NRC FORM 366 **U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION** (7.77) LICENSEE EVENT REPORT Update Report-Previous Report Date (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION) CONTROL BLOCK: \Box 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -0 0 3 4 1 1 1 1 4 57 0 E Τ LICENSEE CODE CON'T L 6 0 5 0 0 3 6 6 7 0 9 0 2 61 DOCKET NUMBER 68 69 EVENT DATE 9 8 1 0 0 7 74 75 REPORT DATE 0 1 SOURCE EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10) The NSSS supplier contacted plant management about possible cable sepa-0 2 ration irregularities within the HPCI system after discovering a simi-0 3 lar problem at another BWR plant. At 1800 hours on 9-2-79, with Unit 2 0 4 reactor at steady state power of 2350 MWt, plant engineering personnel 0 5 reviewed wiring diagrams and confirmed a problem with HPCI cable separa-0 6 tion did exist. This is a non-repetitive occurrence. Unit 1 is affected (Ref. LER 50-321/1979-076). 80 CODE COMP CAUSE CAUSE VALVE SUBCODE COMPONENT CODE SUBCODE Z (15 S F (11) B (12) A (13) Z Z Z Z Z Z (14) Z (16) 18 OCCURRENCE REVISION REPORT SEQUENTIAL CODE EVENT YEAR REPORT NO TYPE NO. LER/RO 0 9 8 0 1 1 REPORT 9 X 1 NUMBER ATTACHMENT PRIME COMP. COMPONENT NPRD-4 ACTION FUTURE TAKEN ACTION SHUTDOWN (22) HOURS FORM SUB. MANUFACTURER SUPPLIER Z (21) Z (25) Z 0 1010 Z | 9 | 9 | 9 ZI N (24) (23) (26) CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27) Separation criteria was not met for HPCI & ADS system cables. The HPCI 1 0 inboard steam isolation valve control cable was routed with ADS control 1 1 cable. Cause was attributed to design error & the HPCI cable was rerouted per Design Change Request 79-380 on 8-22-81. The unit is now in full compliance with the requirements. 1 4 80 METHOD OF FACILITY (30) DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32) OTHER STATUS % POWER E (28) Notification from NSSS Supplier 01 9161 NA 80 CONTENT 9 ACTIVITY LOCATION OF RELEASE (36) AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35) RELEASED OF RELEASE Z (34) NA NA (33)45 80 44 PERSONNEL EXPOSURES DESCRIPTION (39) 01 01 0 (37) Z NA (38) 80 PERSONNEL INJURIES DESCRIPTION (41) 01 0 (40) NA 01 80 LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43) DESCRIPTION NA Z (42) 80 8210290364 821007 PDR ADOCK 05000366 PUBLICITY NRC USE ONLY DESCRIPTION (45 N (44) NA 80 16 912-367-7851 H. L. Sumner - Supt. Plt. Eng. Serv. PHONE: NAME OF PREPARER.

LER #: 50-366/1979-098, Rev. 1 Licensee: Georgia Power Company Facility Name: Edwin I. Hatch Docket #: 50-366

Narrative Report for LER 50-366/1979-098, Rev. 1

Plant management was contacted on August 31, 1979, (circa) by the NSSS supplier in regards to possible cable separation irregularities within the HPCI system. NSSS supplier's concern stemmed from the discovery of such a problem at another BWR plant and they (i.e. NSSS supplier) requested Hatch to review cable routing of the HPCI inboard steam isolation valve (2E41-F002) for similar problems. On 9-2-79, at 1800 hours, plant engineering personnel confirmed the NSSS irregularities within the HPCI system after having investigated the problem. The Unit 2 reactor was at a steady state power of 2350 MWt at the time of problem confirmation.

At the time of the occurrence, Unit 1 was at a steady state power of 1892 MWt. Cable routing was reviewed and discrepancies were also found with HPCI inboard steam isolation valve control cable separation in that it also mixed with RCIC and ADS cables (Ref. LER 50-321/1979-076).

Immediate corrective action included notification of the architect-engineer about the cable separation problem. The A/E provided the design change information for proper cable separation. A Design Change Request (79-380) included re-routing of control cables for the inboard steam isolation valves for HPCI and RCIC system (providing cable separation for HPCI, RCIC, and ADS cables). Cause of this deviation is attributed to design error. Redundant systems were operable and capable of performing their intended functions.

The supplemental action included implementing DCR 79-380, which was completed on 8-22-81. The unit is now in full compliance with the requirements on HPCI/RCIC/ADS cable separation.