



Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box E Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038

Salem Generating Station

October 6, 1982

Mr. R. C. Haynes
Regional Administrator
USNRC
Region 1
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Dear Mr. Haynes:

LICENSE NO. DPR-70
DOCKET NO. 50-272
REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 82-070/03L

Pursuant to the requirements of Salem Generating Station Unit No. 1, Technical Specifications, Section 6.9.1.9.b, we are submitting Licensee Event Report for Reportable Occurrence 82-070/03L. This report is required within thirty (30) days of the occurrence.

Sincerely yours,

H. J. Midura
General Manager -
Salem Operations

RF:ks *z.c.l.*

CC: Distribution

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PDR ADOCK 05000272
S PDR

The Energy People

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Report Number: 82-070/03L

Report Date:

Occurrence Date: 09-12-82

Facility: Salem Generating Station, Unit 1
Public Service Electric & Gas Company
Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

DNB Parameters - Pressurizer Pressure - Out of Specification.

This report was initiated by Incident Reports 82-274 and 82-283.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

Mode 1 - Rx Power 100% - Unit Load 1080 MWe.

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

At 2245 hours, September 12, 1982, during the performance of functional testing of Pressurizer Pressure Channel III instrument, the Control Room Operator noticed that pressure was approximately 2205 PSIA and decreasing. A survey of the control board revealed that the pressurizer controller was in the manual mode of operation. The automatic mode had been selected prior to the occurrence. Control was returned to automatic, the backup heaters energized and pressure started to increase. With pressure less than the Technical Specification limit of 2220 PSIA, Action Statement 3.2.5 was entered, retroactive to the time of discovery of the problem. Pressurizer pressure increased until 2250 hours when it returned within specification limits and Action Statement 3.2.5 was terminated. The minimum pressure reached during the transient was 2200 PSIA.

At 1436 hours, September 14, 1982, a similar malfunction of the pressurizer pressure controller was observed, and Action Statement 3.2.5 was entered for a second time. The control room operator again returned the controller to the automatic mode and pressure was returned to within limits. The action statement was terminated at 1448 hours, September 14, 1982; minimum pressure observed was 2155 PSIA.

DESIGNATION OF APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:

Investigation of the first occurrence showed no link to performance of the surveillance. In both instances, the controller tested satisfactorily following the malfunction. A similar problem had occurred on June 4, 1982 (see LER 82-038/03L), with no identifiable failure in the controller. The occurrences were therefore attributed to an intermittent problem in either the pressure controller or the manual-auto station.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

In accordance with the Technical Specification basis for Limiting Condition for Operation 3.2.5, compliance with the Specification limits assure DNB parameters are within the steady state envelope of operation assumed in the transient and accident analyses of the FSAR. The limits are consistent with the initial FSAR assumptions, and have been analytically demonstrated adequate to maintain a minimum DNBR of 1.30 throughout each analyzed transient. The FSAR does not consider, however, events starting during transients which are already in progress. Action Statement 3.2.5 requires:

With any of the DNB parameters exceeding its limit, restore the parameter to within its limit within 2 hours, or reduce thermal power to less than 5% of rated thermal power within the next 4 hours.

The 2 hour limit contained in the action statement ensures that, following unexpected transients of the type involved in these occurrences, DNB parameters are returned within the envelope assumed in the FSAR. In both instances, pressurizer pressure was within the DNB limit within 2 hours and consequently, no risk to the health or safety of the public was involved.

These occurrences constituted operation in a degraded mode permitted by a limiting condition for operation, and were reportable in accordance with Technical Specification 6.9.1.9.b.

In the event the operator had failed to notice the decreasing pressure, a Pressurizer Pressure-Low trip would have initiated a reactor shutdown at 1880 PSIA, maintaining a minimum DNBR of 1.30, as demonstrated by the FSAR. As such, the occurrence would still not have involved any risk to the health or safety of the public.


CORRECTIVE ACTION:

As noted, in both instances pressure was returned to within limits and the action statement was terminated within the 2 hour interval. The manual-auto station was replaced and the channel was satisfactorily tested on September 16, 1982; no further problems have been noted.

FAILURE DATA:

Hagan Corporation
Manual-Auto Station
Model 124

Prepared By R. Frahm



General Manager -
Salem Operations

SORC Meeting No. 82-88