties is that which relates to that particular county. This information must be coordinated with the EOC before release. It is unclear where the media should go for updated information; i. e., the JPIC, NSP Headquarters, or the counties.

Adequate information has been disseminated to the public within the EPZ in the form of brochures. Emergency information and evacuation tags have been placed in the telephone directory. Transient population measures have been taken through notice placings in area commercial accommodations.

G 1 EVIDENCE OF DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION TO THE PUBLIC WITHIN THE LAST YEAR

Brochures have been mailed to the population in the EPZ as well as emergency information and evacuation tags included in their phone books. An updated brochure will be mailed within the month.

G 2 EVIDENCE OF A PUBLIC INFO PROGRAM FOR PERMANENT & TRANSIENT POP. IN THE PLUME EPZ, SUCH AS POSTED NOTICES, ETC.

The phone books have emergency information.

G 3a APPROPRIATE POINTS OF CONTACT FOR THE MEDIA HAVE BEEN DESIGNATED

There are several contact points: State Capitol Media Center and the two counties. This could be confusing--coordination is questionable. NSP would also activate a media facility at their headquarters. Recommend use of one Joint Public Information Center.

ADEQUACY OF JOINT MEDIA FACILITY, WHERE APPROPRIATE

State Media Center is adequate--visuals were well done and added to the briefings. An area of concern is the size. It would be too small during an actual emergency. The location is the main area of concern--NSP has a media center and information was released from the counties. This situation is confusing. It is unclear where the media should go for updated information.

ADEQUACY OF ISSUED PRESS RELEASES

Press releases were well written and contained necessary and comprehensive information. They were supplemented by informal explanations and elaboration. Short briefings were held on a frequent basis, as well as several formal briefings involving all concerned State agencies and the utility.

G 4a A MEDIA SPOKESPERSON HAS BEEN DESIGNATED WHO HAS ACCESS TO ALL NECESSARY INFORMATION

The State had one spokesperson who had direct access to the EOC and who was well informed and could adequately answer questions. State Departments of Health, Agriculture, Highway Patrol, Welfare had spokespersons at the briefings who were knowledgeable.

G 4 b ADEQUACY OF ARRANGEMENTS FOR EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION AMONG SPOKESPERSONS

Space was provided for all spokespersons to meet before the briefings. The State spokesperson had direct access to the EOC and cleared all information. NSP and the State coordinated releases of all information released at the JPIC. If the county has an information media center, the only information release at the county is that which relates to that county. This information must be coordinated with the EOC before release.

G 4 c ADEQUACY OF COORDINATED ARRANGEMENTS FOR RUMOR CONTROL MEASURES

A person has been designated to coordinate with public information all evidence of rumors. As needed, news releases will be prepared to correct any rumors that are prevalent. This person would be in constant contact with local officials via telephone to correct any misinformation. However, rumor control procedures were not tested during the exercise and, therefore, not observed.

SUMMARY VI.

ACCIDENT ASSESSMENT (STAFF & FIELD OPERATIONS, MONITORING; EQUIPMENT, TECHNICAL CALCULATIONS, USE OF PAGs)

The State Health Department demonstrated a good capability to collect and analyze field data. The State EOC served as the control point for receipt and analysis of this data. Field teams simulated their capability to locate and track the plume. The State requested DOE assistance for field monitoring and properly utilized release data from the utility and field measurements of the teams to calculate doses useful in recommending protective actions. A long period of time was required for the State Health personnel to verify utility protective action recommendations. It is recommended that the State re-examine its decisionmaking process to reduce some of this time during crucial phases of the exercise.

H 7 ADEQUACY OF OFFSITE RADIOLOGICAL MONITORING INSTRUMENTS

Not observed.

H 12 AN ADEQUATE CENTRAL POINT HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED FOR RECEIPT AND ANALYSIS OF FIELD MONITORING DATA AND SAMPLE MEDIA

Field communications van has been established close to reactor site. Field monitoring teams will radio data to the van who then relays data to State EOC RAD assessment group.

I 7 ADEQUACY OF CAPABILITY AND RESOURCES FOR FIELD MONITORING WITHIN THE PLUME EPZ

This applies to field monitoring team observation.

I b ADEQUATE CAPABILITY TO MAKE A RAPID ASSESSMENT OF MAGNITUDE & LOCATION OF LIQUID OR GASEOUS RADIOLOGICAL HAZARDS

This applies to field monitoring team observations.

1 9 CAPABILITY FOR MEASUREMENT OF RADIOIODINE CONCENTRATIONS IN PLUME EPZ UNDER FIELD CONDITIONS TO 10 F-7 (STATE ONLY)

Not observed.

1 10 CAPABILITY FOR RELATING MEASURED PARAMETERS TO DOSE RATES AND ESTIMATED INTEGRATED DOSES (STATE ONLY)

The State RAD assessment group had the capability to take release data from the utility and field measurement made by monitoring teams to calculate dose rates useful in recommending PAGs. Improvements could be made in reducing the time from receipt of data until a number is calculated.

I 11 CAPABILITY FOR LOCATING AND TRACKING AIRBORNE RADIOACTIVE PLUME WITH AID OF FEDERAL AND/OR STATE RESOURCES (STATE ONLY)

State monitoring teams have the capability to locate and track the plume. The State also demonstrated the additional resources of Federal assistance by notifying DOE, Chicago, for IRMAP assistance.

J 10 m CAPABILITY TO RECOMMEND, PROTECTIVE ACTION, BASED ON PAGs, IN PLUME EPZ (STATE ONLY)

Doses calculated using release data and field monitoring data were used to Recommend PAGs. (See I. 10)

C 3 EVIDENCE OF AVAILABILITY & CAPABILITY OF RADIOLOGICAL LABORATORIES (STATE ONLY)

Collection of samples of field team simulated for this exercise. However, provisions have been made for radiological laboratories.

SUMMARY VII.ACTIONS TO PROTECT THE PUBLIC (SHELTERING,
EVACUATION, RECEPTION & CARE, TRANSPORTATION)

The State demonstrated its capability to protect the public during a radiological emergency through its implementation of protective measures, identification of evacuation routes, food chain protective measures including livestock protection, and establishment of relocation centers. Evacuation of institutionally impaired persons was simulated. Impediments to evacuation of personnel was not part of the exercise scenario.

J 2 COORDINATION WITH UTILITY FOR MOVEMENT OF ONSITE
INDIVIDUALS TO OFFSITE LOCATIONS

Not observed.

J 9 CAPABILITY FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF PROTECTIVE MEASURES

Messages for public PAGs were generated by Minnesota Public Health and Minnesota Agriculture Department. Messages were approved by Governor and transmitted to the public by siren, EBS, and media through JPIC announcement.

J 10 d ADEQUACY OF METHODS USED FOR PROTECTING MOBILITY
IMPAIRED PERSONS, INCLUDING INSTITUTIONALLY CONFINED

Salvation Army personnel are dispatched, simulated, from the State EOC to assist county personnel in evacuation of impaired personnel. Demonstrated capability (simulation) of evacuating personnel in a hospital with EPZ evacuation area.

J 10 g ADEQUACY OF METHODS USED FOR IMPLEMENTING RELOCATION
OF POPULACE

Not observed.

J 10 k ADEQUACY OF ORGANIZATIONS IDENTIFICATION OF AND MEANS
FOR DEALING WITH POTENTIAL IMPEDIMENTS TO EVACUATION

Based on data on wind direction, transportation group has established evacuation routes and routes to congregate care center. Data is received on road impediments and actions to remove such is properly received within the EOC. Removal of impediments, not demonstrated.

J 11 ADEQUACY OF PROTECTIVE MEASURES IN INGESTION
EPZ, INCLUDING DAIRY FACILITIES, FOOD PROCESSING
PLANTS, ETC. (State Only)

Prewritten messages have been prepared, giving protective actions concerning livestock protection and/or evacuation. Actions to implement taken quickly and proper approval received.

J 10 h ADEQUATE RELOCATION CENTERS HAVE BEEN ESTABLISHED
AT LEAST 5 MILES AND PREFERABLY 10 MILES OUTSIDE
THE PLUME EPZ

All relocation centers are not established at least 5 miles beyond the plume EPZ. Maps are not available in the EOC showing their locations, however, all pertinent individuals are knowledgeable of their locations. Kings House, Wright County relocation center, is 10 miles from the plant.

ADEQUACY OF FACILITIES, SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT
AT RELOCATION AND/OR MASS CARE CENTERS

Not observed.

ADEQUACY OF STAFFING AT RELOCATION AND/OR MASS
CARE CENTERS

Not observed.

J 12 ADEQUACY OF PROCEDURES FOR PROCESSING EVACUEES
IN RELOCATION CENTERS, INCLUDING HEALTH CARE,
DECONTAMINATION AND RADIOLOGICAL MONITORING, ETC.

Not observed.

SUMMARY VIII.

HEALTH, MEDICAL, AND EXPOSURE CONTROL MEASURES
(ACCESS, CONTROL, ADEQUACY OF EQUIPMENT, USE OF KI)

Measures taken regarding health, medical, and exposure control were largely simulated and unobservable at the State EOC. The decision process for the use of KI for emergency workers was demonstrated and completed in a timely manner. Restriction of access to evacuated areas was completely simulated although communications to State Patrol personnel were well demonstrated. The State's capability for periodic estimation of total population exposure was demonstrated but limited due to the small release amounts in the scenario. Emergency worker exposure records, decontamination procedures, accident victim transportation, and use of KI for the general population could not be observed since these activities would have occurred outside the State EOC.

J 10 e ADEQUACY OF PROVISIONS FOR USE OF KI FOR EMERGENCY WORKERS AND INSTITUTIONALIZED PERSONS IN PLUME EPZ

Instructions for administering KI to emergency workers was issued by Health Department officials based on data received by plant. Recommendation to administer to institutionalized persons were made timely. Distribution of the drug to specific groups and coordination with suppliers was simulated.

J 10 f ADEQUACY OF METHODS USED BY STATE HEALTH DEPARTMENT IN DECISIONS TO ADMINISTER KI TO GENERAL POPULATION (State only)

State will use KI for all general population and emergency workers. Recommendation for use of KI comes from Chief, Section of Radiation Control, Minn. Department of Health (Tab A, pg. 14-15, State Plan).

J 10 j ADEQUACY OF CONTROL OF ACCESS TO EVACUATED AREAS

All placement of barricades to control access to evacuated areas have been simulated for this exercise. Procedures were executed in a timely manner.

K 3 a ADEQUACY OF A 24-HOUR-A-DAY CAPABILITY TO DETERMINE DOSE RECEIVED BY EMERGENCY WORKERS

This capability is maintained by the field monitoring team van in the field.

K 3 b DEMONSTRATION OF ADEQUATE AND FREQUENT EMERGENCY WORKER DOSIMETER READINGS & MAINTENANCE OF DOSAGE RECORDS

Capability to maintain these records exists, however, the responsibility for maintaining these records is assigned to the mobile field lab.

K 4 EVIDENCE THAT AN ADEQUATE DECISION CHAIN HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED TO AUTHORIZE EXPOSURE FOR EMERGENCY WORKERS IN EXCESS OF PAGs

Final decision to exceed PAG is made by senior health department official with recommendations for field monitors to pull back coming from field team captains. This was not demonstrated for this exercise.

K 5 a EVIDENCE THAT APPROPRIATE ACTION LEVELS HAVE BEEN SPECIFIED FOR DETERMINING NEED FOR DECONTAMINATION

Provisions for this element are included in the plan; however, this was not demonstrated in the exercise.

K 5 b ADEQUACY OF MEASURES FOR DECONTAMINATION OF EMERGENCY PERSONNEL, SUPPLIES, AND EQUIPMENT, AND FOR WASTE DISPOSAL.

Not observed.

L 1 ADEQUATE CAPABILITY DEMONSTRATED BY LOCAL AND/OR BACKUP HOSPITAL AND MEDICAL SERVICES FOR HANDLING PERSONNEL

Not observed.

L 4 ADEQUATE CAPABILITY DEMONSTRATED FOR TRANSPORTATION OF RADIOLOGICAL ACCIDENT VICTIMS TO MEDICAL SUPPORT FACILITIES

Not observed.

M 4 CAPABILITY FOR PERIODIC ESTIMATION OF TOTAL POPULATION EXPOSURE (STATE ONLY)

Because the amount of the releases was small, the evacuation ordered was of the precautionary nature. Therefore, population exposure calculations was somewhat limited.

SUMMARY IX.

RECOVERY AND REENTRY OPERATIONS (ADEQUACY OF PLANS AND PROCEDURES)

The State demonstrated an excellent capability in recovery and reentry operations. As the incident was de-escalated, each response organization was notified promptly. Reentry back into previously evacuated areas was authorized only after the State assessment teams verified that radiation levels were back to normal background.

M 3 ADEQUACY OF ESTABLISHED MEANS FOR INFORMING RESPONSE ORGANIZATION THAT RECOVERY AND REENTRY CAN BE INITIATED (State only)

Each organization present in the EOC was informed at each level of de-escalation. This information was appropriately communicate to subgroups within each organization.

M 1 ADEQUACY OF PROCEDURES DEMONSTRATED FOR REENTRY AND RELAXATION OF PROTECTIVE MEASURES ALLOWING REENTRY

Reentry was permitted only after the State had performed and confirmed radiation levels were within acceptable limits.

SUMMARY X.

RELEVANCE OF THE EXERCISE EXPERIENCE (BENEFIT TO PARTICIPANTS, ADEQUACY OF THE SCENARIO)

The exercise scenario did not fully test the State's capability to mobilize its resources and personnel during a radiological emergency, partly because of greater use of simulation than in previous exercises. It is recommended that future scenarios include actual activation of the movement of mobility-impaired personnel, siren system, and an actual but limited movement of populace outside the plume EPZ. The exercise successfully tested the State's integrated capability and resources to respond as evidenced by smooth operations at the State EOC and appropriate decisions being made. A survey of the EOC participants clearly showed the exercise to be of great benefit to each of them.

N 1 b ADEQUACY OF SCENARIO TO TEST CAPABILITY TO MOBILIZE STATE AND LOCAL PERSONNEL AND RESOURCES

The scenario didn't fully test the State's capability to mobilize State personnel and resources, partly because many areas were fully demonstrated in past exercises. Future exercises should include activation of the siren system and a limited movement of personnel outside the plume EPZ.

N 1 a ADEQUACY OF EXERCISE TO TEST INTEGRATED CAPABILITIES & MAJOR PORTIONS OF THE BASIC EXISTING RESPONSE ELEMENTS IN AFFECTED ORGANIZATION

The exercise did adequately test the integration of capabilities, direction and control of all agencies represented in the EOC.

BENEFIT OF EXERCISE TO PARTICIPANTS

A survey of the participants clearly showed that all found the exercise to be of great benefit regarding training and testing.

B. Wright CountySUMMARY I.

EMERGENCY OPERATIONS, FACILITIES AND RESOURCES (SPACE, INTERNAL COMMUNICATIONS, DISPLAYS, SECURITY)

The new EOC was well lighted and has more space than the old EOC. The space is adequate. Displays, security, and internal communications (telephones) are adequate. However, extra backup phone units should be available when or if a unit becomes non-operational.

F 1b ADEQUACY OF COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS (PRIMARY AND BACKUP) WITH CONTIGUOUS STATE/LOCAL GOVERNMENTS WITHIN THE EPZs

There were four types of communications available to various State and local points: teletypes, radio, dedicated telephone lines and regular lines. There was no backup unit available when one phone unit became inoperable.

F 1c ADEQUACY OF COMMUNICATIONS, AS APPROPRIATE, WITH FEDERAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE ORGANIZATIONS

There was no direct communication contact between EOC and Federal emergency response organizations.

F 1d ADEQUACY OF COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS BETWEEN THE NUCLEAR FACILITY AND NEARSITE EOC, AND STATE, AND FOR LOCAL EOCs

There were four types of communications available, and more than one type between nuclear facilities, State and local EOCs.

C 1c ADEQUACY OF SPECIFIC STATE OR LOCAL RESOURCES NEEDED TO SUPPORT FEDERAL RESPONSE

There was an airfield and plane available, if needed. Other resources were not observed.

ADEQUACY OF EOC WORKING SPACE AND AMENITIES

EOC is a well-lighted and roomy room on the first floor of the courthouse. Sheriff's dispatch is down the hall. County Emergency Preparedness Director's Office is located in another building which is connected to the building where the EOC is located. EOC space is primarily used for other purposes.

ADEQUACY OF EOC INTERNAL COMMUNICATIONS, INCLUDING EQUIPMENT, DISPLAYS, AND MESSAGE-HANDLING PROCEDURES

There is no dedicated phone between the county and the utility. Normal telephone is used. There is radio capability between Wright County and Monticello Nuclear Power Plant. It is a Motorola digital voice protection model. An extension is located in the Operations Room. Displays were good and message handling procedures were efficient.

ADEQUACY OF EOC SECURITY MEASURES

Security was more than adequate. Records were kept and everyone was checked when entering or leaving the EOC.

H 3 OVERALL ADEQUACY OF THE EMERGENCY OPERATING CENTER (EOC)

The EOC consists of the communications room (Sheriff's dispatch) and the operations room. Both are located in the Sheriff's Building, but the operations room is located down the hall from the Sheriff's dispatch. The Office of the Emergency Services Coordinator is in another building, connected to the Sheriff's Building.

J 10a ADEQUATE MAPS DISPLAYED, SHOWING EVACUATION ROUTES, SAMPLING POINTS, RELOCATION CENTERS, AND SHELTER AREAS

Maps were displayed.

J 10b ADEQUATE MAPS DISPLAYED SHOWING POPULATION DISTRIBUTION NEAR NUCLEAR FACILITY, BY EVACUATION AREAS

Population distribution maps were displayed.

SUMMARY II.

ALERTING AND MOBILIZATION OF OFFICIALS AND STAFF (STAFFING, 24-HOUR CAPABILITY, ALERTING TIMELINESS)

A 24-hour capability was demonstrated by showing a shift change and a communications capability. Alerting was demonstrated by use of a call list.

A 1e CAPABILITY FOR 24-HOUR INITIAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE AND MANNING OF COMMUNICATIONS

EOC is located in courthouse, with the Sheriff's Department, which enables the EOC to have 24-hour communications capabilities through the Sheriff's dispatch center.

A 4 CAPABILITY FOR 24-HOUR CONTINUOUS EMERGENCY RESPONSE OPERATIONS

Shift change was demonstrated.

E 1 ADEQUACY OF PROCEDURES USED FOR NOTIFICATION OF EMERGENCY RESPONSE ORGANIZATIONS, INCLUDING MEANS FOR VERIFICATION OF MESSAGES.

Not observed.

E 2 ADEQUACY OF PROCEDURES USED FOR ALERTING, NOTIFYING AND MOBILIZING EMERGENCY RESPONSE PERSONNEL

Call list was used.

C 2a IF APPROPRIATE, TIMELY DISPATCH OF A REPRESENTATIVE TO LICENSEE'S NEARSITE EOF

The county did not dispatch a representative to the licensee's nearsite EOF.

F 1a ADEQUACY OF EMERGENCY RESPONSE COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT USED WITH PROMPT ACTIVATION

Emergency response communications equipment is available at the Wright County Sheriff's dispatch. It was demonstrated during the March 3, 1982, siren test that it could promptly activate sirens.

F 1e ADEQUACY OF COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT USED FOR ALERTING AND ACTIVATING EMERGENCY RESPONSE PERSONNEL

A call list system was used and individuals also carried beepers, if not at home.

F 2 CAPABILITY TO COMMUNICATE WITH FIXED AND MOBILE MEDICAL SUPPORT FACILITIES

Rescue trucks, with life support equipment, communicate by two-way radio.

H 4 DEMONSTRATION OF TIMELY AND EFFICIENT ACTIVATION AND STAFFING OF EOCs AND OTHER FACILITIES

Alerting, mobilization, and staffing of the EOC was completed in a timely manner.

SUMMARY III.

EMERGENCY OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT (ORGANIZATION, CONTROL, LEADERSHIP, SUPPORT BY OFFICIALS, DECISIONMAKING)

Organization, leadership, decisionmaking, and support by officials were adequately demonstrated.

A 1a EVIDENCE THAT SPECIFIC ORGANIZATIONS HAVE BEEN ADEQUATELY ESTABLISHED AS PART OF OVERALL RESPONSE

Agency representatives listed on the EOC staffing pattern were in the EOC. Their performance during this exercise indicates specific organizations have been adequately established.

A 1d DEMONSTRATION THAT A SPECIFIC INDIVIDUAL, BY TITLE, WAS EFFECTIVELY IN CHARGE OF EMERGENCY RESPONSE

The civil defense director was in charge of emergency response: General Reese.

A 2 a DEMONSTRATION THAT PRIMARY & SUPPORT FUNCTIONS & RESPONSIBILITIES HAVE BEEN ASSIGNED SPECIFIC ORGANIZATIONAL ELEMENTS

EOC staff demonstrated that primary and support functions and responsibilities assigned specific organizations were understood and were implemented in a coordinated manner during the exercise.

C 1 a EVIDENCE THAT A SPECIFIC PERSON HAS BEEN AUTHORIZED TO REQUEST FEDERAL ASSISTANCE (State Only)

Not observed.

D 3 AN EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM WAS EFFECTIVELY USED AND WAS CONSISTENT WITH THAT OF THE UTILITY.

Emergency classification system used during exercise was consistent with that of the utility and listed in NUREG 0654/FEMA REP-1, Revision 1. System was effectively used.

D 4 ADEQUATE WRITTEN PROCEDURES ARE USED FOR EMERGENCY ACTIONS CONSISTENT WITH FACILITY RECC AND LOCAL OFFSITE CONDITIONS

Written procedures used for emergency actions were consistent with facility recommendation and local off-site conditions.

DEMONSTRATION OF EFFECTIVE COORDINATION BETWEEN EMERGENCY RESPONSE DIRECTOR AND STAFF, THROUGH ORAL BRIEFINGS, STAFF MEETINGS, ETC.

There were adequate oral briefings and staff meetings, as necessary.

ADEQUACY OF SUPPORT AND/OR PARTICIPATION BY ELECTED OFFICIALS

There was support and participation by elected officials. Present were Arlyn Nelson, Lowell Zachman, LeRoy Engstrom, Mechello Boygenreif, Paul McAlpine, all County Commissioners; participating were Paul McAlpine as PIO; Arlyn Nelson as RADEF.

SUMMARY IV.

PUBLIC ALERTING AND NOTIFICATION (MEANS OF NOTIFICATION--SIRENS, VEHICLES, OR OTHER SYSTEMS)

All sirens were tested January 29, 1982, and operated satisfactorily, in addition, there were squad cars and boats with sirens to alert the public. EBS is available. There should be a central location for press releases. Siren system was exercised March 3 rather than on March 2, 1982 (day of the exercise). This was approved by NRC Region III. FEMA evaluators observed activation of the siren system on March 3. FEMA evaluation of effectiveness of the system will take place at some future date. The sheriff's radio dispatcher triggered the combined NSP/CD siren system at 1:00 p.m. Three patrol cars sited in northern, central, and southwestern portions of county reported successful activation and cessation of sirens. Wright County civil defense director reported all civil defense sirens in county's 15 cities sounded. One NSP siren did not activate, as indicated by a citizen who telephoned from Monticello.

E 5 EVIDENCE OF A RELIABLE SYSTEM FOR DISSEMINATION TO THE PUBLIC OF APPROPRIATE INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM THE LICENSEE; E. G., EBS

Press information faxed from State to county and phoned to other counties (Sherburne), released by PIO for dissemination to the public. There should be a central location for press releases.

E 6 ADEQUACY OF MEANS USED FOR NOTIFICATION & PROMPT INSTRUCTION TO THE PUBLIC IN THE PLUME EPZ (WITHIN 15 MINUTES)

Sirens and approximately eight 5-tone alerts at critical facilities. Police cars with speakers and sirens available. Note: Siren test-- Wright County, Minnesota, Mar. 3, 1982. The sheriff's radio dispatcher triggered the combined NSP/CD siren system at 1:00 p.m. Three patrol cars sited in northern, central, and southwest portions of the county reported successful activation and cessation of sirens. Wright County civil defense director reported all civil defense sirens in the county's 15 cities sounded. One of the NSP sirens did not activate, as indicated by a citizen who telephoned from Monticello.

E 7 EFFECTIVE USE OF INSTRUCTIONAL MESSAGES FOR THE PUBLIC IN AFFECTED AREAS

EBS available for instructional messages. Also, government vehicles with speakers.

J 10c ADEQUACY OF MEANS USED FOR NOTIFYING ALL SEGMENTS OF TRANSIENT AND RESIDENT POPULATION

Available two boats on Mississippi River, with sirens and speakers. Patrol cars were also available, with speakers and sirens, and all systems as listed above.

SUMMARY V.

PUBLIC AND MEDIA RELATIONS (PUBLICATIONS, PRESS FACILITIES, MEDIA BRIEFINGS, RELEASE COORDINATION)

Publications, media briefings, release coordination were demonstrated. Deficiencies: (1) Information program for transient population was not evident, (2) exchange of information between county EOCs were hampered by lack of a tape recorder at Sherburne County.

G 1 EVIDENCE OF DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION TO THE PUBLIC, WITHIN THE LAST YEAR

During the past year, two pamphlets were distributed within the 10-mile EPZ to inform the public.

- G 2 EVIDENCE OF A PUBLIC INFORMATION PROGRAM FOR PERMANENT & TRANSIENT POPULATION IN THE PLUME EPZ, SUCH AS POSTED NOTICES, ETC.

Information program for transient population was not evident.

- G 3a APPROPRIATE POINTS OF CONTACT FOR THE MEDIA HAVE BEEN DESIGNATED

Specific location at courthouse with phone and typewriter available.
PIO: Paul McAlpine. Recommend county spokesperson colocate with State spokesperson.

ADEQUACY OF JOINT MEDIA FACILITY, WHERE APPROPRIATE

Closer detailed planning of media facility in Wright County is needed. Room for this purpose is employee lunchroom; employees were allowed access.

ADEQUACY OF ISSUED PRESS RELEASES

Not observed.

- G 4a A MEDIA SPOKESPERSON HAS BEEN DESIGNATED WHO HAS ACCESS TO ALL NECESSARY INFORMATION

PIO, Paul McAlpine.

- G 4b ADEQUACY OF ARRANGEMENTS FOR EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION AMONG SPOKESPERSONS

Exchange of information between county EOCs was hampered by lack of a tape recorder at Sherburne County.

- G 4c ADEQUACY OF COORDINATED ARRANGEMENTS FOR RUMOR CONTROL MEASURES

Not observed.

SUMMARY VI.

ACCIDENT ASSESSMENT (STAFF & FIELD OPERATIONS, MONITORING, EQUIPMENT, TECHNICAL CALCULATIONS, USE OF PAGs)

Not observed.

- H 7 ADEQUACY OF OFFSITE RADIOLOGICAL MONITORING INSTRUMENTS

Not observed. This is a function of the State.

- H 12 AN ADEQUATE CENTRAL POINT HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED FOR RECEIPT AND ANALYSIS OF FIELD MONITORING DATA AND SAMPLE MEDIA
- Not observed. (See State comments)
- I 7 ADEQUACY OF CAPABILITY AND RESOURCES FOR FIELD MONITORING WITHIN THE PLUME EPZ.
- Not observed. (See State comments)
- I 8 ADEQUATE CAPABILITY TO MAKE A RAPID ASSESSMENT OF MAGNITUDE & LOCATION OF LIQUID OR GASEOUS RADIOLOGICAL HAZARDS
- Not observed. (See State comments)
- I 9 CAPABILITY FOR MEASUREMENT OF RADIOIODINE CONCENTRATIONS IN PLUME EPZ UNDER FIELD CONDITIONS TO 10 F-7 (State Only)
- Not observed.
- I 10 CAPABILITY FOR RELATING MEASURED PARAMETERS TO DOSE RATES AND ESTIMATED INTEGRATED DOSES (State Only)
- Not observed.
- I 11 CAPABILITY FOR LOCATING AND TRACKING AIRBORNE RADIOACTIVE PLUME WITH AID OF FEDERAL AND/OR STATE RESOURCES (State Only)
- Not observed.
- J 10m CAPABILITY TO RECOMMEND PROTECTIVE ACTION, BASED ON PAGs IN PLUME EPZ (State Only)
- Not observed.
- C 3 EVIDENCE OF AVAILABILITY & CAPABILITY OF RADIOLOGICAL LABORATORIES (State Only)
- Not observed.

SUMMARY VII.ACTIONS TO PROTECT THE PUBLIC (SHELTERING, EVACUATION,
RECEPTION & CARE, TRANSPORTATION)

Relocation of evacuees was simulated. Demonstration of capability to register, house and provide health care for evacuees was adequately demonstrated at the host reception center and by participating hospitals. However, there was a lack of supplies and equipment necessary for the operation of a host reception center.

J 2 COORDINATION WITH UTILITY FOR MOVEMENT OF ONSITE
INDIVIDUALS TO OFFSITE LOCATIONS

Not observed.

J 9 CAPABILITY FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF PROTECTIVE MEASURES

Evacuation was simulated. Potentially, 300 people were to be evacuated into a facility that holds only 200. State assumption is that some of the people would go elsewhere. Planning should consider all the people.

J 10d ADEQUACY OF METHODS USED FOR PROTECTING MOBILITY IMPAIRED
PERSONS, INCLUDING INSTITUTIONALLY CONFINED

Ten ambulances were available.

J 10g ADEQUACY OF METHODS USED FOR IMPLEMENTING RELOCATION
OF POPULACE

Forty-three buses were available, plus 4-wheel drive vehicles and small aircraft, if necessary.

J 10k ADEQUACY OF ORGANIZATIONS IDENTIFICATION OF AND MEANS
FOR DEALING WITH POTENTIAL IMPEDIMENTS TO EVACUATION

Not observed.

J 11 ADEQUACY OF PROTECTIVE MEASURES IN INGESTION EPZ, INCLUDING
DAIRY FACILITIES, FOOD PROCESSING PLANTS, ETC. (STATE ONLY)

Not observed.

J 10h ADEQUATE RELOCATION CENTERS HAVE BEEN ESTABLISHED AT LEAST 5 MILES AND PREFERABLY 10 MILES OUTSIDE THE PLUME EPZ

Adequate relocation centers have not been established outside the 10-mile Plume EPZ. King's House is at 10 miles. NUREG 0654 recommends relocation center be established at least 5 miles and preferably 10 miles outside the 10-mile EPZ. This would be 15-20 miles from the plant, rather than 10 miles.

ADEQUACY OF FACILITIES, SUPPLIES & EQUIPMENT AT RELOCATION AND/OR MASS CARE CENTERS

There was a lack of supplies and equipment necessary for the operation of a relocation center.

ADEQUACY OF STAFFING AT RELOCATION AND/OR MASS CARE CENTERS

The facility was adequate, however, for the purpose of this exercise the responsible personnel were equipped with only writing pads, several geiger counters, and registration and health forms. However, there was a lack of supplies and equipment necessary for the operation of a host/reception center.

SUMMARY VIII.

HEALTH, MEDICAL, AND EXPOSURE CONTROL MEASURES (ACCESS CONTROL, ADEQUACY OF EQUIPMENT, USE OF KI)

KI was available for EOC workers and field workers, but not evident for institutionalized persons in plume EPZ, if needed. Dosimeters were available, but records were not issued. There was no demonstration of decontamination of emergency supplies and equipment.

J 10e ADEQUACY OF PROVISIONS FOR USE OF KI FOR EMERGENCY WORKERS AND INSTITUTIONALIZED PERSONS IN PLUME EPZ

KI was available for EOC workers and field workers, but not evident for institutionalized persons in plume EPZ.

J 10f ADEQUACY OF METHODS USED BY STATE HEALTH DEPARTMENT IN DECISIONS TO ADMINISTER KI TO CENTRAL POPULATION (State Only)

Not observed.

J 10j ADEQUACY OF CONTROL OF ACCESS TO EVACUATED AREAS

Sheriff and Highway Patrol roadblocks shown on maps.

K 3a ADEQUACY OF A 24-HOUR-A-DAY CAPABILITY TO DETERMINE DOSE RECEIVED BY EMERGENCY WORKERS

Dosimeters available, but record cards were not issued.

J 12 ADEQUACY OF PROCEDURES FOR PROCESSING EVACUEES IN RELOCATION CENTERS, INCLUDING HEALTH CARE, DECON & RAD MONITORING, ETC.

Staffing at the relocation center was adequate and there was a demonstration of a shift change for all personnel within the center. The necessary debriefings were conducted between the outgoing shift personnel and those arriving, although there was no individual designated as the supervisor and/or center coordinator.

K 3b DEMONSTRATION OF ADEQUATE AND FREQUENT EMERGENCY WORKER DOSIMETER READINGS & MAINTENANCE OF DOSAGE RECORDS

Dosimeters read, but no maintenance of dosage records (no record charts or cards for dosimeters).

K 4 EVIDENCE THAT AN ADEQUATE DECISION CHAIN HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED TO AUTHORIZE EXPOSURE FOR EMERGENCY WORKERS IN EXCESS OF PAGs

Not observed.

K 5a EVIDENCE THAT APPROPRIATE ACTION LEVELS HAVE BEEN SPECIFIED FOR DETERMINING NEED FOR DECONTAMINATION

Records of individuals not maintained by EOC staff. These action levels for decontamination are found in the Health Department (tab A). The opinion of evaluators is the county officials need to become more familiar with these levels.

K 5b ADEQUACY OF MEASURES FOR DECONTAMINATION OF EMERGENCY PERSONNEL, SUPPLIES, AND EQUIPMENT, AND FOR WASTE DISPOSAL

There was no demonstration of measures for decontamination of emergency supplies and equipment, however, measures do exist for the decontamination and waste disposal of emergency personnel at Monitcello receiving hospital and the host area hospital at Robbinsdale, Minnesota.

- L 1 ADEQUATE CAPABILITY DEMONSTRATED BY LOCAL AND/OR BACKUP HOSPITAL AND MEDICAL SERVICES FOR HANDLING PERSONNEL

Facility available for decontamination. Personnel at Big Lake Community and North Memorial Hospitals demonstrated that they are well trained and versed in procedures for the care and treatment of the radiologically injured. However, this wasn't demonstrated and the hospital could use additional space; equipment is adequate.

- L 4 ADEQUATE CAPABILITY DEMONSTRATED FOR TRANSPORTATION OF RADIOLOGICAL ACCIDENT VICTIMS TO MEDICAL SUPPORT FACILITIES

Not observed.

- M 4 CAPABILITY FOR PERIODIC ESTIMATION OF TOTAL POPULATION EXPOSURE (State only)

Not observed.

SUMMARY IX.

RECOVERY AND REENTRY OPERATIONS (ADEQUACY OF PLANS AND PROCEDURES)

Procedures were demonstrated for reentry by use of maps showing routes and relocation points. Security and center notification lacking.

- M 3 ADEQUACY OF ESTABLISHED MEANS FOR INFORMING RESPONSE ORGANIZATION THAT RECOVERY AND REENTRY CAN BE INITIATED (State Only)

Not observed.

- M 1 ADEQUACY OF PROCEDURES DEMONSTRATED FOR REENTRY AND RELAXATION OF PROTECTIVE MEASURES ALLOWING REENTRY

Procedures were demonstrated for reentry by use of maps showing routes to relocation points. Maintaining security of evacuated area during reentry was not demonstrated. Reentry operation at Wright County was initiated prior to authorization by the State. This was apparently due to a misunderstanding on the part of the area coordinator at Wright County, who recommended reentry begin before the State authorized it.

SUMMARY X

RELEVANCE OF THE EXERCISE EXPERIENCE (BENEFIT TO PARTICIPANTS, ADEQUACY OF THE SCENARIO)

The scenario can be improved by adding more general problems to be solved by individual agencies present at the EOC. The benefit of the exercise to the participants, as well as to the county, is two-fold: (1) exposure to the program, and (2) as a training vehicle.

N 1 b ADEQUACY OF SCENARIO TO TEST CAPABILITY TO MOBILIZE STATE AND LOCAL PERSONNEL AND RESOURCES

The scenario can be improved by adding more general problems to be solved by individual agencies present at the EOC. One scenario objective called for Wright County to demonstrate sampling techniques. State Plan indicates this is a responsibility of the State. Objectives should not be listed that won't be exercised or are not consistent with State/local plans.

ADEQUACY OF EXERCISE TO TEST INTEGRATED CAPABILITIES AND MAJOR PORTIONS OF THE BASIC EXISTING RESPONSE ELEMENTS IN AFFECTED ORGANIZATION

The scenario, although it simulated much, exercised Wright County's integrated capabilities and resources as evidenced by generally smooth operations by the EOC staff.

BENEFIT OF EXERCISE TO PARTICIPANTS

Participants, as well as the county, need the exposure to the program and opportunities to exercise various agencies and their personnel. Participants indicated they found the exercise to be of benefit to them.

C. Sherburne CountySUMMARY I.

EMERGENCY OPERATIONS, FACILITIES & RECOURCES (SPACE, INTERNAL COMMUNICATIONS, DISPLAYS, SECURITY)

EOC facilities, communications systems, message displays, security, and those maps which were present were adequate; however, serious deficiencies were found in communications with the utility and the lack of evacuation and shelter maps. In addition, improvements could be made in use of radio backup, display boards, and in correcting the plan for EOC location to reflect the actual practice. The EOC was crowded.

F 1b ADEQUACY OF COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS (PRIMARY AND BACKUP) WITH CONTIGUOUS STATE/LOCAL GOVERNMENTS WITHIN THE EPZs

Although primary telephone system worked well, backup radio system was not used enough to demonstrate effective knowledge of its applications. The landline is susceptible to loss during a real crisis and the backup system would have to be used more than demonstrated here.

F 1c ADEQUACY OF COMMUNICATIONS, AS APPROPRIATE, WITH FEDERAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE ORGANIZATIONS

Not observed.

F 1d ADEQUACY OF COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS BETWEEN THE NUCLEAR FACILITY AND NEARSITE EOF, AND STATE, AND FOR LOCAL EOCs

Plan calls for a primary information source for Sherburne County EOC to be Monticello plant. However, no telephone dedicated to this use was observed, nor did the EOC in fact discuss anything with the plant.

C 1c ADEQUACY OF SPECIFIC STATE OR LOCAL RESOURCES NEEDED TO SUPPORT FEDERAL RESPONSE

Not observed.

ADEQUACY OF EOC WORKING SPACE AND AMENITIES

Lighting and creature comforts were excellent, but space in main area was limited (perhaps because of double staffing for exercise. Plan does not describe this EOC, but its predecessor, location in downtown Elk River. It should be corrected to reflect this.

C 1 c ADEQUACY OF EOC INTERNAL COMMUNICATIONS, INCLUDING EQUIPMENT, DISPLAYS, AND MESSAGE-HANDLING PROCEDURES

Communications personnel did a good job of collecting and relaying necessary messages. However, three weaknesses were noted: (1) not all important messages were copied onto the display board; e. g., message that KI was to be taken by emergency workers in plume area, and those that were posted were somewhat cryptic; (2) separate display boards for radiation status, transportation, and roadblock status were placed on floor, visible only to those who wrote them; and, (3) some carbon copies of messages sent to PIO were illegible.

C 1 c ADEQUACY OF EOC SECURITY MEASURES

Security of the Sherburne County EOC was excellent. The Sherburne County EOC is in the Sheriff's Building. Access to the EOC is controlled by the front desk Sergeant. Entrance doors must be unlocked.

H 3 OVERALL ADEQUACY OF THE EMERGENCY OPERATING CENTER (EOC)

See comments, above.

J 10 a ADEQUATE MAPS DISPLAYED SHOWING EVACUATION ROUTES, SAMPLING POINTS, RELOCATION CENTERS AND SHELTER AREAS

Maps of roadblock points, sampling points, and wind direction were displayed. Maps of evacuation routes, State of Minnesota, and relocation and shelter areas were absent. Also, maps should be hung on wall; their placement on chairs against walls created obstacles to easy passage and caused at least two collisions.

J 10 b ADEQUATE MAPS DISPLAYED SHOWING POPULATION DISTRIBUTION NEAR NUCLEAR FACILITY, BY EVACUATION AREAS

Adequate maps showing population distribution by mile sectors were displayed in the EOC. This map display would have been enhanced if evacuation and shelter maps were also displayed in the EOC.

SUMMARY II

ALERTING AND MOBILIZATION OF OFFICIALS AND STAFF
(STAFFING, 24-HOUR CAPABILITY, ALERTING TIMELINESS)

Mobilization of EOC personnel and equipment proceeded smoothly. However, no attempt was made to demonstrate continuity of operation through a shift change, nor was a communications link established with medical vehicles or facilities.

A 1 e CAPABILITY FOR 24-HOUR INITIAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE AND MANNING OF COMMUNICATIONS

No shift change occurred, but some positions were double staffed for training purposes. Ability to transfer responsibility smoothly was not apparent.

A 4 CAPABILITY FOR 24-HOUR CONTINUOUS EMERGENCY RESPONSE OPERATIONS

Sherburne County did not demonstrate a shift change. Both primary and back-up EOC staff operated together during the exercise.

E 1 ADEQUACY OF PROCEDURES USED FOR NOTIFICATION OF EMERGENCY RESPONSE ORGANIZATIONS, INCLUDING MEANS FOR VERIFICATION OF MESSAGES.

Alerting, mobilization, and staffing of the Sherburne County EOC were accomplished in a timely manner. Means for verification were not observed.

E 2 ADEQUACY OF PROCEDURES USED FOR ALERTING, NOTIFYING AND MOBILIZING EMERGENCY RESPONSE PERSONNEL

Alerting, notification, and mobilization of Sherburne County emergency response personnel were accomplished in a timely manner.

C 2 a IF APPROPRIATE, TIMELY DISPATCH OF A REPRESENTATIVE TO LICENSEE'S NEARSITE EOF

Plan does not call for this. Recommend Sherburne County representative be dispatched to the utility's EOF and plan amended to provide for this.

F 1 a ADEQUACY OF EMERGENCY RESPONSE COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT USED WITH PROMPT ACTIVATION

Based on the timely activation of the Sherburne County EOC, emergency response communications equipment used for prompt activation is rated adequate.

F 1 e ADEQUACY OF COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT USED FOR ALERTING AND ACTIVATING EMERGENCY RESPONSE PERSONNEL

Communications equipment used for alerting and activating emergency response personnel rated adequate, based on timely activation of EOC staff.

F 2 CAPABILITY TO COMMUNICATE WITH FIXED AND MOBILE MEDICAL SUPPORT FACILITIES

This was intentionally omitted by the county; it was not part of the scenario.

H 4 DEMONSTRATION OF TIMELY AND EFFICIENT ACTIVATION AND STAFFING OF EOCs AND OTHER FACILITIES

One or two were slightly late, but essential EOC personnel were on time and at their posts.

SUMMARY III

EMERGENCY OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT (ORGANIZATION, CONTROL, LEADERSHIP, SUPPORT BY OFFICIALS, DECISION MAKING)

In general, management of the Sherburne County EOC was effective. However, it is essential that stronger leadership be exercised in the future and that this include substantive briefings and staff meetings.

A 1 a EVIDENCE THAT SPECIFIC ORGANIZATIONS HAVE BEEN ADEQUATELY ESTABLISHED AS PART OF OVERALL RESPONSE

Agency representatives listed in the EOC staffing were in the EOC. Their performance during the exercise indicated specific organizations have been adequately established.

A 1 d DEMONSTRATION THAT A SPECIFIC INDIVIDUAL, BY TITLE, WAS EFFECTIVELY IN CHARGE OF EMERGENCY RESPONSE

Each service operated semi-independently with advice and counseling by the deputy civil defense director. It was difficult to identify a single person in charge, although the civil defense director and sheriff were present and active.

A 2 a DEMONSTRATION THAT PRIMARY AND SUPPORT FUNCTIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES HAVE BEEN ASSIGNED TO SPECIFIC ORGANIZATIONAL ELEMENTS

EOC staff demonstrated primary and support functions and responsibilities, assigned to specific organizations, were understood and implemented in a coordinated manner during the exercise.

C 1 a EVIDENCE THAT A SPECIFIC PERSON HAS BEEN AUTHORIZED TO REQUEST FEDERAL ASSISTANCE (State Only)

Not observed.

D 3 AN EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM WAS EFFECTIVELY USED AND WAS CONSISTENT WITH THAT OF THE UTILITY

In addition to thoroughly knowing the classification system, they double-checked and rejected the erroneous use of an incorrect emergency classification by another county, which was heard in a radio transmission.

D 4 ADEQUATE WRITTEN PROCEDURES ARE USED FOR EMERGENCY ACTIONS CONSISTENT WITH FACILITY RECC AND LOCAL OFFSITE CONDITIONS

Written procedures used for emergency actions were consistent with facility recommendations and local offsite conditions.

- D 4 DEMONSTRATION OF EFFECTIVE COORDINATION BETWEEN EMERGENCY RESPONSE DIRECTOR AND STAFF, THROUGH ORAL BRIEFINGS, STAFF MEETINGS, ETC.

Insufficient oral briefings because deputy civil defense director merely announced messages without explaining their significance. No formal staff meetings occurred, nor did staff roundtable discussions take place. Some informal meetings occurred.

- D 4 ADEQUACY OF SUPPORT AND/OR PARTICIPATION BY ELECTED OFFICIALS

County sheriff played very active role and county board chairman was the designated public information officer. In addition, one county commissioner stopped by the EOC early in the morning.

SUMMARY IV

PUBLIC ALERTING & NOTIFICATION (MEANS OF NOTIFICATION--SIRENS, VEHICLES, OR OTHER SYSTEMS)

Although demonstration of prompt notification and instruction was largely simulated and, therefore, not observed, the county's capability to disseminate information to the public was good.

- E 5 EVIDENCE OF A RELIABLE SYSTEM FOR DISSEMINATION TO THE PUBLIC OF APPROPRIATE INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM THE LICENSEE; e. g., EBS

Siren system has been installed and was tested, but has not been exercised or evaluated by FEMA. Siren Test/Sherburne County: The dispatcher at the sheriff's office in Sherburne County activated the sirens by radio at 1:00 p.m., March 3, 1982. The dispatcher inserted a code number of Big Lake, Becker, and Sherburne County. The sirens were on for 3 minutes and at the end of the 3 minutes they shut off automatically. The dispatcher checked with officers on patrol for confirmation of start-up and shut-off. The civil defense coordinator called private citizens to confirm that sirens worked in areas not covered by the patrol. Fourteen of 20 sirens were checked by the above method, which means 70 percent of the sirens were monitored and worked successfully.

- E 6 ADEQUACY OF MEANS USED FOR NOTIFICATION & PROMPT INSTRUCTION TO THE PUBLIC IN THE PLUME EPZ (Within 15 Minutes)

This was entirely simulated; nothing was demonstrated.

- E 7 EFFECTIVE USE OF INSTRUCTIONAL MESSAGES FOR THE PUBLIC
IN AFFECTED AREAS
Most was simulated. EBS was activated by State's contacting Nat'l Weather Service who activated EBS. No actual messages were broadcast over the air. Recommend consideration be given to activate EBS directly from State EOC.
- J 10c ADEQUACY OF MEANS USED FOR NOTIFYING ALL SEGMENTS OF
TRANSIENT AND RESIDENT POPULATION
- Not observed.

SUMMARY V

PUBLIC AND MEDIA RELATIONS (PUBLICATIONS, PRESS FACILITIES, MEDIA BRIEFINGS, RELEASE COORDINATION)

Sherburne County handled its limited relations with the press well. The only deficiencies identified were minor in their impact, but the proliferation of public information officers among several EOCs is risky.

- G 1 EVIDENCE OF DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION TO THE PUBLIC
WITHIN THE LAST YEAR
- Not observed.
- G 2 EVIDENCE OF A PUBLIC INFORMATION PROGRAM FOR PERMANENT
& TRANSIENT POPULATION IN THE PLUME EPZ, SUCH AS POSTED
NOTICES, ETC.
- Not observed.
- G 3a APPROPRIATE POINTS OF CONTACT FOR THE MEDIA HAVE BEEN
DESIGNATED.
Board of Commissioners Room was designated as the County point of contact for the media. Recommend media spokesperson for Sherburne County be co-located with spokesperson from the State and utility.
- ADEQUACY OF JOINT MEDIA FACILITY, WHERE APPROPRIATE
- Not observed.

ADEQUACY OF ISSUED PRESS RELEASES

Press releases from State EOC were read by telephone to Sherburne County EOC. They were transcribed and forwarded to the Becker and Big Lake EOCs and to the public information officer. The latter gave those he approved to a reporter for the Sherburne County Star and News, who was present. The only problem was that press releases occasionally were illegible and had misspelled words.

G 4 a A MEDIA SPOKESPERSON HAS BEEN DESIGNATED WHO HAS ACCESS TO ALL NECESSARY INFORMATION

An individual was identified as the county public information officer. This person was designated to have access to all necessary information so he could meet with the media.

G 4 b ADEQUACY OF ARRANGEMENTS FOR EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION AMONG SPOKESPERSONS

No problems were apparent, but duplication of public information officers risks uncoordinated news releases. Wright and Sherburne County PIOs should co-locate with State and utility PIOs.

G 4 c ADEQUACY OF COORDINATED ARRANGEMENTS FOR RUMOR CONTROL

Not observed.

SUMMARY VI

ACCIDENT ASSESSMENT (STAFF AND FIELD OPERATIONS, MONITORING EQUIPMENT, TECHNICAL CALCULATIONS, USE OF PAGs)

Very little accident assessment capability was observed, but instruments and personnel were available and could have successfully been used.

H 7 ADEQUACY OF OFFSITE RADIOLOGICAL MONITORING INSTRUMENTS

This is basically a function of State civil defense. Monitoring equipment was used by the EOC and emergency workers. These instruments should not be relied on to measure low-level radioactive releases. Recommendations by the State were acted on by the county in a timely manner.

H 12 AN ADEQUATE CENTRAL POINT HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED FOR RECEIPT AND ANALYSIS OF FIELD MONITORING DATA AND SAMPLE MEDIA.

Not observed.

I 7 ADEQUACY OF CAPABILITY AND RESOURCES FOR FIELD MONITORING WITHIN THE PLUME EPZ

Not observed.

I b ADEQUATE CAPABILITY TO MAKE A RAPID ASSESSMENT OF MAGNITUDE AND LOCATION OF LIQUID OR GASEOUS RADIOLOGICAL HAZARDS

Four persons were present who were trained to monitor radiation. However, they were not requested by the State to help and they apparently have never taken active parts in an exercise.

- I 9 CAPABILITY FOR MEASUREMENT OF RADIOIODINE CONCENTRATIONS IN PLUME EPZ UNDER FIELD CONDITIONS TO 10 F-7 (State Only)

Not observed.

- I 10 CAPABILITY FOR RELATING MEASURED PARAMETERS TO DOSE RATES AND ESTIMATED INTEGRATED DOSES (State Only)

Not observed.

- I 11 CAPABILITY FOR LOCATING AND TRACKING AIRBORNE RADIOACTIVE PLUME WITH AID OF FEDERAL AND/OR STATE RESOURCES (State Only)

Not observed.

- J 10m CAPABILITY TO RECOMMEND PROTECTIVE ACTION BASED ON PAGs IN PLUME EPZ (State Only)

Not observed.

- C 3 EVIDENCE OF AVAILABILITY & CAPABILITY OF RADIOLOGICAL LABORATORIES (State Only)

Not observed.

SUMMARY VII

ACTIONS TO PROTECT THE PUBLIC (SHELTERING, EVACUATION, RECEPTION & CARE, TRANSPORTATION)

Sherburne County EOC was well prepared to protect the mobility impaired but was deficient in the evacuation efforts it made. It is essential that evacuation routes be planned for more items in this area to be demonstrated, rather than simulated.

- J 2 COORDINATE WITH UTILITY FOR MOVEMENT OF ONSITE INDIVIDUALS TO OFFSITE LOCATIONS

Not observed.

- J 9 CAPABILITY FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF PROTECTIVE MEASURES

Not observed. Most of this was simulated.

- J 10d ADEQUACY OF METHODS USED FOR PROTECTING MOBILITY IMPAIRED PERSONS, INCLUDING INSTITUTIONALLY CONFINED

No comment offered by the Sherburne County evaluation team.

J 10g ADEQUACY OF METHODS USED FOR IMPLEMENTING RELOCATION OF POPULACE

Evacuation was simulated, but personnel demonstrated availability of busses, transportation of mobility impaired, and evacuation teams to notify residents in each sector. However, Big Lake EOC mis-directed a bus filled with evacuated school children to Whitney Senior Center, rather than to the State Fairground, where the State EOC had directed their parents to meet the children. After that, the Big Lake EOC had to evacuate to Sherburne County EOC, which corrected this mistake by radioing the bus and changing its destination. This all could have been avoided if evacuation routes had been planned and indicated on posted maps in advance.

J 10k ADEQUACY OF ORGANIZATIONS IDENTIFICATION OF AND MEANS FOR DEALING WITH POTENTIAL IMPEDIMENTS TO EVACUATION

Not observed.

J 11 ADEQUACY OF PROTECTIVE MEASURES IN INGESTION EPZ, INCLUDING DAIRY FACILITIES, FOOD PROCESSING PLANTS, ETC. (State Only)

Not observed.

J 10h ADEQUATE RELOCATION CENTERS HAVE BEEN ESTABLISHED AT LEAST 5 MILES & PREFERABLY 10 MILES OUTSIDE THE PLUME EPZ

Not observed. Not part of scenario for Sherburne County.

ADEQUACY OF FACILITIES, SUPPLIES & EQUIPMENT AT RELOCATION AND/OR MASS CARE CENTERS

Not observed. Not part of the scenario for Sherburne County.

ADEQUACY OF STAFFING AT RELOCATION AND/OR MASS CARE CENTER.

Not observed. Not part of the scenario for Sherburne County.

J 12 ADEQUACY OF PROCEDURES FOR PROCESSING EVACUEES IN RELOCATION CENTERS, INCLUDING HEALTH CARE, DECON & RAD MONITORING, ETC.

Not observed. Not part of the scenario for Sherburne County.

SUMMARY VIIIHEALTH, MEDICAL, AND EXPOSURE CONTROL MEASURES
(ACCESS CONTROL, ADEQUACY OF EQUIPMENT, USE OF KI)

Capability to implement these measures generally was evident, but Sherburne County chose to simulate their demonstration in most respects. Areas for minor improvement in what was shown include communication to the entire EOC about KI use and assuring a fresh supply. In addition, a serious lack in capability was discovered in the failure to monitor and decontaminate evacuees from Big Lake EOC.

J 10e ADEQUACY OF PROVISIONS FOR USE OF KI FOR EMERGENCY WORKERS AND INSTITUTIONALIZED PERSONS IN PLUME EPZ

Instructions to use KI were received in the EOC and simulated notification was given to emergency workers in the field. But, no announcement of this was made in the EOC, nor was it posted on the message board. Moreover, the KI in the EOC was outdated, having expired in December 1981.

J 10f ADEQUACY OF METHODS USED BY STATE HEALTH DEPARTMENT IN DECISIONS TO ADMINISTER KI TO CENTRAL POPULATION (State Only)

Not observed.

J 10j ADEQUACY OF CONTROL OF ACCESS TO EVACUATED AREAS

One roadblock called for in the plan actually was established. Other roadblocks were simulated but posted on maps.

K 3a ADEQUACY OF A 24-HOUR-A-DAY CAPABILITY TO DETERMINE DOSE RECEIVED BY EMERGENCY WORKERS

Four persons present in EOC were trained to determine dosages. However, no attempt was made to exercise this capability.

K 3b DEMONSTRATION OF ADEQUATE AND FREQUENT EMERGENCY WORKER DOSIMETER READINGS & MAINTENANCE OF DOSAGE RECORDS

Not observed.

K 4 EVIDENCE THAT AN ADEQUATE DECISION CHAIN HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED TO AUTHORIZE EXPOSURE FOR EMERGENCY WORKERS IN EXCESS OF PAGs

NOT OBSERVED.

- K 5a EVIDENCE THAT APPROPRIATE ACTION LEVELS HAVE BEEN SPECIFIED FOR DETERMINING NEED FOR DECONTAMINATION

Big Lake EOC personnel relocated to county EOC from within plume without being subjected to measurement or decontamination.

- K 5b ADEQUACY OF MEASURES FOR DECONTAMINATION OF EMERGENCY PERSONNEL, SUPPLIES, AND EQUIPMENT, AND FOR WASTE DISPOSAL

Not observed.

- L 1 ADEQUATE CAPABILITY DEMONSTRATED BY LOCAL AND/OR BACKUP HOSPITAL AND MEDICAL SERVICES FOR HANDLING PERSONNEL

Not observed.

- L 4 ADEQUATE CAPABILITY DEMONSTRATED FOR TRANSPORTATION OF RADIOLOGICAL ACCIDENT VICTIMS TO MEDICAL SUPPORT FACILITIES

Not observed.

- M 4 CAPABILITY FOR PERIODIC ESTIMATION OF TOTAL POPULATION EXPOSURE (State Only)

Not observed.

SUMMARY IX

RECOVERY AND REENTRY OPERATIONS (ADEQUACY OF PLANS AND PROCEDURES)

Personnel necessary to reentry activities departed (e.g., engineer in charge of roadblocks) by the time reentry occurred. No security measures were initiated. No reentry by farmers to care for animals was provided for.

- M 3 ADEQUACY OF ESTABLISHED MEANS FOR INFORMING RESPONSE ORGANIZATION THAT RECOVERY AND REENTRY CAN BE INITIATED (State Only)

Not observed.

- M 1 ADEQUACY OF PROCEDURES DEMONSTRATED FOR REENTRY AND RELAXATION OF PROTECTIVE MEASURES ALLOWING REENTRY

Classification downgrading occurred, but that is all. See Summary IX, above.

SUMMARY X

RELEVANCE OF THE EXERCISE EXPERIENCE (BENEFIT TO PARTICIPANTS, ADEQUACY OF THE SCENARIO)

The scenario offered enough realistic challenge to test a wide range of EOC response capability. However, the decision by Sherburne County to simulate much of its response was an obstacle that limited the benefit participants would otherwise have gained from the experience.

N 1b ADEQUACY OF SCENARIO TO TEST CAPABILITY TO MOBILIZE STATE AND LOCAL PERSONNEL AND RESOURCES

Plan called for county only to measure doses to emergency workers, but scenario objectives included as an objective that county EOC demonstrate sampling of airborne radiation as well.

N 1a ADEQUACY OF EXERCISE TO TEST INTEGRATED CAPABILITIES & MAJOR PORTIONS OF THE BASIC EXISTING RESPONSE ELEMENTS IN AFFECTED ORGANIZATION

Too much of EOC response to the scenario was simulated, including most public notification, monitoring, and evacuation.

BENEFIT OF EXERCISE TO PARTICIPANTS

Participants would have learned much more by doing than they did by simulating.

PART VI

SIGNIFICANT DEFICIENCIESState of Minnesota

- G 3 a* The JPIC has not been fully implemented as a single point of media contact. A single media center should be designated; PIOs from the utility, State, and two counties should be assigned to it.
- J 10 a Maps of relocation centers and shelter areas were not available in the EOC; these additional resources should be provided.

Sherburne County

- A 1 d Clear control and coordination by a single individual of emergency response activities was not established. The civil defense director did not hold staff meetings or oral briefings. Almost all activities were simulated; little attempt was made to coordinate emergency response activities. Additional training and drills of emergency response personnel is recommended.
- E 6 Compliance of the prompt alerting and notification system with NUREG-0654 criteria cannot be established until the system is evaluated by FEMA.
- F 2 Communications with fixed and mobile medical support facilities were not established; this function should be demonstrated at a future exercise.
- J 10 a Maps of evacuation routes, relocation and shelter areas, and population by sector were missing. Available maps were placed on chairs against the walls, obstructing EOC traffic. A full set of required maps should be obtained for the county and municipal EOCs; these maps should be wall-mounted.
- K 3 b Emergency workers had dosimeters. However, dose records for emergency workers were not maintained. It is important that dose record cards be obtained, and that staff be trained in their use.

* The references that precede each deficiency correspond to evaluation criteria from NUREG-0654/FEMA REP-1, Rev. 1, Part II.

- K 5 a Although Big Lake EOC staff had been exposed to the passing plume, no attempt was made to monitor or decontaminate them at the county EOC. Training and drills for EOC staff in handling potentially contaminated persons are required.
- M 1 Reentry and recovery activities were not seriously attempted. Training and drills in this function should be provided.
- N 1 a The decision in Sherburne County to simulate most activities negated the potential benefit of this exercise for emergency response personnel. Full participation by Sherburne County in future exercises is required.

Wright County

- E 6 Compliance of the prompt alerting and notification system with NUREG-0654 criteria cannot be established until the system is evaluated by FEMA.

PART V

MINOR DEFICIENCIESState of Minnesota

- A 4* A shift change of personnel from several agencies demonstrated a capability for continuous operations. In the future, at least one participant from each agency should be replaced by an alternate, to more fully demonstrate this capability.
- G 4 b Timely exchange of information among designated spokespersons of the utility; State and counties would be facilitated by the presence of all PIOs at a single JPIC.
- I 9 The ability to monitor radioiodine in the plume EPZ under field conditions was not demonstrated during this exercise. Necessary resources and training should be provided.
- I 10 Accident assessment staff requires additional training and drills in dose rate calculations, to minimize the time required to translate utility plume release data and field monitoring team data into dose estimates and PAGs.
- N 1 b This exercise tested many State capabilities. However, simulation of activities was excessive. In the future, the use of more free play problems should be considered.

Sherburne County

- A 4 Double staffing of some positions indicates the potential for continuous operations; a shift change should be carried out to more fully demonstrate this capability.
- F 1 b A radio system was available as backup to the primary telephone systems; its use was not adequately demonstrated.
- F 1 d Sherburne County relies on the State and Wright County EOCs to relay information from the MNPP. A dedicated telephone line between the facility and the Sherburne County EOC should be provided, and regular communications drills conducted in its use.

*The reference that precedes each deficiency corresponds to evaluation criteria from NUREG-0654/FEMA REP-1, Rev. 1, Part II.

- G 3 a Sherburne County was not represented at the State media center by a
 G 4 b PIO. It is strongly recommended that a JPIC be designated
 as the principal point of contact for the media.
 The presence of a county PIO at a PIC will also facilitate timely
 exchange of information among spokespersons for the utility, State
 and counties.
- H 3 Messages received at the EOC were not always posted on status
 boards, or were posted in somewhat cryptic form. Additional
 training should be conducted in internal message-handling procedures.
- J 10 e Supplies of KI in the EOC were outdated; fresh KI should be procured.
- J 10 g The Big Lake EOC directed a busload of school children to the
 Whitney Senior Center (St. Cloud), rather than to the State Fair-
 grounds (St. Paul). Evacuation routes should be planned in advance;
 maps marked with these routes should be posted in county and
 municipal EOCs; staff should be trained in evacuation plans and
 procedures.
- K 3 a EOC staff was trained to determine doses received by emergency
 workers; this capability was not exercised. Exposure control is
 important; training and drills are required to assure an adequate
 level of preparedness.
- N 1 b The benefit derived from the exercise was limited by the decision by
 Sherburne County to simulate rather than demonstrate most emergency
 response activities. An adequate demonstration of capability to
 protect the public in an emergency requires, at a minimum, that
 some emergency operations management, protective action, exposure
 control and reentry activities be actually performed, not merely
 simulated.

Wright County

- G 3 a Wright County was not represented at the State media center by a PIO. It
 is strongly recommended that a JPIC be designated
 as the principal point of contact for the media. The presence
 of a County PIO at a JPIC will also facilitate timely exchange of
 information among spokespersons for the utility, State, and counties.
- J 10 e KI availability for institutionalized persons within the plume EPZ was
 not demonstrated; necessary supplies should be procured.

- J 10 h The reception center established by Wright County is located 10 miles from the plant; NUREG-0654 requires that a relocation center be located an additional 5 to 10 miles beyond the plume EPZ. The center was supplied with the radiation monitoring equipment and registration forms required for the exercise. However, the availability of additional resources required for the protracted operation of a reception center should be demonstrated.
- K 5 a Availability of measures to decontaminate emergency supplies and equipment was not demonstrated; EOC staff requires additional training to become familiar with action levels and procedures for decontamination of equipment.
- K 5 b Decontamination facilities for personnel exist, but this function was not demonstrated. EOC staff needs additional training in exposure control for emergency workers.
- M 1 Reentry was initiated prior to authorization from the State. Security was not maintained in evacuated areas during reentry. EOC personnel should receive additional training in reentry plans and procedures.
- N 1 b The exercise was of benefit to participants. However, future exercises would be strengthened by providing for additional free-play problems to be solved by individual agencies and staff.

PART IV

SCHEDULE OF CORRECTIONS OF SIGNIFICANT DEFICIENCIES

A copy of this Final Report has been furnished to the State of Minnesota for its response (schedule of corrections) and a reply to FEMA Region V is anticipated by July 9, 1982. Upon receipt of their reply, a copy will be furnished to FEMA National Office of Natural and Technological Hazards to fulfill this portion of the Final Report.