

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Reports No. 50-454/94008(DRSS); 50-455/94008(DRSS)

Docket Nos. 50-454; 50-455

Licenses No. NPF-37; NPF-66

Licensee: Commonwealth Edison Company
Opus West III
1400 Opus Place
Downers Grove, IL 60515

Facility Name: Byron Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2

Inspection At: Corporate Office, Downers Grove, Illinois

Inspection Date: April 6, 1994

Inspector: J. W. McCormick-Barger for
R. Jickling

4/19/94
Date

Approved By: J. W. McCormick-Barger
J. W. McCormick-Barger, Chief
Radiological Program Section I

4/19/94
Date

Inspection Summary

Inspection on April 6-11, 1994 (Reports No. 50-454/94008(DRSS); 50-455/94008(DRSS))

Areas Inspected: Unannounced inspection of the Byron Station's emergency preparedness exercise involving review of the exercise scenario (IP 82302), and observations by one NRC representative of key functions at the Corporate Emergency Operations Facility (CEOF) during the exercise (IP 82301).

Results: No violations or deviations were identified; however, one concern was identified regarding the licensee's ability to use the CEOF as an interim facility until the nearsite EOF assumes responsibility for emergency response. This concern is discussed in Section 4. The scenario was very challenging. Exercise performance in the CEOF was good.

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DETAILS

1. NRC Observer and Area Observed

R. Jickling, Corporate Emergency Operations Facility

2. Key Persons Contacted

In addition to the key members of the licensee's staff listed below, the inspector interviewed other licensee employees and members of the corporate organization. The asterisk (*) denotes those present during the exit meeting conducted on March 11, 1994.

Commonwealth Edison Company

- *D. Scott, Director, Emergency Preparedness
- *B. McNeill, Emergency Planning (EP) Coordinator
- *I. Holden, Corporate EP Operations Group Supervisor
- *P. Elkmann, Health Physicist, Corporate Emergency Planning
- *P. Johnson, Technical Superintendent
- *R. Groves, EP Scenario Developer
- *D. Silcox, EP Instructor
- *T. Gierich, Maintenance Superintendent
- *D. Saccommilo, Nuclear Licensing Administration

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

- *J. McCormick-Barger, Chief, Radiological Program Section 1

3. General

An announced, daytime exercise of the licensee's Generating Stations Emergency Plan (GSEP) was conducted at Byron Station on April 6, 1994. This exercise included utility only participation. The exercise tested the licensee's emergency response organization's capabilities to respond to an accident scenario. Attachment 1 describes the scope and objectives of the exercise. Attachment 2 summarizes the exercise scenario.

4. Specific Observations (IP 82301)

The CEOF staff was preselected and pre-staged in a nearby conference room prior to activation. Therefore, the timeliness of the facility staffing was not demonstrated during this exercise.

After the Alert declaration at approximately 9 a.m., CEOF personnel began to staff the facility in an orderly manner. There were some initial difficulties with the speaker phone, incoming fax messages, and in accessing the conference line with the Technical Support Center (TSC). The Corporate Manager of Emergency Operations (CMEO) had very effective management of the facility, provided very good periodic

facility briefings, and was cognizant of the timeliness of the required notifications and updates. The CEOF support group reported that the plant data computers were unable to provide plant data from the control room simulator (CRS) computer, upon which the CMEO immediately requested a computer specialist to trouble shoot the problem.

At approximately 9:45 a.m., prior to the TSC taking command and control from the Control Room (CR), the TSC lost all AC power. The CMEO reported that the CEOF could accept control for dose assessment and environs teams, but that he didn't feel comfortable taking responsibility for command and control of the emergency due to a problem with the computers that provided plant data.

Good classification discussions were held between the CEOF and the TSC. A Site Area Emergency (SAE) was declared at approximately 9:59 a.m. by the CR. The CMEO asked the TSC if personnel were needed in the CR to assist in communications. It was reported that the CR did not want additional personnel in the CR and that they could handle the emergency response at that time. The CMEO stated that plant data could be obtained using communicators and tracked on paper, however, this was not accomplished in the CEOF.

At approximately 10:36 a.m. specific plant data came on line in the CEOF, however, the availability of plant data was sporadic due to computer problems. Additional CEOF technical support personnel were requested from the corporate offices and used to obtain plant status information. CEOF technical support and environs support personnel were in communications with their counterparts in the TSC and the nearsite Dixon Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) as it became staffed.

At approximately 10:45 a.m. the TSC regained AC power. The TSC took command and control from the CR at approximately 11:20 a.m. Approximately 20 minutes later the Dixon EOF took transfer of command and control of the emergency response from the TSC.

At approximately 12:35 p.m. a credible bomb threat was received in the Dixon EOF. Within approximately three minutes the CEOF assumed command and control of emergency response from the EOF. CMEO requested additional clerical support for faxing notifications forms.

After the SAE declaration at approximately 9:45 a.m., use of the CEOF was not demonstrated as an interim EOF. Neither the EOF nor the CEOF took command and control of the emergency for approximately one hour and forty minutes after the declaration of the SAE. The emergency response organization should have been more aggressive in pursuing a means to transfer offsite emergency response functions from the control room. For example, the control room, TSC, and CEOF could have coordinated with each other to establish communications between the CEOF and the TSC/CRS in order to obtain the plant data needed for the CEOF to take command and control of the emergency.

CECo has proposed to the NRC to use the CEOF as an interim facility

until the affected site's nearsite EOF is staffed and ready to assume responsibility for overall management of the emergency response. Also, during the March 2, 1994, Braidwood annual exercise it was observed that the use of the CEOF as an interim EOF was not demonstrated. The inability to demonstrate the use of the CEOF as an interim EOF is of concern to the NRC. Other NRC concerns include: (1) not relieving the CR from the additional burden and distraction of offsite interface and notification requirements while the operations crew is trying to control the plant during the emergency, and (2) not promptly relieving the TSC of required notifications and interface with Federal, State, and local authorities. A review of the licensee's corrective actions to address these concerns will be tracked as an Inspection Followup Item (No. 454/94008-01(DRSS); 455/94008-01(DRSS)).

5. Exit Interview

The inspector held an exit interview on April 11, 1994, with those licensee representatives identified in Section 1 to present and discuss the preliminary inspection findings. The licensee indicated that none of the matters discussed were proprietary in nature.

Attachments:

1. Exercise Scope and Objectives
2. Exercise Scenario Summary

BYRON NUCLEAR POWER STATION
 1994 GSEP EXERCISE
 APRIL 6, 1994

STANDARD OBJECTIVES FOR EXERCISES

Rev 3 (1/26/93)

PRIMARY OBJECTIVE:

Commonwealth Edison will demonstrate the ability to implement the Generating Stations Emergency Plan (GSEP) to provide for protection of the public health and safety in the event of a major accident at one of its Nuclear Power Stations.

SUPPORTING OBJECTIVES:

NOTE: An EOF designation includes all EOFs and the CEOF if activated as a Backup EOF. A CEOF designation is for activation of the CEOF as an interim EOF only.

Weight Factor	Raw Score	Weighted Score
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** Denotes critical objectives

1) Assessment and Classification

a. Demonstrate the ability to assess conditions which warrant declaring a GSEP Classification within fifteen (15) minutes.

- (CR, TSC, EOF, CEOF)

4	_____	_____
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b. Demonstrate the ability to determine the highest Emergency Action Level (EAL) applicable for assessed conditions within fifteen (15) minutes.

** (CR, TSC, EOF, CEOF)

5	_____	_____
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c. Demonstrate the ability to determine the most appropriate EAL(s) for assessed conditions within fifteen (15) minutes.

- (CR, TSC, EOF, CEOF)

3	_____	_____
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2) Notification and Communications

a. Demonstrate the ability to correctly fill out the NARS form for conditions presented in the scenario.

- (CR, TSC, EOF, CEOF)

4	_____	_____
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b. Demonstrate the ability to notify appropriate State and local organizations within fifteen (15) minutes of an Emergency classification or significant changes in NARS information.

** (CR, TSC, EOF, CEOF)

5	_____	_____
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d. Demonstrate the ability to notify the NRC immediately after the State notifications and within one (1) hour of the Emergency classification using the Event Notification Worksheet as appropriate.

- (CR, TSC, EOF)

4	_____	_____
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	Weight Factor	Raw Score	Weighted Score
e. Demonstrate the ability to provide information updates to the States at least hourly and within thirty (30) minutes of significant changes in conditions reported on the State Agency Update Checklist. - (CR, TSC, EOF, CEOF)	4	---	---
f. Demonstrate the ability to contact appropriate support organizations such as INPO, ANI, General Electric or Westinghouse, the Fuel Vendor, or Teledyne, for assistance during the Exercise. - (TSC, EOF)	1	---	---
g. Demonstrate the ability to maintain an open-line of communication with the NRC on the Emergency Notification System (ENS) upon request. - (CR, TSC, EOF)	3	---	---
h. Demonstrate the ability to maintain an open-line of communication with the NRC on the Health Physics Network (HPN) upon request. - (TSC, EOF)	3	---	---
i. Demonstrate the ability to provide information updates using the Event Notification Worksheet as appropriate to the NRC within thirty (30) minutes of changes in reportable conditions when an open-line of communication (ENS) is not maintained. - (CR, TSC, EOF)	3	---	---
j. Demonstrate the ability to provide informational announcements over the plant PA system in accordance with procedures and policies. - (CR)	1	---	---
<u>3) Radiological Assessment and Protective Actions</u>			
a. Demonstrate the ability to collect, document and use radiological surveys for conditions presented in the scenario. - (OSC)	3	---	---
b. Demonstrate the ability to evaluate onsite radiological information for conditions presented in the scenario. - (TSC, OSC)	3	---	---
c. Demonstrate the ability to provide appropriate radiological protection (including clothing and respiratory equipment) for onsite personnel in accordance with procedures and policies. ** (TSC, OSC)	4	---	---
d. Demonstrate the ability to prepare and brief personnel for entry into a High Radiation Area in accordance with procedures and policies. - (OSC)	4	---	---
e. Demonstrate the ability to issue and administratively control dosimetry in the OSC in accordance with procedures and policies. - (OSC)	3	---	---

	Weight Factor	Raw Score	Weighted Score
f. Demonstrate the ability to perform habitability surveys in the Emergency Response Facilities in accordance with procedures and policies. - (CR, TSC, OSC)	<u>2</u>	_____	_____
g. Demonstrate the ability to establish and maintain radiological controls in the Emergency Response Facilities in accordance with procedures and policies. - (CR, TSC, OSC)	<u>3</u>	_____	_____
h. Demonstrate the ability to control personnel exposure per 10CFR20 emergency exposure limits in accordance with procedures and policies. -(CR, TSC, EOF, CEOF)	<u>4</u>	_____	_____
i. Demonstrate the ability to monitor, track and document radiation exposure to inplant operations and maintenance teams in accordance with procedures and policies. - (TSC, OSC)	<u>3</u>	_____	_____
j. Demonstrate the ability to respond to and perform decontamination of radioactively contaminated individual(s) in accordance with procedures and policies. - (OSC)	<u>3</u>	_____	_____
k. Demonstrate the ability to identify appropriate Protective Action Recommendations (PARs) in accordance with procedures and policies within fifteen (15) minutes. ** (TSC, EOF, CEOF)	<u>5</u>	_____	_____
o. Demonstrate the ability to obtain a meteorological forecast. - (TSC, EOF, CEOF)	<u>3</u>	_____	_____
r. Demonstrate the ability to collect and analyze RCS and Containment Atmosphere samples using High Radiation Sampling System equipment in accordance with HRSS procedures and health physics controls. - (TSC, OSC)	<u>3</u>	_____	_____
s. Demonstrate the ability to estimate core damage in accordance with emergency procedures. - (TSC, EOF)	<u>3</u>	_____	_____
t. Demonstrate the ability of the Environs Director to initially brief the Field Teams and keep them aware of critical information. - (TSC, EOF)	<u>3</u>	_____	_____
y. Demonstrate the ability to evaluate field sample results in accordance with procedures and policies. - (TSC, EOF)	<u>3</u>	_____	_____
z. Demonstrate the ability to dispatch the Field Teams within forty-five (45) minutes of determination of the need for field samples. - (TSC, OSC)	<u>3</u>	_____	_____

	Weight Factor	Raw Score	Weighted Score
aa. Demonstrate the ability to monitor and direct Field Team activities in accordance with procedures and policies. - (TSC, EOF)	<u>3</u>	---	---
bb. Demonstrate the ability to monitor Field Team activities. - (CEOF)	<u>3</u>	---	---
cc. Demonstrate the ability to transfer control of Field Team activities in accordance with procedures and policies. - (TSC, EOF)	<u>3</u>	---	---
4. <u>Emergency Facilities</u>			
a. Demonstrate the ability to establish minimum staffing in the TSC and OSC within thirty (30) minutes of an Alert or higher Classification during a daytime event in accordance with GSEP Section 4. ** (TSC, OSC)	<u>4</u>	---	---
e. Demonstrate the ability to transfer Command and Control authority from the Control Room to the TSC in accordance with procedures and policies. - (CR, TSC)	<u>3</u>	---	---
f. Demonstrate the ability to transfer Command and Control authority from the TSC to the EOF/CEOF in accordance with procedures and policies. - (TSC, EOF, CEOF)	<u>3</u>	---	---
g. Demonstrate the ability to transfer Command and Control authority from the CEOF to the EOF in accordance with procedures and policies. - (EOF, CEOF)	<u>3</u>	---	---
h. Demonstrate the ability to maintain current and accurate information on Status Boards by updating at least every thirty (30) minutes. - (TSC, OSC, EOF)	<u>2</u>	---	---
i. Demonstrate the ability to maintain information on the Electronic Status Board in accordance with procedures and policies. - (TSC, EOF)	<u>1</u>	---	---
j. Demonstrate the ability to exchange data and technical information between the Emergency Response Facilities in accordance with procedures and policies. - (CR, OSC, TSC, EOF, CEOF, OSC/FIELD TEAMS)	<u>3</u>	---	---
5) <u>Emergency Direction and Control</u>			
a. Demonstrate the ability of the Directors and Managers to provide leadership in their respective areas of responsibility as specified in GSEP and position-specific procedures. (CR, TSC, OSC, EOF, CEOF)	<u>4</u>	---	---

	Weight Factor	Raw Score	Weighted Score
b. Demonstrate the ability to prioritize resources for Inplant Team activities in accordance with Station procedures. - (CR, TSC, OSC)	<u>3</u>	_____	_____
c. Demonstrate the ability to assemble, dispatch and brief Inplant Teams in accordance with Station procedures. - (OSC)	<u>4</u>	_____	_____
d. Demonstrate the ability of in-plant teams to perform their assigned functions. - (OSC)	<u>4</u>	_____	_____
e. Demonstrate the ability of the OSC Staff and team members to conduct a thorough debriefing following the completion of assigned tasks. - (OSC)	<u>3</u>	_____	_____
f. Demonstrate the ability to acquire and transport Emergency equipment and supplies necessary to mitigate or control unsafe or abnormal plant conditions. - (TSC, EOF)	<u>3</u>	_____	_____
g. Demonstrate the ability of the Acting Station Director, Station Director, OSC Director and MEO to provide briefings and updates concerning plant status, event classification, and activities in progress at least every sixty (60) minutes. - (CR, TSC, OSC, EOF, CEOF)	<u>3</u>	_____	_____
h. Demonstrate the ability to provide access for the NRC Site Team in accordance with Access Control procedures. - (TSC, EOF)	<u>3</u>	_____	_____
i. Demonstrate the ability to provide an initial briefing to the NRC Site Team. - (TSC)	<u>3</u>	_____	_____
j. Demonstrate the ability to provide the NRC Site Team with adequate and timely information pertaining to critical emergency response activities. - (TSC, EOF)	<u>3</u>	_____	_____
k. Demonstrate the ability of individuals in the Emergency Response Organization to use position specific procedures. - (CR, TSC, OSC, EOF, CEOF, OSC/FIELD TEAMS)	<u>3</u>	_____	_____
n. Demonstrate the ability to identify and designate non-essential personnel within thirty (30) minutes after completion of Site Accountability. - (TSC)	<u>3</u>	_____	_____
p. Demonstrate the ability to explain the evacuation route, brief personnel and arrange for traffic control prior to initiating site evacuation. - (TSC, EOF)	<u>3</u>	_____	_____

6) Recovery

- | | | | | |
|----|--|---|-----|-----|
| a. | Demonstrate the ability to identify the criteria to enter a Recovery classification in accordance with procedures and policies.
- (TSC, EOF) | 3 | --- | --- |
| b. | Demonstrate the ability to generate a Recovery Plan which will return the plant to normal operations in accordance with procedures and policies.
- (TSC, EOF) | 3 | --- | --- |
| c. | Demonstrate the ability to determine long-term recovery staffing requirements.
- (TSC, EOF) | 1 | --- | --- |

7) SECURITY

- | | | | | |
|----|--|---|-----|-----|
| a. | Demonstrate the ability of the Security force to respond to an emergency situation in accordance with procedures and policies.
- (TSC, EOF) | 5 | --- | --- |
| b. | Demonstrate the ability of the Security Director/Safeguards Specialist to coordinate actions per the Nuclear Station Security Plan with the GSEP.
- (TSC, EOF) | 3 | --- | --- |
| c. | Demonstrate the ability to establish access control to Emergency Response Facilities.
- (TSC, EOF) | 3 | --- | --- |
| d. | Demonstrate the ability of the Safeguards Specialist/Security Director to coordinate emergency response action with appropriate offsite agencies. (e.g., evacuation routes with County Sheriff, NRC Safeguards personnel).
- (TSC, EOF) | 3 | --- | --- |

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BYRON NUCLEAR POWER STATION
1994 GSEP EXERCISE
SCOPE OF PARTICIPATION

DATE: April 6, 1994

TYPE: Daytime, CECO only

OFFSITE AGENCY PARTICIPATION

None

PURPOSE:

Test the capability of the basic elements within the Commonwealth Edison Company Generating Stations Emergency Plan (GSEP). The Exercise will include mobilization of CECO personnel and resources adequate to verify their capability to respond to a simulated emergency.

CECO FACILITIES ACTIVATED:

- Control Room
- TSC
- OSC
- CEOF
- EOF

CECO FACILITIES NOT ACTIVATED

- JPIC

OTHER PARTICIPANTS:

- Murray & Trettel

The "Exercise" Nuclear Duty Officer will be notified of simulated events as appropriate on a real-time basis. The "Exercise" Nuclear Duty Officer and the balance of the offsite Emergency Response Organization will be prepositioned close to the EOF and CEOF in order to allow personnel from distant CECO facilities to fulfill their biennial participation requirement without impacting the Exercise timeline.

Commonwealth Edison will demonstrate the capability to make contact with contractors whose assistance would be required by the simulated accident situation, but will not actually incur the expense of using contractor services to simulate emergency response except as prearranged specifically for the Exercise.

Byron Nuclear Generating Station
1994 GSEP Exercise
April 6, 1994

Initial Conditions

Narrative Summary

Unit Zero

Dredging and follow up work on the River Screen House intake has caused CW makeup to be isolated. The night shift has raised flume level to the top of the allowable band to facilitate this work. Other major events scheduled for today are:

- 0B Deepwell pump - Motor Uncoupling and determination
- 345 KV line LI0621 - OOS for Annual Inspection
- 0B WX Demin Resin Transfer at VR
- 0RE-PR005 - pump replacement, should exit LCOAR today
- MUD Regen - System Engineering and Chemistry want to watch regen
- 0B VC Chiller PM - Chiller OOS

Unit One

Unit One has been operating at 95% power for the last one-hundred thirty (130) days per a recommendation from Nuclear Fuel Services (NFS). NFS along with Westinghouse has determined that if the Unit operates above 95% power there is a risk aggravating several small leakers in five of the core's outer assemblies. The 1B Steam Generator has had a steady fifty (50) gpd leak for the last twenty-six (26) days. The N-16 detectors are set up in the 1B and 1D MSIV rooms. Work in progress today includes:

- 1B RHR Pump - ASME surveillance run
- Containment Release
- Turbine Supervisory - Vibration Probe on #5 bearing

Unit Two

Unit Two has been operating at 100% power for the past one-hundred seventy (170) days. Work in progress includes:

- 2B AF pump - Monthly Surveillance
- Feedwater Isolation Valves - Partial Strokes
- Furmanite steam leak on 2C HD pump recirc

Revision 2

Byron Nuclear Generating Station
1994 GSEP Exercise
April 6, 1994

Unusual Event
[0745 - 0845]

At 0730, a security officer on protected area vehicle patrol discovers a bag near the fence at perimeter eighteen (18). Upon investigation it appears as though the bag was thrown over the fence. The bag contains blasting caps, wires, batteries, and clay like blocks, along with the code name of a known FBI terrorist affiliation and unknown telephone. At this time he observes two (2) white trucks leaving through the OCA fenced area at the south end of the switchyard at a high rate of speed. At 0815 a flange leak occurs in the Rad Waste VR area near the lower truck bay causing the OPB140 VR area and cubicle vent gas alarm to alarm on the RM-11 in the Control Room. Two personnel are contaminated. Rad monitor ORE-PR040 goes into alert and alarms on the RM-11 in the Control Room.

Expected Action

The security patrol officer should report the material to his supervisor. The Shift Security Supervisor will report the finding to the Shift Engineer. The Shift Engineer should declare an Unusual Event per HU-1. The Rad Protection personnel will respond to the resin spill. Mechanical Maintenance will be called upon to assist in the repair and control of the spill.

Alert
[0845 - 1000]

At 0845, a four (4) wheel drive pickup truck crashes through the main vehicle access gate and proceeds south along the east side of the plant at a high rate of speed. At 0846, a loud explosion is observed and heard at the Condensate Storage Tanks (CSTs) and the vehicle is near the tanks burning. Both CSTs are leaking water and appears to have sustain structural damage. Shrapnel from the explosion has torn several large holes in the Unit One and Two Condensate Storage Tanks (CST's). Water is observed pouring out from the holes in the CST's. The Unit 1 CST level transmitter is disabled due to flooding caused by the leaking vessels. At 0945, multiple explosions occur in the Byron Switchyard. The net effect is to open all breakers to lines L0622, L0624, and L15501. With L0621 OOS both Units trip. The Unit Two Diesel Generators(D/G's) come up to speed and voltage and synchronize to their respective ESF buses. The 1A D/G comes up to speed and voltage, and its output breaker closes. The loads begin sequencing on until the 1A Auxiliary Feedwater (AF) pump breaker closes in. There is an internal fault in the 1A AF pump motor which concurrent with a failure of the 1A AF pump breaker to trip open causes a lockout on bus 141. This trips open the 1A D/G output breaker. The 1B D/G trips on overspeed caused by a leak on the governor. When Unit One trips, the operators will enter IBCA-0.0 due to both ESF busses being de-energized. Following the procedure, their next action will be to attempt to crosstie Bus 142 to Unit Two via the two crosstie breakers, 1424 and 2424. When this is attempted, breaker 2424 will not close. Investigation of breaker 2424 will find nothing wrong. Once all ESF busses have been de-energized for fifteen minutes, restoration of the crosstie breaker will be allowed. The timing will depend on the operator's actions. Power and normal lighting is lost in the Service Building, Control Room, Technical Support Center, and Operations Support Center, and various locations within the plant.

Revision 2

Expected Action

After the explosion, the officer will radio CAS and report the explosion and fire. The officer will also report the obvious damage to the CST's. CAS will notify the Security Supervisor of the explosion. The Security Supervisor will notify the Shift Engineer. The Shift Engineer will declare an Alert per HA-1/HA-5/HA-2. Following the explosion in the switchyards and the lost of power to Bus 142 and 242, the shift will work to restore power to the plant and place the station on a 15 minute time clock for lost of all offsite power for greater than 15 minutes. The Shift Engineer will dispatch an EO to investigate the problem. Electrical Maintenance will be dispatched to troubleshoot and repair the problem.

Site Area Emergency [1000 - 1100]

At 1000, a Site Emergency is in affect at the station due to the loss of power to Unit 1 (142-1 and 142-2) OR Unit 2 (242-1 and 242-2) transformers AND Failure of A and B Diesel Generators to supply power to buses 141 and (241) or 142 (242). Failure to restore power to at least one ESF bus in ≥ 15 minutes from the time of loss of both onsite and offsite AC power. The 1B Diesel Generator autostarts but trips shortly due to an overspeed. The Shift should attempt to Crosstie Unit One to Unit Two. At 1045, power should be restored to the 1B Diesel Generator. The FBI will report to the station information suggesting that a terrorist attempt was aborted in a Northwest Utility earlier today and suggests that the activities occurring at the Byron Station could be linked to an international terroist group set on discrediting the Clinton's administration position on cracking down on international violence. Several individuals were arrested and the same type of setup used in the Byron explosion (blasting caps, contact name and number) were found to exist in the Northwest Utility attack.

Expected Action

The Shift Engineer should recognize and declare a Site Emergency after 15 minutes due to MS 1 [a loss of power to Unit 1 (142-1 and 142-2) OR Unit 2 (242-1 and 242-2) transformers AND Failure of A and B Diesel Generators to supply power to buses 141 and (241) or 142 (242). Failure to restore power to at least one ESF bus in ≥ 15 minutes from the time of loss of both onsite and offsite AC power]. Attempts to crosstie the breakers will result in failure, however physical repair of the breaker will result in a success. The Emergency Operations Facility will be staffed to support the emergency at the Station. The EOF, CEOF, and TSC should be able to draw a conclusion that the events that occurred are due to a terroist attack on the station. Efforts should be made to ensure that the station is free from all terroist and potential terroist threats.

Revision 2