U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

DOCKET/REPORT NO:	50-245/94-13
LICENSE NO:	DPR-21
LICENSEE:	Northeast Nuclear Energy Company P. O. Box 270 Hartford, Connecticut 06141-0270
FACILITY NAME:	Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1
INSPECTION AT:	Waterford, Connecticut
INSPECTION DATES:	March 28-31, 1994

INSPECTOR: Carl Sisco 4/21/94

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Date

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Date

Inspection Summary: Inspection conducted March 28-31, 1994 (Inspection Report No. 50-245/94-13).

Areas Inspected: A regional initiative safety inspection was conducted of the Millstone Unit 1 outage activities by observing ongoing outage activities conducted in the control room and in the plant. NRC Inspection procedure 62700 was used during the inspection.

Results: The inspector identified a Severity Level IV violation of NRC requirements in that a replacement valve was installed in the service water system without first conducting a replacement item evaluation in accordance with NU procedures. An executive summary follows.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

An announced inspection was conducted from March 28 to March 31, 1994, at the Millstone Unit 1 power plant. The purpose of the inspection was to observe outage activities in the control room as well as in the plant.

Engineering

The inspector identified a Severity Level IV violation in that a replacement valve was modified and installed in the service water system without first conducting a replacement item evaluation in accordance with NU procedures.

Also, the inspector identified an inaccurate control room drawing due to a PDCR that had not been closed out in a timely manner. An NU review concluded that this was an isolated incident.

Maintenance

The inspector noted examples of poor attention to detail, including clogged room ventilation filters, damaged electrical wiring housings, an incorrect work order, and poor battery room housekeeping.

Also, the inspector concluded that a long-term water leak into the torus room had been about one gallon per minute. NU stated they plan to repair the leak prior to restart.

Operations

The inspector concluded outage activities were conducted in a business-like manner at the work control center. In addition, the operators were attentive to the plant controls.

DETAILS

1.0 INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this inspection was to conduct observations of ongoing outage activities in the control room and in the plant. NRC Inspection procedure 62700 was used during the inspection. The inspection findings are reported using the functional areas of operations, maintenance, and engineering, as used in the systematic assessment of license performance (SALP).

2.0 MAINTENANCE

The inspector identified that the shutdown cooling pump room cooler filters were blocking air flow. Northeast Utilities (NU) took prompt corrective actions to replace the room coolers filters. In addition, NU inspected and replaced other pump room cooler filters as necessary. The inspector also identified minor housekeeping problems in the "A" station battery room. A replaced battery cell cover and pair of work gloves were removed by NU from the battery room.

The inspector identified electrical wiring housings of pressure switches associated with torus/drywell vacuum breakers were not securely fastened. At the exit meeting, NU stated these electrical wiring housings would be tightened prior to plant startup.

The inspector reviewed work orders 93-01994 and 94-05292/05577 concerning a water leak through the reactor building wall into the reactor building. Water was leaking from the demineralized water header and the control rod drive pump minimum flow lines as the piping passes through the wall. Based on a review of water inventory records, the inspector concluded the leakage into the reactor building has been about one gallon per minute. At the exit meeting, NU stated the leak into the reactor building would be repaired before the plant is restarted.

The inspector reviewed work order 94-05779/05780 that authorized adjustments to plant equipment during integrated leak rate testing (ILRT). At the exit meeting, NU explained the work orders were in error, as the authorized work should have been for local leak rate testing (LLRT). The inspector noted that the ILRT had not been conducted during the time of the inspection and concluded typographical errors had occurred, but that the error should have been corrected during the review process.

3.0 OPERATIONS

The inspector observed routine control room activities. The inspector observed that the operators were attentive to the plant controls and conducted their activities in a professional manner. In addition, outage activities conducted at the work control center (in the control room) were conducted in a business-like manner.

4.0 ENGINEERING

4.1 Service Water System Valve Replacement

The inspector reviewed the NU activities in the replacement of service water system valve SW-9. SW-9 was replaced with a valve that had a valve stem 1/4 inch smaller than the original. On March 5, 1994, NU installed the valve into the system to allow system testing prior to evaluating the differences between valves or initiating a plant design change request (PDCR). NU was aware of the valve differences on March 5, 1994.

The NRC resident staff identified that design change control measures were not implemented for the modifications to the SW-9 valve. The valve as installed in the plant did not have any tagging identifying that the valve did not meet design control measures. In response to the NRC resident concerns, NU documented, in plant information report 1-94-142, dated March 19, 1994, that a PDCR was required. The PDCR was prepared on March 19, 1994.

The inspector reviewed Nuclear Engineering and Operations Procedure NEO-12, "Evaluation of a Replacement Item." Based on a review of this procedure, the inspector determined that NU had failed to perform a replacement item design evaluation of the modified SW-9 valve prior to placing the valve in the service water system. The replacement item evaluation would have indicated that a PDCR was required before placing the new valve in the system. This is a violation of 10 CFR Appendix B, Criterion III. (VIO 94-14-01)

4.2 Plant Drawing Control

The inspector reviewed plant design change request (PDCR) 91-115 concerning the placement of filters in the air/nitrogen supply lines to the safety relief valves located inside primary containment. As a result of this review, the inspector determined that the PDCR was not closed, and control room drawings (25202-26009/26012) did not contain reference to the PDCR or show the installed filters. NU took prompt corrective actions to correct the control room drawings and close the open PDCR. Based on discussions with NU, the inspector determined this open PDCR was an isolated incident.

5.0 EXIT MEETING

An exit meeting was conducted on site on March 31, 1994. The inspector discussed the findings of the inspection with those individuals identified below. NU representatives acknowledged the inspector findings as described in the report.

Northeast Nuclear Energy Company

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