



CONNECTICUT YANKEE ATOMIC POWER COMPANY

HADDAM NECK PLANT

RR#1 • BOX 127E • EAST HAMPTON, CT 06424-9341

December 7, 1990

Re: 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D. C. 20555

Reference: Facility Operating License No. DPR-61
Docket No. 50-213
Reportable Occurrence LER 50-213/90-028-00

Gentlemen:

This letter forwards the Licensee Event Report 90-028-00, required to be submitted, pursuant to the requirements of Connecticut Yankee Technical Specifications.

Very truly yours,

John P. Stetz
Station Director

JPS/dl

Attachment: LER 50-213/90-028-00

cc: Mr. Thomas T. Martin
Regional Administrator, Region I
475 Allendale Road
King of Prussia, PA 19406

J. T. Shedlosky
Sr. Resident Inspector
Haddam Neck

9012120225 901207
PDR 3DOCK 05000213
S PDC

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1): **Haddam Neck** DOCKET NUMBER (2): **0 5 0 0 0 2 1 3** PAGE (3): **1 OF 0 3**

TITLE (4): **Inadequate Number of Shutdown Monitors Inservice**

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)		REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)			
MONTH	DA	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES		
1	1	08	90	02	8	0	1	2	07	9	0
											0 5 0 0 0

OPERATING MODE (9): **5** THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 5. (Check one or more of the following) (11)

20.402(i)	20.406(i)	50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)
20.406(k)(1)(i)	50.73(a)(1)	50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(c)
20.406(k)(1)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)	50.73(a)(2)(iv)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)
20.406(k)(1)(iii)	X 50.73(a)(2)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	
20.406(k)(1)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	
20.406(k)(1)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(ix)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12):
NAME: **J. J. LaPlatney, Operations Manager** TELEPHONE NUMBER: **203 267-2556**

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14): YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) NO

EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15): MONTH: **11** DAY: **15** YEAR: **90**

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

ABSTRACT

On November 8, 1990, at 0745 hours, with the plant in Mode 5 (cold shutdown) the operations shift Supervisor noted that one of two shutdown monitors was out of service due to modification work on its associated wide range nuclear instrumentation drawer (channel 1). Technical Specification 3.3.3.9 requires that both shutdown monitors be operable in Modes 3, 4, 5 and 6. Following discovery of this condition the shift supervisor immediately complied with the Technical Specification action statement requirements. The root cause of this event is personnel error due to the failure of licensed operators to identify a limiting condition for operation (LCO) prior to removing equipment from service for modification work. A contributory cause was that this was a new requirement on new equipment. Corrective action consisted of counseling the personnel involved and modifying the licensed operator requalification program to place additional emphasis on identification of LCO's, in particular, those that are new requirements. This event is reportable under 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) since it resulted in a condition prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1) Haddam Neck	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 6 0 0 0 2 1 3 9 0	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
		0	28	0	0	2	OF

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 306A's) (17)

BACKGROUND INFORMATION

Haddam Neck's conversion to revised Technical Specifications that are in the Westinghouse Standard Technical Specification format was completed in May 1990. These revised Technical Specifications added many new requirements that did not exist in the old specifications. Among these changes was the addition of specification 3.3.3.9, Boron Dilution Alarm, which requires that both of the new shutdown monitors, installed during the 1989/1990 refueling outage, be operable in Modes 3, 4, 5 and 6. Plant operators received training on both the revised Technical Specifications and the new nuclear instrumentation system (EIIIS Code: JC), of which the shutdown monitors are a part, during the 1989/1990 refueling outage.

EVENT DESCRIPTION

On November 8, 1990, at 0745 hours, with the plant in Mode 5 (cold shutdown) the operations shift supervisor noted that one of two shutdown monitors was out of service due to modification work on its associated wide range nuclear instrumentation drawer (channel 1). Following discovery of this condition the shift supervisor immediately complied with the Technical Specification action statement which requires continuous monitoring of the source range channels as compensatory action. The affected wide range channel was placed back in service at 0900 hours and the action statement was exited. Subsequent investigation revealed that the modifications had been performed on all four wide range channels. Therefore there was also only one shutdown monitor operable when channel 3 was being worked on. The modification work was sequenced such that at least one shutdown monitor remained operable and in operation throughout this event. The total time that one shutdown monitor was out of service was 27 hours between November 6 and November 8.

CAUSE OF THE EVENT

The root cause of this event was personnel error due to the failure of licensed operators to identify a limiting condition for operation (LCO) prior to removing equipment from service for modification work. A contributory cause was that this was a new LCO on new equipment and there was not much operational experience with this new requirement.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1) Haddam Neck	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 2 1 3	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
		9 0	0 2 8	0 0	0 3	OF	0 3

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 365A's) (17)

SAFETY ASSESSMENT

This event is reportable under 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) since it resulted in a condition prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications.

The two shutdown monitors provide indication and alarm for loss of shutdown margin. These instruments are credited in the boron dilution, FSAR Chapter 15, analysis. Two independent channels are provided to guard against loss or failure of one channel. Only one shutdown monitor at a time was removed from service. One channel was in service at all times. No evolutions were in progress which would have diluted the reactor coolant system boron concentration. Additionally, selected nuclear instrumentation channels are continuously tracked on a large strip chart recorder mounted in the main control board which would have provided indication of a loss of shutdown margin to control room operators. Although this event reduced redundant indication of shutdown margin, the safety consequence is minimal.

CORRECTIVE ACTION

Corrective action consisted of counseling the personnel involved and modifying the licensed operator requalification program to place additional emphasis on the identification of LCO's, in particular, those that are new requirements. This training is scheduled for the first quarter of 1991.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

None

PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS

None