

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION TO
LER 82-074/03 L-0

Licensee: Mississippi Power & Light Company
Facility: Grand Gulf Nuclear Station - Unit 1
Docket No: 50-416

On August 13, 1982, during the course of an audit by MP&L Quality Assurance Department of ECCS Technical Specifications, a review was conducted of the following documents: Control Room Operators Logbook, the LCO Logbook, and the Shift Turnover Status Checksheets for the period July 1 to July 31, 1982. The audit was conducted to verify documentation concerning operability of the ECCS systems.

It was discovered on July 22, 1982 at 1305 that an LCO condition existed when only one ECCS system, LPCI "A", was operable. Technical Specifications 3.5.2 requires two ECCS systems be operable in operational condition 5 with the cavity not flooded. The plant was performing initial fuel load at the time of the LCO. It was determined from researching the Operators Logbook and the Shift Supervisors Logbook that no activities were allowed during the 16.5 hours the LCO was in effect which would have had a potential for draining the reactor vessel. However, plant operations personnel did not realize an LCO condition existed and did not document the situation along with the required report per Technical Specification 6.9.1.13.b.

The events leading up to the LCO were:

HPCS was inoperable when the HPCS Diesel Generator was found to have a bad jacket water heater and was taken out of service for maintenance.

LPCI "B" and LPCI "C" were inoperable when the Division 2 Standby Diesel Generator tripped on High Jacket water temperature during a scheduled surveillance run. The Diesel Generator trip was due to the manual isolation valve on the cooling water system (Standby Service Water) being closed. The valve indication was found to be reversed. (LER 82-011-01T-0).

LPCS was declared inoperable at 1305 on July 22, 1982 when its jockey pump was taken out of service for maintenance work.

On July 23, 1982 at 0534 LPCS was placed back in service and at that time the plant was no longer in a LCO.

The factors contributing to the failure of the operations department to recognize that an LCO had been entered were attributed to:

- 1) Personnel error in not correctly annotating the operability status of system, and
- 2) Inconsistency among operations personnel with respect to indicating on the status checksheet (which is intended to give a complete and concise status of the plant) that a particular system is inoperable because a support system is inoperable.

As corrective action, the Operations Department stressed to operations personnel the need for accurate, detailed log keeping and system status reports. To ensure consistency in completing the system status reports a Standing Order was written on September 30, 1982 defining policy for completing status reports.

The manual isolation valve problem was identified as a potential problem in other systems and a design modification was initiated for this valve and other like valves in the plant to insure that the position indicator would show the correct position.

The HPCS Diesel Jacket water heater was replaced.

The audit findings and resolution described above are documented in the Nuclear Site Quality Assurance Corrective Action Request (CAR) 0638.

The effects of this incident are insignificant in that one ECCS system was operable, no activities took place which had the potential to drain the vessel and the fuel was not irradiated.