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DUKE POWER

December 20, 1990

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Subject: Catawba Nuclear Station, Unit 2
Docket No. 50-414
Special Report
Invalid Failure Diesel Generator 2A

Pursuant to Technical Specification 4.8.1.1.3 and 6.9.2, find attached a Special Report concerning Unit 2A Diesel Generator Invalid Failure on December 4, 1990.

Very truly yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "M. S. Tuckman", with the word "for" written below it.

M. S. Tuckman, Vice President
Nuclear Operations

CRL/11/lcs

Attachment

xc: Mr. S. D. Ebner
Regional Administrator, Region II
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
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U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
One White Flint North, Mail Stop 9H3
Washington, D.C. 20555

Mr. W. T. Orders
NRC Resident Inspector
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SPECIAL REPORT
CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION

DIESEL GENERATOR 2A INVALID FAILURE DUE
TO OPERATOR ERROR DURING MONTHLY
OPERABILITY TESTING OF ENGINE

An invalid failure (start #637) of Diesel Generator (D/G) 2A occurred on December 4, 1990 at 1120 hours. The failure occurred during the air roll test preceding the start attempt for the normal monthly operability performance test (PT/2/A/4350/02A). NO attempt was made to start the engine at this point. D/G 2A was on a monthly operability test schedule at the time of this invalid failure. There have been 0 valid failures in the past 20 valid starts and 2 valid failures in the past 100 valid starts for D/G 2A.

Immediately following the inability to roll, the Mechanical Supervisor was called because the barring device had just been removed for rebuilding. The Supervisor immediately recognized the problem. The removal of the barring device had caused the safety pin to move slightly thereby preventing the engine from being air rolled. This system is designed to prevent air rolling the engine during maintenance when the barring device is in use, thus providing a positive personnel safety function. A spacer was installed to maintain the pin in its intended position, thus restoring the engine to an "available for operation" condition. The D/G could respond to and sustain all emergency start demands as designed. Unavailable time for this event was 45 minutes.

At 1500 on December 4, 1990, start and load (start 638) was successfully performed per Operation procedure PT/2/A/4350/02A.

The barring device is a maintenance tool and, in itself, is not required for operability.

This inability to roll is considered an isolated incident in that:

Operator error (Maintenance and Operations) is directly attributable for the inability to roll.

No other failures were caused by this mechanism.