UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

AUG 0 3 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: D. Muller, Acting Director, Division of Site Safety and Environmental Analysis

FROM: V. Stello, Jr., Director, Division of Operating Reactors

SUBJECT: TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE REQUEST - REVIEW OF RECENT EVENTS AT MILLSTONE AND BRUNSWICK

PLANT NAMES: Millstone Unit 2 and Brunswick Unit 2
DOCKET NOS.: 50-336 and 50-325
RESPONSIBLE BRANCHES: ORB #4, ORB #3, EEB
PROJECT MANAGERS: E. Conner and J. Hannon
REQUESTED COMPLETION DATE: October 2, 1978
TAC NO.; ACTIVITY CODE; NRR CONTROL NO.: 7761 and 7762; R36; 39

This is a request for technical assistance to review two recent events at Millstone 2 and Brunswick 2 to assess their safety and environmental significance.

The first event (Enclosure 1) was the catastrophic failure of a radwaste concentrate tank at Millstone Unit 2. This resulted from the overpressurization of the tank because a vent line was plugged with solidified concentrates. There has also been a recurring problem with corrosion of this radwaste concentrate tank which may have affected the structural integrity of the tank. Three LERs and DOR, DSE and DSS memoranda (Enclosure 2), which discuss the corrosion problems associated with this tank, are enclosed. The review of the first event should also consider this problem.

The second event (Enclosure 3) was the contamination of the area around the Brunswick 2 Radwaste Building. This was caused by a steam release from the auxiliary steam system. Radioactivity had been drawn back into a steam heating supply line from the concentrated waste tank during cooling of the steam line. This activity was released when the steam line was inadvertently pressurized lifting a steam relief valve.

We request that DSE review the above events at Millstone 2 and Brunswick 2. The evaluation should address the safety and environmental significance of the events, the generic implications, and recommendations to resolve any identified problems. This should include estimates of the possible exposures to the public offsite from the two events.

Contact: J. Donohew, EEB/DOR
28066

The review of corrective action for LERs is an OI&E responsibility. Consequently, OI&E should be contacted to obtain further technical information on the occurrences. Additional information requests to the licensee (if any are needed) should be discussed with the DOR contact, J. Donohew.

The review should also address the applicability of this evaluation to the CP/OL licensing process. Should the review lead to any changes in the licensing positions, these changes should be addressed in your response to ensure consistent technical positions for both DSE and EEB.

The DOR contact for this technical assistance request is Jack Donohew.

Victor Stello, Jr., Director
Division of Operating Reactors

Enclosures:
As stated

cc: B. Grimes
D. Eisenhut
R. Vollmer
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Section B/EEB

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DATE	7/27/78	7/28/78	7/28/78	7/28/78	8/3/78	

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RECOMMENDATIONS TO REDUCE PERSONNEL ERROR OFTEN LEADING TO UNPLANNED RADIOACTIVE RELEASES AT LWRs

1. Avoid jerry-rig maintenance. Prompt repairs and maintenance can normally be completed in a calendar quarter. Temporary repairs are often forgotten by the operating personnel.

2. Do not introduce live steam or compressed gases into a radioactive liquid tank without adequate provisions for controlling the potential radioactive materials in gaseous releases.

3. Do not connect contaminated systems to non-contaminated systems without adequate back flow control, such as a check valve or syphon break to assure that potentially radioactive materials are not inadvertently transferred into non-contaminated systems.