

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: _____ (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0 1 | V | A | S | P | S | 1 | 2 | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | 0 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 5
9 LICENSEE CODE 14 15 LICENSE NUMBER 25 26 LICENSE TYPE JO 57 CAT 58

CONT
0 1 | REPORT SOURCE | L | 6 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 8 | 0 | 7 | 0 | 9 | 2 | 0 | 8 | 2 | 8 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 8 | 8 | 2 | 9
60 61 DOCKET NUMBER 66 69 EVENT DATE 74 75 REPORT DATE 80

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 2 | With both units at 100% power, power was lost for ten minutes to the following
0 3 | Radiation Monitors: RI-GW-101, 102; VG-103, 104 and RM-LW-108. This is contrary
0 4 | to T.S. 3.11.A.5, 3.11.R.4, 3.7 and 4.9C and is reportable per T.S.6.6.2.b.(4).
0 5 | Since the applicable AP's were performed and the release that was in progress was
0 6 | terminated immediately, the health and safety of the public were not affected.
0 7 |
0 8 |

0 9 | SYSTEM CODE | M | I | C | 11 | CAUSE CODE | A | 12 | CAUSE SUBCODE | C | 13 | COMPONENT CODE | C | K | T | B | R | K | 14 | COMP. SUBCODE | A | 15 | VALVE SUBCODE | Z | 16 |
17 | LER/RO REPORT NUMBER | 8 | 2 | 21 | 22 | SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. | 0 | 9 | 9 | 24 | OCCURRENCE CODE | 0 | 3 | 28 | 29 | REPORT TYPE | L | 30 | REVISION NO. | 0 | 32 |
ACTION TAKEN | A | 18 | FUTURE ACTION | Z | 19 | EFFECT ON PLANT | Z | 20 | SHUTDOWN METHOD | 21 | HOURS | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 22 | ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED | Y | 23 | NPRO-4 FORM SUB. | N | 24 | PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER | L | 25 | COMPONENT MANUFACTURER | X | 9 | 9 | 9 | 26 |

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 | Inadvertent shorting of a control relay to ground caused a supply fuse to blow,
1 1 | thereby creating a loss of power to the monitors. The fuse was replaced and the
1 2 | monitors returned to service within ten minutes.
1 3 |
1 4 |

1 5 | FACILITY STATUS | E | 28 | % POWER | 1 | 0 | 0 | 29 | OTHER STATUS | N/A | 30 | METHOD OF DISCOVERY | A | 31 | DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION | Operator Observation | 32 |

1 6 | ACTIVITY CONTENT RELEASED OF RELEASE | Z | 33 | AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY | N/A | 35 | LOCATION OF RELEASE | N/A | 36 |

1 7 | PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER | 0 | 0 | 0 | 37 | TYPE | Z | 38 | DESCRIPTION | N/A | 39 |

1 8 | PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER | 0 | 0 | 0 | 40 | DESCRIPTION | N/A | 41 |

1 9 | LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE | Z | 42 | DESCRIPTION | N/A | 43 |

2 0 | PUBLICITY ISSUED DESCRIPTION | N | 44 | DESCRIPTION | 8210220413 821008 PDR AD0CK 0500C280 S PDR | 45 | NRC USE ONLY | 68 59 |
NAME OF PREPARED | J. L. Wilson | PHONE | (804) 357-3184

ATTACHMENT 1
SURRY POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 1
DOCKET NO: 50-280
REPORT NO: 82-099/03L-0
EVENT DATE: 09-20-82

TITLE OF THE EVENT: Loss of Power to Radiation Monitors

1. DESCRIPTION OF THE EVENT:

With both units at 100% power, electrical power was lost to the following radiation monitors: RI-GW-101, 102; RM-VG-103, 104 and RM-LW-108. This is contrary to Tech. Spec. 3.11.A.5, 3.11.B.4, 4.9C and 3.7, Table 3.7-5.

This event is reportable per Tech. Spec. 6.6.2.b.(4).

2. PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES and STATUS of REDUNDANT EQUIPMENT:

The above radiation monitors serve to provide indication and recording of gross activity levels. In addition, they provide alarm functions and selected monitors provide control actions.

The actions required by applicable abnormal procedures were performed, e.g. termination of liquid waste release. The release that was in progress was within allowable Tech. Spec. limits. Also the monitors were returned to service within ten minutes, therefore the health and safety of the public were not affected.

3. CAUSE:

The loss of power to the monitors was due to a blown fuse. The blown fuse was caused by inadvertent shorting of a control relay to ground while Instrument Technicians were investigating a monitor malfunction.

4. IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTION:

Applicable abnormal procedures were performed. The blown fuse was replaced and all radiation monitors were returned to service within ten minutes.

5. SUBSEQUENT CORRECTIVE ACTION:

None.

6. ACTIONS TAKEN TO PREVENT RECURRENCE:

Since procedures are available to cope with this type failure, no additional actions are deemed necessary.

7. GENERIC IMPLICATIONS:

None.