LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK:
0 1 T N S N P 1 200 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
CON'T O 1 SOURCE L 6 0 5 10 10 0 3 2 7 7 10 19 11 6 8 12 8 1 0 1 4 8 2 9 EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES 10 O 2 With unit 1 in mode 5 (0% power, 0 psig and 134 degrees F) at 0941 CST on 09/16/82,
both trains of the residual heat removal system were declared inoperable due to
the inadvertent closing of RHR suction valve 1-FCV-74-2. This event required
[0]5] entry into action statement (b) of LCO 3.4.1.4. There was no effect upon public .
health or safety. Previous occurrences - none.
0771
SYSTEM CODE CODE SUBCODE SUBCO
LEA/RO EVENT YEAR SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. 17 REPORT NUMBER 2 1 1 1 6 2 0 3 L 1 1 0 0 3 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
During modifications on train "b" of the solid state protection system (SSPS), the
power fuses were removed to allow work on the output relays. This caused valve
1-FCV-74-2 to close rendering the RHR system inoperable. Immediate operator action
was initiated to stop the RHR pump and the valve was reopened using auxiliary power.
The pump was restarted and the system returned to service at 0947 on 09/16/82.
STATUS SPOWER OTHER STATUS (30) METHOD OF DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32) [1 5 G (28) O O O (29) NA B (31) Operator observation
7 .8 4 10 12 13 44 45 46 80 RELEASED OF RELEASE AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY 35 LOCATION OF RELEASE 36
7 8 9 10 11 NA NA NA NA NA NA
PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER TYPE DESCRIPTION 39 1 7 0 0 0 0 (37) Z (38) NA
PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER DESCRIPTION (41)
18 0 0 0 0 0 NA
LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (4) PDR ADDCK 05000327 PDR PDR
PURLICITY ISSUED DESCRIPTION (45) NRC USE ONLY
NA NA

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LER SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

SQRO-50-327/82116 Technical Specification Involved: 3.4.1.4

Reported Under Technical Specification: 6.9.1.13.b

Date of Occurrence: 69/16/82 Time of Occurrence: 0941 CST

Identification and Description of Occurrence:

During modifications to train "b" of the SSPS, the power fuses to the output relay were pulled to facilitate work. This caused the train "b" RHR suction valve FCV-74-2 to close rendering the RHR system inoperable. The unit entered action statement (b) of LCO 3.4.1.4.

Conditions Prior to Occurrence:

Unit 1 in mode 5 (0% power, 0 psig, 134 degrees F).

Apparent Cause of Occurrence:

When the 120VAC power supply fuses were pulled to facilitate modifications on the output relays, this deenergized the separation relay to valve FCV-74-2 allowing it to go closed and rendering the RHR system inoperable. The cause of the event was a defective procedure in that the $\underline{\underline{W}}$ supplied procedure for the modifications work did not adequately address the effects of pulling the power fuses to the SSPS output relays.

Analysis of Occurrence:

A review of the drawings of the SSPS wiring schematics revealed that the 120VAC power supply to the output relays in the SSPS also supplied power to a separation relay to valve FCV-74-2. When energized, this separation relay circuit is activated by the RCS pressure being less than a setpoint for PS-68-66 which allows the valve to be opened. When the separation relay was deenergized, the valve automatically closed.

Corrective Action:

Immediate operator action was initiated upon the closing of the RHR suction valve. The RHR pump was shut off and the valve switched to auxiliary power and opened. With flow reestablished, the pump was restarted and the system returned to normal at 0947 CST on 09/16/82.

A change was made to the workplan covering the SSPS modifications to inform operators that removal of the power fuses isolates the associated train of RHR suction. For future work, caution signs at the fuses will be placed in the SSPS cabinets to prevent recurrence.

Failure Data:

None.