NRC FOR	IM 366	U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION	
	LICENSE	E EVENT REPORT	
	CONTROL BLOCK:	(PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)	
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012			
0 3	service water strainers AP gauges	which resulted in 1-SWP-10B becoming airbound.	
014	This is contrary to T.S.3.3.A.8.b and is reportable per T.S.6.6.2.(b)2. The		
0 5	s redundant pump started immediately, therefore the health and safety of the public		
0 5	were not affected.		
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0 9	$\begin{array}{c} \begin{array}{c} \text{SYSTEM} \\ \text{CODE} \end{array} \begin{array}{c} \text{CAUSE} \\ \text{CODE} \end{array} \begin{array}{c} \text{CAUSE} \\ \text{SUBCODE} \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{c} \text{SUBCODE} \\ \text{SUBCODE} \end{array} \\ \end{array} $ \\ \begin{array}{c} \text{SUBCODE} \\ \text{SUBCODE} \end{array} \\ \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{c} \text{SUBCODE} \\ \text{SUBCODE} \end{array} \\ \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{c} \text{SUBCODE} \\ \text{SUBCODE} \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{c} \text{SUBCODE} \\ \text{SUBCODE} \end{array} \\ \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{c} \text{SUBCODE} \\ \text{SUBCODE} \end{array} \\ \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{c} \text{SUBCODE} \\ \text{SUBCODE} \end{array} \\ \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{c} \text{SUBCODE} \\ \text{SUBCODE} \end{array} \\ \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{c} \text{SUBCODE} \\ \text{SUBCODE} \end{array} \\ \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{c} \text{SUBCODE} \\ \text{SUBCODE} \end{array} \\ \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{c} \text{SUBCODE} \\ \text{SUBCODE} \end{array} \\ \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{c} \text{SUBCODE} \\ \text{SUBCODE} \end{array} \\ \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{c} \text{SUBCODE} \\ \text{SUBCODE} \end{array} \\ \\ \\ \begin{array}{c} \text{SUBCODE} \\ \text{SUBCODE} \end{array} \\ \\ \begin{array}{c} \text{SUBCODE} \\ \text{SUBCODE} \end{array} \\ \\ \\ \\ \\ \end{array} \\ \\ \begin{array}{c} \text{SUBCODE} \\ \text{SUBCODE} \end{array} \\ \\ \\ \\ \\ \\ \\ \\ \end{array} \\ \\ \\ \\ \\ \\ \\ \\ \\	COMPONENT CODE SUBCODE SUBCODE	
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10		ected into the service water lines upstream of	
111	[the pump and causing it to become a	airbound. Personnel have been reminded of the	
1 2	importance of thinking about the co	onsequences of their actions prior to performing]	
1 1 2 1	maintenance.		
14	9	08	
	FACULITY STATUS POWER OTHER STATUS 30 E 28 1 0 0 29 N/A 10 12 13 13 13 13	METHOD OF DISCOVERY DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION 32 A 31 Operator Observation	
	CTIVITY CONTENT ELEASED OF RELEASE AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY 35	LOCATION OF RELEASE 36	
· 7	PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER 0 0 0 0 37 2 38 2500 39	N/A	
1	PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER DESCRIPTION	N/A	
- 3	USS OF OF DAMAGE TO FACILITY 43	8210290270 821022 to PDR ADOCK 05000280	
- 9		N/A PDR 80	
12121	SUBLICITY ISSUED DESCRIPTION (45)	N/A	
- 3	9 10	58 59 30 3 = (804) 357-3184	
	NAME DE POGOLOGO _ J. L. Wilson		

ATTACHMENT 1 SURRY POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 1 DOCKET NO: 50-280 REPORT NO: 82-100/03L-0 EVENT DATE: 09-22-82

TITLE OF THE EVENT: Air Injected into Suction of 1-SW-P-10B

1. DESCRIPTION OF THE EVENT:

With Unit 1 @ 100% power, plant personnel were using air to clear sensing lines to the service water strainers AP gauges. This resulted in air being injected into the suction of 1-SW-P-10B (Charging Pump Service Water Pump) and causing it to become airbound. This is contrary to Technical Specifications 3.3.A.8.b and is reportable per Tech. Spec.6.6.2.(b)2.

2. PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES and STATUS of REDUNDANT EQUIPMENT:

The redundant service water pump started immediately, therefore the health and safety of the public were not affected.

3. CAUSE:

The cause has been attributed to air being injected into the service water lines by Maintenance Personnel which resulted in the pump becoming air bound.

4. IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTION:

The redundant pump was verified to be operating and the air bound pump was vented and returned to service.

5. SUBSEQUENT CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

None required.

6. ACTIONS TAKEN TO PREVENT RECURRENCE:

Personnel involved were reminded of the importance of thinking of the consequences of their actions prior to performing any maintenance.

7. GENERIC IMPLICATIONS:

None.