



Burns and Roe, Inc.

601 Williams Boulevard ■ Richland, Washington 99352 ■ Tel: (509) 943-8200

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REGISTRATION

Subject Work Order 3900-4000
Washington Public Power Supply System
Supply System Nuclear Project 2
10CFR21 Reportable Condition #82-06
Remote Shutdown Panel
Responds to: NA

Main Office
550 Kinderkamack Road
Oradell, New Jersey 07649
(201) 265-2000

50-397

October 5, 1992
BRGO-RO-82-009
Response Required: NA

Mr. R. H. Engelken
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region V
1450 Maria Lane, Suite 210
Walnut Creek, California 94596

Dear Mr. Engelken:

This letter provides a revised report on the subject reportable condition. The only change from our previous report is the addition of reference to other facilities.

If you have any additional questions, please contact either A. T. Luksic (509) 943-8243 or G. W. Brastad (509) 943-8242.

Very truly yours,

A T Luksic

W. G. Conn
Licensing Group Supervisor

WGC:ATL:jk

Attachment

cc: B. A. Holmberg - SS
R. T. Johnson - SS
J. G. Tellefson - SS
L. C. Floyd - SS
L. LeBlanc - Bechtel

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REMOTE SHUTDOWN PANEL
(82-06)

Description of Deficiency

GE design criteria (22A3085, Sec. 4.1) states that "the remote shutdown system shall be designed to control the required shutdown systems from outside the control room irrespective of shorts, opens, or grounds in control circuits (in the control room)" which we have committed to in the FSAR (Sec. 7.4.1.4.b).

The remote shutdown panel controls loop B of the standby service water (SSW). During a Human Factors Engineering Review, it was discovered that there did not exist any controls on the remote shutdown panel to operate valve SW-PCV-38B. During a subsequent review, it was further discovered that the Supervisory Control Panel CS-2, which controls valves SW-V-2B, SW-V-12B and SW-V-69B, received its power from the control room.

Both of these conditions made the system dependent on the control room which is a violation of the design criteria for the system.

Date and Method of Discovery

The condition that the control for valve SW-PCV-38B was not on the remote shutdown panel was noted during a Human Factors Engineering Review and documented on July 21, 1982 on an internal memorandum (EMR-82-1143). It was determined to be reportable by Burns and Roe on August 19, 1982.

Analysis of Safety Implication

If the control room is evacuated, and it becomes necessary to bring the reactor to cold shutdown, the spray ponds may not be available. Reactor decay heat would be dumped to the suppression pool which ultimately lead to overpressurization of the primary containment.

Corrective Action

The design of the remote shutdown panel has been reviewed and no other deficiencies have been identified. Control switches for SW-PCV-38B will be located on the remote shutdown panel and power to the supervisory panel will be supplied from outside the control room.

Other Facilities Affected

None known.