

DATE: 11/26/90

J H Joyner James H Joyner  
(NAME)

NRC Regions 11/26/90

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
REGION I

Report No. 50-286/90-18

Docket No. 50-286

License No. DPR-64

Licensee: Power Authority of the State of New York  
P.O. Box 215  
Buchanan, New York 10511

Facility Name: Indian Point 3 Nuclear Power Plant

Inspection At: Buchanan, New York

Inspection Conducted: October 22-25, 1990

Inspector: T. W. Dexter 11/26/90  
T. W. Dexter, Physical Security Inspector date

Approved by: R. R. Kelmig 11-27-90  
R. R. Kelmig, Chief, Safeguards Section, DRSS date

Inspection Summary: Special Security Inspection on October 22-25, 1990.  
(Report No. 50-286/90-18)

Areas Inspected: Onsite follow-up of previously identified concerns during plant outage; Management of the Security Program; Protected and Vital Area Physical Barriers, Detection and Assessment Aids; Protected and Vital Area Access Control of Personnel, Packages, and Vehicles.

Results: The licensee was in compliance with NRC requirements in the areas inspected; however, potential weaknesses were identified in the areas of protected area detection aids and access control of personnel, packages and vehicles.

9012140020 901127  
PDR ADOCK 05000286  
PDC

## DETAILS

### 1.0 Key Personnel Contacted

#### Licensee Personnel

- \*J. Russell, Resident Manager
- \*M. Peckham, Assistant to Resident Manager
- \*R. Tansky, Training Superintendent
- \*D. Halama, Quality Assurance Superintendent
- \*E. Sackman, Manager of Security - Corporate
- \*J. Hahn, Security Manager
- \*W. Weady, Security Supervisory
- \*M. Leonard, Security Coordinator
- J. Fitzsimmons, Assistant Security Manager
- J. Norton, I&C Supervisor

#### U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)

L. Rossbach, Senior Resident Inspector

\*present at the exit meeting

### 2.0 Purpose and Scope of the Inspection

The purpose of this regional initiative inspection was to followup on the violations and NRC's concerns discussed in Inspection Report Nos. 50-286/89-05 and 89-15 and in the Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP) Report No. 50-286/88-99 and to review the licensee's continued actions to correct those previously identified problems. Since most of those problems were attributed by the licensee to outage activities, this inspection was conducted during a plant outage to assess the effectiveness of the licensee's corrective actions, implemented to date, while similar outage conditions existed.

### 3.0 Management of the Security Program

Management attention to the physical security program and to the previously identified problems was very apparent during this inspection. This observation is based upon the inspector's review of the licensee's actions relative to the current plant outage and the licensee's adherence to security plan commitments for the protected area (PA), isolation zones and Vital Areas (VAs), as discussed in this report. The inspector noted that the licensee was using a contract security force to supplement the regular proprietary security force during the outage. However, due to procurement problems and training requirements, the contract security force was not in place at the beginning of the outage and members of the proprietary force were working about 25 percent overtime. With the supplementary force, the overtime has been somewhat reduced, but the general feeling among the proprietary security force members (SFMs), as

related to the inspector during interviews, is that even less overtime is desirable. The licensee was briefed on the results of the interviews and agreed to look into this matter further.

4.0 Protected and Vital Area Physical Barriers, Detection and Assessment Aids

- 4.1 Protected Area Barriers - The inspector conducted a physical inspection of the Protected Area (PA) barrier on October 22 and 23, 1990. The inspector determined, by observation, that the barrier was installed and maintained as described in the Plan. No deficiencies were noted.
- 4.2 Vital Area Barriers - The inspector conducted a physical inspection of several Vital Area (VA) barriers on October 23 and 24, 1990. The inspector determined, by observation, that the barriers were installed and maintained as described in the Plan. No deficiencies were noted.
- 4.3 Protected Area Detection Aids - The inspector observed testing of the PA perimeter detection aids on October 24, 1990, and determined that they were installed, maintained and operated as committed to in the Plan.

THIS PARAGRAPH CONTAINS SAFEGUARDED  
INFORMATION AND IS NOT FOR PUBLIC  
DISCLOSURE, IT IS INTENTIONALLY  
LEFT BLANK.

The licensee had the I&C maintenance technicians working to repair these deficiencies the next day. The licensee committed to correct the IDS on this and other similar applications.

- 4.4 Isolation Zones - The inspector verified throughout the inspection that isolation zones were maintained to permit observation of activities on both sides of the PA barrier. No deficiencies were noted.

4.5 Protected Area and Isolation Zone Lighting

The inspector conducted a PA and isolation zone lighting survey on October 23, 1990, from approximately 8:00 p.m. to 11:00 p.m., accompanied by the Security Manager and a security coordinator. The inspector determined, by observation, that all areas were adequately illuminated and that the licensee is effectively using portable

lighting to supplement temporary losses of permanent lighting and to illuminate areas that have been somewhat darkened by outage facilities and activities. No deficiencies were noted.

- 4.6 Assessment Aids - The inspector observed the use of assessment aids and other security equipment in operation in the Central Alarm Station (CAS) between approximately 10:00 p.m. and 11:00 p.m., on October 23, 1990, and on October 24, 1990, during daylight hours. Significant improvements in assessment were noted and additional improvements are underway. Compensatory measures were in place in areas where potential weaknesses existed. No deficiencies were observed.

THIS PARAGRAPH CONTAINS SAFEGUARDS  
INFORMATION AND IS NOT FOR PUBLIC  
DISCLOSURE, IT IS INTENTIONALLY  
LEFT BLANK.

The continuing assessment upgrades will be reviewed during subsequent inspections.

5.0 Protected and Vital Area Access Control of Personnel, Packages, and Vehicles

- 5.1 The inspector determined that the licensee was generally exercising positive control over personnel access to the PA and VAs. This determination was based on the following:
- 5.1.1 The inspector verified that personnel are properly identified and authorization is checked prior to issuance of badges and key-cards.
- 5.1.2 The inspector verified that the licensee has a search program, as committed to in the Plan, for firearms, explosives, incendiary devices and other unauthorized materials. The inspector observed plant personnel and visitor access processing several times during the inspection and interviewed members of the security force and the licensee's security staff about personnel access procedures. One potential weakness was identified.

THIS PARAGRAPH CONTAINS SAFEGUARDS  
INFORMATION AND IS NOT FOR PUBLIC  
DISCLOSURE, IT IS INTENTIONALLY  
LEFT BLANK.

THIS PARAGRAPH CONTAINS SAFEGUARDED  
INFORMATION AND IS NOT FOR PUBLIC  
DISCLOSURE, IT IS INTENTIONALLY  
LEFT BLANK.

This item will be reviewed during subsequent inspections.

5.2 The inspector determined that the licensee had established and implemented adequate controls for vehicle access to and within the PA. The inspector observed vehicle processing several times during the course of the inspection and verified that vehicles are properly processed prior to entering the PA.

#### 6.0 Exit Interview

The inspector met with the licensee's representatives indicated in paragraph 1 at the conclusion of the inspection on October 25, 1990. At that time, the purpose and scope of the inspection were reviewed and the findings were presented. The licensee's commitments, as documented in this report, were reviewed and confirmed with the licensee.