

P.O. BOX 270 HARTFORD, CONNECTICUT 06101 (203) 666-6911

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October 15, 1982 MP-4230

Mr. Ronald C. Haynes Regional Administrator, Region 1 Office of Inspection and Enforcement U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Reference:

Provisional License DPR-21

Docket No. 50-245

Reportable Occurrence RO-82-20/1T-1

Dear Mr. Haynes:

This letter forwards the Licensee Event Report for Reportable Occurrence RO-82-20/1T-1 required to be submitted within fourteen days pursuant to the requirements of the Millstone Unit 1 Technical Specifications, Section 6.9.1.8.i. This reportable occurrence number 82-20/1T was originally inadvertantly assigned to a previous reportable occurrence. An additional three copies of the report are enclosed.

Yours truly,

NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY

E. J. Mroczka for Station Superintendent Millstone Nuclear Power Station

EJM/TST:ejl

Attachment: LER RO-82-20/1T-1

cc: Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement, Washington, D. C.

(30)

Director, Office of Management Information and Program Control,

Washington, D. C. (3)

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, c/o Document Management Branch,

Attachment to LER 82-20/1T -1
Northeast Nuclear Energy Company
Millstone Nuclear Power Station - Unit 1
Provisional License Number DPR-21
Docket Number 50-245

Identification of Occurrence

Performance of components that required corrective action to prevent operation in a manner less conservative than established in technical specifications were discovered when hydraulic snubbers failed to meet their surveillance requirements.

Conditions Prior to Occurrence

Prior to occurrence the unit was shutdown for a refueling outage.

Description of Occurrence

On September 30, 1982, at 1630 hours, while performing a Hydraulic Snubber Functional test in accordance with Technical Specification 4.6.I.3, on a sample of 10 snubbers, four ITT Grinnell snubbers failed to fall within their recommended ranges. Of the four, one failed lock up and bleed rate requirements and three failed the bleed rate requirements. Further detailed evaluations on the four failures revealed that three did meet their specific design acceptance ranges and one snubber failed to meet the specific design acceptance range. As required by Technical Specifications, an additional sample of 10 snubbers were functionally tested. All were found acceptable.

The visual examination of all snubbers performed in accordance with Technical Specification 4.6.I.l indicated three possible failures based on the reservoir oil level. Functional testing on these three snubbers in the as found condition revealed only one snubber failure. This changes the required visual inspection interval from 18 months to 12 months plus or minus 25 percent.

Apparent Cause of Occurrence

Failure of the one snubber to meet its specific design acceptance range is unknown at this time. Further analysis and evaluation is required to determine the cause.

The single confirmed visual examination failure is contributed to oil leakage through the cracked reservoir glass.

Analysis of Occurrence

The detailed analysis and impact on the plant is unknown at this time. An update report will be submitted when this information is available.

Corrective Action

Pending the results of the investigation, the snubber will be rebuilt or replaced prior to start-up. The cracked reservoir glass on the single confirmed visual failure will be replaced prior to start up.

In the future the recommended acceptable ranges for functional testing of hydraulic snubbers will be evaluated on an individual basis for each safety related snubber as compared to the present recommended acceptable ranges which were done on a group basis.