



UNITED STATES  
 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
 REGION II  
 101 MARIETTA ST., N.W., SUITE 3100  
 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303

Report Nos. 50-250/82-28 and 50-251/82-28

Licensee: Florida Power & Light Company  
 9250 West Flagler Street  
 Miami, FL 33101

Facility Name: Turkey Point 3 and 4

Docket Nos. 50-250 and 50-251

License Nos. DPR-31 and DPR-41

Inspection at Turkey Point site near Homestead, Florida

Inspector: C-Julian for  
 R. J. Vogt-Lowell

8/24/82  
 Date Signed

Accompanying Personnel: J. A. Agles

Approved by: C-Julian  
 C. Julian, Section Chief, Division of Project  
 and Resident Programs

8/24/82  
 Date Signed

SUMMARY

Inspection on June 26 - July 25, 1982

Areas Inspected

This routine, announced inspection involved 213 resident inspector-hours on site in the areas of followup on licensee actions on previous inspection findings; LER review; plant operations; surveillance test observation; and plant tours.

Results

Of the five areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified in four areas; one violation was found in one area (Violation - Failure to maintain locked a high radiation area - paragraph 8).

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## DETAILS

### 1. Persons Contacted

#### Licensee Employees

- \*D. W. Haase, Plant Manager Nuclear (Acting)
- J. P. Mendieta, Maintenance Superintendent Nuclear
- \*V. A. Kaminskas, Operations Superintendent - Nuclear (Acting)
- J. P. Lowman, Assistant Superintendent Mechanical Maintenance - Nuclear
- L. L. Thomas, Assistant Superintendent Mechanical Maintenance
- W. R. Williams, Assistant Superintendent Electrical Maintenance - Nuclear
- \*J. W. Kappes, Instrumentation and Control Supervisor
- V. B. Wager, Operations Supervisor
- J. S. Wade, Chemistry Supervisor
- \*P. W. Hughes, Health Physics Supervisor
- \*D. W. Jones, Quality Control Supervisor
- K. N. York, Document Control Supervisor
- J. A. Labarraque, Technical Department Supervisor
- J. C. Balaguero, Licensing Engineer
- \*S. Feith, Operations QA Supervisor
- \*H. N. Paduano, Manager Nuclear Energy-Services

Other licensee employees contacted included technicians, operators, mechanics and security force members.

\*Attended exit interview

### 2. Exit Interview

The inspection scope and findings were summarized on August 3, 1982, with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The inspector maintained frequent unprogrammed discussions and communications with the Plant Manager during the inspection report period. The licensee did not take exception to the findings discussed in this report.

### 3. Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings

- a. (Closed) 251/81-28-02 - Spent Fuel Pit Doors. The inspectors reviewed the licensee safety evaluation and had no further questions.
- b. (Closed) 50-250, 251/82-21-03 - Failure to Update O.P. 9600.1. The inspector reviewed the licensee's corrective action and had no further questions.

### 4. Unresolved Items

Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required to determine whether they are acceptable or may involve noncompliance or

deviations. New unresolved items identified during this inspection are discussed in paragraph 6.

5. Licensee Event Report (LER) Followup

The following LER's were reviewed and closed. The inspector verified that reporting requirements had been met, causes had been identified, corrective actions appeared appropriate, generic applicability had been considered, and the LER forms were complete. Additionally, for those reports identified by asterisk, a more detailed review was performed to verify that the licensee had reviewed the event, corrective action had been taken, no unreviewed safety questions were involved, and violations of regulations or technical specification conditions had been identified.

\*250-82-04, Augmented Surveillance.

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The inspector confirmed the addition of step 8.61 to O.P. 202.2, "Unit Startup, Hot Shutdown to Power Operation" which introduces a signoff requirement for initiation of the augmented surveillance. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed a letter of agreement between the Instrumentation and Control (I&C) department and the Reactor Engineering department whereby concurrence from Reactor Engineering will be sought any time I&C personnel will be removing the plant computer from service.

250-82-06, Emergency Diesel Generator "A" Trip.

\*250-82-07, Blowdown Snubber Failure

The inspector witnessed the performance of the special instruction on blowdown system valve lineup and operation by the licensee. The instruction appeared to be successful in avoiding hydraulic shocking of the system.

250-82-08, 3A High Head Safety Injection Pump

250-82-09, Missed Surveillance (Tritium Analysis).

250-82-10, Component Cooling Water Pump Pipe Support.

251-82-05, Condensate Storage Tank Level.

251-82-08, "4A" Main Feedwater Check Valve.

251-82-09, T(ave) and Delta T Surveillance.

## 6. Plant Operations

The inspector kept informed on a daily basis of the overall plant status and any significant safety matters related to plant operations. Discussions were held with plant management and various members of the operations staff on a regular basis. Selected portions of daily operating logs and operating data sheets were reviewed during the report period. The inspector conducted various plant tours and made frequent visits to the control room. Observations included witnessing work activities in progress, status of operating and standby safety systems, confirming valve positions, instrument readings and recordings, annunciator alarms, housekeeping, radiation area controls, and vital area controls. Informal discussions were held with operators and other personnel on work activities in progress and the status of safety-related equipment or systems.

On July 7, 1982, the inspectors witnessed Unit 4 shutdown from 100% power to the hot shutdown condition (boron added to hot shutdown, xenon free condition) in accordance with O.P. 205.1, "Unit Shutdown, Full Load to Hot Shutdown Conditions" and O.P. 205.2, "Reactor Shutdown, Hot Shutdown to Cold Shutdown Conditions". During the shutdown, the inspector observed Instrumentation and Control (IC) technicians performing the adjustment of the nuclear instrumentation intermediate range compensating voltage as per O.P. 12207.1, "Intermediate Range Nuclear Instrumentation - Compensating Voltage Adjustments". The inspector noted that the procedure could not be performed as written within one hour of shutdown. Discussions with the I&C technicians revealed that the procedure could also not be performed as procedurally prescribed during the Unit 4 shutdown on June 4, 1982. Licensee representatives stated that defective detector cables are the suspected cause of their inability to properly adjust the compensation on the intermediate range channels. The licensee is pursuing a solution to this problem. At the conclusion of the inspection report period, the inspector was unable to obtain any documentation that would disclose that the licensee had evaluated the adequacy and acceptability of operation with the voltage compensation issue remaining open. This is an unresolved item pending review of the results of the licensee's further evaluation (50-251/82-28-02).

The inspector performed a tagout audit on clearance number 7-71 for Unit 4's BIT (Boron Injection Tank) inlet isolation valves. The various clearance tags placed on equipment related to the overhauling of the BIT inlet isolation valves were verified to be technically and administratively correct.

On July 14, 1982 the inspector performed an emergency diesel generator lineup verification in accordance with O.P. 4303.1 and noted no discrepancies.

## 7. Surveillance Test Observation

On June 6, 1982, and July 12, 1982 the inspector witnessed the performance on Unit 4 and Unit 3 respectively, of periodic test O.P. 4004.1, "Containment Spray Pumps - Periodic Test"

On July 15, 1982 the inspector witnessed performance of O.P. 4104.1, "High Head Safety Injection System - Periodic Test" on both Units 3 and 4 safety injection pumps.

On July 9, 1982 the inspector witnessed performance of O.P. 209.3, "Inservice Pumps Testing Program Implementation Procedure for Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps". Testing of the A and B pumps was observed from the control room. Testing of C pump was observed locally. The inspector verified the following aspects of these surveillance tests: the procedures conformed to technical specification requirements; proper licensee review; test instrumentation was calibrated; removal of the system from service; conduct of the surveillance test; restoration of the system to service; review of the test data for accuracy and completeness; confirmation that surveillance test documentation was reviewed and test discrepancies were rectified; test results satisfied technical specification requirements; testing was done by qualified personnel; and the surveillance schedule for this test was met.

No violations or deviations were identified within the areas inspected.

#### 8. Plant Tours

Various plant tours were conducted by the inspectors. Attention was focused on the operability of safety-related equipment in the following areas: cable spreading room; inverter and battery room; motor generator set and battery rooms; rod control equipment rooms; switchgear rooms; diesel generators rooms and day tank rooms; and auxiliary building.

During a tour of the Auxiliary Building on July 1, 1982 at approximately 1:15 p.m., the inspector noted that both ground level gates to the RHR pit stairwells on Unit 4 were open and unattended. The inspectors notified the health physics supervisor of the condition and the gates were promptly locked. The observed condition was a violation of the requirements of Technical Specification 6.12.1.b which states that entrances to a high radiation area with dose rates greater than 1 Rem/hour shall be locked to prevent unauthorized entry. Current licensee radiation surveys showed that there were accessible areas in the RHR pit stairway area with dose rates greater than 1 Rem/hour.

This is a violation (50-251/82-28-01).