



PEACH BOTTOM--THE POWER OF EXCELLENCE

PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY

PEACH BOTTOM ATOMIC POWER STATION

R. D. 1, Box 208

Delta, Pennsylvania 17314

(717) 456-7014

December 17, 1990

Docket No. 50-277

Document Control Desk
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555

SUBJECT: Licensee Event Report
Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station - Unit 2

This LER concerns a Technical Specification violation as a result of less than the required amount of operable Intermediate Range Monitors.

Reference: Docket No. 50-277
Report Number: 2-90-037
Revision Number: 00
Event Date: 11/19/90
Report Date: 12/17/90
Facility: Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station
RD 1, Box 208, Delta, PA 17314

This LER is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1).

Sincerely,

cc: J. J. Lyash, USNRC Senior Resident Inspector
T. T. Martin, USNRC, Region I

9012210114 901217
FDR ADOCK 05000277
S FDR

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EEI

bcc: R. A. Burricelli, Public Service Electric & Gas
Commitment Coordinator
Correspondence Control Program
T. M. Gerusky, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
INPO Records Center
R. I. McLean, State of Maryland
C. A. McNeill, Jr. - S2 -1, PECO President and COO
D. B. Miller, Jr. - SMO 1, Vice President - PBAPS
Nuclear Records - PBAPS
H. C. Schwemm, VP - Atlantic Electric
J. Urban, Delmarva Power

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station - Unit 2	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 2 7 7	PAGE (3) 1 OF 0 3
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TITLE (4) Tech Spec Violation Due To Less Than Required Operable Intermediate Range Monitor Channels Due To Personnel Error And Procedural Weakness

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)		
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES		DOCKET NUMBER(S)
1	1	19	9	0	0	1	2	1			0 5 0 0 0
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THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 2 (Check one or more of the following) (11)

OPERATING MODE (9) N	20.402(b)	20.405(e)	50.73(e)(2)(iv)	72.71(b)
	20.405(a)(1)(ii)	50.36(e)(1)	50.73(e)(2)(vi)	72.71(c)
	20.405(a)(1)(ix)	50.36(e)(2)	50.73(e)(2)(vii)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 306A)
	20.405(a)(1)(iii)	X 50.73(e)(2)(ii)	50.73(e)(2)(viii)(A)	
	20.405(a)(1)(iv)	50.73(e)(2)(iii)	50.73(e)(2)(viii)(B)	
20.405(a)(1)(vi)	50.73(e)(2)(iv)	50.73(e)(2)(ix)		

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME A. A. Fulvio, Regulatory Engineer	TELEPHONE NUMBER 7 1 7 4 5 6 - 1 7 0 1 4
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COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRRDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRRDS

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	X NO	EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single space typewritten lines) (16)

On 11/19/90, at 0441 hours, during reactor startup, Operations Management discovered a Technical Specification (Tech Spec) violation as a result of not taking appropriate Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) actions when the number of operable Intermediate Range Monitor (IRM) channels for the 'A' Reactor Protection System (RPS) trip circuit fell below the required amount. On 11/19/90, at 0400 hours, the 'E' IRM was bypassed and the 'C' IRM unbypassed resulting in this violation. The 'C' IRM had been repaired on 11/18/90, however the functional testing to prove operability had not yet been done.

The causes of the event were an incorrect decision made by the Shift Manager and procedural weakness. There were no safety consequences as a result of this event. On 11/19/90, at 0441 hours, the 'A' RPS trip circuit was tripped thereby complying with Tech Specs. Later on 11/19/90, the 'C' IRM was tested and proved operable. The event has been discussed with the Shift Manager. Procedures will be revised as appropriate to ensure inoperable IRMs are not placed into service.

There was one previous similar event.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

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		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

Requirements for the Report

This report is required pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1)(B) to report a condition prohibited by Technical Specifications (Tech Specs).

Unit Status at Time of Event

Unit 2 was in the STARTUP mode with the reactor (EIIS:RPV) critical and control rod (EIIS:AA) pulls in progress. The 'C' Intermediate Range Monitor (IRM)(EIIS:IG) functional test not yet performed following maintenance on 11/18/90.

Description of the Event

On 11/19/90, at 0441 hours, Operations Shift Management discovered a Tech Spec violation as a result of not taking appropriate Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) actions when the number of operable IRM channels for the 'A' Reactor Protection System (RPS)(EIIS:JC) trip circuit fell below the required amount. Tech Spec Table 3.1.1. requires that at least 3 of the 4 IRM channels for each of the trip circuits be operable. If the operable number of IRM channels falls below 3, the circuit is required to be placed in the tripped condition or operable control rods shall be inserted with insertion of rods completed within 4 hours. The IRM channels that input to the 'A' RPS trip circuit are A,C,E, and G.

On 11/19/90, at 0400 hours, it was observed by a reactor operator (RO) that the 'E' IRM channel was not responding and appeared inoperable. At this time, Shift Management directed the 'E' IRM to be bypassed and the 'C' IRM to be unbypassed. The 'C' IRM had been previously observed to be responding properly; however, the 'C' IRM had just been repaired on 11/18/90 and the functional testing to prove operability had not yet been done.

On 11/19/90, at 0441 hours, the 'A' RPS trip circuit was tripped thereby complying with Tech Specs for less than three operable IRM channels per trip circuit.

On 11/19/90, at 0950 hours the 'C' IRM was proved operable by functional testing.

Cause of the Event

The cause of the event is an incorrect decision by the Shift Manager to continue with Reactor Startup after bypassing the 'E' IRM and unbypassing the 'C' IRM without thoroughly analyzing the situation or consulting with the Shift Supervisor (SSV). The SSV was aware that the 'C' IRM had not yet been functionally tested to prove operability.

A contributing cause was procedural weakness in that the Reactor Startup procedure General Plant (GP)-2, "Normal Plant Startup", did not contain sufficient controls to ensure a bypassed IRM that was not yet verified operable was not placed into service.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

Analysis of the Event

There were no safety consequences that occurred as a result of this event.

The IRMs are Reactor neutron monitoring equipment that are capable of generating a RPS scram signal to prevent fuel damage resulting from abnormal operational transients that could occur while operating in the startup or refuel modes of operation.

Functional testing of the 'C' IRM on 11/19/90 proved operability of the 'C' IRM during the 41 minutes which the 'C' IRM was in service.

Corrective Actions

This event has been discussed with the Shift Manager involved. Other appropriate Operations personnel will be informed of this event.

Appropriate procedures will be reviewed and revised as necessary to strengthen programmatic controls to ensure inoperable IRMs as well as other neutron monitoring equipment are not incorrectly placed into service.

Previous Similar Events

There was one previous similar event identified in which a Tech Spec violation occurred as a result of less than the required number of operable IRM channels in an RPS trip circuit. LER 2-85-005 identified a violation that occurred when the 'B' IRM channel was bypassed while the 'F' was blocked for maintenance. Corrective actions involved a revision to the blocking sequence and therefore would not have prevented this event since the 'C' IRM was not blocked out of service when the event occurred.