



**GULF STATES UTILITIES COMPANY**

IVER BEND STATION      POST OFFICE BOX 220      ST. FRANCISVILLE, LOUISIANA 70775

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December 19, 1990  
RBG- 34186  
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U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Document Control Desk  
Washington, D. C. 20555

Gentlemen:

River Bend Station - Unit 1  
Docket No. 50-458

Please find enclosed Licensee Event Report No. 90-044 for River Bend Station - Unit 1. This report is being submitted pursuant to 10CFR50.73.

Sincerely,

W. H. Odell  
Manager-Oversight  
River Bend Nuclear Group

*LAJ*  
LAJ/PDG/DEJ/JHM/RHJ/pg

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 500 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-330), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1): RIVER BEND STATION  
 DOCKET NUMBER (2): 0 5 0 0 0 4 5 8 1 OF 0 1 3  
 PAGE (3): 1 OF 0 1 3

TITLE (4): Isolation of Various Division II Valves and Dampers When the Wrong Breaker was Opened, Caused by Human Error

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)		
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES		DOCKET NUMBER(S)
11	19	90	90	044	00	12	19	90			0 5 0 0 0
THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 5. (Check one or more of the following) (11):											

OPERATING MODE (8): 5	20.402(b)	20.406(a)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iv)	72.71(b)
POWER LEVEL (10): 0.00	20.406(a)(1)(iii)	50.30(a)(1)	50.73(a)(2)(v)	72.71(c)
	20.406(a)(1)(iv)	50.36(a)(2)	50.73(a)(2)(vi)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)
	20.406(a)(1)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)(A)	
	20.406(a)(1)(vi)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)(B)	
	20.406(a)(1)(vii)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(ix)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12):  
 NAME: L. A. England, Director-Nuclear Licensing  
 TELEPHONE NUMBER: 5 0 4 3 8 1 - 4 1 4 5

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14):  
 YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)  NO  
 EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15): MONTH: DAY: YEAR:

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces - a. approximately fifteen single space typewritten lines) (16)  
 On 11/19/90 at 1203 with the unit in Operational Condition 5 (Refueling), operations personnel were completing a clearance for removing the reactor protection system alternate supply breaker from service for maintenance when the power supply breaker for 1SCM\*XRC14B1 power line conditioner (PLC) was opened instead of the power supply breaker for 1RPS\*XRC10B1 PLC. This caused de-energization of 1SCM\*PNL01B 120 Volt AC vital distribution panel and the isolation of various Division II valves and dampers. The ESF actuation was determined to be reportable. The control room red-lined drawings were not checked by electrical maintenance for plant changes prior to hanging the clearance. Root cause of this event is "Failure to follow procedure" or personnel error. Realizing the error, operations personnel re-energized 1SCM\*PNL01B, thereby restoring to normal the affected systems. Corrective action will include training for operations and maintenance personnel on this incident stressing the use of control room prints. This will also be emphasized during training on Administrative Procedure (ADM-0027). Since all systems responded as required, this event did not adversely affect the health and safety of the public.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)  
TEXT CONTINUATION

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST 500 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (F-530), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1)  RIVER BEND STATION	DOCKET NUMBER (2)  0500045890	LER NUMBER (3)		PAGE (3)  012 OF 03
		YEAR	SEQUENT NUM	
		04	4	

TEXT IF more space is required, use additional NRC Form 386A's (17)

REPORTED CONDITION

On 11/19/90 at 1203 with the unit in Operational Condition 5 (Refueling) operations personnel were in the process of completing clearance RB-1-90-2072 for removing the reactor protection system (RPS) (\*JE\*) alternate supply breaker (\*BKR\*) from service for maintenance at electrical panel (\*PL\*) 1EHS\*MCC14 when an error occurred. The power supply breaker for 1SCM\*XRC14B1 power line conditioner (\*RJX\*) was opened instead of the power supply breaker for 1RPS\*XRC10B1 power line conditioner. This caused de-energization of 1SCM\*PNL01B 120 Volt AC vital distribution panel and the isolation of Division II valves (\*V\*) and dampers (\*DMP\*) for various in-service systems, e.g. drywell equipment drains (DER) (\*DRN\*) and floor drains, heating and ventilation for containment (HVR) (\*AHU\*) and fuel building (HVF), and reject-to-radwaste line (RHR "A"). The occurrence of the half isolation was determined to be reportable pursuant to 10CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv).

INVESTIGATION

Electrical maintenance was preparing to work on electrical protection assembly (EPA) breaker 1C71\*ES003G served by power line conditioner 1RPS\*XRC10B1 in the reactor protection system (RPS). The breaker provides protection for undervoltage and frequency for the alternate supply to the RPS bus.

In preparation for the work, the electrical foreman completed the clearance request using an official work copy of the 480 VAC wiring diagram of 1EHS\*MCC14B, the bus that supplies alternate power to the RPS bus. On the clearance request he noted that breaker 3D supplies power to the RPS bus. The electrical foreman then took the clearance request to the control room. He did not check the control room prints which are routinely updated to show current plant configurations by the use of a red lining process. The operator took the request and completed the danger tags per the request. He consulted the 480V wiring diagram that the electrical foreman had listed as a reference but the operator was not able to find the breaker number. He then contacted the electrical foreman who assured him that it was the right breaker. The operator then approved the clearance which referenced work package R147615 and drawing EE-9P2.

An operator was then sent to hang the clearance tag on breaker 3D. The operator verified that the breaker numbers were correct but had difficulty in matching mark numbers. The clearance stated 1EHS\*MCC14B breaker 3D "RPS 'B' Alt Supply" while the breaker itself listed 1SCM\*XRC14B1. This should have alerted the operator that this was the wrong breaker. But, the breaker was opened causing a loss of power to 1SCM\*PNL01B which caused the Division II isolation to occur.

The control room personnel carried out the applicable abnormal operating procedures having discovered the loss of 1SCM\*PNL01B, and ordered the breaker to be reclosed. After power was restored to

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TEXT CONTINUATION

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST 500 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-630), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555 AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503

FACILITY NAME (1)  RIVER BEND STATION	DOCKET NUMBER (2)  0 5 0 0 0 0 4 5 8 9 0	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)	
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER		
		0 4 4	0 0	0 3	OF	0 3

TEXT (if more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)  
 1SCM\*PNLO1B, the plant was restored to its original status. The clearance was then placed on the correct breaker.

Further investigation after the isolation showed that the control room drawing had been appropriately updated using red lines to show completed modifications to the plant. This is the authorized method for showing changes until the prints can be revised. The control room drawings showed that breaker 3C and 3D on the same electrical bus were swapped, i.e. breaker 3C should have been tagged versus the 3D. This particular change was made in September 1989. Until prints are changed to reflect plant modifications, red lines are made only on control room drawings. All other plant drawings refer personnel to the control room red-lined drawings to check for unincorporated changes. In this case the drawings were not checked by electrical maintenance prior to hanging the clearance. Operations personnel did check the drawing but because it was a wiring diagram and not a one-line electrical diagram, the operator could not adequately identify the breaker on the print. At this point, he telephoned the electrical foreman to resolve the problem. The electrical foreman, being away from the control room, did not readily have a red-lined drawing but convinced the operator of the correctness of his request. If the foreman had checked the control room drawings, he would have noticed the change and if the operator hanging the tag had noted that the breaker was for 1SCM instead of 1RPS, the wrong breaker would not have been opened. Root cause of this event is "Failure to follow procedure" or personnel error.

In reviewing earlier LERs, no similar event was identified with a common root cause.

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Realizing the error and after referencing the applicable procedures (AOP/OSPs), maintenance personnel re-energized 1SCM\*PNLO1B panel, thereby restoring to normal the affected systems. Clearance was then placed on the correct breaker for 1RPS\*RC10B1 power line conditioner.

Operations and maintenance personnel will receive training on this incident stressing the use of control room prints. This training will be completed by March 31, 1991. Use of red-lined drawings will also be emphasized in Administrative procedure (ADM-0027) "Protective Tagging System" requalification training.

SAFETY ASSESSMENT

Since all systems responded as required, this event did not adversely affect the health and safety of the public.