



December 3, 1990

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U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
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Washington, D.C. 20555

SUBJECT: Arkansas Nuclear One - Units 1 and 2
Docket Nos. 50-313 and 50-368
License Nos. DPR-51 and NPF-6
Special Report Concerning
Inoperability of a Fire Pump

Gentlemen:

In accordance with ANO-1 Technical Specifications 3.17.2 and 6.12.5 and ANO-2 Technical Specifications 3.7.10.1 and 6.9.2, a Special Report is being submitted concerning inoperability of a fire pump for more than seven days. This report addresses the cause of the inoperable condition and the plans and procedures to be used to provide for the loss of redundancy in the fire suppression water system.

The fire protection water supply for ANO Units 1 and 2 consists of one 2,500 gpm automatic electric motor driven pump (P6A) and one 2,500 gpm automatic diesel engine driven pump. Each pump is individually capable of providing full flow required for proper fire suppression water system operation.

At 1430 on October 26, 1990, the electric motor driven fire pump (P6A) was declared inoperable and Technical Specification action statements 3.17.2 and 3.7.10.1.a were entered for Unit 1 and 2, respectively. The "C" service water bay was being drained down to perform maintenance and modification work for the Unit 1 refueling outage; therefore, the water source for P6A was unavailable. The work in "C" service water bay was initially scheduled to be complete within seven days; however, the work took longer than expected and the seven days allowed by the Technical Specifications expired at 1430 on November 2, 1990. The electric motor driven fire pump (P6A) was restored to an operable condition at 0553 on November 7, 1990.

During the time the electric motor driven pump (P6A) was inoperable, the diesel engine driven fire pump was operable and a temporary electric fire pump was available to provide for the loss of redundancy in the fire suppression water system. The temporary pump had been installed to provide a heat sink for spent fuel pool cooling while both loops of service water were out of service during the Unit 1 refueling outage and the fire suppression piping had been interconnected with the intermediate cooling water system. This pump is capable of providing full flow required for proper fire suppression water system operation. To ensure that sufficient water is available for fire suppression during a loss of offsite power, special work plan 1409.245 (ANO Unit 1 Service Water and Auxiliary Cooling Water Chemical Cleaning) was revised to include provisions for isolating the additional demands on the fire suppression water system in the event of a Unit 1 or 2 fire alarm. This procedure could also be used to ensure sufficient water is available for fire suppression with P6A inoperable.

The temporary fire pump and associated procedures provided sufficient redundancy in the fire suppression water system until the electric motor driven pump (P6A) was restored to operability. Should you have any questions, please contact me at (501) 964-8601.

Very truly yours,

James J. Fisicaro
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JJF/GRA/mmg

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