U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION NRC FORM 366 (2.77) Attachment to AECM-82/483 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT Page 1 of 2 (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION) CONTROL BLOCK: 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 G 01 0 CON'T REPORT (7) 1 0 0 4 (8)[1] 0 1 0 5 0 10 0 4 6 (6)SOURCE DOCKET NUMBER EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10) With the unit in cold shutdown, a special inspection on the Division 2 Standby Diesel 0 2 [Generator was conducted. During this inspection, one of the capscrews which secures 0 3 the rear crankcase cover to the engine block was discovered to be defective. This 0 4 report is being submitted pursuant to T.S.6.9.1.12.e. and i. This event resulted in 0 5 Ino significant event, damage to equipment or effect upon public health or safety. The 0 6 Division 1 and 3 Diesel Generators were operable at the time the defect was discovered. 80 SYSTEM CAUSE CAUSE COMP VALVE CODE COMPONENT CODE SUBCODE B (13) Z (15 E B1(12 NGIIIN E Z (16 E SEQUENTIAL OCCURRENCE REVISION REPORT EVENT YEAR REPORT NO. CODE TYPE NO LER/RO 0 REPORT 0 8 T 0 0 ATTACHMENT SHUTDOWN METHOD NPRD-4 PRIME COMP COMPONENT FUTURE EFFECT ON PLANT HOURS (22) SUPPLIER FORM SUB MANUFACTURER Z (21) Z (20) 010 D 10 15 X (19 0 0 A (18) N A CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27) The capscrew broke while being checked for the correct torque. It is believed that the [capscrew (SAE Grade 5, 5/8" NC X 1-3/4") had partially cracked due to fatigue during lengine operation prior to the torque check. This capscrew and 20 other capscrews were replaced. Nuclear Plant Engineering is evaluating the capscrew failure. Div. 1 Diesel Generator capscrews were inspected and determined to be satisfactory. METHOD OF FACILITY (30)% POWER OTHER STATUS DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32) C (31) Special Inspection by Maint Work Order G (28) 0 0 01 9 10 ACTIVITY CONTENT 80 AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35 LOCATION OF RELEASE (36) RELEASED OF RELEASE Z (34) Z (33) NA NA 44 80 PERSONNEL EXPOSURES DESCRIPTION (39) NUMBER TYPE 0 0 0 (37) Z (38) NA 80 PERSONNEL INJURIES DESCRIPTION (41) NUMBER 0 0 0 (40) NA 80 LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43)TYPE DESCRIPTION Z (42) NA 80 8210220150 821018 PUBLICITY NRC USE ONLY PDR DESCRIPTION (45) ADOCK 05000416 SUED PDR N (44) 111 68 69 80 NAME OF PREPARER Original signed by W. H. Chenault PHONE: .

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## SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION TO LER 82-080/01 T-0

Licensee: Mississippi Power & Light Co. Facility: Grand Gulf Nuclear Station - Unit 1 Docket No: 50-416

A special inspection of the 21 capscrews which secure the rear crankcase cover to the engine block on the Division 2 Standby Diesel Generator revealed that one capscrew had failed. The capscrews are SAE Grade 5, 5/8" NC x 1-3/4".

The maintenance work order which led to the discovery of the failed capscrew had been initiated as a follow-up to a previous, similarly failed capscrew on the same Division 2 Standby Diesel Generator rear crankcase cover. This situation was previously reported to the NRC as a Potentially Reportable Deficiency (PRD) 82/14 under 10 CFR 50.55e. The first failure occurred on March 15, 1982 during the 24-hour load test performed as part of the Pre-Operational Test Program. The failure on March 15, 1982 resulted in a generator fault caused by the head of the broken capscrew becoming lodged between the generator stator and rotor while the generator was at 100% load. This resulted in the generator tripping on Generator Differential Current. The generator was subsequently replaced. The capscrews securing the rear crankcase cover were inspected for correct tightness and found to be below the required 60 ft-1bs. The capscrews were replaced on both the Division 1 and 2 Diesel Generators and torqued to the required 60 ft-1bs.

The follow-up work order, performed on October 4, 1982, instructed that each of the capscrews securing the rear crankcase cover to the engine block be checked for correct tightness (60 ft-lbs). Three of the capscrews were found to be less than 40 ft-lbs (20,23 and 35 ft-lbs). The work order further instructed that any capscrews not within ±2 ft-lbs of the required 60 ft-lbs be torqued within the acceptable range. When the capscrew (which was at 20 ft-lbs originally) was tightened, it sheared off approximately one inch from the bottom side of the head before reaching 60 ft-lbs. The remaining capscrews were tightened successfully. An additional work order was issued to replace the 21 capscrews on the Division 2 Diesel Generator rear cover and torqued to 60 ft-lbs. (The Division 3 Diesel Generator is supplied by a different manufacturer so no inspection was required).

Currently Nuclear Plant Engineering is evaluating the failed capscrew and their findings will be reported in a followup LER.