# CONNECTICUT YANKEE ATOMIC POWER COMPANY



HADDAM NECK PLANT RR#1 + BOX 127E + EAST HAMPTON, CT 06424-9341

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December 7, 1990 Re: 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, D. C. 20555

Reference: Facility Operating License No. DPR-61 Docket No. 50-213 Reportable Occurrence LER 50-213/90-028-00

Gentlemen:

This letter forwards the Licensee Event Report 90-028-00, required to be submitted, pursuant to the requirements of Connecticut Yankee Technical Specifications.

Very truly yours,


John P. Stetz Station Director

JPS/dl

Attachment: LER 50-213/90-028-00

cc: Mr. Thomas T. Martin Regional Administrator, Region I 475 Allendale Road King of Prussia, PA 19406

> J. T. Shedlosky Sr. Resident Inspector Haddam Neck



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## ABSTRACT

On November 8, 1990, at 0745 hours, with the plant in Mode 5 (cold shutdown) the operations shift Supervisor noted that one of two shutdown monitors was out of service sue to modification work on its associated wide range nuclear instrumentation drawer (channel 1). Technical Specification 3.3.3.9 requires that both shutdown monitors be operable in Modes 3, 4, 5 and 6. Following discovery of this condition the shift supervisor immediately complied with the Technical Specification action statement requirements. The root cause of this event is personnel error due to the failure of licensed operators to identify a limiting condition for operation (LCO) prior to removing equipment from service for modification work. A contributory cause was that this was a new requirement on new equipment. Corrective action consisted of counseling the personnel involved and modifying the licensed operator regualification program to place additional emphasis on identification of LCO's, in particular, those that are new requirements. This event is reportable under 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) since it resulted in a condition prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED OM8 NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 6/31/89

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)	PAGE (3)		
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#### BACKGROUND INFORMATION

NRC Form 386A

Haddam Neck's conversion to revised Technical Specifications that are in the Westinghouse Standard Technical Specification format was completed in May 1990. These revised Technical Specifications added many new requirements that did not exist in the old specifications. Among these changes was the addition of specification 3.3.3.9, Boron Dilution Alarm, which requires that both of the new shutdown monitors, inscalled during the 1989/1990 refueling outage, be operable in Mcdes 3, 4, 5 and 6. Plant operators received training on both the revised Technical Specifications and the new nuclear instrumentation system (EIIS Code: JC), of which the shutdown monitors are a part, during the 1989/1990 refueling outage.

#### EVENT DESCRIPTION

On November 8, 1990, at 0745 hours, with the plant in Mode 5 (cold shutdown) the operations shift supervisor noted that one of two shutdown monitors was out of service due to modification work on its associated wide range nuclear instrumentation drawer (channel 1). Following discovery of this condition the shift supervisor immediately complied with the Technical Specification action statement which requires continuous monitoring of the source range channels as compensatory action. The affected wide range channel was placed back in service at 0900 hours and the action statement was exited. Subsequent investigation revealed that the modifications had been performed on all four wide range channels. Therefore there was also only one shutdown monitor operable when channel 3 was being worked on. The modification work was sequenced such that at least one shutdown monitor remained operable and in operation throughout this event. The total time that one shutdown monitor was out of service was 27 hours between November 6 and November 8.

#### CAUSE OF THE EVENT

The root cause of this event was personnel error due to the failure of licensed operators to identify a limiting condition for operation (LCO) prior to removing equipment from service for modification work. A contributory cause was that this was a new LCO on new equipment and there was not much operational experience with this new requirement.

### LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 8/31/88

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)	PAGE (3)		
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#### SAFETY ASSESSMENT

NRC Form 366A.

This event is reportable under 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) since it resulted in a condition prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications.

The two shutdown monitors provide indication and alarm for loss of shutdown margin. These instruments are credited in the boron dilution, FSAR Chapter 15, analysis. Two independent channels are provided to guard against loss or failure of one channel. Only one shutdown monitor at a time was removed from service. One channel was in service at all times. No evolutions were in progress which would have diluted the reactor coolant system boron concentration. Additionally, selected nuclear instrumentation channels are continuously tracked on a large strip chart recorder mounted in the main control board which would have provided indication of a loss of shutdown margin to control room operators. Although this event reduced redundant indication of shutdown margin, the safety consequence is minimal.

#### CORRECTIVE ACTION

Corrective action consisted of counseling the personnel involved and modifying the licensed operator requalification program to place additional emphasis on the identification of LCO's, in particular, those that are new requirements. This training is scheduled for the first quarter of 1991.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

None

PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS

None