

Southern California Edison Company

SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION
P.O. BOX 128
SAN CLEMENTE, CALIFORNIA 92672

H. B. RAY
STATION MANAGER

October 6, 1982

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U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Region V
1450 Maria Lane, Suite 210
Walnut Creek, California 94596-5368

Attention: Mr. R. H. Engelken, Regional Administrator

Dear Sir:

Subject: Docket No. 50-206
Licensee Event Report No. 81-025, Revision 2
San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station
Unit 1

- Reference:
1. Letter H. B. Ray (SCE) to R. H. Engelken (NRC) dated October 26, 1981.
 2. Letter H. B. Ray (SCE) to R. H. Engelken (NRC), dated November 3, 1981.
 3. Letter H. B. Ray (SCE) to R. H. Engelken (NRC), dated May 19, 1982.

The above referenced submittals identified failures with two SONGS 1 Containment Isolation Valves, CV-107 and CV-534, and provided a description of the probable cause of the failures. The purpose of this submittal is to clarify the information provided in previous correspondence and to report on the results of the corrective actions taken to prevent recurrence. A summary of cause and corrective action follows:

The failures of Containment Isolation Valves CV-107 and CV-534 were traced to failure of two Agastat Magnetic Latch Relays used in the containment isolation control circuits. Preliminary investigations attributed failure of the relays to arming contacts used in series with the reset coil of each Agastat Magnetic Latch Relay to prevent damage to the coil from continuous energization. The immediate corrective action consisted of replacing the failed relays with new relays of the same design and returning the valves to service.

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Mr. R. H. Engelken

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October 6, 1982


Subsequent investigations included inspection of the failed relays, testing of sample relays in a test circuit similar to the containment isolation circuits, and review of the logic of the containment isolation control circuits.

The results of these subsequent investigations indicated that the failures were caused not by the arming contacts as we originally thought, but by an overheated coil in one relay and poorly aligned contacts in the other relay.

Corrective actions resulting from these later investigations consisted of removal, inspection, and test of each Agastat Magnetic Latch Relay used in the containment isolation control circuits. Relays that failed to operate properly in the test circuit or showed evidence of coil overheating, poor contact alignment, or excessive contact pitting were replaced. A total of 10 relays were replaced. All corrective actions have now been completed.

Enclosed is LER 81-025, Revision 2. If you should require further information, please contact me.

Sincerely,



Enclosure: LER No. 81-025, Revision 2

cc: U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Office of Inspection & Enforcement

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Office of Management Information and Program Control

Institute of Nuclear Power Operation (INPO)

L. F. Miller (USNRC Resident Inspector - San Onofre Unit 1)