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April 22, 1994

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
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Gentlemen:

In the Matter of) Docket Nos. 50-327
Tennessee Valley Authority) 50-328

SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT (SQN) - UNITS 1 AND 2 - FACILITY OPERATING
LICENSES DPR-77 AND DPR-79 - TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS (TSs) 3.3.3.8 AND
3.7.12 - SPECIAL REPORT 94-04

The enclosed special report provides details concerning the fire detection instruments in Fire Zone 116 for the auxiliary building cask loading area being inoperable for a period greater than the allowable TS timeframe. Also provided in this special report are details concerning Fire Barrier Door A-197 and Fire Barrier Wall A-8 in the auxiliary building between the Units 1 and 2 480-volt board rooms being breached and nonfunctional as fire barriers for a period greater than the allowable TS timeframe. This report is being submitted in accordance with TS Action Statements 3.3.3.8(b) and 3.7.12(a).

If you have any questions concerning this submittal, please telephone C. H. Whittemore at (615) 843-7210.

Sincerely,

Ken Powers

Enclosure
cc: See page 2

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ENCLOSURE

SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2
SPECIAL REPORT 94-04

I. FIRE DETECTORS IN CASK LOADING AREA IN AUXILIARY BUILDING

Description of Condition

On March 14, 1994, with Unit 1 in Mode 5 coming out of a refueling outage and Unit 2 in Mode 1, the ionization fire detection instrumentation in the auxiliary building cask loading area (Fire Zone 116) was declared inoperable, and Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.3.3.8 was entered.

Cause of Condition

The detectors in the auxiliary building cask loading area were disabled to prevent the exhaust of diesel trucks from initiating invalid fire alarm signals. This area is used to unload fuel casks and equipment needed to support the Unit 1 outage and the upcoming Unit 2 refueling outage. The detectors were disabled for a period of time that exceeded the technical specification allowable timeframe as specified in LCO 3.3.3.8 Action Statement (b).

Corrective Action

In accordance with LCO 3.3.3.8 Action Statement (a), an hourly fire patrol was established to inspect the auxiliary building cask loading area. The patrol will be maintained until the outage activities in the area are completed, the detectors are returned to operable status, and LCO 3.3.3.8 is exited.

II. AUXILIARY BUILDING FIRE BARRIER WALL A-8 AND FIRE BARRIER DOOR A-197

Description of Condition

On April 4, with Unit 1 in Mode 3 coming out of a refueling outage and Unit 2 in Mode 1, the fire barrier wall between the Units 1 and 2 480-volt board rooms and Fire Barrier Door A-197 on Elevation 749.0 of the auxiliary building were breached, and LCO 3.7.12 was entered.

Cause of Condition

A design change notice (DCN) modification involving the installation of heating and ventilating ductwork is being implemented. This DCN requires the breaching of Fire Barrier Wall A-8 between the Units 1 and 2 480-volt board rooms on Elevation 749.0 of the auxiliary building. Fire Barrier Door A-197 will be breached to facilitate the movement of personnel and equipment and also to route cables necessary to accomplish the modification.

Corrective Action

In accordance with LCO 3.7.12 Action Statement (a), the fire detectors were verified operable on one side of the breach, and an hourly fire patrol was established to inspect the area affected by the breach. The patrol will be maintained until the modification is completed, the fire barriers are reestablished as functional fire barriers, and LCO 3.7.12 is exited.