

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

7 | 8 | 9 | 0 | 1 | F | I | L | C | R | I | P | 3 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | 0 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 5

CON'T 7 | 8 | 0 | 1 | REPORT SOURCE 7 | 8 | L | 6 | 0 | 5 | 0 | - | 0 | 3 | 0 | 2 | 7 | 0 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 5 | 8 | 2 | 8 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 5 | 8 | 2 | 9

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)
02 | At 0540, on 9-15-82, while performing surveillance on the decay heat

03 | line B, a valve (DHV-111) failed to control flow as intended. This is

04 | contrary to the requirements of T.S.3.5.2. Operability was restored at

05 | 1500 on 9-16-82. Decay heat line A was available to provide emergency

06 | core cooling. There was no effect on public health or safety. This is

07 | the fifth occurrence for DHV-111 and the twenty-first report under this

08 | specification.

09 | SYSTEM CODE C | F | I | 11 | CAUSE CODE E | 12 | CAUSE SUBCODE E | 13 | COMPONENT CODE I | N | S | T | R | U | 14 | COMP SUBCODE S | 15 | VALVE SUBCODE Z | 16

(17) LER/RO REPORT NUMBER 8 | 2 | EVENT YEAR 8 | 2 | SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. 0 | 5 | 9 | OCCURRENCE CODE 0 | 1 | 3 | REPORT TYPE L | REVISION 0

ACTION TAKEN A | 18 | FUTURE ACTION X | 19 | EFFECT ON PLANT Z | 20 | SHUTDOWN METHOD Z | 21 | HOURS 0 | 0 | 0 | ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED Y | 23 | NPRD-4 FORM SUB N | 24 | PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER A | 25 | COMPONENT MANUFACTURER B | 0 | 8 | 0 | 47

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)
10 | This event was caused by an inoperable flow switch. The switch was re-

11 | placed and calibrated and DHV-111 was functionally tested with satisfac-

12 | tory results. An engineering evaluation has been initiated to determine

13 | further corrective action.

14 |

FACILITY STATUS L | 28 | % POWER 0 | 0 | 0 | 7 | 29 | OTHER STATUS N/A | 30 | METHOD OF DISCOVERY I | B | 31 | DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION Routine inspection | 32

ACTIVITY CONTENT Z | 33 | RELEASED OF RELEASE Z | 34 | AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY N/A | 35 | LOCATION OF RELEASE N/A | 36

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 37 | TYPE Z | 38 | DESCRIPTION N/A | 39

PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 40 | DESCRIPTION N/A | 41

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE Z | 42 | DESCRIPTION N/A | 43

PUBLICITY ISSUED DESCRIPTION N/A | 44

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SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION

REPORT NO: 50-302/82-059/O3L-0

FACILITY: Crystal River Unit #3

REPORT DATE: October 15, 1982

OCCURRENCE DATE: September 15, 1982

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

The flow path of Decay Heat Line B was found to be inoperable when a valve failed to control the flow as intended. This is contrary to Technical Specification 3.5.2.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

Mode I, Power Operation, (97%).

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

At 0540, on September 15, 1982, while performing surveillance on Decay Heat Line B, a valve (DHV-111) failed to control flow as intended. After performing maintenance, the valve was functionally tested and declared operable at 1500 on September 16, 1982. Decay Heat Line A was available to provide emergency core cooling.

DESIGNATION OF APPARENT CAUSE:

This event was caused by a stuck signal switch.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

There was no effect on public health or safety.

CORRECTIVE ACTION:

The signal switch was replaced and calibrated and the valve was functionally tested satisfactorily. An Engineering Evaluation has been initiated to determine further corrective action.

FAILURE DATA:

This was the fifth occurrence for DHV-111 and the twenty-first report under this Specification.