



PSEG

Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box E Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038

Salem Generating Station

October 20, 1982

Mr. R. C. Haynes
Regional Administrator
USNRC
Region 1
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Dear Mr. Haynes:

LICENSE NO. DPR-75
DOCKET NO. 50-311
REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 82-110/03L

Pursuant to the requirements of Salem Generating Station Unit No. 2, Technical Specifications, Section 6.9.1.9.b, we are submitting Licensee Event Report for Reportable Occurrence 82-110/03L. This report is required within thirty (30) days of the occurrence.

Sincerely yours,

H. J. Midura
General Manager -
Salem Operations

RF:ks *742*

CC: Distribution

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The Energy People

IEU

Report Number: 82-110/03L
Report Date: 10-20-82
Occurrence Date: 09-26-82
Facility: Salem Generating Station, Unit 2
Public Service Electric & Gas Company
Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

100' Elevation Containment Air Lock - Inoperable.

This report was initiated by Incident Reports 82-306 and 82-307.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

Mode 1 - Rx Power 81% - Unit Load 820 MWe.

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

At 0530 hours, September 26, 1982, during routine operation of the 100' Elevation Containment Air Lock, an operator observed that there was no indication of seal interspace air pressure. The air lock was declared inoperable and Action Statement 3.6.1.3.a was entered. The air lock doors were maintained closed to provide for containment integrity. Later that day, an operator was able to restore air pressure to the seals by manually relocating the air interlock linkage, and the air lock was satisfactorily tested. The 100' Elevation Air Lock was declared operable at 0838 hours, September 26, 1982, and Action Statement 3.6.1.3.a was terminated. Adjustment of the linkage was subsequently checked and found to be correct; it was assumed that the linkage had jammed in an apparently isolated occurrence.

At 0628 hours, September 27, 1982, during the performance of surveillance on the 100' Elevation Air Lock seals, the leakage on the exterior door seals was found to be greater than the test specification. The air lock was declared inoperable and Action Statement 3.6.1.3.a was entered for a second time. The excessive leakage had resulted from the failure of the inner rubber seal and a new seal was installed. During retesting of the door, however, a failure of the test air supply similar to that of the previous day was observed. Containment integrity was maintained by insuring the inner door was closed throughout the occurrence.

DESIGNATION OF APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:

Investigation of the problem with the air supply to the 100' Elevation Air Lock revealed that one of the pivot assemblies for the air interlock linkage was loose; the problem had been overlooked in the investigation following the first occurrence. The excessive leakage in the second case apparently involved a parting of the bonded joint in the seal. No previous failures of either type have been observed and the events were assumed to be isolated in nature.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

The containment air lock doors allow for personnel access to the Containment Building while providing a redundant boundary as part of overall containment integrity. This barrier prevents the release of radioactive contamination to the environment in the event of a design basis accident. Since one door was maintained closed, providing containment integrity, no risk to the health and safety of the public was involved. Therefore, this event constituted operation in a degraded mode permitted by a limiting condition for operation, and is reportable in accordance with Technical Specification 6.9.1.9.b.

Action Statement 3.6.1.3.a requires:

With one containment air lock door inoperable, maintain at least the operable air lock door closed and either restore the inoperable door to operable status within 24 hours, or lock the operable air lock door closed.

CORRECTIVE ACTION:

As noted, in both instances an operable air lock door was maintained closed, in compliance with the action statement. In the first case, as mentioned, the air lock tested satisfactorily, was declared operable and the action statement terminated. On the second occasion, the inner door was locked closed within 24 hours, in compliance with the action statement. The failed seal was replaced, the loose pivot bracket was tightened, and the linkage was readjusted. The air lock was satisfactorily tested for a second time. It was declared operable at 1425 hours, September 28, 1982, and Action Statement 3.6.1.3.a was terminated.

A number of previous problems with air lock operating linkage and door seals have been encountered. Efforts are presently underway to correct the problems including improved operator training, installation of snubbers on the doors, relocation of air supply isolation valves and revision of the surveillance test to more accurately simulate desired air lock performance.

FAILURE DATA:

Chicago Bridge and Iron Company
Personnel Air Lock
Door Seal

Prepared By R. Frahm

H. J. Repolun
General Manager -
Salem Operations

SORC Meeting No. 82-94B