ILLINOIS POWER

Docket No. 50-461

Document Control Desk Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555

Subject:

Clinton Power Station - Unit 1

Licensee Event Report No. 94-004-00

Dear Sir:

Enclosed is Licensee Event Report No. 94-004-00: Minimum Control Room
Staffing Not Met When Only Licensed Senior Reactor Operator In the Control Room
Failed to Request Relief Before Exiting. This report is being submitted in accordance with the requirements of 10CFR50.73.

Sincerely yours,

Vice President

RSF/csm

Enclosure

NRC Clinton Licensing Project Manager
NRC Resident Office, V-690
Regional Administrator, Region III, USNRC
Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety
INPO Records Center

100040

9405130192 940506 PDR ADDCK 05000461 S PDR SEAD!

Illinois Power Company Clinton Power Sution P.O. Sox 678

John G. Cook

U-602285

2C.220

Clinton, IL. 61727 Tel 217 935-8881, Ext 3200

L45-94( 05-06 )LP

10CFR50.73 JGC-057-94

May 6, 1994

NEC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 (5-92)EXPIRES 5/31/95 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MNBB 7714), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION. (See reverse for required number of digits/characters for each block) WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK (3150-0104), REDUCTION PROJECT OFFICE MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (" Clinton Power Station 05000461 LOF 4 TITLE (4) Minimum Control Room Staffing Not Met When Only Licensed Senior Reactor Operator In the Control Room Failed to Request Relief Before Exiting LER NUMBER (6) EVENT DATE (5) OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8) MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION MONTH DAY NUMBER NUMBER 05000 None FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 04 13 94 94 004 00 None 05000 TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more) OPERATING THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT 73.71(b) MODE (9) 20.402(b) 73.71(c) 20,405(a)(1)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(v) 50.73(a)(2)(vii) POWER 95 20.405(a)(1)(ii) 50.36(c)(2) LEVEL (10) OTHER 20.405(a)(1)(iii) 20.405(a)(1)(iv) 50.73(a)(2)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) (Specify in Abstract below and in Text. 20.405(a)(1)(v) 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 50.73(a)(2)(x) NRC Form 366A) LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12) NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code) J. A. Neuschwanger, Assistant Director - Plant Operations (217) 935-8881, Extension 3326 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

ENT | MANUFACTURER | REPORTABLE | | CAUSE | SYSTEM | COMPONENT | CAUSE COMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE TO NPRDS TO NPRDS SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14) EXPECTED MONTH DAY YEAR X NO SUBMISSION (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE). DATE (15) ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16) With the plant in POWER OPERATION at about 95 percent reactor power, the Line Assistant Shift Supervisor (LASS), the only licensed senior reactor operator (SRO) in the main control room (MCR) area, experienced severe

With the plant in POWER OPERATION at about 95 percent reactor power, the Line Assistant Shift Supervisor (LASS), the only licensed senior reactor operator (SRO) in the main control room (MCR) area, experienced severe abdominal cramps, requiring him to leave the MCR area for about 3 minutes and 10 seconds to use the restroom. The Shift Supervisor (SS) and the Staff Assistant Shift Supervisor (SASS), the other shift crew SROs, were touring the screenhouse due to high lake water level caused by heavy rain. During the LASS' absence, no SRO was in the MCR, thus the requirements of Technical Specification (TS) 6.2.2 b were not met. TS 6.2.2 b requires at least one licensed SRO in the MCR while the plant is in POWER OPERATION, STARTUP, or HOT SHUTDOWN. No evolutions or power changes were in progress during the absence of SROs from the MCR. The cause of this event is attributed to untimely action by the LASS. When the LASS became aware of his developing discomfort, he delayed contacting the SS or the SASS for relief. When the LASS realized he could no longer delay using the restroom, his condition was such that he had no time for contacting the SS or SASS. Corrective actions include counseling the LASS, and discussing this event with the reactor operators and senior reactor operators.

# LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MNBB 7714), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	
Clinton Power Station	05000461	94	004	00	

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

DESCRIPTION OF EVENT

On April 13, 1994, the plant was in Mode 1 (POWER OPERATION) at about ninety-five percent reactor [RCT] power. The plant had been operating at reduced reactor power level since about 1730 hours on April 12, 1994, when an orderly plant shutdown was initiated in accordance with off-normal procedure CPS 4303.02, "Abnormal Lake Level," due to abnormally high and increasing lake water level caused by heavy rain. At about 2200 hours on April 12, 1994, the lake water level had stabilized and the power reduction was stopped at ninety-five percent reactor power.

On April 13, 1994, at about 0256 hours and 0309 hours respectively, the Operations Shift Supervisor (SS) and the Staff Assistant Shift Supervisor (SASS), both licensed senior reactor operators (SROs), left the main control room (MCR) area and went to the screenhouse to check the status of efforts to restore the plant from the effects of high lake water level. The SS notified the Line Assistant Shift Supervisor (LASS) that he and the SASS were leaving the MCR and that their destination was the screenhouse. The LASS, a licensed SRO, and two licensed reactor operators remained in the MCR area.

At about 0354 hours, while the SS and the SASS were out of the MCR area, the LASS experienced severe abdominal cramps, requiring him to leave the MCR area to use the restroom. The LASS was out of the MCR area for about three minutes and ten seconds.

During the LASS' absence, a licensed SRO was not in the MCR area, thus, the requirement of Technical Specification (TS) 6.2.2 b was not met. TS 6.2.2 b requires that at least one licensed senior operator shall be in the control room while the plant is in Modes 1, 2 (STARTUP), or 3 (HOT SHUTDOWN).

The LASS was aware of the TS 6.2.2 b requirement but felt he did not have sufficient time to summon the SS or SASS to return from the screenhouse. One of the two licensed reactor operators in the MCR has an SRO license, but the license is not being maintained in active status. No evolutions or power changes were in progress during the absence of the SROs.

No attempts were made by the LASS or the reactor operators to contact the SS or the SASS to advise them of the situation although the LASS and the reactor operators were cognizant of the control room staffing requirements.

At about 0359 hours, when the SS returned to the MCR area from the screenhouse, the LASS reported the absence of a licensed SRO in the MCR.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MNBB 7714), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	3 OF 4
Clinton Power Station	05000461	94	004	00	

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

The LASs was immediately counseled by the SS about the importance of meeting the TS requirement for having a minimum of one licensed senior reactor operator in the Main Control Room.

Condition Report 1-94-04-029 was initiated to track a root cause and corrective action determination for this event.

No automatic or manually initiated safety system responses were necessary to place the plant in a safe and stable condition. No equipment or components were inoperable at the start of this event to the extent that their inoperable condition contributed to this event.

#### CAUSE OF EVENT

The cause of this event is attributed to untimely action by the LASS because he failed to request relief before exiting the MCR. When the LASS became aware of his developing discomfort, he delayed contacting the SS or the SASS for relief because of their involvement in assessing the recovery efforts from the high lake level. When the LASS realized he could no longer delay using the restroom, his condition was such that he had no time for contacting the SS or SASS.

## CORRECTIVE ACTION

When the SS returned to the main control room from the screenhouse, the LASS immediately informed him of the incident.

The SS discussed this incident with the LASS, placing emphasis on the importance of maintaining compliance with the Technical Speciation requirement for having an SRO in the MCR. The SS also counseled the LASS that he should have notified the SS or had a reactor operator notify the SS about needing to leave the MCR.

This event will be discussed with reactor operators and senior reactor operators to emphasize their responsibilities above, informing the shift supervisor when the only available licensed senior reactor operator becomes incapacitated or has to leave the main control room without proper relief.

#### ANALYSIS OF EVENT

This event is reportable under the provisions of 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) because operating the plant in Mode 1 without having a qualified senior reactor operator in the main control room constitutes an operation prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications.

NRO FORM 366A (5-92) : U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 5/31/95

# LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (MNBB 7714), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2)		LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
	Poster Asiaca (E)	YEAR	American de la constitución de l	REVISION NUMBER	And the second s
Clinton Power Station	05000461	94	004	00	

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)

Assessment of the safety consequences and implications of this event indicates that this event was not nuclear safety significant. One of the two licensed reactor operators has an SRO license; however, the SRO license is not being maintained active. The SS or the SASS could have been contacted quickly if a plant emergency arose. The SS was in the power block and enroute to the MCR when the LASS exited the MCR, however, because the LASS did not attempt to contact the SS, the LASS was not aware that the SS had already returned to the power block. The plant was in steady state operations with no evolutions or power changes in progress. The ability to conduct plant operations was not impaired. The return of the LASS to the MCR restored the shift staffing to Technical Specification requirements.

### ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

No equipment or components failed during this event.

Clinton Power Station has not reported similar events in the past.

For further information regarding this event, contact J. A. Neuschwanger, Assistant Director-Plant Operations at (217) 935-8881, extension 3326.