

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION TO
LER 82-068/03 L-0

Licensee: Mississippi Power & Light Company
Facility: Grand Gulf Nuclear Station - Unit 1
Docket No: 50-416

On September 8, 1982, the plant was in condition mode 4 with no irradiated fuel in the Reactor Vessel and vessel temperature 100°F. The installed instrumentation for vessel flange and head flange temperatures were not operable. The temperatures for the vessel flange and head flange were monitored by a hand-held pyrometer.

T.S.4.4.6.1.4.a requires verifying the vessel and head flange temperatures greater than 70°F at least once per 12 hours when reactor coolant temperature is less than 100°F.

On September 8, 1982, as part of the shift turnover, reactor coolant temperature was determined and recorded at 0730 and 2330. The values were 103°F and 98.7°F, respectively. On September 9, 1982 at 1013, ten hours and 45 minutes after it was determined that reactor coolant system temperature was less than 100°F, the vessel and head flange temperatures were verified to be greater than 70°F.

Existing procedures require recording coolant system temperature at every shift turnover. This was not done at the 1530 September 8, 1982 turnover. Had the coolant system temperature been recorded, it is anticipated that the observed trend would have resulted in subsequent monitoring and performance of the surveillance in the required interval.

Analysis of reactor coolant system temperature indicates that vessel temperature had dropped below 100°F at approximately 1900 on September 8, 1982. This indicates vessel and head flange temperatures were not verified to be greater than 70°F until 15 hours 13 minutes after coolant temperature dropped below 100°F. This did not meet strict compliance with the surveillance requirement to monitor temperature every 12 hours below Vessel Temperature of 100°F.

This event is only significant in that the surveillance requirement was not met. The potential for damage to the Reactor Vessel was insignificant because the measured values of the flange temperatures never approached 70°F. The threat to the public was insignificant since the plant had no irradiated fuel at the time of the event.

The problem is that the parameter of importance was not monitored adequately to ensure conformance with Technical Specification surveillance requirements.

Corrective action was to ensure temperatures monitored every 12 hours and temperatures recorded at the time of shift turnover as requested by procedure.