


GULF STATES UTILITIES COMPANY



December 10, 1990
RBG- 34133
File Nos. G9.5, G9.25.1.3

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Gentlemen:

River Bend Station - Unit 1
Docket No. 50-458

Please find enclosed Licensee Event Report No. 90-039 for River Bend Station - Unit 1. This report is being submitted pursuant to 10CFR50.73.

Sincerely,

W. H. Odell
Manager-Oversight
River Bend Nuclear Group

JE 12 25 90
TAE/PDG/DEJ/DCH/VCC/pg

cc: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 1000
Arlington, TX 76011

NRC Resident Inspector
P.O. Box 1051
St. Francisville, LA 70775

INPO Records Center
1100 Circle 75 Parkway
Atlanta, GA 30339-3064

Mr. C. R. Oberg
Public Utility Commission of Texas
7800 Shoal Creek Blvd., Suite 400 North
Austin, TX 78757

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PDR ADOCK 05000458
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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 500 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-630), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555. AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1): RIVER BEND STATION
 DOCKET NUMBER (2): 05000458
 PAGE (3): 1 OF 03

TITLE (4): Isolations During Realignment of Load Centers due to Insufficient Communication Among Personnel and Failure to Utilize the Procedure

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)		
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES		DOCKET NUMBER(S)
11	09	90	90	039	00	12	10	90			05000
THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 50.73 (Check one or more of the following) (11):											

OPERATING MODE (9): 5	20.402(b)	20.406(c)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)
POWER LEVEL (10): 10	20.406(a)(1)(ii)	50.38(c)(1)	<input type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(c)
	20.406(a)(1)(iii)	50.38(c)(2)	<input type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(vi)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)
	20.406(a)(1)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(i)	<input type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(vii)(A)	
	20.406(a)(1)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)	<input type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(vii)(B)	
	20.406(a)(1)(vi)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	<input type="checkbox"/>	50.73(a)(2)(viii)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12):
 NAME: L. A. England, Director - Nuclear Licensing
 TELEPHONE NUMBER: 510431801-4145

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13):

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFAC TURER	REPORTABLE TO NPROS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFAC TURER	REPORTABLE TO NPROS

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14):
 YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE): NO:
 EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15): MONTH: DAY: YEAR:

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e. approximately fifteen single space typewritten lines) (16):
 On 11/09/90 at 2036 with the unit in Operational Condition 5 (Refueling), with the water level greater than 23 feet above the reactor vessel flange, power was lost to 480 volt load center 1NJS-SWG1D causing loss of the 'B' reactor protection system (RPS) motor generator (MG) set. This resulted in isolations of the reactor water cleanup system (RWCU), and the Division II containment isolation valves, resulting in a loss of shutdown cooling. This report is submitted pursuant to 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv) to document these engineered safety feature (ESF) actuations.

Following completion of maintenance activities, operations personnel were in the process of realigning those load centers normally powered from the 'B' 13.8KV bus back to 1NPS-SWG1B. The loss of power occurred because a nuclear equipment operator did not perform the verifications required by procedure. This event was caused by inadequate communication between the control operating foreman (COF) and the NEO, and the NEO not using the procedure to perform required verifications. Training on this event will be provided to Operations personnel.

All actuations occurred as designed upon loss of power. Shutdown cooling was restored in about 6 minutes and no increase in reactor vessel temperature was observed. Therefore, this event did not adversely affect the health and safety of the public.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST 500 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-530) U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, DC 20555 AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104) OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1) RIVER BEND STATION	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 4 5 8 9 0	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)	
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER		
		9 0	- 0 3 9	- 0 1 0	0 2	OF 0 3

TEXT (if more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

REPORTED CONDITION

On 11/09/90 at 2036 with the unit in Operational Condition 5 (Refueling), with the water level greater than 23 feet above the reactor vessel flange, power was lost to 480 volt load center 1NJS-SWG1D (*SWGR*) causing loss of the 'B' reactor protection system (RPS) motor generator (MG) set (*MG*). This resulted in isolation of the reactor water cleanup system (RWCU) (*CE*), and the Division II containment isolation valves (*ISV*), resulting in a loss of shutdown cooling. These isolations constitute actuations of engineered safety features (ESFs); therefore, this report is submitted pursuant to 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv).

INVESTIGATION

Prior to the event, maintenance on 1NPS-SWG1B (*SWGR*) required it to be de-energized and all 480 volt load centers to be cross-tied to 1NPS-SWG1A (*SWGR*). Following completion of maintenance activities, operations personnel were in the process of splitting the 480 volt load centers by realigning those load centers normally powered from the 'B' 13.8KV bus back to 1NPS-SWG1B (*SWGR*). When the nuclear equipment operator (NEO) arrived at load centers 1NJS-SWG1C and 1NJS-SWG1D, he closed normal supply breaker (*52*) 1NJS-SWG1D-ACB62 and then opened bus tie breaker 1NJS-SWG1D-ACB52 which caused a loss of power to 1NJS-SWG1D. The loss of power occurred because breaker (*52*) 1NPS-SWG1B-ACB33 was still open. This is the 13.8KV supply breaker to 480V transformer (*XFMR*) 1NJS-X1D supplying load center 1NJS-SWG1D. Operations personnel closed 1NPS-SWG1B-ACB33 (*52*) to restore power to 1NJS-SWG1D.

This event was caused by inadequate communication between the control operating foreman (COF) and the NEO, and the NEO not using the procedure to perform required verifications.

Station Operating Procedure (SOP)-0047 Section 5.3 covers restoring cross-tied 480 volt load centers. The first two steps of this section of the procedure require the operator to verify that the 13.8KV breaker supplying the 480 volt transformers is closed and to verify proper voltage on the low side of the transformer. The NEO did not verify these items because the instructions he received from the COF led him to believe that all of the 13.8KV breakers were closed. The NEO did not have a copy of the procedure with him because he considered this to be a routine evolution.

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Operations Department personnel will be trained on this event with an emphasis being placed on: 1) Assuring that instructions given to

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 500 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (F-530), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1) RIVER BEND STATION	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 4 5 8 9 0	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)	
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER		
		0 3 9	0 0		0 3	OF 0 3

TEXT (if more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

personnel are concise. 2) Reinforcing the importance of the use and prior review of procedures in connection with routine evolutions. 3) Detailed briefings prior to performing planned configuration changes. This training will be performed during licensed operator requalification training and will be completed by March 31, 1991.

SAFETY ASSESSMENT

All actuations occurred as designed upon loss of power. Shutdown cooling was restored in about 6 minutes and no increase in reactor vessel temperature was observed. Therefore, this event did not adversely affect the health and safety of the public.

NOTE: Energy Industry Identification System Codes are identified in the text as (*XX*).