YANKEE ATOMIC ELECTRIC COMPANY

Telephone (413) 424-5261

Star Route, Rowe, Massachusetts 01367

December 4 1990
BYR 90-158

TO: NRC - DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK
DOCUMENT: LICENSEE EVENT REPORT, LER
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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555

Subject: Licensee Event Report No. 50-29/90-009

Failure to Perform Surveillances Required by Technical Specifications

Dear Sir:

In accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i), the attached Licensee Event Report is hereby submitted.

Very truly yours,

Normand N. St. Laurent
Plant Superintendent

DJY/pkg
ENCLOSURE

cc: [3] NSARC Chairman (YAEC)
[1] Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO)
[1] USNRC, Region I
[1] Resident Inspector

IE22
1/1

NRC Form 366
(9-83)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104
EXPIRES: 8/31/88

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	PAGE (3)
Yankee Nuclear Power Station, Rowe, MA 01367	0 5 0 0 0 0 2 9	1 OF 0 3

TITLE (4)

Failure to Perform Surveillances Required by Technical Specifications

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES	DOCKET NUMBER(S)
										0 5 0 0 0
1 1	0 5	9 0	9 0	0 0 9	0 0	1 2	0 4	9 0		0 5 0 0 0

OPERATING MODE (9)		THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)			
5		20.402(b)	20.405(c)	50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)
POWER LEVEL (10)		20.405(a)(1)(i)	50.36(c)(1)	50.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(c)
0 1 0	0	20.405(a)(1)(ii)	50.36(c)(2)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)
		20.405(a)(1)(iii)	X 50.73(a)(2)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	
		20.405(a)(1)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	
		20.405(a)(1)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(x)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER
	AREA CODE
Gregory A. Maret, Technical Director	4 1 3 4 2 4 - 5 2 6 1

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)		EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	X NO				

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e. approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On November 5, 1990, while in Mode 5 following a plant refueling outage, the determination was made that the required Technical Specification (TS) surveillances of the main steam (MS) line and primary vent stack (PVS) process monitors had not been satisfactorily performed between November, 1989 and October, 1990. T.S.4.3.3.1 requires that each of these radiation monitoring instrumentation channels be demonstrated OPERABLE (during Modes 1-4) by the performance of channel functional tests on a monthly basis. Plant procedure OP-4816 specified that these radiation monitors be tested quarterly.

The root cause of this event has been attributed to personnel error. Although aware of the issuance of License Amendment No. 126, Radiation Protection Department personnel did not revise OP-4816 to change the surveillance frequency from quarterly to monthly. Immediate corrective action involved testing the MS line and PVS process monitors on November 5, 1990. The results of these functional tests were all satisfactory. Other corrective action included revising OP-4816 to reflect the correct surveillance frequencies, and also, reviewing all surveillance procedures for TS radiation monitors to ensure that frequencies are correct.

There was no adverse effect to the public health or safety. This is the first occurrence of this nature at this facility.

EVENT DESCRIPTION

On November 5, 1990, while in Mode 5 following a plant refueling outage, the determination was made that the surveillance requirement for functional testing of the main steam (MS) line and primary vent stack (PVS) high range process monitors [EIIS:IL] had not been satisfactorily performed. Technical Specification (TS) 4.3.3.1 requires that each of these radiation monitoring instrumentation channels [EIIS:CHA] shall be demonstrated OPERABLE (during Modes 1-4) by the performance of channel functional tests on a monthly basis. Plant procedure OP-4816, "Functional Test and Alarm Settings of the Area Radiation Monitoring System," specified that these radiation monitors [EIIS:MON] be tested quarterly.

The operability and surveillance requirements of this radiation monitoring instrumentation were recently modified by the issuance of License Amendment No. 126. This amendment incorporated into the TS new requirements for plant equipment installed to meet the criteria of NUREG-0737 concerning noble gas effluent monitoring systems. The effective date of Amendment No. 126 was October 23, 1989.

A review of the surveillance records demonstrated that the required TS surveillances for these radiation monitors had not been performed during the months of November, 1989 and January, April, May and October of 1990.

CAUSE OF EVENT

The root cause of this event has been attributed to personnel error. Although aware of the issuance of License Amendment No. 126, Radiation Protection Department personnel did not revise OP-4816 to change the surveillance frequency from quarterly to monthly. This omission was not detected by plant procedure AP-0041, "Plant Surveillance Schedule," because OP-4816 contains both quarterly and monthly surveillances. Hence, data input to AP-0041 indicated that surveillance procedure OP-4816 was completed monthly, presumably for all radiation monitors.

SAFETY ASSESSMENT

This event is reportable per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) since it involves a condition that is prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications.

Even though some monthly required TS surveillances were missed, quarterly surveillances for these radiation monitors were still being performed. A review of the surveillance records indicates that surveillances for the main steam line and primary vent stack process monitors were performed during the months of December, 1989 and February, March, June and September of 1990. The results of these functional tests were all satisfactory.

Based on the above discussion, the health and safety of the public were not affected as a result of this event.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

Immediate corrective action involved testing the MS line and PVS process monitors on November 5, 1990. The results of these functional tests were all satisfactory.

Other corrective action included revising plant procedure OP-4816 to reflect the correct surveillance frequencies for this radiation monitoring instrumentation. A'so, all surveillance procedures for TS radiation monitors under the control of the Radiation Protection Department have been reviewed to verify that all surveillance frequencies are correct.

In addition, reporting of the completion of TS surveillance procedures for radiation monitors which contain two or more frequencies will now specify which surveillance interval was performed.

SIMILAR EVENTS

None