UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY

CENTERIOR SERVICE COMPANY

AND

THE CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING COMPANY

DOCKET NO. 50-346

DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT NO. 1

AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 186
License No. NPF-3

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

   A. The application for amendment by the Toledo Edison Company, Centerior Service Company, and the Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company (the licensees) dated July 28, 1992, as supplemented on February 17, 1993, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;

   B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;

   C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;

   D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and

   E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-3 is hereby amended to read as follows:

(a) Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No. 186, are hereby incorporated in the license. The Toledo Edison Company shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented not later than 90 days after issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Garmon West, Asst. Project Manager
Project Directorate III-3
Division of Reactor Projects III/IV/V
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:
Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of issuance: April 15, 1994

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 186

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-3

DOCKET NO. 50-346

Replace the following pages of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with the attached pages. The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the area of change. The corresponding overleaf pages are also provided to maintain document completeness.

Remove	Insert
VIII	VIII
XIII	XIII
3/4 3-12	3/4 3-12
3/4 3-22	3/4 3-22
3/4 9-4	3/4 9-4
3/4 9-9	3/4 9-9
B 3/4 9-1	B 3/4 9-1
B 3/4 9-2	B 3/4 9-2

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LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

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LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

BASES

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DESIGN FEATURES

TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued)
TABLE NOTATION

* Trip function may be bypassed in this MODE with RCS pressure below 1800 psig. Bypass shall be automatically removed when RCS pressure exceeds 1800 psig.

** Trip function may be bypassed in this MODE with RCS pressure below 600 psig. Bypass shall be automatically removed when RCS pressure exceeds 600 psig.

*** One must be in SFAS Channels #1 or #3, the other must be in Channels #2 or #4.

**** This instrumentation, or the containment purge and exhaust system noble gas monitor (with the containment purge and exhaust system in operation), must be OPERABLE during CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel within containment to meet the requirements of Technical Specification 3.9.4. When using the containment purge and exhaust system noble gas monitor, SFAS is not required to be OPERABLE in MODE 6.

***** All functional units may be bypassed for up to one minute when starting each Reactor Coolant Pump or Circulating Water Pump.

****** When either Decay Heat Isolation Valve is open.

\# The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

ACTION STATEMENTS

ACTION 10 - With the number of OPERABLE functional units one less than the Total Number of Units, STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may proceed provided both of the following conditions are satisfied:

a. The inoperable functional unit is placed in the tripped condition within one hour. For functional unit 4a the sequencer channel shall be placed in the tripped condition by physical removal of the sequencer module.

b. The Minimum Units OPERABLE requirement is met; however, one additional functional unit may be bypassed for up to 2 hours for surveillance testing per Specification 4.3.2.1.1.

ACTION 11 - With any component in the Output Logic inoperable, trip the associated components within one hour or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

ACTION 12 - With the number of OPERABLE Units one less than the Total Number of Units, restore the inoperable functional unit to OPERABLE status within 48 hours or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours.

ACTION 13 - a. With less than the Minimum Units OPERABLE and reactor coolant pressure $\geq$ 438 psig, both Decay Heat Isolation Valves (DH11 and DH12) shall be verified closed.

TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued)

SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION

FUNCTIONAL UNIT	TOTAL NO. OF UNITS	UNITS TO TRIP	MINIMUM UNITS OPERABLE	APPLICABLE MODES	ACTION
3. MANUAL ACTUATION					
a. SFAS (except Containment Spray and Emergency Sump Recirculation)	2	2	2	1,2,3,4,6****	12
b. Containment Spray	2	2	2	1,2,3,4	12
4. SEQUENCE LOGIC CHANNELS					
a. Sequencer	4	2***	3	1,2,3,4	10#
b. Essential Bus Feeder Breaker Trip (90%)	2	1	2*****	1,2,3,4	15#
c. Diesel Generator Start, Load Shed on Essential Bus (59%)	2	1	2	1,2,3,4	15#
5. INTERLOCK CHANNELS					
a. Decay Heat Isolation Valve	1	1	1	1,2,3	13# |
b. Pressurizer Heaters	2	2	2	3******	14 |

Amendment No. 126, 137, 152, 202, 233, 159

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TABLE 4.3-2 (Continued)

SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

FUNCTIONAL UNIT	CHANNEL CHECK	CHANNEL CALIBRATION	CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST	MODES IN WHICH SURVEILLANCE REQUIRED
5. INTERLOCK CHANNELS				
a. Decay Heat Isolation Valve	S	R	**	1, 2, 3
b. Pressurizer Heater	S	R	**	3 ##

**See Specification 4.5.2.d.1

TABLE NOTATION

(1) Manual actuation switches shall be tested at least once per 18 months during shutdown. All other circuitry associated with manual safeguards actuation shall receive a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST at least once per 31 days.

(2) The CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST shall include exercising the transmitter by applying either vacuum or pressure to the appropriate side of the transmitter.

These surveillance requirements in conjunction with those of Section 4.9.4 apply during CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel within the containment only if using the SFAS area radiation monitors listed in Table 3.3-3, Items 1a, 2a, and 3a, in lieu of the containment purge and exhaust system noble gas monitor.

When either Decay Heat Isolation Valve is open.

Amendment No. 28, 35, 37, 139, 139, 186

TABLE 4.3-2

SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

FUNCTIONAL UNIT	CHANNEL CHECK	CHANNEL CALIBRATION	CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST	MODES IN WHICH SURVEILLANCE REQUIRED
1. INSTRUMENT STRINGS				
a. Containment Radiation - High	S	R	M	1,2,3,4,6#
b. Containment Pressure - High	S	R	M(2)	1, 2, 3
c. Containment Pressure - High-High	S	R	M(2)	1, 2, 3
d. RCS Pressure - Low	S	R	M	1, 2, 3
e. RCS Pressure - Low-Low	S	R	M	1, 2, 3
f. BWST Level - Low-Low	S	R	M	1, 2, 3
2. OUTPUT LOGIC				
a. Incident Level #1: Containment Isolation	S	R	M	1,2,3,4,6#
b. Incident Level #2: High Pressure Injection and Starting Diesel Generators	S	R	M	1, 2, 3, 4
c. Incident Level #3: Low Pressure Injection	S	R	M	1, 2, 3, 4
d. Incident Level #4: Containment Spray	S	R	M	1, 2, 3, 4
e. Incident Level #5: Containment Sump Recirculation Permissive	S	R	M	1, 2, 3, 4
3. MANUAL ACTUATION				
a. SFAS (Except Containment Spray and Emergency Sump Recirculation)	NA	NA	M(1)	1,2,3,4,6#
b. Containment Spray	NA	NA	M(1)	1, 2, 3
4. SEQUENCE LOGIC CHANNELS	S	NA	M	1, 2, 3, 4

REFUELING OPERATIONS

CONTAINMENT PENETRATIONS

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.9.4 The containment penetrations shall be in the following status:

a. The equipment door closed and held in place by a minimum of four bolts,

b. A minimum of one door in each airlock closed, and

c. Each penetration providing direct access from the containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere shall be either:

1. Closed by an isolation valve, blind flange, or manual valve, or

2. Be capable of being closed by an OPERABLE containment purge and exhaust isolation valve.

APPLICABILITY: During CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel within the containment.

ACTION:

a. With the requirements of the above specification not satisfied, immediately suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel in the containment. The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable.

b. With the containment purge and exhaust isolation system inoperable, close each of the purge and exhaust penetrations providing direct access from the containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere.

c. The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.9.4 Each of the above required containment penetrations shall be determined to be either in its closed/isolated condition or capable of being closed by an OPERABLE containment purge and exhaust valve, within 100 hours prior to the start of and at least once per 7 days during CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel in the containment, by:

a. Verifying the penetrations are in their isolated condition, or

b. Verifying that with the containment purge and exhaust system in operation, and the containment purge and exhaust system noble gas monitor capable of providing a high radiation signal to the control room, that after initiation of the high radiation signal, the containment purge and exhaust isolation valves can be closed from the control room, or

If using the SFAS area radiation monitors, verifying that on a Containment Purge and Exhaust Isolation test signal, each purge and exhaust isolation valve automatically actuates to its isolation position.

REFUELING OPERATIONS

DECAY TIME

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.9.3 The reactor shall be subcritical for at least 72 hours.

APPLICABILITY: During movement of irradiated fuel in the reactor pressure vessel.

ACTION:

With the reactor subcritical for less than 72 hours, suspend all operations involving movement of irradiated fuel in the reactor pressure vessel. The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.9.3 The reactor shall be determined to have been subcritical for at least 72 hours by verification of the date and time of subcriticality prior to movement of irradiated fuel in the reactor pressure vessel.

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REFUELING OPERATIONS

WATER LEVEL - REACTOR VESSEL

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.9.10 As a minimum, 23 feet of water shall be maintained over the top of irradiated fuel assemblies seated within the reactor pressure vessel.

APPLICABILITY: During movement of fuel assemblies or control rods within the reactor pressure vessel while in MODE 6.

ACTION:

With the requirements of the above specification not satisfied, suspend all operation involving movement of fuel assemblies or control rods within the reactor pressure vessel. The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.9.10 The water level shall be determined to be at least its minimum required depth within 2 hours prior to the start of and at least once per 24 hours during movement of fuel assemblies or control rods within the reactor pressure vessel.

3/4.9.1 BORON CONCENTRATION

The limitations on reactivity conditions during REFUELING ensure that: 1) the reactor will remain subcritical during CORE ALTERATIONS, and 2) a uniform boron concentration is maintained for reactivity control in the water volumes having direct access to the reactor vessel. These limitations are consistent with the initial conditions assumed for the boron dilution incident in the accident analysis.

3/4.9.2 INSTRUMENTATION

The OPERABILITY of source range neutron flux monitors ensures that redundant monitoring capability is available to detect changes in the reactivity condition of the core.

3/4.9.3 DECAY TIME

The minimum requirement for reactor subcriticality prior to movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the reactor pressure vessel ensures that sufficient time has elapsed to allow the radioactive decay of the short lived fission products. This decay time is consistent with the assumptions used in the safety analyses.

3/4.9.4 CONTAINMENT PENETRATIONS

The requirements on containment penetration closure and OPERABILITY ensure that a release of radioactive material within containment will be restricted from leakage to the environment. The OPERABILITY and closure requirements are sufficient to restrict radioactive material release from a fuel element rupture based upon the lack of containment pressurization potential while in the REFUELING MODE.

With the containment purge and exhaust system in operation, a high radiation signal received from the containment purge and exhaust system noble gas monitor will effectively automatically contain the release by shutting down the containment purge system supply and exhaust fans and closing their inlet and outlet dampers. On a valid signal, the control room operator will then manually close the containment purge and exhaust isolation valves. Therefore, the uncontrolled release of radioactive material from the containment to the environment will be restricted.

Likewise, use of the SFAS area radiation monitors provide an automatic containment isolation signal on high radiation, restricting the uncontrolled release of radioactive material from the containment to the environment.

3/4.9.5 COMMUNICATIONS

The requirement for communications capability ensures that refueling station personnel can be promptly informed of significant changes in the facility status or core reactivity condition during CORE ALTERATIONS.

3/4.9.6 FUEL HANDLING BRIDGE OPERABILITY

The OPERABILITY requirements of the hoist bridges used for movement of fuel assemblies ensures that: 1) fuel handling bridges will be used for movement of control rods and fuel assemblies, 2) each hoist has sufficient load capacity to lift a fuel element, and 3) the core internals and pressure vessel are protected from excessive lifting force in the event they are inadvertently engaged during lifting operations.

3/4.9.7 CRANE TRAVEL - FUEL HANDLING BUILDING

The restriction on movement of loads in excess of the nominal weight of a fuel assembly in a failed fuel container over other fuel assemblies in the storage pool ensures that in the event this load is dropped 1) the activity release will be limited to that contained in a single fuel assembly, and (2) any possible distortion of fuel in the storage racks will not result in a critical array. This assumption is consistent with the activity release assumed in the accident analyses.

3/49.8 COOLANT CIRCULATION

The requirement that at least one decay heat removal loop be in operation ensures that (1) sufficient cooling capacity is available to remove decay heat and maintain the water in the reactor pressure vessel below 140°F as required during the REFUELING MODE, and (2) sufficient coolant circulation is maintained through the reactor core to minimize the effect of a boron dilution incident and prevent boron stratification.

The requirement to have two DHR loops OPERABLE when there is less than 23 feet of water above the core ensures that a single failure of the operating DHR loop will not result in a complete loss of decay heat removal capability. With the reactor vessel head removed and 23 feet of water above the core, a large heat sink is available for core cooling. Thus, in the event of a failure of the operating DHR loop, adequate time is provided to initiate emergency procedures to cool the core.

3/4.9.9 CONTAINMENT PURGE AND EXHAUST ISOLATION SYSTEM

Deleted

3/4.9.10 and 3/4.9.11 WATER LEVEL - REACTOR VESSEL AND STORAGE POOL

The restrictions on minimum water level ensure that sufficient water depth is available to remove 99% of the assumed 10% iodine gap activity released from the rupture of an irradiated fuel assembly. The minimum water depth is consistent with the assumptions of the safety analysis.