

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: [][][][][][] ① (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

① A | L | B | R | F | 2 | ② 0 | 0 | - | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | 0 | ③ 4 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | ④ [][] | ⑤ [][]

8 9 14 15 29 36 47 57 CAT 58

REPORT SOURCE: ⑥ L | ⑦ G | ⑧ 0 | ⑨ 5 | ⑩ 0 | ⑪ 0 | ⑫ 0 | ⑬ 2 | ⑭ 6 | ⑮ 0 | ⑯ 7 | ⑰ 0 | ⑱ 9 | ⑲ 2 | ⑳ 1 | ㉑ 8 | ㉒ 2 | ㉓ ① 1 | ㉔ 0 | ㉕ 1 | ㉖ 9 | ㉗ 8 | ㉘ 2 | ㉙ ②

60 61 68 69 74 75 80

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES ⑩

① During refueling outage, while performing a routine inspection, a small pinhole

② leak was discovered in a 3-inch fire protection line which supplies water to

③ ten (10) cable-tray fixed water spray systems. The systems remained operable

④ until removed from service for repair (T.S. 3.11.A.5). There was no effect on

⑤ public health and safety. There are no redundant systems but a patrolling firewatch

⑥ was established during repairs in accordance with Technical Specification 3.11.A.2.

SYSTEM CODE: ① A | ② B | ③ ④ ⑤ ⑥ ⑦ ⑧

CAUSE CODE: ① X | ② ③ ④ ⑤ ⑥ ⑦ ⑧ ⑨ ⑩ ⑪

CAUSE SUBCODE: ① Z | ② ③ ④ ⑤ ⑥ ⑦ ⑧ ⑨ ⑩ ⑪

COMPONENT CODE: ① P | ② I | ③ P | ④ E | ⑤ X | ⑥ X | ⑦ ⑧ ⑨ ⑩ ⑪ ⑫

COMP. SUBCODE: ① A | ② ③ ④ ⑤ ⑥ ⑦ ⑧ ⑨ ⑩ ⑪ ⑫

VALVE SUBCODE: ① Z | ② ③ ④ ⑤ ⑥ ⑦ ⑧ ⑨ ⑩ ⑪ ⑫

LER/RO REPORT NUMBER: ① 8 | ② 2 | ③ ④ ⑤ ⑥ ⑦ ⑧ ⑨ ⑩ ⑪ ⑫

EVENT YEAR: ① 8 | ② 2 | ③ ④ ⑤ ⑥ ⑦ ⑧ ⑨ ⑩ ⑪ ⑫

SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.: ① 0 | ② 2 | ③ 9 | ④ ⑤ ⑥ ⑦ ⑧ ⑨ ⑩ ⑪ ⑫

OCCURRENCE CODE: ① 0 | ② 3 | ③ ④ ⑤ ⑥ ⑦ ⑧ ⑨ ⑩ ⑪ ⑫

REPORT TYPE: ① L | ② ③ ④ ⑤ ⑥ ⑦ ⑧ ⑨ ⑩ ⑪ ⑫

REVISION NO.: ① 0 | ② ③ ④ ⑤ ⑥ ⑦ ⑧ ⑨ ⑩ ⑪ ⑫

ACTION TAKEN: ① B | ② ③ ④ ⑤ ⑥ ⑦ ⑧ ⑨ ⑩ ⑪ ⑫

FUTURE ACTION: ① X | ② ③ ④ ⑤ ⑥ ⑦ ⑧ ⑨ ⑩ ⑪ ⑫

EFFECT ON PLANT: ① Z | ② ③ ④ ⑤ ⑥ ⑦ ⑧ ⑨ ⑩ ⑪ ⑫

SHUTDOWN METHOD: ① Z | ② ③ ④ ⑤ ⑥ ⑦ ⑧ ⑨ ⑩ ⑪ ⑫

HOURS: ① 0 | ② 0 | ③ 0 | ④ 0 | ⑤ ⑥ ⑦ ⑧ ⑨ ⑩ ⑪ ⑫

ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED: ① Y | ② ③ ④ ⑤ ⑥ ⑦ ⑧ ⑨ ⑩ ⑪ ⑫

NPRD-4 FORM SUB.: ① N | ② ③ ④ ⑤ ⑥ ⑦ ⑧ ⑨ ⑩ ⑪ ⑫

PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER: ① L | ② ③ ④ ⑤ ⑥ ⑦ ⑧ ⑨ ⑩ ⑪ ⑫

COMPONENT MANUFACTURER: ① X | ② 9 | ③ 9 | ④ 9 | ⑤ ⑥ ⑦ ⑧ ⑨ ⑩ ⑪ ⑫

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS ②⑦

① The pipe failure appears to be caused by a through-wall pitting corrosion attack.

② The through-wall hole was repaired by welding and hydrostatically tested. A

③ patrolling firewatch was established during repairs. Ultrasonic tests will be

④ conducted to determine the extent of this problem. Testing and determination

⑤ will be completed by February 1, 1983.

FACILITY STATUS: ① H | ② ③ ④ ⑤ ⑥ ⑦ ⑧ ⑨ ⑩ ⑪ ⑫

% POWER: ① 0 | ② 0 | ③ 0 | ④ ⑤ ⑥ ⑦ ⑧ ⑨ ⑩ ⑪ ⑫

OTHER STATUS: ① NA | ② ③ ④ ⑤ ⑥ ⑦ ⑧ ⑨ ⑩ ⑪ ⑫

METHOD OF DISCOVERY: ① B | ② ③ ④ ⑤ ⑥ ⑦ ⑧ ⑨ ⑩ ⑪ ⑫

DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION: ① Routine Inspection | ② ③ ④ ⑤ ⑥ ⑦ ⑧ ⑨ ⑩ ⑪ ⑫

AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY: ① NA | ② ③ ④ ⑤ ⑥ ⑦ ⑧ ⑨ ⑩ ⑪ ⑫

LOCATION OF RELEASE: ① NA | ② ③ ④ ⑤ ⑥ ⑦ ⑧ ⑨ ⑩ ⑪ ⑫

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES: ① ② ③ ④ ⑤ ⑥ ⑦ ⑧ ⑨ ⑩ ⑪ ⑫

PERSONNEL INJURIES: ① ② ③ ④ ⑤ ⑥ ⑦ ⑧ ⑨ ⑩ ⑪ ⑫

LOSS OF CARGO/PAGE TO FACILITY: ① NA | ② ③ ④ ⑤ ⑥ ⑦ ⑧ ⑨ ⑩ ⑪ ⑫

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PDR ADOCK 05000260
S PDR

NRC USE ONLY

LER SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

BFRO-50- 260 / 82029 Technical Specification Involved 3.11.A.2/3.11.A.5

Reported Under Technical Specification 6.7.2.b.(2) Date Due NRC 10/20/82

Event Narrative:

Unit 1 was operating at 97-percent power; unit 2 was in a refueling outage; and unit 3 was operating at 97-percent power. Only unit 2 was affected by the event. While performing a routine inspection, a small pinhole was discovered in a 3-inch fire protection line which supplies water to 10 cable-tray fixed water spray systems. The systems remained operable until removed from service per Technical Specification (T.S.) 3.11.A.5. There was no effect on public health and safety. There are no redundant systems, but a patrolling firewatch was established during repairs in accordance with T.S. 3.11.A.2. The pipe failure appears to be caused by a through-wall pitting corrosion attack. The through-wall hole was repaired by welding and hydrostatically tested. Through-wall leaks have occurred in raw water systems in the past. The pipe has been removed and sent offsite for a metallurgical analysis. The results of this investigation showed that through-wall pitting was caused by a sulfide corrosion attack. It was concluded that stagnant raw water pipes would be ultrasonically tested for wall thinning or pitting. The lowest stagnant points of all safety-related fire protection systems were tested and the evaluation confirmed that widespread corrosion and/or degradation had not occurred in the fire protection system. Ultrasonic tests will also be conducted on this section of pipe to determine the extent of corrosion damage and the possible need for piping replacement. This testing and determination will be completed by February 1, 1983.

* Previous Similar Events:

None.

Retention: Period - Lifetime; Responsibility - Document Control Supervisor

*Revision: JRP