


10 CFR 50.59(B) REPORT OF FACILITY
CHANGES, TESTS & EXPERIMENTS.
JUNE 1, 1992 THRU OCTOBER 22, 1993

**VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT
UNITS 1 & 2**



SUBJECT: DCP: 87-V1E0071, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THIS DCP INSTALLED PERSONNEL CONTAMINATION MONITORS, ACCESS CONTROL TERMINALS AND A ELECTRONIC POCKET DOSIMETER SYSTEM IN ROOMS 180 AND 141.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THIS MODIFICATION WILL HELP PREVENT THE SPREAD OF CONTAMINATION. THE EQUIPMENT ADDED IS NON-SAFETY RELATED. THEREFORE THIS DCP DOES NOT AFFECT SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT, ACCIDENT ANALYSIS OR THE MARGINS OF SAFETY AS SPECIFIED IN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES.

SUBJECT: DCP: 87-V1E0071, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 2

DESCRIPTION: THIS DCP INSTALLED EQUIPMENT IN AUXILIARY BUILDING ROOM 123 FOR HEALTH PHYSICS USE.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE CHANGES MADE UNDER THIS DCP DID NOT INVOLVE SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT AND DID NOT DECREASE THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS SET FORTH IN TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS AND DID NOT EFFECT ANY ACCIDENT ANALYSIS AS SET FORTH IN THE FSAR.

SUBJECT: DCP: 87-V1E0073, REVISION 1, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THIS DCP IMPLEMENTED 9 WESTINGHOUSE RECOMMENDATIONS, PRESENTED AS FCN'S, TO THE WASTE EVAPORATOR PACKAGE. THESE CHANGES IMPROVED THE RELIABILITY AND OPERABILITY OF THE WASTE EVAPORATOR.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE WASTE EVAPORATOR PACKAGE IS NOT A SAFETY RELATED PIECE OF EQUIPMENT, MODIFICATIONS TO THE WASTE EVAPORATOR PACKAGE NO NOT IMPACT ANY SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS SINCE THE EQUIPMENT IS NOT REQUIRED TO MITIGATE THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT, NOR IS IT REQUIRED TO BRING THE PLANT TO A SAFE SHUTDOWN CONDITION. THE WASTE EVAPORATOR IS NOT ADDRESSED IN TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS PER A REVIEW OF SECTIONS 3/4.7, 3/4.11, AND 3/4.12.

SUBJECT: DCP: 87-V1E0098, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THIS DCP CHANGED THE PRESSURE GAUGE AND REMOTE DIAPHRAGM ASSEMBLY FOR THE BACK FLUSHABLE FILTER CRUD TANK LEVEL INDICATOR. THIS PROVIDES THE CORRECT RANGE FOR CRUD TANK PUMP SUCTION PRESSURE DETERMINATION AND BACK FLUSHABLE FILTER CRUD TANK LEVEL

SAFETY EVALUATION: THIS CHANGE ALLOWS THE SYSTEM TO FUNCTION AS DESIGNED THEREBY COMPLYING WITH DESIGN AND LICENSING REQUIREMENTS PER FSAR SECTION 11.4.2.3.2. THIS CHANGE HAS NO EFFECT ON ACCIDENTS AS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR.

SUBJECT: DCP: 87-V1E0098, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 2

DESCRIPTION: THIS CHANGE PROVIDED LOCAL INDICATION OF CRUD TANK LEVEL PRIOR TO STARTING THE CRUD TANK PUMP.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THIS CHANGE HAS NO EFFECT ON ACCIDENTS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR SECTION 11.4.2, FSAR SECTION 15 AND 16. THIS ALLOWS THE SYSTEM PER DESIGN INTENT. THERE BY COMPLYING WITH DESIGN AND LICENSING REQUIREMENTS. THIS MODIFICATION HAS NO EFFECT ON EQUIPMENT USED IN THE FSAR ANALYSIS. FSAR SECTION 1.5 AND 16 ARE NOT EFFECTED BY THIS CHANGE. BY INCREASING THE RELIABILITY OF THE CRUD TANK LEVEL INDICATION THE POSSIBILITY OF AN ACCIDENT OR MALFUNCTION NOT DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR IS DECREASED. THIS CHANGE DOES NOT DECREASE THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS SET FORTH IN ANY TECHNICAL BASES.

SUBJECT: DCP: 87-V1E0135, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THIS DCP INSTALL ACOUSTICAL PANEL IN CAS TO HELP MEET THE HVAC SOUND LEVEL REQUIREMENTS. THIS DCP CONTAINS SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THIS DCP CONTAINS SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION. IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS DCP DOES NOT INCREASE THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT OR THE PROBABILITY OF AN ACCIDENT. IT DOES NOT EFFECT EQUIPMENT, SYSTEM, OR COMPONENTS REQUIRED TO MITIGATE THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT AS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR. THE MARGIN OF SAFETY HAS NOT BEEN DECREASED AS DESCRIBED IN THE BASIS FOR ANY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION.

SUBJECT: DCP: 87-V1E0141, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1, 2, & 3

DESCRIPTION: PESB UPGRADE DCP WHICH ADDED TURNSTILES AT PESB TO ELIMINATE TAILGATING AND PROVIDED CONTROLLED ACCESS INTO THE PROTECTED AREA. THIS DCP CONTAINS SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THIS DCP CONTAINS SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION. IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS DCP DOES NOT INCREASE THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT OR THE PROBABILITY OF AN ACCIDENT. IT DOES NOT EFFECT EQUIPMENT, SYSTEM, OR COMPONENTS REQUIRED TO MITIGATE THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT AS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR. THE MARGIN OF SAFETY HAS NOT BEEN DECREASED AS DESCRIBED IN THE BASIS FOR ANY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION.

SUBJECT: DCP: 87-V1E0287, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THIS DCP PROVIDES RE-ROUTING OF PIPE (LINE NO. 1-1225-003) DOWN STREAM OF NEUTRALIZING SUMP 1-1225-F4-001 TO KEEP CONDUCTIVITY ELEMENT 1CE-17649 CONTINUOUSLY SUBMERGED. BY SUBMERGING THE ELEMENT IN A 6" PIPE, FILLED WITH WATER, THE NUISANCE ALARM WILL NOT COME IN. THE LOW ALARM COMES IN ONLY WHEN THE ELEMENT IS DRY; WHICH INDICATES THAT THE PIPE SHOULD BE FILLED WITH WATER.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE DCP INVOLVES NON-SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT. THESE CHANGES ENHANCED THE PERFORMANCE OF NON-SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT AND DID NOT AFFECT ANY SAFETY SYSTEM, POSTULATED TO FUNCTION IN ANY FSAR ACCIDENT ANALYSIS. FAILURE OF THE DRAIN SYSTEM WILL NOT INITIATE OR CONTRIBUTE TO THE FAILURE OF SYSTEMS OR COMPONENTS POSTULATED IN THE FSAR.

THE DCP PROVIDES FOR CHANGES TO NON-SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT/SYSTEM WHICH ARE NOT ADDRESSED IN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION THEREFORE, THERE IS NO REDUCTION IN THE MARGIN OF SAFETY DEFINED OR INFERRED BY THE BASES OF ANY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION.

SUBJECT: DCP: 87-V1E0290, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: PERIMETER GRAVEL UPGRADE, REVISE MICROWAVE, RESOLVE GLARE PROBLEMS, AND INSTALL CLIMB DETERRENT. THIS DCP CONTAINS SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THIS DCP CONTAINS SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION. IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS DCP DOES NOT INCREASE THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT OR THE PROBABILITY OF AN ACCIDENT. IT DOES NOT EFFECT EQUIPMENT, SYSTEM, OR COMPONENTS REQUIRED TO MITIGATE THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT AS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR. THE MARGIN OF SAFETY HAS NOT BEEN DECREASED AS DESCRIBED IN THE BASIS FOR ANY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION.

SUBJECT: DCP: 87-V1E0361, REVISION 1, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THIS DCP INSTALLED MICRO SWITCHES ON CERTAIN SECURITY DOORS. THIS DCP CONTAINS SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THIS DCP CONTAINS SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION. IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS DCP DOES NOT INCREASE THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT OR THE PROBABILITY OF AN ACCIDENT. IT DOES NOT EFFECT EQUIPMENT, SYSTEM, OR COMPONENTS REQUIRED TO MITIGATE THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT AS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR. THE MARGIN OF SAFETY HAS NOT BEEN DECREASED AS DESCRIBED IN THE BASIS FOR ANY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION.

SUBJECT: DCP: 87-V1N0420, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THIS CHANGE REDUCED THE QUANTITY OF SNUBBERS IN THE PORTION OF THE 1301 SYSTEM ANALYZED IN STRESS CALC NO. X4CP-7151A. THE SPECIFIC LINES AFFECTED BY THIS DCP ARE FOR THE STEAM GENERATOR WET LAY-UP PORTION OF THE MAIN STEAM SYSTEM. THIS DESIGN CHANGE WAS LIMITED TO MODIFICATIONS OF PIPE SUPPORTS ONLY AND DID NOT CHANGE PIPE ROUTING, EQUIPMENT OR COMPONENTS.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THIS CHANGE DID NOT AFFECT SYSTEM FUNCTION OR OPERATION AND THEREFORE DID NOT AFFECT THE ACCIDENT ANALYSIS, PROBABILITY OR CONSEQUENCES OF A MAIN STEAM ACCIDENT AND DOES NOT AFFECT THE SAFETY MARGIN DEFINED BY TECH SPEC 3/4.7, 3/4.7.8. THE LIST OF SNUBBERS REFERRED TO IN THE BASES OF TECH SPEC 3/4.7.8 WILL CHANGE, BUT THE MARGIN OF SAFETY IS NOT AFFECTED. THIS IS BASED ON REVIEWS OF FSAR SECTIONS 15.1 AND 15.2.

SUBJECT: DCP: 87-V1N0456, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THIS DCP INSTALL A PERMANENT CATWALK STRUCTURE AND ASSOCIATED LADDERS BETWEEN AFW PUMP HOUSE SUMP PUMP ROOM 104 AND AFW PUMP HOUSE ROOM 105 ON UNIT 1 TO FACILITATE ACCESS TO ROOM 105 DURING

EMERGENCY AND NORMAL OPERATING CONDITIONS. THIS DESIGN ALSO IMPROVED THE SAFETY OF THE PREVIOUS LADDERS.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE ACCIDENTS POSTULATED IN FSAR SECTIONS 9.4.8, 10.4.9, 15, AND APP. 10A ARE NOT AFFECTED BY THE ADDITION OF THE CATWALK STRUCTURE AND DOES NOT AFFECT ANY EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY ANALYZED IN THE FSAR FOR ACCIDENT MITIGATION. THE MARGIN OF SAFETY DEFINED IN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3/4.4.7 IS NOT AFFECTED.

SUBJECT: DCP: 87-V1N0467, REVISION 2, SEQUENCE 2

DESCRIPTION: UPGRADES TO MAIN PESB, EAST-SIDE ROOM BY ADDING A THIRD ENTRANCE SCREENING LANE. THIS DCP CONTAINS SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THIS DCP CONTAINS SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION. IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS DCP DOES NOT INCREASE THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT OR THE PROBABILITY OF AN ACCIDENT. IT DOES NOT EFFECT EQUIPMENT, SYSTEM, OR COMPONENTS REQUIRED TO MITIGATE THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT AS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR. THE MARGIN OF SAFETY HAS NOT BEEN DECREASED AS DESCRIBED IN THE BASIS FOR ANY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION.

SUBJECT: DCP: 87-V1N0467, REVISION 2, SEQUENCE 3

DESCRIPTION: UPGRADES TO MAIN PESB, BARRIER WALL INSTALLATION, INSTALL A NEW CAMERA, RELOCATE MICROWAVE TRANSMITTERS AND RECEIVERS, DELETE MICROWAVE TRANSCEIVER, AND REWORK RESTROOMS. THIS DCP CONTAINS SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THIS DCP CONTAINS SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION. IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS DCP DOES NOT INCREASE THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT OR THE PROBABILITY OF AN ACCIDENT. IT DOES NOT EFFECT EQUIPMENT, SYSTEM, OR COMPONENTS REQUIRED TO MITIGATE THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT AS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR. THE MARGIN OF SAFETY HAS NOT BEEN DECREASED AS DESCRIBED IN THE BASIS FOR ANY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION.

SUBJECT: DCP: 87-V1N0467, REVISION 2, SEQUENCE 4

DESCRIPTION: UPGRADES TO MAIN PESB, MODIFY MAIN ENTRANCE GATE X-RAY EQUIPMENT THIS DCP CONTAINS SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THIS DCP CONTAINS SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION. IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS DCP DOES NOT INCREASE THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT OR THE PROBABILITY OF AN ACCIDENT. IT DOES NOT EFFECT EQUIPMENT, SYSTEM, OR COMPONENTS REQUIRED TO MITIGATE THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT AS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR. THE MARGIN OF SAFETY HAS NOT BEEN DECREASED AS DESCRIBED IN THE BASIS FOR ANY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION.

SUBJECT: DCP: 87-VCE0250, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THIS DCP MODIFIED THE POTABLE WATER CHLORINATION SKID TO USE SODIUM HYPOCHLORITE RATHER THAN CHLORINE GAS FOR WATER PURIFICATION. BECAUSE OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR CONTROL ROOM VENTILATION ALL MAJOR SOURCES OF CHLORINE GAS WERE REMOVED FROM SITE.

SAFETY EVALUATION: FSAR SECTION 15 DOES NOT DISCUSS ACCIDENTS INVOLVING THE CHLORINE SYSTEM. THERE IS NO CHANGE IN THE CHEMICAL EVALUATIONS IN SECTION 2.2 OF THE FSAR OR HABITABILITY SYSTEMS OF SECTION 6.4. THIS DESIGN CHANGE DOES NOT AFFECT THE TECH SPEC BASIS PER A REVIEW OF SECTION B3/4.3.3.7 AND 3/4.3-3.

SUBJECT: DCP: 87-VCE0304, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THIS DESIGN CHANGE ADDRESSED THE INSTALLATION OF PIPING, VALVES, AND INSTRUMENTATION WHICH ALLOW THE TURBINE PLANT COOLING WATER SYSTEM TO SUPPLY SEAL AND COOLING WATER TO THE UNIT 1 CIRCULATING WATER PUMPS AND MOTORS AS A BACKUP SUPPLY IN THE EVENT UTILITY WATER IS NOT AVAILABLE. SEQUENCE 1 OF THE DCP ALLOWS THE INSTALLATION OF PIPING FROM THE DISCHARGE OF TPCW PUMP 1-1405-P4-501 TO THE FIRST ISOLATION GLOBE VALVE ON THE NEW LINE. IT ALSO COVERED MODIFICATIONS TO UTILITY WATER LINE 1-2419-543-2" AND THE NEW LINE WHICH TAPS INTO 543 UP TO THE FIRST ISOLATION GLOBE VALVE. THESE LINES WERE INSTALLED DURING A PLANT OUTAGE AND WERE CAPPED OFF. SEQUENCE 2 OF THE DCP REMOVED THE CAPS AND JOINED THE TWO NEW LINES TO FORM ONE NEW LINE. THE NEW PIPING IS LOCATED AT THE CIRCULATING WATER PUMP STRUCTURE.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THIS WAS PERFORMED ON NON-SAFETY RELATED SYSTEMS, PROJECT CLASS 626. THE CHANGE DOES NOT AFFECT AREAS COVERED IN THE TECH. SPECS. INCLUDING SECTION 3/4.7, "TURBINE CYCLE."

SUBJECT: DCP: 88-V1N0037, REVISION 1, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THIS DCP RE-CONFIGURES THE HIGH PRESSURE (REFERENCE LEG) SENSING LINE FOR INSTRUMENTS 1LT-461, 1LT-462, 1PT-457, AND 1PT-458. THIS CHANGE CORRECTS LEAKAGE PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH THIS LEG AND PROVIDES A NEW CONDENSATE POT ASSEMBLY WHICH REFILLS THE REFERENCE LEG BETTER DURING POWER OPERATIONS.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE TRANSMITTERS RESPOND IDENTICALLY TO THEIR PREVIOUS RESPONSE SINCE THE DESIGN CHANGE THUS THERE IS NO IMPACT ON THE ACCIDENT ANALYSES IN SECTION 15 AND 7.3.1 OF THE FSAR.

SUBJECT: DCP: 88-V1N0042, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: INVERTERS A-1807-Y3-SAS110, A-1807-Y3-CAS111, AND A-1807-Y3-CAS112 HAVE NEW STATIC TRANSFER SWITCHES ADDED TO THEIR SCHEME OF OPERATION. ALSO A NEW MAKE-BEFORE-BREAK MAINTENANCE BYPASS SWITCH REPLACED THE PREVIOUS BREAK-BEFORE-MAKE TRANSFER SWITCH IN EACH OF THESE INVERTERS. INCLUDED IN THESE SWITCH ADDITIONS ARE SYNCHRONIZING CIRCUITS. ALL ADDITIONS AND REPLACEMENTS IS WITHIN THE INVERTER CABINETS. THE PLANT ENTRY SECURITY BUILDING (PESB) BATTERY CHARGER ROOM EXHAUST FAN

(A-1583-B7-005) HAD ITS BLADE SETTING CHANGED TO INCREASE THE FAN CAPACITY FROM 3, 500 CFM TO 3, 800 CFM. THE SYSTEM POWER SUPPLY WAS MADE MORE RELIABLE BY PROVIDING A NO-BREAK AUTOMATIC TRANSFER TO BYPASS POWER UPON LOSS OF INVERTER OUTPUT AND TO ALLOW THE INVERTER TO BE SHUT DOWN FOR MAINTENANCE OR CALIBRATION BY PROVIDING A NO-BREAK MANUAL TRANSFER TO BYPASS POWER. THE PESB BATTERY CHARGER ROOM EXHAUST FAN BLADE SETTING CHANGE INCREASES FLOW RATE FOR PROPER DISSIPATION OF HEAT GAIN DUE TO THE ADDITION OF THE STATIC TRANSFER SWITCH.

SAFETY EVALUATION: A DESCRIPTION OF THE PHYSICAL SECURITY PROGRAM IS NOT PROVIDED IN THE FSAR BUT IS DESCRIBED IN A SEPARATE DOCUMENT WHICH IS CLASSIFIED AS "SAFEGUARDS" MATERIAL. REPLACEMENT OF THE PREVIOUS TRANSFER SWITCHES IN THE NON-1E SECURITY INVERTERS WITH STATIC TRANSFER AND MAKE-BEFORE BREAK MAINTENANCE BYPASS SWITCHES ENHANCED THE SECURITY POWER SYSTEMS PERFORMANCE AND OPERATION. OPERATION OF THE ON-SITE ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM WAS NOT AFFECTED. THESE NEW SWITCHES ARE INSTALLED WITHIN THE EXISTING INVERTER CABINETS SO THE PHYSICAL ARRANGEMENT OF THE PLANT WAS NOT CHANGED. A DESCRIPTION OF THE PESB BATTERY CHARGER ROOM HVAC IS NOT PROVIDED IN THE FSAR. THE EXHAUST FAN IN THIS ROOM HAD ITS BLADE SETTING CHANGED TO INCREASE AIR FLOW TO HANDLE THE HEAT GAIN ASSOCIATED WITH THE ADDITION OF THE STATIC TRANSFER SWITCH. THE ONLY EFFECT IS INCREASED EXHAUST AIR FLOW. PREVIOUS AIR FLOW IN THE CONTROL BUILDING INVERTER ROOM IS ADEQUATE TO HANDLE THE ADDITIONAL HEAT LOAD OF ADDING STATIC TRANSFER SWITCHES. THE INVERTERS AND EXHAUST FAN DO NOT PROVIDE A PRIMARY OR DIVERSE PROTECTIVE FUNCTION WHICH IS RELIED UPON TO BRING THE PLANT TO A SAFE SHUTDOWN CONDITION OR TO MITIGATE THE RELEASE OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL TO THE ATMOSPHERE. ALL EQUIPMENT INSTALLED IN THE CONTROL BUILDING INVERTER ROOM IS SEISMIC CATEGORY 2. ADDITION OF STATIC SWITCH AND REPLACEMENT OF MAINTENANCE BYPASS SWITCH INSIDE EACH INVERTER DID NOT HAVE ANY SIGNIFICANT CHANGE TO THE OVERALL WEIGHT OF THE INVERTER. THERE ARE NO FAILURE MODES OF THE SWITCHES OR ANY FAILURE MODES ASSOCIATED WITH CHANGING THE EXHAUST FAN BLADE SETTING THAT CAN LEAD TO ACCIDENTS. THERE IS NO MARGIN OF SAFETY ASSOCIATED WITH THE SECURITY SYSTEM OR THE PESB BATTERY CHARGER ROOM EXHAUST FAN.

SUBJECT: DCP: 88-V1N0058, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THIS DCP REPLACED THE PREVIOUS FILTER HOLDER WITH A HOLDER THAT ALLOWS FOR USE OF A QUICK-DISCONNECT FITTING, ELIMINATING POSSIBLE AIR LEAKAGE AND INSTALLATION/ REMOVAL PROBLEMS WITH THE PASSIVE SAMPLE FILTER HOLDER. A FLEXIBLE METAL HOSE IS PART OF THIS INSTALLATION TO ALLOW MOVEMENT WHILE CHANGING THE FILTER MEDIUM. ALSO A FLOW TOTALIZER WAS ADDED TO REDUCE ANY ERROR IN THE WEEKLY SAMPLE ANALYSIS BY PROVIDING MEANS OF RECORDING ACTUAL TOTAL FLOW THRU THE SKID VERSUS ESTIMATING TOTAL FLOW. THIS INCREASED THE ACCURACY OF THE SAMPLE ANALYSIS.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THERE WAS NO CHANGE TO ANY PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE OR CONSEQUENCES OF ANY CHAPTER 15 ACCIDENT. THE DESIGN DID NOT AFFECT ANY SAFETY RELATED FUNCTIONS OF ANY RADIATION MONITORS. THIS CHANGE DID NOT AFFECT THE PERFORMANCE OF ANY EQUIPMENT ASSUMED TO FUNCTION IN THE FSAR ACCIDENT ANALYSIS. THE FLEXHOSE DID NOT AFFECT THE

PLATEOUT OF IODINE AND PARTICULATES IN THE SAMPLE LINE SINCE IT IS LOCATED DOWNSTREAM FROM THE SAMPLE FILTERS. THIS REVIEW INCLUDED FSAR CHAPTER 9.4.3, 9.4.6, 9.4.9, 11.5, 15. THIS CHANGE DOES NOT CREATE THE POSSIBILITY OF ANY MALFUNCTION NOT ALREADY ANALYZED IN THE FSAR. THIS INCLUDED A REVIEW OF CHAPTER 7, 9, AND 15. THERE ARE NO CHANGES IN THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED BY THE BASES OF TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3/4.3.2 3/4.3.3 3/4.11.2

SUBJECT: DCP: 88-V1N0076, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THIS DCP DELETED THE RHR SUCTION ISOLATION VALVE AUTO CLOSURE INTERLOCK (ACI) AND REPLACED IT WITH A CONTROL ROOM ALARM. IN ADDITION THE RHR SUCTION ISOLATION VALVE OPEN PERMISSIVE INTERLOCK (OPI) PRESSURE SETPOINT WERE REDUCED FROM 377 PSIG TO 365 PSIG.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE RHR ACI FEATURE ENSURES THAT THE RHR SUCTION ISOLATION VALVES ARE FULLY CLOSED WHEN THE RCS PRESSURE RISES ABOVE THE INTERLOCK SET POINT. WESTINGHOUSE ANALYSES INDICATE THAT THE REPLACEMENT OF THE ACI FEATURE WITH THE COMBINATION OF THE CONTROL ROOM ALARM AND REVISED ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES ENSURE THAT THE APPROPRIATE ACTIONS BE TAKEN BY THE OPERATORS SO THAT THE RHR IS ISOLATED FROM THE RCS WHEN THE RCS PRESSURE RISES ABOVE THE ALARM SET POINT. (THE INTERLOCK PROVIDES AN AUTOMATIC CLOSURE OF THE RHR SUCTION ISOLATION VALVES ON HIGH RCS PRESSURE, HOWEVER, RAPID OVER PRESSURE PROTECTION OF THE RHR SYSTEM IS AND ARE PROVIDED BY THE RHR SYSTEM RELIEF VALVES AND NOT BY THE SLOW ACTING SUCTION ISOLATION VALVES.) THIS COMBINATION RESULTS IN A REDUCED PROBABILITY OF AN ACCIDENT OCCURRENCE (WCAP-12927). THE OPI SET POINT PREVENTS THE RHR SUCTION ISOLATION VALVES FROM BEING OPENED WHILE THE RCS PRESSURE IS POTENTIALLY ABOVE THE DESIGN PRESSURE OF THE RHR SYSTEM. THE REDUCED OPI SET POINT FURTHER MINIMIZES THE POTENTIAL OF OPENING THE RHR SUCTION ISOLATION VALVES WHILE THE RCS PRESSURE IS ABOVE THE DESIGN PRESSURE OF THE RHR SYSTEM. THE REMOVAL OF THE RHR ACI FEATURE AND THE REDUCTION IN THE OPI SET POINT W NOT RESULT IN A CONDITION WHERE THE DESIGN, MATERIAL, AND CONSTRUCTION STANDARDS THAT WERE APPLICABLE PRIOR TO THE CHANGE ARE ALTERED. IN ADDITION, THE SAFETY FUNCTIONS OF THE RHR SYSTEM HAVE NOT BEEN ALTERED AND NO NEW SINGLE FAILURES HAVE BEEN CREATED BY THIS MODIFICATION.

SUBJECT: DCP: 88-V1N0086, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THIS DCP MODIFIED THE DETECTOR TUBES FOR RADIATION MONITORS :1RE-1950, ARE-016, ARE-025, 1RE-48000, 1RE-0020A, 1RE-0020B, 1RE-17A, 1RE-17B, 1RE-0848, 1RE-0021, 1RE-0019, 1RE-0018, 1RE-2565B, AND 1RE-12442B. THE MOD ADDED A STRAP TO THE DETECTOR TUBE TO BE USED IN HANDLING THE DETECTOR ASSEMBLY. THE RADIATION MONITORS ARE EITHER 61J OR 62J PROJECT CLASS AND ARE NOT SAFETY RELATED. THESE MONITORS DO NOT PERFORM A SAFETY RELATED FUNCTION.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE MODIFICATIONS PERFORMED TO THESE MONITORS DID NOT EFFECT THEIR ABILITY TO RESPOND TO RADIATION IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE ACCIDENT ANALYSIS OF FSAR CHAPTERS 6 AND 15. IT DOES NOT RESULT IN AN UNANALYZED ACCIDENT AS DETERMINED BY A REVIEW OF FSAR SECTIONS 6, 9, 11, AND 15. THERE IS NO CHANGE IN THE MARGIN OF SAFETY DEFINED BY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASED ON A REVIEW OF TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASIS SECTIONS 3/4.3 AND 3/4.11.

SUBJECT: DCP: 88-V1N0093, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THIS DESIGN CHANGE PROVIDED THE TEMPERATURE INSTRUMENTATION AND THE DATA ACQUISITION SYSTEM NECESSARY TO COMPLY WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF NRC BULLETIN 88-08. THIS DESIGN CHANGE INSTALLED THE FOLLOWING RTDS: TAG NUMBERS 1TE-27734, 1TE-27735, 1TE-27736, 1TE-27737, 1TE-27738, 1TE-27739, 1TE-27740, 1TE-27741, 1TE-27742, 1TE-27743, 1TE-27744, 1TE-27745, 1TE-27746, AND 1TE-27747.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THIS DESIGN CHANGE DOES NOT INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE OR CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT AS DESCRIBED IN FSAR SECTIONS 3, 5.1, 6.3 AND 15.0. THE DCP DID NOT INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE OR CONSEQUENCES OF THE MALFUNCTION OF ANY EQUIPMENT OR COMPONENT ASSUMED TO FUNCTION IN ACCIDENTS ANALYZED IN FSAR SECTIONS 5.1, 6.3 AND 15.0. "THE HARDWARE MOUNTED ON THE PIPE DID NOT AFFECT THE SYSTEM DESIGN STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS DUE TO THE ADDITIONAL WEIGHT ON THE PIPE." THE TEMPERATURE ACQUISITION SYSTEM ADDED PROVIDED DATA FOR ENGINEERING ANALYSIS. THE SYSTEM DOES NOT PERFORM ANY CONTROL OR OPERATION FUNCTION. THE DCP PROVIDED A NON-SAFETY RELATED NON-IE TEMPERATURE MONITORING AND DATA ACQUISITION SYSTEM AS RECOMMENDED BY WESTINGHOUSE IN LETTER GP-13778 DATED 8/31/88. THE DCP DID NOT IMPACT THE OPERATION OF ANY SAFETY RELATED SYSTEM, NO DECREASE IN THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED BY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASES 3/4.5.2 AND 3/4.5.3 HAS OCCURRED.

SUBJECT: DCP: 88-VCE0100, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THIS DCP REMOVED THE INTERIM BARRIER USED BETWEEN UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 TO CONTROL ACCESS DURING UNIT 2 CONSTRUCTION.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THIS DCP DOES NOT EFFECT ANY ACCIDENT AS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR BASED ON A REVIEW OF FSAR SECTIONS 3.4, 3.6 AND 9A. THERE ARE NO CHANGES TO ANY EQUIPMENT OR COMPONENT ASSUMED TO FUNCTION IN ANY ACCIDENT ANALYZED IN THE FSAR. THERE IS NO DECREASE IN THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES.

SUBJECT: DCP: 88-VCN0028, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THIS DCP ADDS A NEW BUILDING ADJACENT TO THE ARB THAT HOUSES THE ARB CONTROL ROOM AND DRESS OUT AREA.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THIS DCP DOES NOT AFFECT ANY FSAR ACCIDENT ANALYSIS NOR CREATE A CONDITION WHICH HAS NOT BEEN ANALYZED, NOR REDUCE THE MARGIN OF SAFETY ; THEREFORE THIS DCP DOES NOT RESULT IN AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION.

SUBJECT: DCP: 88-VCN0028, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 2

DESCRIPTION: THIS DCP IMPLEMENTS THE ELECTRICAL, CIVIL/STRUCTURAL, ARCHITECTURAL, INSTRUMENTATION, MECHANICAL, RAD MONITORING AND SECURITY

LIGHTING NECESSARY FOR THE ADDITION OF A NEW BUILDING ADJACENT TO THE ARB THAT HOUSES THE ARB CONTROL ROOM AND DRESS OUT AREA.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THIS DCP DOES NOT AFFECT ANY FSAR ACCIDENT ANALYSIS NOR CREATE A CONDITION WHICH HAS NOT BEEN ANALYZED, NOR REDUCE THE MARGIN OF SAFETY ; THEREFORE THIS DCP DOES NOT RESULT IN AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION.

SUBJECT: DCP: 88-VCN0057, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1 & 2

DESCRIPTION: THIS DCP ADDED TWO 20, 000 GALLON LIQUID RADWASTE MONITOR TANK AND THE ABILITY TO PROCESS TO AND FROM THESE TANKS (A-1901-T4-012 AND A-1901-T4-013).

SAFETY EVALUATION: THERE ARE NO UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTIONS INVOLVED WITH THIS DESIGN CHANGE.

SUBJECT: DCP: 88-VCN0090, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THIS DCP REPLACED THE PREVIOUS UNIT 1 ERF UTILITY PRINTERS AND THE UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 LINE PRINTERS WITH A MORE RELIABLE AND PROVEN TECHNOLOGY.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE ERF SYSTEM IS ASSUMED TO BE OPERATIONAL THROUGHOUT ALL OPERATING CONDITIONS INCLUDING ANTICIPATED OPERATIONAL OCCURRENCES AND ACCIDENT CONDITIONS. HOWEVER WHILE THE ERF COMPUTER IS DESIGNED TO BE HIGHLY RELIABLE AND QUANTITATIVELY COMPARABLE WITH REGARDS TO ACCURACY TO 1-E SYSTEMS, IT IS NON-Q CLASS 62J AND PERFORMS NO SAFETY RELATED FUNCTION. THEREFORE NO IMPACTS ARE INVOLVED WITH THE FSAR SAFETY ANALYSIS OR TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASED ON REVIEWS OF FSAR SECTIONS 15, 7.5 AND EMERGENCY PLAN SECTION "H" ;THE ERF SYSTEM IS NOT ADDRESSED SPECIFICALLY IN TECH. SPECS.

SUBJECT: DCP: 88-VCN0092, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THIS DCP INSTALLED GROUND LOOP ISOLATION TRANSFORMERS FOR THE PLANT SECURITY SYSTEM. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION IS SAFEGUARDS.

SAFETY EVALUATION: NO NEW POTENTIAL ACCIDENTS OR EVENTS ARE CREATED AS A RESULT OF THIS MODIFICATION, THEREFORE THE CHANGE DOES NOT CREATE THE POSSIBILITY OF AN EQUIPMENT /COMPONENT MALFUNCTION NOT DESCRIBED AND ANALYZED IN THE FSAR.

SUBJECT: DCP: 89-VIN0013, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: EACH OF THE EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR'S CONNECTING ROD BOLTS THAT SECURE THE CONNECTING RODS AROUND THE CRANKSHAFT IS REQUIRED TO BE PRELOADED AND THE PRELOAD VERIFIED. THE PREVIOUS DIESEL ENGINE CONNECTING ROD BOLTS ARE TO BE REPLACED WITH NEW STUD/NUT ASSEMBLIES. THE

NEW ASSEMBLY UTILIZES A HYDRAULIC PRESTRESSER, INSTEAD OF TORQUEING THE BOLTS, TO ACHIEVE A MORE ACCURATE PRELOAD. THIS CHANGE IS PROJECT CLASS 015.

SAFETY EVALUATION: FAILURE OF THE EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR IS NOT AN INITIATING EVENT OF AN ACCIDENT NOR IS IT ANALYZED IN THE FSAR ACCIDENT ANALYSIS. THIS DESIGN CHANGE DID NOT AFFECT THE RELIABILITY OF THE DIESEL ENGINE IN THAT THE CONNECTING RODS ARE STILL SECURED TO THE CRANKSHAFT WITH THE SAME PRELOAD. THIS DESIGN CHANGE DID NOT INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE OF AN ACCIDENT DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR. THE CHANGE IN THE EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR CONNECTING ROD BOLTS AND THE CHANGE IN THE METHOD FOR MEASUREMENT OF THE BOLT PRELOADING REDUCED THE PROBABILITY OF GALLING THE THREADS AND DID NOT DECREASE THE ENGINE RELIABILITY. THE NEW STUDS ARE MADE OF THE SAME MATERIAL AS THE PREVIOUS BOLTS, AND THE PRELOAD REMAINS THE SAME ALSO. THE METHOD OF APPLYING AND MEASURING THE PRELOAD HAS BEEN IMPROVED. THIS DESIGN CHANGE DOES NOT ALTER THE OPERATION OF THE DIESEL ENGINE NOR DOES IT CREATE OR INCREASE THE POSSIBILITY OF ANY TYPE OF FAILURE THAT DOES NOT CURRENTLY EXIST. NEITHER THE RELIABILITY OF THE DIESEL GENERATOR NOR THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS AND BASES WAS DECREASED AS A RESULT OF THE CHANGE IN THE EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR CONNECTING ROD BOLTS.

SUBJECT: DCP: 89-V1N0014, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1 & 2

DESCRIPTION: THIS DCP IMPROVED ACCESS TO THE MAIN STEAM ISOLATION VALVE AREA BY ADDING A DOOR BETWEEN ROOMS RA05 AND RA06 IN LEVEL A OF THE AUX. BUILDING. IN ADDITION, BETTER HP CONTROL IS PROVIDED TO LIMIT ACCESS TO THE ROOMS IN THE MSIV AREA AT LEVEL A BY COVERING THE FLOOR OPENING IN ROOM R106 NOW USED FOR THE ACCESS LADDER BETWEEN ROOMS RA06 AND R106. BY COVERING THIS OPENING, ACCESS TO RA06 IS LIMITED TO ONLY THROUGH THE MAIN ENTRANCE OF THE CONTROL BUILDING. ELIMINATION OF THIS OPENING ALSO PREVENTS THE SPREAD OF CONTAMINATION FROM LEVEL A INTO THE MSIV ROOM AT LEVEL 1.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE OR CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR REMAIN UNCHANGED.

SUBJECT: DCP: 89-V1N0043, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THIS CHANGE REDUCED THE QUANTITY OF SNUBBERS AND MODIFIED CERTAIN PIPE SUPPORTS FOR THAT PORTION OF THE AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM ANALYZED IN PIPE STRESS CALCULATION NUMBERS: MAL02008; MIX4CP-7072C; AND MIX4CP-7072E1. THIS DESIGN CHANGE REQUIRED PIPE SUPPORT MODIFICATIONS/DELETIONS (INCLUDING PIPE SNUBBER DELETIONS) AND DID NOT CHANGE PIPE ROUTING OR EQUIPMENT. THE LONG TERM BENEFIT INCLUDED A REDUCTION IN PERSONNEL RADIATION EXPOSURE OVER THE LIFE OF THE PLANT DUE TO A REDUCTION IN THE NUMBER OF SNUBBERS REQUIRING TESTING AND MAINTENANCE.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE PIPE SUPPORT MODIFICATIONS HAVE BEEN DESIGNED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE DESIGN CRITERIA IDENTIFIED IN THE DESIGN INPUT RECORD AND THE MODIFICATIONS DO NOT AFFECT THE SYSTEM FUNCTION OR OPERATION. THE CALCULATED DESIGN STRESSES ASSOCIATED WITH THE AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM ARE STILL WITHIN THE CODE ALLOWABLES AND ARE CONSISTENT WITH THE

ORIGINAL DESIGN BASES FOR THIS SYSTEM. OTHER SYSTEMS REQUIRED TO MITIGATE A DESIGN BASIS ACCIDENT WERE NOT ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY THIS DESIGN MODIFICATION. REDISTRIBUTION OF PIPING LOADS WITHIN THE SYSTEM AS A RESULT OF REDUCING THE QUANTITY OF SNUBBERS HAS BEEN EVALUATED AND COMPENSATED FOR, WHERE NECESSARY, WITH MODIFICATIONS TO THE PREVIOUS PIPE SUPPORT SYSTEM. THE MARGIN OF SAFETY IS ESTABLISHED BY THE ALLOWABLE STRESSES (ACCEPTANCE LIMITS) DEFINED IN THE SPECIFIED CODES AND STANDARDS. THESE CRITERIA AND FSAR TABLE 1.9-1(SHEET 5 OF 5) PERMIT THE USE OF ASME CODE CASE N-411 WHICH ALLOWS THE USE OF HIGHER DAMPING RESPONSE SPECTRA IN THE SEISMIC ANALYSIS OF PIPING SYSTEMS. THE AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PIPING WAS REANALYZED UTILIZING THE HIGHER DAMPING RESPONSE SPECTRA PERMITTED BY ASME CODE CASE N-411 TO REDUCE THE QUANTITY OF SNUBBERS IN THE PIPING SYSTEM AND MAINTAIN PIPE STRESSES WITHIN THE SAME CODE ALLOWABLES. ALTHOUGH THERE HAS BEEN A REDUCTION IN THE NUMBER OF SNUBBERS IN THE AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM THERE HAS NOT BEEN A DECREASE IN THE MARGIN OF SAFETY.

SUBJECT: DCP: 89-V1N0044, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THIS CHANGE REDUCED THE QUANTITY OF SNUBBERS AND MODIFIED CERTAIN PIPE SUPPORTS FOR THAT PORTION OF THE CONDENSATE AND FEEDWATER SYSTEM AND AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM ANALYZED IN PIPE STRESS CALCULATION NUMBERS: MIX4CP-7071C; MIX4CP-7072D; MIX4CP-7071A/B; AND MIX4CP-7072B-1. THIS DESIGN CHANGE REQUIRED PIPE SUPPORT MODIFICATIONS/ ADDITIONS/ DELETIONS (INCLUDING PIPE SNUBBER DELETIONS) AND DID NOT CHANGE PIPE ROUTING OR EQUIPMENT. THE LONG TERM BENEFIT INCLUDES A REDUCTION IN PERSONNEL RADIATION EXPOSURE OVER THE LIFE OF THE PLANT DUE TO A REDUCTION IN THE NUMBER OF SNUBBERS REQUIRING TESTING AND MAINTENANCE.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THIS DCP INVOLVED THE PIPING AND SUPPORTS ASSOCIATED WITH THE CONDENSATE AND FEEDWATER SYSTEM AND THE AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM. IT WAS DEMONSTRATED BY THE CALCULATIONS IDENTIFIED IN THE CALCULATION RECORD SECTION OF THIS DCP THAT THE CALCULATED DESIGN STRESSES ASSOCIATED WITH THE AFOREMENTIONED SYSTEMS ARE WITHIN THE CODE ALLOWABLES AND ARE CONSISTENT WITH THE ORIGINAL DESIGN BASES FOR THESE SYSTEMS. THERE WAS NO INCREASE IN THE PROBABILITY OF AN ACCIDENT AS DESCRIBED IN FSAR SECTION 15. THE ACCEPTABILITY OF THIS REVIEW WAS DOCUMENTED IN THE CALCULATIONS IDENTIFIED IN THE CALCULATION RECORD. THE MARGIN OF SAFETY WAS ESTABLISHED BY THE ALLOWABLE STRESSES (ACCEPTANCE LIMITS) DEFINED IN THE SPECIFIED CODES AND STANDARDS. THESE CRITERIA AND FSAR TABLE 1.9-1(SHEET 5 OF 5) PERMIT THE USE OF ASME CODE CASE N-411 WHICH ALLOWS THE USE OF HIGHER DAMPING RESPONSE SPECTRA IN THE SEISMIC ANALYSIS OF PIPING SYSTEMS. THE CONDENSATE AND FEEDWATER SYSTEM AND AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PIPING WERE REANALYZED UTILIZING THE HIGHER DAMPING RESPONSE SPECTRA PERMITTED BY ASME CODE CASE N-411 TO REDUCE THE QUANTITY OF SNUBBERS IN THE PIPING SYSTEM AND MAINTAIN PIPE STRESSES WITHIN THE SAME CODE ALLOWABLES (ACCEPTANCE LIMITS) AS THE ORIGINAL PIPING AND SUPPORT SYSTEM DESIGN.

SUBJECT: DCP: 89-V1N0045, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: AS PART OF THE PIPING SNUBBER REDUCTION PROGRAM, THIS DCP DELETES/CHANGES/ADDS CERTAIN PIPE SUPPORTS WITHIN THE MAIN STEAM SYSTEM INSIDE THE AUXILIARY BUILDING, CONTROL BUILDING, AND OUTSIDE AREAS. THERE

ARE NO CHANGES TO SYSTEM PIPING OR COMPONENTS OTHER THAN THE SPECIFIED PIPE SUPPORTS

SAFETY EVALUATION: THIS CHANGE DOES NOT AFFECT ANY SYSTEM, EQUIPMENT, OR COMPONENTS FUNCTION OR OPERATION AND DOES NOT AFFECT ANY FSAR ACCIDENT ANALYSIS OR CREATE A CONDITION WHICH HAS NOT BEEN POSTULATED, THEREFORE THIS CHANGE DOES NOT RESULT IN AN UNRESOLVED SAFETY QUESTION.

SUBJECT: DCP: 89-VIN0047, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THIS CHANGE REDUCED THE QUANTITY OF SNUBBERS IN THE NSCW SYSTEM (OUTSIDE OF CONTAINMENT) ANALYZED IN STRESS CALCULATIONS M-EF-01-053, M-1X4CP-7158, M-1X4CP-7159, M-X4CP-7160, AND M-X4CP-7161. THE PRIMARY FUNCTION OF THE NSCW SYSTEM IS TO PROVIDE ESSENTIAL COOLING TO SAFETY-RELATED EQUIPMENT AND SOME NONSAFETY-RELATED AUXILIARY COMPONENTS. THIS SYSTEM FUNCTIONS DURING ALL NORMAL PLANT OPERATIONS AND DURING ABNORMAL AND ACCIDENT CONDITIONS. AS PREVIOUSLY STATED, THIS DESIGN CHANGE IS LIMITED TO MODIFICATION OF PIPE SUPPORTS ONLY AND DOES NOT CHANGE SYSTEM FUNCTION, PIPE ROUTING, EQUIPMENT OR COMPONENTS. NSCW IS A SAFETY-RELATED, SEISMIC CATEGORY 1, MODERATE ENERGY SYSTEM. THE LONG TERM EFFECT IS SIGNIFICANT SAVINGS IN INSPECTION AND MAINTENANCE COSTS IN ADDITION TO A REDUCTION IN PERSONNEL RADIATION EXPOSURE OVER THE LIFE OF THE PLANT.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THIS CHANGE DID NOT AFFECT ANY SYSTEM, EQUIPMENT OR COMPONENTS FUNCTION OR OPERATION AND DOES NOT AFFECT THE PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE OR CONSEQUENCES OF THE MALFUNCTION OF ANY EQUIPMENT OR COMPONENTS ASSUMED TO FUNCTION IN THE ACCIDENT ANALYZED IN THE FSAR INCLUDING THOSE IN SECTION 3, 6, 9 OR 15 OF THE FSAR AND BASED ON REVIEW OF FSAR SECTIONS 3, 6, 9 AND 15 DID NOT CREATE THE POSSIBILITY OF AN UNANALYZED OR UNDESCRIBED ACCIDENT OR EQUIPMENT/COMPONENT MALFUNCTION. NO NEW PIPE BREAK LOCATIONS WERE CREATED AND THE APPLICABLE PIPE STRESSES WERE NOT EXCEEDED DUE TO THE REMOVAL OF THESE SNUBBERS. THIS CHANGE DID NOT AFFECT THE SYSTEM, EQUIPMENT FUNCTION OR OPERATION AND DID NOT AFFECT THE SAFETY MARGIN DEFINED BY TECH SPEC 3/4.7.4 AND 3/4.7.8. THE LIST OF SNUBBERS REFERRED TO IN THE BASES OF TECH SPEC 3/4.7.8 DID CHANGE, BUT THE MARGIN OF SAFETY WAS NOT AFFECTED AND THE BASES OF THE TECH SPEC DID NOT REQUIRE A CHANGE.

SUBJECT: DCP: 89-VIN0079, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THIS DCP REPLACES THE TURBINE BUILDING DRAIN SYSTEM RADIATION MONITORING SKID (1-1609-S5-014) CRANE PUMP WITH A GOULDS PUMP. ASSOCIATED TUBING, VALVES, EQUIPMENT AND POWER SUPPLY CABLE IS ALSO REPLACED. NO CHANGE TO THE RADIATION ELEMENT IRE-848 WILL BE MADE.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE GOULDS PUMP WHICH WILL REPLACE THE EXISTING PUMP IS UTILIZED IN OTHER RADIATION MONITORING SKIDS WITHIN THE PLANT AND HAS AN EXCELLENT OPERATING HISTORY. THE PUMP WILL BE THROTTLED TO PRODUCE THE 2 TO 8 GPM FLOW RATE WHICH THE EXISTING PUMP PROVIDES THROUGH THE RADIATION MONITOR. THE RADIATION MONITOR SKID, REPLACEMENT PUMP AND ASSOCIATED PIPING, INSTRUMENTATION, AND VALVES ARE NON SAFETY RELATED, NON SEISMIC, DO NOT FUNCTION AS THE INITIATOR OF ANY ACCIDENT, AND ARE NOT

REQUIRED TO FUNCTION TO MITIGATE THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT AS ANALYZED IN THE FSAR. FSAR CHAPTER 15 DOES NOT IDENTIFY THIS MONITOR AS REQUIRED TO FUNCTION DURING OR AFTER AN EVENT.

SUBJECT: DCP: 89-V1N0094, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THE PREVIOUS DESIGN CONFIGURATION HAD ONE ACKNOWLEDGE/RESET/TEST PUSHBUTTONS SWITCH (HS-40057) AND ONE HORN (UA-40099) FOR ANNUNCIATOR WINDOW ALB09, ALB10, ALB11 & ALB12. THIS DESIGN CHANGE PACKAGE (DCP) ADDED SEPARATE ACKNOWLEDGE/RESET/TEST PUSHBUTTONS (HS-40143) & A HORN (UA-40145) FOR ANNUNCIATOR WINDOW ALB09. SWITCH (HS-40057) & HORN (UA-40099) WERE USED FOR ANNUNCIATOR WINDOW ALB10 THROUGH ALB12. SWITCH (HS-40143) WAS INSTALLED ON MAIN CONTROL BOARD (MCB) SECTION C AND THE HORN (UA-40145) WAS INSTALLED BEHIND THE SOFFIT ABOVE SECTION C OF MCB. ANNUNCIATOR WINDOW ALB09 PROVIDES PRIMARY INFORMATION TO THE OPERATORS ON THE OCCURRENCE OF A SAFETY INJECTION FOLLOWING A REACTOR TRIP. PER THE PREVIOUS DESIGN, ANNUNCIATOR WINDOW ALB09 (FIRST OUT) LOSES ITS DATA WHEN ANOTHER ANNUNCIATOR CONTROL SHARING THE COMMON WINDOW WAS RESET. BY ADDING A SEPARATE ACKNOWLEDGE/RESET/TEST PUSHBUTTONS SWITCH FOR ALB09 THE ABOVE PROBLEM IS ELIMINATED.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THIS DCP INVOLVED THE NON-SAFETY RELATED ANNUNCIATOR SYSTEM AND NON-SAFETY RELATED CHANGES TO THE MCB. THIS CHANGE ENHANCED THE PERFORMANCE OF NON-SAFETY RELATED ANNUNCIATOR EQUIPMENT AND DID NOT ADVERSELY AFFECT ANY SAFETY SYSTEM, POSTULATED TO FUNCTION IN ANY FSAR ACCIDENT ANALYSIS. A REVIEW OF THE MODIFICATION HAS BEEN PERFORMED BY WESTINGHOUSE TO DETERMINE THE EFFECT OF ADDING THE PUSHBUTTONS TO THE MAIN CONTROL BOARD. THE RESULTS OF THIS REVIEW INDICATED THAT THE INSTALLATIONS OF THE PUSHBUTTONS DID NOT INVALIDATE THE SEISMIC QUALIFICATION OF THE MAIN CONTROL BOARD AND WILL REMAIN INTACT DURING A SEISMIC EVENT. IN ADDITION, THE PUSHBUTTONS MEET THE QUALIFICATION REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORIGINAL CONTROL BOARD SWITCH MODULES (REFERENCE THE ATTACHED WESTINGHOUSE SAFETY EVALUATION, SECL NO. 90-186).

SUBJECT: DCP: 89-V1N0104, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THIS CHANGE INVOLVES CHANGES TO VARIOUS PIPE SUPPORTS IN CVCS SUCH AS DELETING/REPLACING SNUBBERS AND/OR MODIFICATION TO PIPE SUPPORT STEEL. THERE ARE NO CHANGES TO THE SYSTEM PIPING OR COMPONENTS.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THIS CHANGE DOES NOT AFFECT ANY SYSTEM, EQUIPMENT, OR COMPONENTS FUNCTION OR OPERATION AND DOES NOT AFFECT ANY FSAR ACCIDENT ANALYSIS OR CREATE A CONDITION WHICH HAS NOT BEEN POSTULATED, THEREFORE THIS CHANGE DOES NOT RESULT IN AN UNRESOLVED SAFETY QUESTION.

SUBJECT: DCP: 89-V1N0105, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THIS CHANGE INVOLVES CHANGES TO VARIOUS PIPE SUPPORTS IN THE RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM SUCH AS DELETING /REPLACING SNUBBERS AND /OR MODIFICATION TO PIPE SUPP-ORT STEEL. THERE IS NO CHANGE TO THE SYSTEM PIPING OR COMPONENTS.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THIS CHANGE DOES NOT AFFECT ANY SYSTEM, EQUIPMENT, OR COMPONENTS FUNCTION OR OPERATION AND DOES NOT AFFECT ANY FSAR ACCIDENT ANALYSIS OR CREATE A CONDITION WHICH HAS NOT BEEN POSTULATED, THEREFORE THIS CHANGE DOES NOT RESULT IN AN UNRESOLVED SAFETY QUESTION.

SUBJECT: DCP: 89-V1N0106, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: AS PART OF THE UNIT ONE SNUBBER REDUCTION PROGRAM FOR THE RCS PRESSURIZER SPRAY LINE, THIS DESIGN CHANGE PACKAGE SPECIFIES THAT 9 OF THE 27 PREVIOUS SNUBBERS WERE DELETED WITH 6 SNUBBERS BEING REPLACED BY RIGID STRUTS. THERE ARE NO CHANGES TO THE SYSTEM PIPING OR COMPONENTS OTHER THAN TO THE PIPE SUPPORTS.

SAFETY EVALUATION: BASED ON THE EVALUATIONS AND SUPPORT ANALYSIS IN THE DCP, PURSUANT TO THE CRITERIA SPECIFIED IN 10CFR50.59, THIS MODIFICATION DOES NOT INVOLVE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION.

SUBJECT: DCP: 89-V1N0107, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THIS CHANGE INVOLVES CHANGES TO VARIOUS PIPE SUPPORTS IN THE SAFETY INJECTION SYSTEM SUCH AS DELETING /REPLACING SNUBBERS AND /OR MODIFICATION TO PIPE SUPPORT STEEL. THERE IS NO CHANGE TO THE SYSTEM PIPING OR COMPONENTS.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THIS CHANGE DOES NOT AFFECT ANY SYSTEM, EQUIPMENT, OR COMPONENTS FUNCTION OR OPERATION AND DOES NOT AFFECT ANY FSAR ACCIDENT ANALYSIS OR CREATE A CONDITION WHICH HAS NOT BEEN POSTULATED, THEREFORE THIS CHANGE DOES NOT RESULT IN AN UNRESOLVED SAFETY QUESTION.

SUBJECT: DCP: 89-V1N0238, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THIS CHANGE ADDED A NEW FLOOR DRAIN TO AUXILIARY BUILDING ROOM A06. THE NEW DRAIN PIPING WAS ROUTED TO AN EXISTING DRAIN LOCATED IN AUXILIARY BUILDING ROOM B02. THE DRAIN DISCHARGES TO THE FLOOR DRAIN TANK FOR EVENTUAL PROCESSING IN THE RADWASTE SYSTEM. PREVIOUSLY, ROOM A06 HAD NO MEANS OF DRAINAGE AND ANY SOURCE OF WATER (CONDENSATION, LEAKAGE, ETC.) ACCUMULATED IN THE ROOM AND REMAINED THERE.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE ADDITION OF AUXILIARY BUILDING ROOM A06 FLOOR DRAIN REDUCED THE STEADY STATE FLOOD LEVEL AND REDUCED THE LEAKAGE OF WATER INTO THE ADJOINING ROOMS A05 AND A07. THE TRANSFER OF WATER FROM A06 TO B02 VIA THE NEW DRAIN LINE IS ENVELOPED BY THE EXISTING ROOM B02 FLOODING ANALYSIS. THE DESIGN FLOOD LEVELS REMAIN UNCHANGED. ROOMS A06 AND B02

CONTAIN ONLY SAFETY RELATED PIPING. NO EQUIPMENT OR COMPONENTS REQUIRED FOR THE SAFE SHUTDOWN OF THE PLANT ARE LOCATED IN THESE SPACES. THE NEW PIPE AND SUPPORTS ADDED FOR THIS CHANGE ARE DESIGNED TO SEISMIC CATEGORY 1 REQUIREMENTS WHICH PRECLUDE SEISMIC 2/1 INTERACTIONS. ALTHOUGH THE ADDITION OF THE DRAIN AND ITS ASSOCIATED PIPING PROVIDED A SMALL VENT PATH BETWEEN ROOMS A06 AND B02, THERE ARE NO HIGH ENERGY LINE BREAKS POSTULATED IN EITHER ROOM. THERE IS NO EFFECT ON THE COMPARTMENTAL PRESSURE/TEMPERATURE ANALYSIS. BOTH OF THESE ROOMS ARE OUTSIDE THE NEGATIVE PRESSURE BOUNDARY. A POSTULATED FIRE IN BOTH ZONES WOULD NOT PRECLUDE THE ABILITY TO ACHIEVE SAFE SHUTDOWN. THIS REVIEW INCLUDED SECTIONS 9.3.3, 9A.1, 11.2, AND 15.0 OF THE FSAR. THE ADDITION OF THE FLOOR DRAIN TO AUXILIARY BUILDING ROOM A06 HAS NO EFFECT ON THE EQUIPMENT OR SYSTEMS ASSUMED TO FUNCTION IN ANY ACCIDENT ANALYSES. IT IS ANTICIPATED THAT THE LIQUIDS COLLECTED FROM ROOM A06 WILL BE NON-RADIOACTIVE AND THAT THE VOLUME OF THE LIQUIDS WILL BE SMALL, AND THAT THIS COLLECTION WILL OCCUR INFREQUENTLY. ULTIMATELY, THE LIQUIDS COLLECTED FROM ROOM A06 DRAIN ARE COLLECTED IN THE FLOOR DRAIN TANK. THE CONTENTS OF THE FLOOR DRAIN TANK ARE PROCESSED, SAMPLED, AND EVENTUALLY DISCHARGED EITHER TO THE ENVIRONMENT OR THE LIQUID WASTE PROCESSING SYSTEM. THE ADDITION OF THE FLOOR DRAIN TO AUXILIARY BUILDING ROOM A06 HAS NO EFFECT ON THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED BY THE BASES OF THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS.

SUBJECT: DCP: 89-V1N0297, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THIS DCP PERMANENTLY DISABLED CHLORINE DETECTORS 1AE-12110/12112 AND THE ALARM INPUT FROM RETURN AIR FANS 1-1531-B7-005/006 TO THE SYSTEM STATUS MONITOR PANEL ASSOCIATED WITH THE CONTROL BUILDING CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY HVAC SYSTEM.

SAFETY EVALUATION: CHLORINE DETECTION FOR THE CONTROL ROOM IS NO LONGER REQUIRED SINCE PLANT VOGTLE HAS COMMITTED TO NOT STORE LIQUEFIED GASEOUS CHLORINE IN EXCESS OF 20 POUNDS ON SITE. DELETION OF CHLORINE DETECTION FROM THE CONTROL ROOM HVAC SYSTEM DESIGN HAS BEEN EVALUATED IN THE NRC SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT SUPPLEMENT NO. 8, SECTION 9.4. BASED ON THE NRC REVIEW OF THE VOGTLE COMMITMENT TO LIMIT CHLORINE QUANTITIES, IT WAS CONCLUDED THAT "AUTOMATIC ISOLATION OF THE CONTROL ROOM IF CHLORINE WAS DETECTED IS NO LONGER REQUIRED." IN ADDITION, LDCR 89-049 WHICH DELETES THE REQUIREMENT FOR CHLORINE DETECTION IN THE CONTROL ROOM HAS BEEN APPROVED BY THE PRB FOR INCORPORATION INTO THE FSAR.

SUBJECT: DCP: 89-V1N0309, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THIS DESIGN CHANGE REMOVED THE PREVIOUS 4" 90 DEGREE ELBOW ON THE RIVER WATER MAKEUP LINES TO THE NSCW TOWERS, UPSTREAM OF VALVES 11402U4013 AND 11402U4015 FOR TRAINS A AND B RESPECTIVELY AND REPLACED THEM WITH A 4" TEE. A 4" GATE VALVE WAS ALSO ADDED TO THE TEE DOWN STREAM OF THE VALVE WITH A FLANGE ON THE END AND A THREADED CAP ON THE FLANGE. THIS CHANGE PROVIDED CHEMICAL INJECTION CAPABILITY USING PORTABLE EQUIPMENT. THE CHEMICALS ARE CHEMICALS PRESENTLY IN USE BY THE PLANT.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE RIVER WATER MAKEUP PIPE IS NON-SAFETY RELATED AND NO FAILURE OF THE MAKE-UP PIPE CAUSED BY THIS MODIFICATION OF ANY

EQUIPMENT OR COMPONENT ASSUMED TO FUNCTION IN ANY ACCIDENT ANALYZED IN THE FSAR. THIS INCLUDES A REVIEW OF SECTIONS 2.4.11, 9.2.1, 9.2.5, 10.4.5, AND 15. THIS CHANGE DOES NOT DECREASE THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED BY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS, THIS INCLUDES A REVIEW OF SECTIONS B 3/4. 7.4 AND B 3/4.7.5.

SUBJECT: DCP: 89-V2E0002, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THIS DCP INSTALLED LADDERS IN CHASE 2-RC-37, A FIRE DOOR IN THE WEST END OF UC-A03, A WALKWAY IN RC-23, AND A LADDER, PLATFORM, AND WALKWAY IN RA-81. THIS WAS TO FACILITATE EASE OF ACCESS TO AREAS WHICH WERE DIFFICULT TO REACH. THE PREVIOUS ACCESS REQUIRED REMOVAL OF CONCRETE FLOOR PLUGS OR INSTALLATION OF TEMPORARY SCAFFOLDING.

SAFETY EVALUATION: BASED ON A REVIEW OF FSAR SECTIONS 3.4, 3.6, 3.8.4, AND 15 THIS DCP DOES NOT AFFECT THE PROBABILITY OR CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT AS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR. ALSO NO EQUIPMENT OR COMPONENTS IN THE SPECIFIED LOCATIONS WERE AFFECTED. FSAR SECTIONS 3.6, 9.5, APP. 9A, AND 15 WERE REVIEWED. THERE IS NO DECREASE IN THE SAFETY MARGIN OF PLANT SYSTEMS PER REVIEW OF THE BASES FOR TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3/4.7.10.

SUBJECT: DCP: 89-V2N0095, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THE PRESENT DESIGN CONFIGURATION HAS ONE ACKNOWLEDGE/RESET/TEST PUSHBUTTONS SWITCH (HS-40057)-AND ONE HORN (UA-40099) FOR ANNUNCIATOR WINDOW ALB09, ALB10, ALB11 & ALB12. THIS DESIGN CHANGE PACKAGE (DCP) ADDED SEPARATE ACKNOWLEDGE/RESET/TEST PUSHBUTTONS/SWITCHES (HS-40143) & A HORN (UA-40145) FOR ANNUNCIATOR WINDOW ALB09. SWITCH (HS-40057) & HORN (UA-40099) ARE USED FOR ANNUNCIATOR WINDOW ALB10 THROUGH ALB12. SWITCH (HS-40143) WAS INSTALLED ON MAIN CONTROL BOARD (MCB) SECTION C AND THE HORN (UA-40145) WAS INSTALLED BEHIND THE SOFFIT ABOVE SECTION C OF MCB.

SAFETY EVALUATION: CHANGE IN THE DCP INVOLVES NON-SAFETY RELATED ANNUNCIATOR SYSTEM AND NON-SAFETY RELATED CHANGES TO THE MCB. THIS CHANGE ENHANCES THE PERFORMANCE OF NON-SAFETY RELATED ANNUNCIATOR EQUIPMENT AND DOES NOT ADVERSELY AFFECT ANY SAFETY SYSTEM, POSTULATED TO FUNCTION IN ANY FSAR ACCIDENT ANALYSIS. A REVIEW OF THE MODIFICATION HAS BEEN PERFORMED BY WESTINGHOUSE TO DETERMINE THE EFFECT OF ADDING THE PUSHBUTTONS TO THE MAIN CONTROL BOARD. THE RESULTS OF THIS REVIEW INDICATED THAT THE INSTALLATION OF THE PUSHBUTTONS DID NOT INVALIDATE THE SEISMIC QUALIFICATION OF THE MAIN CONTROL BOARD AND WILL REMAIN INTACT DURING A SEISMIC EVENT. IN ADDITION, THE PUSHBUTTONS MEET THE QUALIFICATION REQUIREMENTS OF THE ORIGINAL CONTROL BOARD SWITCH MODULES (REFERENCE THE ATTACHED WESTINGHOUSE SAFETY EVALUATION, SECL NO. 90-186).

SUBJECT: DCP: 89-V2N0116, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 3

DESCRIPTION: THIS DCP ADDS TO ELECTRICAL POWER SUPPLIES TO UNIT TWO TURBINE BUILDING FOR USE DURING REFUELING OUTAGES.

SAFETY EVALUATION: BASED ON A REVIEW OF THE FSAR INCLUDING SECTION 8.3 NO CHANGE TO THE FACILITY AS DESCRIBED OR IMPLIED IN THE FSAR IS REQUIRED.

ALSO THE CHANGE DOES NOT INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE OF AN ACCIDENT OR EQUIPMENT FAILURE AS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR.

SUBJECT: DCP: 89-V2N0305, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: PROVIDES A BLOCKING FEATURE THAT WHEN INVOKED ESTABLISHES A HARD BLOCK TO THE SOLID STATE PROTECTION SYSTEM FOR RAD MONITORS 2RE-0002, 0003, 2565A, 2565B, AND 2565C. THIS WILL INHIBIT CVI ACTUATION AND MAINTAIN THE EXISTING MAIN CONTROL ROOM ALARMS AND INDICATIONS CURRENTLY PROVIDED. THIS ALSO ALLOWS LOCAL DEENERGIZATION OF THE DPM FOR MAINTENANCE OR OTHER REQUIREMENTS.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THIS DESIGN ADDED ADDITIONAL CONDUIT AND CABLE TERMINATION'S TO SAFETY RELATED RELAY ENCLOSURES 2RY-0002 AND 2RY-0003. THE NEW EQUIPMENT ADDED WERE HAND SWITCHES 2HS-13259, 2HS-13260, AND 2HS-13261 WHICH WERE MOUNTED IN THE CORRESPONDING ENCLOSURES 2-1609-P5-CB1, 2-1609-P5-CB2, AND 2-1609-P5-CB3. THE ABOVE MENTIONED CHANGES HAS NO AFFECT ON WATER SENSITIVITY OF THE EXISTING EQUIPMENT, AND THE NEW SWITCH/ENCLOSURE ASSEMBLIES WERE MOUNTED ABOVE THE AREA FLOOD LEVELS.

SUBJECT: DCP: 89-VAN0050, REVISION 2, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THE OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT COUNCIL AND SAFETY COMMITTEES ON SITE HAVE IDENTIFIED SEVERAL AREAS FOR IMPROVING ACCESS AND SAFETY FOR PLANT PERSONNEL. THESE ADDITIONAL LADDERS AND PLATFORMS WERE INSTALLED USING SUPPORTS ATTACHED TO EXISTING EMBEDS OR STRUCTURAL STEEL. THE EXISTING STEEL HAS BEEN REVIEWED FOR ACCEPTABILITY OF THE ADDITIONAL LOADING OF THE ADDED LADDERS AND PLATFORMS TO THE ORIGINAL DESIGN ASSUMPTIONS. LIGHTING FOR THESE PLATFORMS WAS ADDED OR EXISTING LIGHTING WAS MODIFIED WHERE POSSIBLE TO PROVIDE THE PROPER ILLUMINATION LEVELS. THE SUPPORTS FOR THE PLATFORMS WERE ATTACHED TO EXISTING STEEL MEMBERS OR EMBEDS. THE EXISTING STEEL HAS BEEN REVIEWED FOR ACCEPTABILITY OF THE ADDITIONAL LOADING FROM THE ADDED PLATFORMS. THE ADDITION OF PLATFORMS AND LADDERS PROVIDED PERMANENT ACCESS TO EQUIPMENT AND AREAS THAT REQUIRED SCAFFOLDING AND EXTENSION LADDERS TO BE INSTALLED FOR EXTENDED PERIODS OF TIME. THE MODIFICATION OF PLATFORMS AND LADDERS PROVIDES IMPROVED ACCESS FOR EXISTING INSTALLATION. THE ROUTING MODIFICATIONS OF PIPING PROVIDE REQUIRED ACCESS CLEARANCE FOR CURRENTLY INSTALLED LADDERS IMPROVING EXISTING ACCESS. THE ASSOCIATED LIGHTING CHANGES FOR THE PLATFORMS ADDED PROVIDED REQUIRED LEVELS OF ILLUMINATION FOR OPERATING ACTIVITIES. THE ADDITION OF SUPPORTS FOR A STATIC SAFETY LINE PROVIDES ADDITIONAL MEASURES OF SAFETY FOR WORK ASSOCIATED WITH THE POLAR CRANE. THE MODIFICATION OF AUXILIARY BUILDING VALVE PIT COVERS PROVIDES THE MEANS FOR A SINGLE INDIVIDUAL TO REMOVE THE PIT COVERS FOR VALVE LINE-UP/VERIFICATIONS AND OTHER OPERATING ACTIVITIES FOR THE VALVES LOCATED IN THE PITS.

SAFETY EVALUATION: MODIFICATIONS TO THE PIPING SYSTEMS 2301, 1311, 1322, 2401, 2419, AND 2420 DID NOT CHANGE SYSTEM OPERATION. ADDITION OF, OR MODIFICATIONS TO, PLATFORMS AND LADDERS IN THE TURBINE BUILDING, STEAM TUNNELS, DIESEL GENERATOR BUILDING AND UNIT 1 NORTH MSIV VALVE ROOMS DO NOT AFFECT SYSTEM OPERATIONS AND ARE DESIGNED TO 2 OVER 1 SEISMIC CATEGORY

REQUIREMENTS. ADDITION OF THE STATIC SAFETY LINE SUPPORTS DID NOT CHANGE CRANE OPERATIONS AND THE SUPPORTS ARE DESIGNED TO SEISMIC CATEGORY 1 REQUIREMENTS. AUXILIARY BUILDING VALVE PIT COVER MODIFICATIONS DID NOT CHANGE SYSTEM OPERATIONS. ALL STRUCTURAL MODIFICATIONS ARE DESIGNED TO SEISMIC 1 CRITERIA TO PREVENT THEM FROM FALLING ON SAFETY EQUIPMENT. THE ADDITIONAL GRATING DID NOT ADVERSELY AFFECT THE HELB VENT PATH FOR THE MSIV PLATFORM ADDITION. THE DESIGN CHANGE DID NOT ADD EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY. ALL MODIFICATIONS STATED ABOVE WERE REVIEWED FOR IMPACTS TO EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT SAFETY AND APPROPRIATE CLEARANCES HAVE BEEN MAINTAINED. NO ADVERSE IMPACT TO EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY HAS BEEN CREATED. THERE IS NO REDUCTION IN THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASIS.

SUBJECT: DCP: 89-VAN0241, REVISION 1, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THIS DESIGN CHANGE MODIFIED THE TWO LADDERS DESCENDING INTO THE UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 NO.1 TENDON ACCESS SHAFTS AND ADDS A LADDER/PLATFORM TO PROVIDE IMPROVED ACCESS TO THE TOP OF THE UNIT 1 UNIT 2 OILY WASTE SEPARATORS. THUS IMPROVING ACCESS IN THESE AREAS AND ENHANCING PERSONNEL SAFETY.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE ADDITION OF THE PLATFORMS AND MODIFICATIONS TO THE PREVIOUS LADDERS DID NOT INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE OF AN ACCIDENT PREVIOUSLY DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR.

SUBJECT: DCP: 89-VCE0112, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 2

DESCRIPTION: UPDATE VOGTLE PLANT SECURITY DRAWINGS TO SHOW THE FLUSHING WATER STORAGE TANK AS A PERMANENT PLANT EQUIPMENT AND THE FLUSHING WATER STORAGE TANK PUMP ENCLOSURE AS A PERMANENT PLANT STRUCTURE.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THIS DCP WAS ISSUED AS A SUPPLEMENT TO SEQUENCE 1 FOR DRAWING CHANGES ONLY AND HAS NO IMPACT ON ANY SYSTEM OPERATION OR RESPONSE AND REQUIRES NO PHYSICAL CHANGES TO THE PLANT.

SUBJECT: DCP: 89-VCN0024, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THE TUBULAR DIAPHRAGM ACID AND CAUSTIC METERING PUMPS (A-1409-D4-001-P11 AND -P12 AND A-1409-D4-001-P15 AND -P16) WERE REPLACED WITH MORE RELIABLE DISC DIAPHRAGM PUMPS. THE RUPTURE DISC PSE-3661 WERE REPLACED WITH THE PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE A-PSV-27550. PRESSURE GAUGES A-PI-3650, A-PI-3651, A-PI-7539 AND A-PI-7556 WERE REPLACED WITH HIGH-RELIABILITY PRESSURE GAUGES WITH PULSATION DAMPENERS. ADDITIONALLY, THE LEVEL SWITCH CABLES A-LS-7538 AND A-LS-7555 WAS CHANGED FROM STAINLESS STEEL TO A MORE CORROSION RESISTANT NICKEL ALLOY. THE SLOPE OF THE CHEMICAL FEED ROOM FLOOR WAS CORRECTED AND THE CONCRETE COATING REPAIRED. IN ADDITION, THE EQUIPMENT DRAIN INSIDE THE MIXING AREA BEHIND THE PLEXIGLAS SHIELD WAS CONVERTED TO A FLOOR DRAIN AND THE TEMPORARY LINE CONNECTING THE DEMINERALIZED WATER TANK TO THE SAMPLE SINK WAS REPLACED WITH A PERMANENT 3/8" DIA. SAMPLE LINE.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS DO NOT ADDRESS THE PLANT MAKEUP WATER TREATMENT SYSTEM AND THE DEMINERALIZED WATER SYSTEM. THIS DCP REPLACED RUPTURE DISC PSE-3661 WITH PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE A-PSV-27550. THIS DCP INVOLVES CHANGES TO THE DEMINERALIZED WATER PORTION OF THE PLANT MAKEUP WATER TREATMENT SYSTEM WHICH DOES NOT HAVE A SAFETY RELATED DESIGN BASIS AS INDICATED IN DESIGN CRITERIA DC-1409, PARA. 3.1 AND FSAR SECTION 9.2.3.1.1. FAILURE OF THIS SYSTEM DOES NOT RESULT IN THE INITIATION OF ANY ACCIDENTS ANALYZED IN THE FSAR. THERE ARE NO SAFETY RELATED SYSTEMS AFFECTED BY THIS DCP. TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS DO NOT ADDRESS THE PLANT MAKEUP WATER TREATMENT SYSTEM. THE MODIFICATIONS REQUIRED BY THIS DCP DID NOT DECREASE THE MARGIN OF SAFETY DEFINED BY THE BASES IN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS.

SUBJECT: DCP: 89-VCN0035, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: INSTALL NEW DOOR LEAF'S AND MAGNETIC LOCKING MECHANISMS. THIS DCP CONTAINS SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THIS DCP CONTAINS SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION. IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS DCP DOES NOT INCREASE THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT OR THE PROBABILITY OF AN ACCIDENT. IT DOES NOT EFFECT EQUIPMENT, SYSTEM, OR COMPONENTS REQUIRED TO MITIGATE THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT AS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR. THE MARGIN OF SAFETY HAS NOT BEEN DECREASED AS DESCRIBED IN THE BASIS FOR ANY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION.

SUBJECT: DCP: 89-VCN0038, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1, 2, 3, & 5

DESCRIPTION: THIS DCP CONSTRUCTED AN ALTERNATE PLANT ENTRANCE SECURITY BUILDING. THIS DCP CONTAINS SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THIS DCP CONTAINS SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION. IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS DCP DOES NOT INCREASE THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT OR THE PROBABILITY OF AN ACCIDENT. IT DOES NOT EFFECT EQUIPMENT, SYSTEM, OR COMPONENTS REQUIRED TO MITIGATE THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT AS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR. THE MARGIN OF SAFETY HAS NOT BEEN DECREASED AS DESCRIBED IN THE BASIS FOR ANY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION.

SUBJECT: DCP: 89-VCN0088, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: INSTALL REACH ROD OPERATORS, WITH REMOTE VALVE POSITION INDICATORS ON VALVES: 11901U4050, 11902U4251, 11205U6019, 11508U4012

SAFETY EVALUATION: THIS DCP DOES NOT AFFECT ANY SYSTEM, EQUIPMENT OR COMPONENT FUNCTION OR OPERATION AND DOES NOT AFFECT ANY FSAR ACCIDENT ANALYSIS NOR CREATE A CONDITION WHICH HAS NOT BEEN ANALYZED, NOR REDUCE THE MARGIN OF SAFETY ; THEREFORE THIS DCP DOES NOT RESULT IN AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION.

SUBJECT: DCP: 89-VCN0109, REVISION 1, SEQUENCE 1
DESCRIPTION: THIS DCP SEQUENCE INSTALLS A PERMANENT OFFICE FOR G.E. PERSONNEL ON THE TURBINE DECK WITH A TOOL/EQUIPMENT STORAGE AREA. THE OFFICE IS A HENGES IN-PLANT OFFICE, SERIES 175 SUPPORTED ON A PLATFORM ON THE TURBINE DECK.

SAFETY EVALUATION: BASED ON A REVIEW OF FSAR SECTIONS 3, 8.3, 9.5.2, & 15 AND A REVIEW OF TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 3/4.3 AND 3/4.7 THIS DCP DOES NOT AFFECT ACCIDENT PROBABILITIES, AFFECT SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT, CREATE NEW POSSIBILITIES OF EQUIPMENT MALFUNCTIONS, INVOLVE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION, OR DECREASE THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN THE BASES OF TECH SPECS.

SUBJECT: DCP: 89-VCN0109, REVISION 1, SEQUENCE 2

DESCRIPTION: THIS SEQUENCE PROVIDED NON-SAFETY RELATED ELECTRICAL CONNECTIONS, INTERNAL WIRING, TELEPHONE SERVICE, PAGE SERVICE, OFFICE GROUNDING, AND DOCUMENTATION OF CHANGES TO THE PERMANENT OFFICE INSTALLED ON THE TURBINE DECK FOR G.E. PERSONNEL. THIS BUILDING WAS PREVIOUSLY INSTALLED BY DCP 89-VCN0109-1-1 AS A PERMANENT OFFICE.

SAFETY EVALUATION: BASED ON A REVIEW OF FSAR SECTIONS 3, 8, 9.5.2, & 15 AND A REVIEW OF TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 3/4.3 AND 3/4.7 THIS DCP DOES NOT AFFECT ACCIDENT PROBABILITIES, AFFECT SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT, CREATE NEW POSSIBILITIES OF EQUIPMENT MALFUNCTIONS, INVOLVE AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION, OR DECREASE THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN THE BASES OF TECH SPECS.

SUBJECT: DCP: 89-VCN0120, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THIS CHANGE INVOLVED THE DELETION OF TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER (TSC) AREA RADIATION MONITORS ARE-50002A, ARE-50002B AND THE ASSOCIATED LOCAL ALARMS, INDICATORS, AND DPM'S. IT ALSO INCLUDED THE DELETION OF THE AIRBORNE RADIATION MONITOR FROM WITHIN THE HVAC INTAKE (ARE-50003) AND ITS ASSOCIATED LOCAL ALARMS AND INDICATION. ALL INSTRUMENTS DELETED ARE NON-SAFETY RELATED PROJECT CLASS 62J COMPONENTS. AN ERROR IN THE FSAR CONCERNING THE TSC EXHAUST DUCT ISOLATION WAS ALSO CORRECTED. THE TSC MUST BE MANNED POST-ACCIDENT. THE DELETION OF THE AREA MONITORS (ARE-50002A AND B) WAS ACCOMPANIED BY THE DEDICATION OF A PORTABLE AREA MONITOR TO BE PLACED IN THE TSC WHENEVER IT IS ACTIVATED. THIS MONITOR SHOULD BE PLACED IN A MANNED AREA THAT IS CLOSEST TO THE PRINCIPAL FILTRATION UNITS ADJACENT TO THE TSC. A REVIEW OF THE TSC POST- ACCIDENT HABITABILITY CALCULATION REVEALS THAT THE MAXIMUM ANTICIPATED DOSE RATE IN THE TSC IS 70 MILLIREM PER HOUR. THUS, A PORTABLE INSTRUMENT WITH SUFFICIENT ACCURACY TO RELIABLY PROVIDE AN ALARM AT 5 MILLIREM PER HOUR WHILE PROVIDING DOSE RATE INDICATION UP TO 100 MILLIREM PER HOUR IS ADEQUATE. THE RADIATION MONITORING SYSTEM RELIABILITY HAS BEEN LESS THAN EXPECTED CREATING THE NEED FOR CONTINUOUS MAINTENANCE AND SIGNIFICANT MANPOWER TO MAINTAIN THE SYSTEM. THESE MONITORS ARE BEING DELETED AS PART OF VEGP'S PROGRAM TO ELIMINATE NONESSENTIAL

RADIATION MONITORS. ELIMINATION OF NONESSENTIAL MONITORS SIMPLIFY THE SYSTEM, REDUCE O&M COSTS, AND THE AMOUNT OF MANPOWER REQUIRED TO MAINTAIN THE SYSTEM. FSAR SECTION 9.4.1.8.2.3.2 INCORRECTLY STATES THAT THE TOILET AND BATTERY ROOM EXHAUST DAMPERS REMAIN OPEN. THE LOGIC DIAGRAM IS ALSO INCORRECT. THESE DAMPERS CLOSE TO HELP MAINTAIN A POSITIVE PRESSURE IN THE TSC. THE FSAR AND THE LOGIC DIAGRAM ARE BEING CORRECTED TO REFLECT THE PROPER OPERATION OF THESE DAMPERS. NO CHANGES TO THE PLANT OR OTHER DESIGN DRAWINGS ARE REQUIRED.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE INSTRUMENTATION INVOLVED IN THIS CHANGE DOES NOT DIRECTLY AFFECT PLANT OPERATIONS. THE POST ACCIDENT ISOLATION AND ALARM FUNCTIONS OF THE REMOVED INSTRUMENTS ASSOCIATED WITH AIRBORNE RADIOACTIVITY WAS PERFORMED BY THE CONTROL ROOM INTAKE AIRBORNE RADIATION MONITOR. THE REQUIRED PORTABLE AREA MONITOR WITH AN ALARM SET AT FIVE MILLIREM PER HOUR PROVIDES ADEQUATE WARNING OF AN INCREASE IN TSC GENERAL AREA RADIATION LEVELS. ISOLATION RELAYS ARE UTILIZED TO ESTABLISH THE ISOLATION REQUIREMENTS BETWEEN THE NON-SAFETY TSC CIRCUITS AND THE SAFETY RELATED CRI CIRCUITS. THIS IS REQUIRED TO PRECLUDE ANY POSSIBLE DEGRADATION OF THE CRI CIRCUITS IF A FAILURE WITHIN THE TSC CIRCUITS WAS TO OCCUR. SINCE THE FUNCTIONS OF THE INSTRUMENTS TO BE DELETED ARE ADEQUATELY PERFORMED BY ALTERNATE INSTRUMENTS, AND THE DESIGN PROPERLY ADDRESSES THE NEW INTERFACE BETWEEN SAFETY RELATED AND NON-SAFETY RELATED CIRCUITS, IT IS CONCLUDED THAT THIS CHANGE DID NOT INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE OR CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR. ALL RELAYS ASSOCIATED WITH THIS DESIGN ARE QUALIFIED TO MEET THE SEISMIC REQUIREMENTS FOR THIS SERVICE. NEWLY INSTALLED CONDUITS AND CABLES CONTINUE TO MEET THE REQUIRED ELECTRICAL TRAIN SEPARATION AND TO MEET THE ELECTRICAL SEPARATION CRITERIA AS SPECIFIED IN FSAR SECTION 8.3. NO PANEL MODIFICATIONS ARE REQUIRED DUE TO THE UTILIZATION OF EXISTING SPARE RELAYS WITHIN THE AFFECTED PANELS. THE INSTRUMENTS TO BE REMOVED ARE NOT MENTIONED IN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS AND DO NOT AFFECT THE OPERATION OF THE PLANT. THESE INSTRUMENTS DO NOT AFFECT ANY INSTRUMENTS OR EQUIPMENT THAT ARE MENTIONED IN THE BASES TO ANY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION. THE EMERGENCY FILTRATION OF THE TSC AND THE WARNING OF PERSONNEL IF HIGH RADIATION EXISTS WILL CONTINUE TO BE ACCOMPLISHED AS EFFECTIVELY AS BEFORE.

SUBJECT: DCP: 89-VCN0303, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THIS DCP DELETED RADIATION ARE-0007A, ARE-0009A, ARE-0009B, AND ARE-0009C. THE RADIATION MONITORING SYSTEM RELIABILITY HAS BEEN LESS THAN EXPECTED CREATING THE NEED FOR CONTINUOUS MAINTENANCE AND SIGNIFICANT MANPOWER TO MAINTAIN THE SYSTEM. THESE MONITORS ARE BEING DELETED AS PART OF VEGP'S PROGRAM TO ELIMINATE NON-ESSENTIAL RADIATION MONITORS. THE MONITORS TO BE DELETED ARE LOCATED IN NON-ESSENTIAL AREAS WHERE ACCESS IS NOT REQUIRED TO SERVICE SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT OR ACCESS TO AN AREA IMPORTANT TO SAFETY. ELIMINATION OF NON-ESSENTIAL MONITORS SIMPLIFY THE SYSTEM, REDUCE, O&M COST, AND THE AMOUNT OF MANPOWER REQUIRED TO MAINTAIN THE SYSTEM.

SAFETY EVALUATION: NO CREDIT WAS TAKEN FOR THESE DELETED MONITORS IN ANY ACCIDENT ANALYSIS BASED ON A REVIEW OF FSAR SECTIONS 15, 11.5, 12.3.1, AND 12.3.4. THESE MONITORS DO NOT PROVIDE ANY CONTROL FUNCTIONS AND ARE NOT ASSOCIATED WITH ANY FAILURE ANALYSIS OR LIMITING SINGLE FAILURE CONDITIONS. THEREFORE THIS CHANGE DOES NOT EFFECT SAFETY RELATED COMMENTS EQUIPMENT, OR FSAR ACCIDENT ANALYSIS. BASED ON A REVIEW OF TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION SECTIONS B3/4.3.2, B3/4.3.3, B3/4.4, AND B3/4.11 THERE IS NO CHANGE TO THE MARGIN OF SAFETY DEFINED BY THE BASES OF TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS.

SUBJECT: DCP: 89-VCN0328, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THIS DCP UPGRADED THE SECURITY MULTIPLEXER DATA INPUT MODULES. THIS DCP CONTAINS SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THIS DCP CONTAINS SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION. IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS DCP DOES NOT INCREASE THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT OR THE PROBABILITY OF AN ACCIDENT. IT DOES NOT EFFECT EQUIPMENT, SYSTEM, OR COMPONENTS REQUIRED TO MITIGATE THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT AS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR. THE MARGIN OF SAFETY HAS NOT BEEN DECREASED AS DESCRIBED IN THE BASIS FOR ANY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION.

SUBJECT: DCP: 90-V1E0148, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THIS DCP INSTALLED TWO SPLICE BOXES AND REPLACED THE DAMAGED SECTION OF CONTROL CABLE 1BA0308VB WITH A NEW SECTION OF CABLE. CABLE 1BA0308VB HAD AN OPEN CONDUCTOR WHICH DISABLED THE "B" TRAIN CCW DRAIN TANK LOW LOW LEVEL ALARM IN THE MAIN CONTROL ROOM DUE TO THE CLOSING OF A CONTACT IN SWITCH ILSLL-1853.

SAFETY EVALUATION: NO NEW POTENTIAL ACCIDENTS OR EVENTS ARE CREATED AS A RESULT OF THIS MODIFICATION, THEREFORE THE CHANGE DOES NOT CREATE THE POSSIBILITY OF AN EQUIPMENT /COMPONENT MALFUNCTION NOT DESCRIBED AND ANALYZED IN THE FSAR.

SUBJECT: DCP: 90-V1N0001, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THIS DCP RELOCATED DOOR 12111L1125 SECURITY ACAD. THIS DCP CONTAINS SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THIS DCP CONTAINS SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION. IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS DCP DOES NOT INCREASE THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT OR THE PROBABILITY OF AN ACCIDENT. IT DOES NOT EFFECT EQUIPMENT, SYSTEM, OR COMPONENTS REQUIRED TO MITIGATE THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT AS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR. THE MARGIN OF SAFETY HAS NOT BEEN DECREASED AS DESCRIBED IN THE BASIS FOR ANY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION.

SUBJECT: DCP: 90-V1E0007, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THIS DCP INSTALLED TWO AIR HANDLING UNITS, 1-1556-A7-001 AND 1-1556-A7-002 ON THE ROOF OF THE UNIT 1 CONTROL BUILDING AT ELEVATION 260'-0",

AND TWO AIR HANDLING UNITS, 1-1556-A7-003 AND 1-1556-A7-004 ON THE ROOF OF THE UNIT 1 AUXILIARY BUILDING AT ELEVATION 260'-0". EACH CAPABLE OF PROVIDING 100% OF THE CLEAN AIR REQUIRED TO MAINTAIN THE TEMPERATURE IN THE VICINITY OF MSIVS 1-HV-3016-A/B AND 1-HV-3026-A/B WITHIN THE DESIGN LIMITS. AUXILIARY BUILDING AIR HANDLING UNITS 1-1556-A7-003 AND 1-1556-A7-004 ARE REDUNDANT UNITS, EACH CAPABLE OF PROVIDING 100% OF THE CLEAN AIR REQUIRED TO MAINTAIN THE TEMPERATURE IN THE VICINITY OF MSIVS 1-HV-3006-A/B AND 1-HV-3036-A/B WITHIN THE DESIGN LIMITS. AIR HANDLING UNITS SUPPLY OUTSIDE AIR AND DISTRIBUTE THE AIR TO REGISTERS LOCATED NEAR EACH MSIV BONNET AND ACTUATOR. A BACKDRAFT DAMPER SEPARATES THE OPERATING SYSTEM FROM THE NONOPERATING SYSTEM. FAILURE OF THE HEATER TO MAINTAIN THE SUPPLY AIR TEMPERATURE ABOVE 50 DEGREES F AUTOMATICALLY DE-ENERGIZES THE OPERATING FAN. THIS DCP ALSO REVERSES THE ORIENTATION OF THE EXISTING UNIT 1 CONTROL BUILDING 5-WAY RESTRAINT COOLING FANS FROM THE SUPPLY TO THE EXHAUST CONFIGURATION. THIS PREVENTS THE HEATED AIR, WHICH IS DISSIPATED BY THE RESTRAINTS, FROM IMPINGING ON THE MSIV ACTUATORS, AND FACILITATE THE REMOVAL OF HEATED AIR FROM THE BUILDING BY NATURAL CONVECTION. A "HIGH TEMP" SENSOR IS LOCATED IN EACH BUILDING IN THE VICINITY OF THE MSIVS; A "LOW TEMP" SENSOR IS LOCATED IN EACH BUILDING IN THE AIR HANDLER DISCHARGE AIR STREAM NEAR ONE OF THE MSIVS. THE HIGH AND LOW TEMPERATURE SENSORS ANNUNCIATE IN THE MAIN CONTROL ROOM TO INFORM AN OPERATOR IF A TEMPERATURE ANOMALY EXISTS. THIS DCP INVOLVED PENETRATIONS THROUGH PRESSURE, FIRE, AND FLOOD BOUNDARIES, WHICH WERE SUBJECT TO THE RESTRICTIONS OF VEGP PENETRATION SEAL CONTROL PROCEDURE 00432-C. PENETRATIONS WERE RESEALED IN ACCORDANCE WITH SPECIFICATION XIAG11 AFTER CONSTRUCTION.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE CHANGES IMPLEMENTED BY THIS DCP WERE DESIGNED TO REDUCE THE TEMPERATURE OF THE MSIV ACTUATOR, AND THEREFORE, DID NOT INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OF INADVERTENT CLOSURE. THE ADDITIONAL WEIGHT EXERTED ON THE ROOF BY THE AIR HANDLERS HAS BEEN EVALUATED, AS HAS THE DUCTWORK INSTALLED BY THIS DCP. THE DUCT SUPPORTS COMPLY WITH THE REQUIREMENTS SPECIFIED BY DESIGN CRITERIA DC-2167 FOR DUCTWORK IN SEISMIC CATEGORY 1 STRUCTURES, AND THEREFORE WILL NOT FALL ON SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT DURING A SAFE SHUTDOWN EARTHQUAKE (SSE). CIRCUITRY IS DESIGNED TO ENSURE THAT THE OPERATING FAN AUTOMATICALLY LOCKS OUT THE REDUNDANT UNIT, AND TO ENSURE THAT THE HEATER CANNOT OPERATE WITHOUT AIR FLOW. FAILURE OF THE HEATER TO MAINTAIN THE SUPPLY AIR TEMPERATURE ABOVE 50 DEGREES F AUTOMATICALLY DE-ENERGIZE THE OPERATING FAN. THERE WERE NO CREDIBLE COMMON-MODE FAILURES INTRODUCED BY THE DESIGN CHANGE WHICH AFFECTS SAFETY-RELATED EQUIPMENT. THE ROOFS OF THE CONTROL AND AUXILIARY BUILDING MSIV ENCLOSURES HAVE BEEN ANALYZED AND ARE CAPABLE OF SUPPORTING THE AIR HANDLERS AND MAINTAINING STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY DURING A SEISMIC EVENT. ELECTRICAL SEPARATION FROM CLASS 1E WIRING IS MAINTAINED. FAILURE OF AN AIR HANDLER FAN COULD CAUSE A HIGH TEMPERATURE EXCURSION IN THE VICINITY OF THE MSIVS, POTENTIALLY IMPACTING THEIR ENVIRONMENTALLY QUALIFIED LIFE. FAILURE OF THE HEATING COIL COULD RESULT IN LOW HYDRAULIC FLUID TEMPERATURE AND INCREASED VISCOSITY, RESULTING IN DEGRADED OPERABILITY OF THE MSIVS. NOTIFICATION OF A HIGH TEMPERATURE EXCURSION IS PROVIDED BY A "HIGH TEMP" ALARM, WHICH IS INSTALLED IN THE MAIN CONTROL ROOM QHVC PANEL AS PART OF THIS DCP. NOTIFICATION OF A LOW TEMPERATURE EXCURSION IS PROVIDED BY A "LOW TEMP" ALARM, WHICH IS INSTALLED ON THE CONTROL ROOM QHVC PANEL AS PART OF THIS DCP. ANNUNCIATION OF EITHER ALARM REQUIRE MITIGATING OPERATOR ACTION. AS AN ADDITIONAL PRECAUTION, THE AIR HANDLER FAN IS DESIGNED TO TRIP ON LOW TEMPERATURE. THE SAFETY RELATED

PORTIONS OF THE MSIV SYSTEM ARE CAPABLE OF WITHSTANDING THE EFFECTS OF NATURAL PHENOMENA, AND OF PERFORMING THEIR INTENDED FUNCTION FOLLOWING POSTULATED HAZARDS OF FIRE, INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL MISSILES, AND PIPE BREAK. NEW PENETRATIONS THROUGH THE PENTHOUSE WALLS HAVE BEEN ANALYZED TO DETERMINE THAT THERE ARE NO ADVERSE EFFECTS FROM MISSILES. MSLB VENT PATHS TO ATMOSPHERE, WHICH ARE PARTIALLY OBSTRUCTED BY THE INSTALLATION OF DUCT, HAVE BEEN ANALYZED. THE NET FREE AREA USED IN THE CALCULATION IS NOT AFFECTED, NOR HAS THE ABILITY TO RELIEVE PRESSURE BEEN REDUCED. THE ADDITION OF COOLING AIR INTO THE MSIV ENCLOSURES DOES NOT INCREASE THE AMOUNT OF RADIOACTIVITY RELEASED FOLLOWING AN MSLB. THERE IS NO ADVERSE IMPACT ON SAFETY RELATED STRUCTURES OR COMPONENTS AS SHOWN IN THE EVALUATIONS ABOVE. OPERABILITY AND BASIS FOR OPERABILITY DELINEATED IN TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 3/4.7.1.1 FOR SAFETY VALVES, AND 3/4.7.1.5 FOR THE MSIVS, HAS NOT BEEN REDUCED. THEREFORE, THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS IS NOT REDUCED AS A RESULT OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS DCP.

SUBJECT: DCP: 90-V1N0010, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THE MAIN GENERATOR SHORTING BREAKER IS EQUIPPED WITH FIVE RC NETWORKS (SNUBBERS) TO SUPPRESS CONTACT ARCING DUE TO INDUCTIVE COUNTER ELECTROMOTIVE FORCE (EMF). THE NETWORKS ARE LOCATED ON THE BREAKER AND ARE WIRED IN PARALLEL TO THE BREAKER RELAY COILS. THIS DESIGN CHANGE REMOVED THE SNUBBERS FROM THEIR PRESENT LOCATION ON THE MAIN GENERATOR'S FIELD SHORTING BREAKER AND RELOCATE THEM IN THE EXCITER CUBICLE. THE RELOCATION OF THE SNUBBERS DID NOT ADVERSELY AFFECT THEIR OPERATION OF THE NETWORKS. THIS CHANGE REQUIRED INTERNAL WIRING CHANGES TO THE MAIN GENERATOR'S FIELD SHORTING BREAKER SECTION OF THE EXCITER CUBICLE WHICH IS LOCATED IN THE TURBINE BUILDING. THE SNUBBERS FIELD SHORTING BREAKER AND EXCITER CUBICLE, 1-1328-P5-GEC, ARE PROJECT CLASS 62J. THIS DESIGN CHANGE WAS IMPLEMENTED ON UNIT 2. BY IMPLEMENTING THIS CHANGE ON UNIT 1, SPARE BREAKERS IN THE WAREHOUSE CAN BE USED INTERCHANGEABLY BETWEEN BOTH UNITS WITHOUT HAVING TO MAKE MODIFICATIONS TO THEM PRIOR TO INSTALLATION.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THIS DCP RELOCATED THE SNUBBER NETWORKS ONLY. THE OPERATION OF THE NETWORKS AND THE MAIN GENERATOR SHORTING BREAKER ARE UNAFFECTED BY THIS CHANGE. THERE IS NO MENTION OF THE SNUBBER NETWORKS OR THE MAIN GENERATOR SHORTING BREAKER IN THE FSAR. NEITHER THE MAIN GENERATOR NOR THE MAIN GENERATOR SHORTING BREAKER IS DISCUSSED IN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS

SUBJECT: DCP: 90-V1N0017, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: AGASTAT TIME DELAY RELAYS WERE INSTALLED INSIDE PANEL INCQHVC3 (1-1500-Q5-HVC) TO ALLOW ENOUGH TIME FOR PRESSURE INSIDE THE PIPING PENETRATION FILTRATION EXHAUST UNIT ROOMS (AUX. BLDG R-209 AND R-210) TO STABILIZE TO NO LESS THAN NEGATIVE 0.25 INCH WG AFTER THE DOORS ARE CYCLED OPEN AND CLOSED. DUE TO MINIMUM SPACE INSIDE THIS PANEL AT LAYOUT NO. 11, TERMINATION BLOCK TB11P (TERMINATION'S 1-12) MUST BE REMOVED. THE SECOND HALF OF THIS TERMINATION BLOCK (TERMINATION'S 13-24) WAS RE-NUMBERED 1-12.. THIS DESIGN CHANGE DID NOT AFFECT ANY CLASS-1E SYSTEM. THE EQUIPMENT PROJECT CLASSIFICATION FOR THIS MODIFICATION IS 61E. THE POWER SOURCE IS 120VAC SUPPLIED FROM 120VAC DISTRIBUTION PANEL 1NYS11 BREAKER 30 TO TB17M.23,

24 LOCATED AT LAYOUT NO. 17 OF PANEL INCQHVC4. EACH RELAY REQUIRES 1-3AMP 120VAC FUSE IN SERIES. IN ADDITION THIS DCP ALSO ADDED ANNUNCIATORS ALARMS ALB52A02 AND ALB52A03. THIS MODIFICATION REQUIRED CHANGING THE LOW DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE ALARM SETPOINT (IPDIS-2550 AND IPDIS-2551) FROM NEGATIVE 0.26 INCH WATER GAUGE (WG) TO NEGATIVE 0.28 INCH WG DECREASING. CHANGING THE SETPOINT REQUIRED THAT ANNUNCIATOR RESPONSE PROCEDURE 17052-1 AND 17053-1 BE REVISED. THE HIGH DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE ALARM WAS DELETED IN DCP 88-V1N0051-0-1.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THERE WAS NO CHANGE TO THE PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE OR CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENT AS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR SECTION 15. THIS MODIFICATION AFFECTED ANNUNCIATORS ALB52A02 AND ALB52A03 ONLY. THESE ANNUNCIATORS HAVE NO SAFETY FUNCTION AND ARE NOT REQUIRED FOR SAFE SHUTDOWN OR A SYSTEM REQUIRED FOR SAFE SHUTDOWN. LEAKAGE FROM THE PIPING PENETRATION AREA IS FILTERED BY THE PIPING PENETRATION AND EXHAUST SYSTEM. BOTH TRAINS NORMALLY START ON A CVI SIGNAL AND FAILURE OF ONE TRAIN DOES NOT AFFECT OFFSITE DOSES. DEGRADATION OF THE NEGATIVE PRESSURE BOUNDARY DURING NORMAL OPERATION WILL ALARM ANNUNCIATORS ALB52A02 AND ALB52A03. THIS IS BASED ON REVIEW OF THE FSAR INCLUDING SECTIONS 6, 7, 9 AND 15. THESE ANNUNCIATORS HAVE NO SAFETY FUNCTION AND ARE NOT REQUIRED FOR SAFE SHUTDOWN OR A SYSTEM REQUIRED FOR SAFE SHUTDOWN. THE AGASTAT RELAYS ALONG WITH PRESSURE SWITCHES IPDIS-2550 AND IPDIS-2551 ARE DESIGNED AS FAIL SAFE DEVICES. THIS MEANS THAT IF EITHER DEVICE (RELAY OR PRESSURE SWITCH) FAIL, THE CONTACTS OF THESE DEVICES FAIL CLOSE ACTIVATING ANNUNCIATOR ALARMS ALB52A02 AND ALB52A03. THE RELAYS ARE SEISMICALLY MOUNTED IN A SEISMIC CATEGORY 1 PANEL IN THE CONTROL ROOM, ROOM 163. THERE IS NO CHANGE TO THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN THE BASES OF THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS INCLUDING THE BASES TO 3/4.3, 3/4.7 OR 3/4.11. ANNUNCIATORS ALB52A02 AND ALB52A03 HAVE NO SAFETY FUNCTION AND ARE NOT REQUIRED FOR SAFE SHUTDOWN OR A SYSTEM REQUIRED FOR SAFE SHUTDOWN.

SUBJECT: DCP: 90-V1N0032, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: IMPROVE U/I PERIMETER & MICROWAVE CONFIGURATION. THIS DCP CONTAINS SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THIS DCP CONTAINS SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION. IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS DCP DOES NOT INCREASE THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT OR THE PROBABILITY OF AN ACCIDENT. IT DOES NOT EFFECT EQUIPMENT, SYSTEM, OR COMPONENTS REQUIRED TO MITIGATE THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT AS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR. THE MARGIN OF SAFETY HAS NOT BEEN DECREASED AS DESCRIBED IN THE BASIS FOR ANY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION.

SUBJECT: DCP: 90-V1N0032, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 2

DESCRIPTION: IMPROVE U/I PERIMETER & MICROWAVE CONFIGURATION. THIS DCP CONTAINS SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THIS DCP CONTAINS SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION. IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS DCP DOES NOT INCREASE THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT OR THE PROBABILITY OF AN ACCIDENT. IT DOES NOT EFFECT EQUIPMENT, SYSTEM, OR COMPONENTS REQUIRED TO MITIGATE THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN

ACCIDENT AS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR. THE MARGIN OF SAFETY HAS NOT BEEN DECREASED AS DESCRIBED IN THE BASIS FOR ANY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION.

SUBJECT: DCP: 90-V1N0032, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 3

DESCRIPTION: IMPROVE U/I PERIMETER & MICROWAVE CONFIGURATION. THIS DCP CONTAINS SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THIS DCP CONTAINS SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION. IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS DCP DOES NOT INCREASE THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT OR THE PROBABILITY OF AN ACCIDENT. IT DOES NOT EFFECT EQUIPMENT, SYSTEM, OR COMPONENTS REQUIRED TO MITIGATE THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT AS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR. THE MARGIN OF SAFETY HAS NOT BEEN DECREASED AS DESCRIBED IN THE BASIS FOR ANY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION.

SUBJECT: DCP: 90-V1N0040, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THIS DCP ALLOWED THE REPLACEMENT OF THE PREVIOUS CROSBY/WATTS SAFETY VALVES WITH CONSOLIDATED SAFETY VALVES, FOR THE DIESEL GENERATOR. THE VALVES ARE INSTALLED IN THE NON-SAFETY RELATED PORTION OF THE STARTING AIR SYSTEM. THE PROJECT CLASSIFICATION FOR THE VALVES IS 626.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THIS CHANGE INVOLVED A MODIFICATION OF THE DIESEL GENERATOR STARTING AIR COMPRESSOR WHICH IS NON-SAFETY RELATED. THIS DESIGN CHANGE MAKES THE COMPRESSOR SAFETY VALVES MORE RELIABLE AND DOES NOT AFFECT THE SAFETY RELATED PORTION OF THE DIESEL GENERATOR AIR START SYSTEM. THEREFORE IT DOES NOT HAVE ANY AFFECT ON THE FSAR SAFETY EVALUATIONS. THIS CHANGE DOES NOT AFFECT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASED ON A REVIEW OF TECH SPECS.

SUBJECT: DCP: 90-V1N0040, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 2

DESCRIPTION: THIS DCP ADDED A CRANKCASE HEATER WITH ASSOCIATED THERMOSTAT AND THE DELETED THE LOW LEVEL OIL SWITCH FROM EACH OF THE FOUR EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR AIR START COMPRESSORS (SYSTEM NO. 2403). ALL OF THE EQUIPMENT IS PROJECT CLASSIFICATION 626 OR 62E. THE HEATER AND THERMOSTAT PROBE WERE INSTALLED IN THE COMPRESSOR'S CRANKCASE. THE LEVEL SWITCH AND ASSOCIATED ELECTRICAL ACCESSORIES WERE DELETED. INSTALLING A CRANKCASE OIL HEATER AND SETTING THE THERMOSTAT TEMPERATURE TO MAINTAIN THE TEMPERATURE OF THE OIL AND CRANKCASE SURFACE ABOVE THE DEW POINT OF THE INTAKE AIR, PRECLUDES CONDENSATION OF WATER IN THE CRANKCASE AND OIL CONTAMINATION IS AVOIDED.

SAFETY EVALUATION: A REVIEW OF FSAR SECTION 9.5.6, AND A REVIEW OF CHAPTER 15, CONFIRMED THAT THE AIR START COMPRESSORS ARE NOT CONSIDERED AS AN ACCIDENT INITIATOR IN ANY FSAR ACCIDENT ANALYSIS. THE COMPRESSORS ARE NON-SAFETY RELATED AND FAILURE OF A COMPRESSOR WILL NOT AFFECT THE SAFETY RELATED PORTION OF THE DIESEL GENERATOR AIR START SYSTEM. THE ADDITION OF THE HEATER AND THERMOSTAT AND THE DELETION OF THE LOW LEVEL OIL SWITCH MADE THE COMPRESSOR MORE RELIABLE. THIS CHANGE DID NOT AFFECT ANY SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT. THE MODIFICATIONS MADE BY THIS DCP WERE BE IMPLEMENTED

IN ACCORDANCE WITH PLANT APPROVED SPECIFICATIONS AND PROCEDURES WHICH RESULTED IN A DESIGN WHICH IS IN COMPLIANCE WITH PLANT DESIGN REQUIREMENTS. APPLICABLE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3/4.8.1 INCLUDING THE CORRESPONDING BASIS WAS REVIEWED AND IT WAS DETERMINED THAT IT WAS NOT AFFECTED BY THIS CHANGE.

SUBJECT: DCP: 90-V1N0044, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THIS DCP IS MOUNTED HOFFMAN BOXES ON ONE END OF THE WASTE GAS SYSTEM WASTE GAS ANALYZER RACKS A-1902-P5-GAC (ANCPGAC) AND 1-1902-P5-GAP (1NCPGAP). THESE BOXES CONTAIN STATES CO. TYPE ZWM-250, SLIDING LINK TERMINAL BLOCKS AND BANANA TEST JACKS. SINCE THE END PANEL OF THESE RACKS WAS REMOVED BY THE PLANT PERSONNEL THE END PANEL IS ALSO BEING CHANGED TO A HINGED DOOR.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THIS DCP MODIFIED THE WIRING OF THE WASTE GAS ANALYZER RACKS A1902-P5-GAC AND 1-1902-P5-GAP TO ADD TEST POINTS SO THAT THE PLANT PERSONNEL CAN PERFORM THEIR ROUTINE MAINTENANCE OR SURVEILLANCE TESTING WITHOUT DETERMINING WIRES. BASED ON THE REVIEW OF THE DESIGN CRITERIA DC-1902 AND THE FSAR SECTION 11.3 IT WAS CONCLUDED THAT THIS MODIFICATION DID NOT CHANGE THE DESIGN BASES, FUNCTION OR OPERATION OF THE WASTE GAS ANALYZERS. THE WASTE GAS ANALYZER RACKS A-1902-P5-GAC AND 1-1902-P5-GAP ARE NONSAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT AND ARE NOT REQUIRED TO FUNCTION DURING ANY DESIGN BASIS ACCIDENT CONDITION. THE GASEOUS WASTE PROCESSING SYSTEM MONITORS ARE DESCRIBED IN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS SECTIONS 3/4.3.3.10 AND 3/4.11.2.5. THIS DCP DID NOT CHANGE ANY PARAMETERS OR SETPOINTS ASSOCIATED WITH THE NON SAFETY RELATED ANALYZERS NOR DID IT CHANGE THE FUNCTION OR OPERATION OF THE ANALYZERS AND THEREFORE, DID NOT AFFECT AUTOMATIC CONTROL FEATURES ASSOCIATED WITH HYDROGEN/OXYGEN MONITORS. HENCE THE DCP DID NOT DECREASE THE MARGIN OF SAFETY DEFINED BY THE BASES OF THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS.

SUBJECT: DCP: 90-V1N0063, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: PROVIDES A BLOCKING FEATURE THAT WHEN INVOKED ESTABLISHES A HARD BLOCK TO THE SOLID STATE PROTECTION SYSTEM FOR RAD MONITORS 1RE-0002, 0003, 2565A, 2565B, AND 2565C. THIS INHIBITS CVI ACTUATION AND MAINTAIN THE EXISTING MAIN CONTROL ROOM ALARMS AND INDICATIONS CURRENTLY PROVIDED. THIS ALSO ALLOWS LOCAL DEENERGIZATION OF THE DPM FOR MAINTENANCE OR OTHER REQUIREMENTS.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THIS DESIGN ADDED ADDITIONAL CONDUIT AND CABLE TERMINATION'S TO SAFETY RELATED RELAY ENCLOSURES 1RY-0002 AND 1RY-0003. THE NEW EQUIPMENT ADDED WAS HAND SWITCHES 1HS-13259, 1HS-13260, AND 1HS-13261 WHICH ARE MOUNTED IN THE CORRESPONDING ENCLOSURES 1-1609-P5-CB1, 1-1609-P5-CB2, AND 1-1609-P5-CB3. THE ABOVE MENTION CHANGES HAS NO AFFECT ON WATER SENSITIVITY OF THE EXISTING EQUIPMENT, AND THE NEW SWITCH/ENCLOSURE ASSEMBLIES ARE MOUNTED ABOVE THE AREA FLOOD LEVELS.

SUBJECT: DCP: 90-V1N0079, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THIS DCP INSTALLED TWO NON-SAFETY RELATED PUMPS IN THE UNIT 1 CONTAINMENT TENDON GALLERY POWERED FROM EXISTING WELDING RECEPTACLES IN THE TENDON GALLERY. THE PUMPS DISCHARGE TO THE STORM DRAIN SYSTEM AND SATISFY SEISMIC CATEGORY 2/1 REQUIREMENTS.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE EQUIPMENT INSTALLED UNDER THIS DCP IS NON-SAFETY RELATED, SEISMIC CATEGORY 2/1 QUALIFIED, SERVES NO POST ACCIDENT FUNCTION, AND DOES NOT EFFECT THE FUNCTION OF ANY SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT.

SUBJECT: DCP 90-V1N0104, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THIS DCP MODIFIES THE VENTILATION SYSTEM ASSOCIATED WITH THE CONTROL BUILDING GAS BOTTLE STORAGE ROOM R-133 TO CONFORM WITH THE APPLICABLE NFPA, CGA AND OSHA CODES AND STANDARDS WHICH GOVERN STRUCTURES IN THIS USE CATEGORY. A LOW POINT SUPPLY AIR INLET WILL BE PROVIDED VIA THE GAP UNDER THE DOOR. THE EXISTING TRANSFER GRILLE WILL BE BLANKED OFF. A HIGH POINT EXHAUST WILL BE PROVIDED BY ADDING AN 8 FOOT CEILING AND A LOW POINT EXHAUST WILL ALSO BE ADDED.

SAFETY EVALUATION THE NORMAL FUNCTION OF THE EXHAUST SYSTEM IS NOT ADVERSELY AFFECTED NOR IS THE OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES FOR THE SYSTEM. THE CHANGE WILL CONFORM TO THE CODES AND STANDARDS GOVERNING COMPRESSED GAS STORAGE AND DISPENSING AREAS. THE GAS BOTTLE ROOM DOES NOT CONTAIN ANY SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT AND THE VENTILATION SYSTEM IS NOT SAFETY RELATED. THERE ARE NO SEISMIC HAZARDS INTRODUCED SINCE THERE ARE NO SAFETY COMPONENTS IN THE ROOM. THE CEILING WILL BE COATED TO PREVENT GASES FROM PERMEATING.

SUBJECT: DCP: 90-V1N0105, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THIS DCP MODIFIES SEVERAL SECONDARY STEAM DUMP VALVES AND OTHER VALVES TO UTILIZE LIVE LOAD PACKING STEM PACKING SYSTEM.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THERE ARE NO UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTIONS INVOLVED WITH THIS DESIGN CHANGE.

SUBJECT: DCP: 90-V1N0106, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THIS DCP INVOLVED CHANGES TO LEVEL INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROLS ASSOCIATED WITH THE FOLLOWING EQUIPMENT: FEEDWATER HEATERS 1A, 1B, 1C, 2A, 2B, 2C, 3A, 3B, 3C, 5A, 5B, 6A AND 6B; HEATER DRAIN TANKS A AND B; REHEATER DRAIN TANKS A, B, C AND D; MOISTURE SEPARATOR DRAIN TANKS A, B, C AND D. IT INCLUDED REVISIONS TO SETPOINTS AND OPERATING RANGES FOR MANY OF THE LEVEL SWITCHES AND LEVEL CONTROLLERS ASSOCIATED WITH THE ABOVE EQUIPMENT. SOME OF THE LEVEL SWITCHES AND LEVEL CONTROLLERS WERE PHYSICALLY RELOCATED IN ELEVATION AS DESCRIBED BELOW. THE PHYSICAL CHANGES DID NOT REQUIRE RE-ROUTING OF PIPE TO THE LEVEL INSTRUMENTS BUT DID REQUIRE CUTTING AND RE-WELDING IN ORDER TO CHANGE THE ELEVATION OF THE INSTRUMENTS.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THIS DCP REVISED MANY OF THE SETPOINTS FOR THE HIGH-HIGH LEVEL ALARM/ISOLATION SWITCHES; HOWEVER, THE SETPOINT ELEVATIONS WERE INCREASED TO PROVIDE GREATER SEPARATION FROM NORMAL WATER LEVELS AND DECREASE THE CHANCE THAT MINOR TRANSIENTS WOULD RESULT IN ISOLATIONS. OTHER CHANGES IN THIS DCP ALSO PROMOTE STABILITY OF OPERATION AND RELIABILITY OF THE CONDENSATE/FEED WATER AND HEATER DRAIN SYSTEMS. THE CHANGES PROMOTE STABILITY OF OPERATION AND DO NOT INCREASE THE CHANCES OF LOSS OF NORMAL FEED WATER. THE CHANGES DO NOT INCREASE THE CHANCES OF SECONDARY SYSTEMS FAILURES. THE CHANGES IN THE DCP DID NOT INCREASE THE MAGNITUDE OF THE THERMAL LOAD THAT OCCURS UPON HEATER STRING ISOLATION OR HEATER DRAIN PUMP TRIP. THE DESIGN CHANGES EFFECTS ONLY NON-SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT AND INSTRUMENTATION WHICH ARE NOT ASSUMED TO FUNCTION IN THE ANALYSIS. SECTION 15.2.3 OF THE FSAR EVALUATES TURBINE TRIP. THE ANALYSIS IN THIS SECTION COMPLETELY ENVELOPS ANY IMPACT THAT THE CHANGES IN THIS DCP COULD HAVE ON THE EVENT. NONE OF THE EQUIPMENT AFFECTED BY THE DCP IS ASSUMED TO FUNCTION IN THE ANALYSIS. THE COMPONENTS ARE LOCATED IN THE TURBINE BUILDING AND FAILURE WILL NOT DAMAGE SAFETY RELATED STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS OR COMPONENTS. THE CHANCES HAVE NOT INCREASED THAT INSTABILITIES IN THE NON-SAFETY SYSTEMS WILL PROPAGATE AND HAVE AN INFLUENCE ON SAFETY RELATED COMPONENTS. OTHER POSSIBLE EFFECTS THAT THE CHANGES IN THE DCP COULD HAVE ON ANY SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT FAILURE ARE ENVELOPED BY THE ANALYSES IN FSAR SECTIONS 15.1.1, 15.2.7 AND 15.2.3. THE POSSIBILITY OF INCREASED WATER VOLUMES IN THE HEATER SHELLS HAS BEEN REVIEWED AND FOUND ACCEPTABLE BY THE TURBINE MANUFACTURER THE STORED ENERGY LEVELS ARE WITHIN THE LIMITS FOR OPERATION WITH THE EXISTING CONFIGURATION OF EXTRACTION LINE NON-RETURN VALVES. THIS ENSURES THAT TURBINE OVERSPEED DUE TO REVERSE FLOW IN THE EXTRACTION LINES DOES NOT OCCUR ON LOAD REJECTION OR TURBINE TRIP. THUS, THE TURBINE MISSILE ANALYSIS AS DESCRIBED IN FSAR SECTION 3.5.1.3 REMAINS VALID. THE EQUIPMENT DESCRIBED IS NOT ADDRESSED IN THE BASIS FOR ANY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION. BASED ON A REVIEW OF THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASES THERE ARE NO REDUCTIONS IN THE MARGIN OF SAFETY IN THE BASIS FOR ANY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION.

SUBJECT: DCP: 90-V1N0117, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THIS DESIGN CHANGE INVOLVES THE NEW DESIGN AND FABRICATION OF A REPLACEMENT FILTER ELEMENT FOR THE UNIT 1 SPENT RESIN SLUICE BACKFLUSHABLE FILTER (1-1901-F4-003). THE ELEMENT WAS DESIGNED AND RETROFITTED BY PALL CORPORATION FOR USE IN THE EXISTING VACCO VESSEL HOUSING. THE NEW DESIGN WAS A COMPLETE REPLACEMENT FOR THE PREVIOUS ELEMENT IN THE VACCO FILTER AND ALLOWS FOR THE CONTINUED UTILIZATION OF THE VACCO TUBESHEET WITHOUT MODIFICATION. HOWEVER, THE OPTION OF USING THE CURRENT VACCO FILTER ELEMENT DESIGN STILL EXISTS.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THIS CHANGE DOES NOT INVOLVE A CHANGE TO TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS. THIS FILTER DOES NOT PERFORM A SAFETY RELATED FUNCTION. THIS FILTER MEETS SEISMIC CATEGORY 1 STANDARDS. ITS FAILURE WILL NOT COMPROMISE ANY SAFETY RELATED FUNCTION.

SUBJECT: DCP: 90-V1N0120, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THIS DCP REMOUNTED SOME OF THE SECURITY CAMERAS FROM SIDE-BY-SIDE TO VERTICAL STACK. THIS DCP CONTAINS SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THIS DCP CONTAINS SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION. IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS DCP DOES NOT INCREASE THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT OR THE PROBABILITY OF AN ACCIDENT. IT DOES NOT EFFECT EQUIPMENT, SYSTEM, OR COMPONENTS REQUIRED TO MITIGATE THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT AS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR. THE MARGIN OF SAFETY HAS NOT BEEN DECREASED AS DESCRIBED IN THE BASIS FOR ANY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION

SUBJECT: DCP: 90-V1N0175, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THIS DCP REROUTES THE LOWER SENSING LINES FOR STEAM GENERATOR NARROW RANGE LEVEL TRANSMITTERS 1LT-517, 518, 519, 527, 528, 529, 537, 538, 539, 547, 548, 549, 551, 552, 553, AND 554 TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE CONTINUOUS DOWNWARD SLOPE ON THE SENSING LINE. THIS CHANGE PREVENTS THE POSSIBLE BUILDUP OF NON-CONDENSABLE GASES AND ENSURE A WATER SOLID SENSING LINE TO THE TRANSMITTER.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THIS CHANGE DOES NOT INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE OF AN ACCIDENT DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR OR DECREASE THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS. THE RELOCATION OF THE LEVEL TRANSMITTERS AND THE ASSOCIATED CORE DRILLS DOES NOT ADVERSELY AFFECT THE OPERATION OF THE STEAM GENERATOR LEVEL INSTRUMENTS NOR DOES IT ADVERSELY AFFECT THE OPERATION OR FUNCTION OF ANY SAFETY SYSTEM. IT DOES NOT DEGRADE THE FUNCTIONAL CAPABILITY OF THE STEAM GENERATOR NARROW RANGE LEVEL SYSTEM. THIS DESIGN IS AN ENHANCEMENT OVER THE PREVIOUS DESIGN DUE TO THE ELIMINATION OF GAS TRAPS IN THE INSTRUMENT TUBING.

SUBJECT: DCP: 90-V2E0114, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1 & 2

DESCRIPTION: THIS DESIGN CHANGE INSTALLED PIPING, VALVES, AND INSTRUMENTATION TO ALLOW THE TURBINE PLANT COOLING WATER SYSTEM TO BE AN ALTERNATE SOURCE OF SEAL AND COOLING WATER TO THE UNIT 2 CIRCULATING WATER PUMPS AND MOTORS, WHEN UTILITY WATER IS UNAVAILABLE. SEQUENCE 1 OF THE DCP INSTALLED PIPING FROM THE DISCHARGE OF TPCW PUMP 2-1405-P4-501 TO THE FIRST ISOLATION GLOBE VALVE ON THE NEW LINE (2-1405-L4-594). IT ALSO MODIFIED UTILITY WATER LINE 2-2419-L4-543 AND THE PORTION OF THE NEW LINE (2-1405-L4-594) WHICH TAPS INTO LINE 543 UP TO THE FIRST ISOLATION GLOBE VALVE. SEQUENCE 2 OF THE DCP REMOVED THE CAPS AND JOINED THE TWO NEW LINES TO FORM ONE NEW LINE. THE NEW PIPING IS LOCATED AT THE CIRCULATING WATER PUMP STRUCTURE. THIS WORK IS BEING PERFORMED ON NON-SAFETY RELATED SYSTEMS, PROJECT CLASS 626.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THIS DESIGN CHANGE DID NOT INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE OR CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR INCLUDING SECTION 15 (ACCIDENT ANALYSES). CHANGES ARE TO PIPING IN THE TURBINE PLANT COOLING WATER SYSTEM AND THE UTILITY WATER SYSTEM, BOTH OF WHICH ARE NON-SAFETY RELATED AND WHOSE FAILURE WILL NOT COMPROMISE A SAFETY RELATED SYSTEM OR PREVENT A SAFE SHUTDOWN. THE NEW PIPING IS LOCATED AT THE CIRCULATING WATER PUMP STRUCTURE AND MEETS THE SAME DESIGN CRITERIA AS THE PREVIOUS SYSTEM, (I.E., PRESSURE, TEMPERATURE, MATERIAL,

SUPPORT, ETC.). THE MODIFICATIONS IN THIS DESIGN CHANGE DID NOT DECREASE TECH. SPECS. SAFETY MARGINS SINCE THE SYSTEMS AFFECTED, SYSTEMS 2419 AND 1405, HAVE NO SAFETY DESIGN BASES. THIS IS BASED ON A REVIEW OF TECH SPEC. BASES, INCLUDING SECTION B 3/4.11.

SUBJECT: DCP: 90-V2N0003, REVISION 1, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THIS DCP REPLACED THE FOUR TURBINE BUILDING SUMP PUMPS WITH FOUR HIGH HEAD SUBMERSIBLE SUMP PUMPS CAPABLE OF PUMPING 275 GPM AT 100 FT. OF HEAD PRESSURE.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE TURBINE BUILDING DRAIN SYSTEM IS NOT SAFETY RELATED AND IS NOT RELIED UPON TO MITIGATE THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT. THE INCREASED FLOW RATE WILL NOT EFFECT THE ABILITY OF RADIATION MONITOR RE-848 TO PERFORM ITS INTENDED FUNCTION. THEREFORE THIS DCP DOES NOT INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE OR CONSEQUENCES OF THE MALFUNCTION OF ANY EQUIPMENT OR COMPONENT ASSUMED TO FUNCTION IN ANY ACCIDENT ANALYZED IN THE FSAR. FSAR SECTIONS 9.3.3 AND 15.0 WERE REVIEWED. ALSO THIS SYSTEM IS NOT DESCRIBED IN TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS.

SUBJECT: DCP: 90-V2N0018, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: AGASTAT TIME DELAY RELAYS WERE INSTALLED INSIDE PANEL 2NCQHVC3 (2-1500-Q5-HVC) TO ALLOW ENOUGH TIME FOR PRESSURE INSIDE THE PIPING PENETRATION FILTRATION EXHAUST UNIT ROOMS (AUX. BLDG R-209 AND R-210) TO STABILIZE TO NO LESS THAN NEGATIVE 0.25 INCH WG AFTER THE DOORS ARE CYCLED OPEN AND CLOSED. DUE TO MINIMUM SPACE INSIDE THIS PANEL AT LAYOUT NO. 11, TERMINATION BLOCK TB11P (TERMINATION'S 1-12) MUST BE REMOVED. THE SECOND HALF OF THIS TERMINATION BLOCK (TERMINATION'S 13-24) WAS RE-NUMBERED 1-12. THIS DESIGN CHANGE DID NOT AFFECT ANY CLASS-1E SYSTEM. THE EQUIPMENT PROJECT CLASSIFICATION FOR THIS MODIFICATION IS 61E. THE POWER SOURCE IS 120VAC SUPPLIED FROM 120VAC DISTRIBUTION PANEL 2NYS1 BREAKER 30 TO TB17M.22, 23 LOCATED AT LAYOUT NO. 16 OF PANEL 2NCQHVC3. EACH RELAY REQUIRES 1-3AMP 120VAC FUSE IN SERIES. IN ADDITION THIS DCP ALSO ADDED ANNUNCIATOR ALARMS ALB52A02 AND ALB52A03. THIS MODIFICATION REQUIRED CHANGING THE LOW DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE ALARM SETPOINT (2PDIS-2550 AND 2PDIS-2551) FROM NEGATIVE 0.26 INCH WATER GAUGE (WG) TO NEGATIVE 0.28 INCH WG DECREASING. CHANGING THE SETPOINT REQUIRED THAT ANNUNCIATOR RESPONSE PROCEDURE 17052-2 BE REVISED.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THERE WAS NO CHANGE TO THE PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE OR CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENT AS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR SECTION 15. THIS MODIFICATION AFFECTED ANNUNCIATORS ALB52A02 AND ALB52A03 ONLY. THESE ANNUNCIATORS HAVE NO SAFETY FUNCTION AND ARE NOT REQUIRED FOR SAFE SHUTDOWN OR A SYSTEM REQUIRED FOR SAFE SHUTDOWN. LEAKAGE FROM THE PIPING PENETRATION AREA IS FILTERED BY THE PIPING PENETRATION AND EXHAUST SYSTEM. BOTH TRAINS NORMALLY START ON A CVI SIGNAL AND FAILURE OF ONE TRAIN DOES NOT AFFECT OFFSITE DOSES. DEGRADATION OF THE NEGATIVE PRESSURE BOUNDARY DURING NORMAL OPERATION WILL ALARM ANNUNCIATORS ALB. 2A02 AND ALB52A03. THIS IS BASED ON REVIEW OF THE FSAR INCLUDING SECTIONS 6, 7, 9 AND 15. THESE ANNUNCIATORS HAVE NO SAFETY FUNCTION AND ARE NOT REQUIRED FOR SAFE SHUTDOWN OR A SYSTEM REQUIRED FOR SAFE SHUTDOWN. THE AGASTAT RELAYS ALONG WITH PRESSURE SWITCHES 2PDIS-2550 AND 2PDIS-2551 ARE DESIGNATED AS FAIL

SAFE DEVICES. THIS MEANS THAT IF EITHER DEVICE (RELAY OR PRESSURE SWITCH) FAILS, THE CONTACTS OF THESE DEVICES WILL FAIL CLOSE ACTIVATING ANNUNCIATOR ALARMS ALB52A02 AND ALB52A03. THE RELAYS ARE SEISMICALLY MOUNTED IN A SEISMIC CATEGORY 1 PANEL IN THE CONTROL ROOM, ROOM 163. THERE IS NO CHANGE TO THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN THE BASES OF THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS INCLUDING THE BASES TO 3/4.3, 3/4.7 OR 3/4.11. ANNUNCIATORS ALB52A02 AND ALB52A03 HAVE NO SAFETY FUNCTION AND ARE NOT REQUIRED FOR SAFE SHUTDOWN OR A SYSTEM REQUIRED FOR SAFE SHUTDOWN.

SUBJECT: DCP: 90-V2N0027, REVISION 1, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THIS DCP ADDS PLATFORMS TO UNIT 2 TO PROVIDE ACCESS TO THE STEAM GENERATOR FEED PUMPS "A" AND "B" INSTRUMENT CONSOLES AND PLATFORMS TO PROVIDE ACCESS AROUND THE MAIN STEAM ISOLATION VALVES. ALSO IT INSTALLS PLATFORMS TO PROVIDE ACCESS AROUND THE NSCW PUMPS TRAIN "A" AND "B." THESE ARE TO ENHANCE PERSONNEL SAFETY AND EQUIPMENT ACCESSIBILITY.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE PLATFORM INSTALLATIONS DID NOT AFFECT ANY DESCRIPTIONS IN THE FSAR REGARDING THE MANNER IN WHICH THE CONTROLLERS, VALVES, AND OTHER INSTRUMENTATION ARE OPERATED, TO WHICH THE PLATFORMS PROVIDE ACCESS NOR DOES IT PROVIDE ANY SAFETY RELATED FUNCTION OR SUPPORT ANY SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT.

SUBJECT: DCP: 90-V2N0041, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THIS DCP ALLOWED THE REPLACEMENT OF THE PREVIOUS CROSBY/WATTS SAFETY VALVES WITH CONSOLIDATED SAFETY VALVES, FOR THE DIESEL GENERATOR. THE VALVES ARE INSTALLED IN THE NON-SAFETY RELATED PORTION OF THE STARTING AIR SYSTEM. THE PROJECT CLASSIFICATION FOR THE VALVES IS 626.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THIS CHANGE INVOLVED A MODIFICATION OF THE DIESEL GENERATOR STARTING AIR COMPRESSOR WHICH IS NON-SAFETY RELATED. THIS DESIGN CHANGE MAKES THE COMPRESSOR SAFETY VALVES MORE RELIABLE AND DOES NOT AFFECT THE SAFETY RELATED PORTION OF THE DIESEL GENERATOR AIR START SYSTEM. THEREFORE IT DOES NOT HAVE ANY AFFECT ON THE FSAR SAFETY EVALUATIONS. THIS CHANGE DOES NOT AFFECT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASED ON A REVIEW OF TECH SPECS.

SUBJECT: DCP: 90-V2N0041, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 2

DESCRIPTION: THIS DCP INSTALLED HEATERS IN THE DIESEL GENERATOR AIR COMPRESSOR CRANKCASES TO ELIMINATE MOISTURE INTRUSION INTO THE COMPRESSOR OIL THEREBY EXTENDING THE COMPRESSOR LIFE.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THIS CHANGE INVOLVED A MODIFICATION OF THE DIESEL GENERATOR STARTING AIR COMPRESSOR WHICH IS NON-SAFETY RELATED. THIS DESIGN CHANGE MAKES THE COMPRESSOR MORE RELIABLE AND DOES NOT AFFECT THE SAFETY RELATED PORTION OF THE DIESEL GENERATOR AIR START SYSTEM. THEREFORE IT DOES NOT HAVE ANY AFFECT ON THE FSAR SAFETY EVALUATIONS. THIS CHANGE DOES NOT AFFECT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASED ON A REVIEW OF TECH SPECS.

SUBJECT: DCP: 90-V2N0078, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THIS DESIGN CHANGE MODIFIED THE UNIT 2 NATURAL DRAFT COOLING TOWER BY: (1) ADDING PIPE EXTENSIONS AT THE PERIMETER OF THE TOWER, (2) ADDING ADDITIONAL NOZZLES (256 LOCATIONS) AT THE PERIMETER OF THE TOWER, (3) REPLACING NOZZLE ASSEMBLIES AT THE FLUME BOTTOMS WITH FRENCH SPRAYERS, (4) REPLACING ALL REMAINING SINGLE-SPLASH PLATE ASSEMBLIES (R-C TYPE), (5) REARRANGING NOZZLE SIZES TO PROVIDE MORE WATER AT THE OUTER PORTIONS OF THE TOWER, REDUCED WATER LOADING IN THE CENTER, (6) ADDING DIVERTERS (STAINLESS STEEL ANGLES) TO IMPROVE ENTERING FLOW TO THE DISTRIBUTION LATERALS IN THE FIRST SECTION OF THE FLUMES AT THE SECOND AND THIRD RISERS, AND (7) ADDING PVC FILL AT THE PERIMETER AND CENTER OF THE TOWER. THE NATURAL DRAFT COOLING TOWERS ARE PART OF THE CIRCULATING WATER SYSTEM (1401) AND HAVE A PROJECT CLASSIFICATION OF 626. THIS IS A NON-SAFETY RELATED SYSTEM. FAILURE OF THIS SYSTEM WILL NOT COMPROMISE THE ABILITY OF THE PLANT TO ACCOMPLISH A SAFE SHUTDOWN.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE CIRCULATING WATER COOLING TOWERS ARE NOT ASSUMED TO BE AVAILABLE WHEN DETERMINING AND EVALUATING THE LIMITING CASES DESCRIBED IN FSAR CHAPTER 15 (ACCIDENT ANALYSIS). THIS DESIGN CHANGE IS ASSOCIATED WITH SYSTEM 1401 AND DOES NOT DECREASE TECH. SPEC. SAFETY MARGINS SINCE IT HAS NO SAFETY DESIGN BASES. THIS IS BASED ON REVIEW OF THE TECH. SPEC. BASES, INCLUDING SECTION B 3/4.7.

SUBJECT: DCP: 90-V2N0080, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THIS DCP INSTALLED TWO NON-SAFETY RELATED PUMPS IN THE UNIT 2 CONTAINMENT TENDON GALLERY POWERED FROM EXISTING WELDING RECEPTACLES IN THE TENDON GALLERY. THE PUMPS DISCHARGE TO THE STORM DRAIN SYSTEM AND SATISFY SEISMIC CATEGORY 2/1 REQUIREMENTS.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE EQUIPMENT INSTALLED UNDER THIS DCP IS NON-SAFETY RELATED, SEISMIC CATEGORY 2/1 QUALIFIED, SERVES NO POST ACCIDENT FUNCTION, AND DOES NOT EFFECT THE FUNCTION OF ANY SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT.

SUBJECT: DCP: 90-V2N0090, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THIS DCP UPGRADES THE STEAM GENERATOR HYDRAULIC SNUBBERS BY ADDING "TRUE TEST-IN-PLACE" FEATURE. THIS PERMITS IN-SERVICE TESTING OF THE HYDRAULIC SNUBBERS WITHOUT THE RISK, COST, AND SCHEDULE DURATION OF CLEVIS PIN REMOVAL OR SNUBBER HANDLING.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THIS DCP DOES NOT AFFECT ANY SYSTEM, EQUIPMENT OR COMPONENT FUNCTION OR OPERATION AND DOES NOT AFFECT ANY FSAR ACCIDENT ANALYSIS NOR CREATE A CONDITION WHICH HAS NOT BEEN ANALYZED, NOR REDUCE THE MARGIN OF SAFETY. THEREFORE, THIS DCP DOES NOT RESULT IN AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION.

SUBJECT: DCP: 90-V2N0107, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THIS DCP INVOLVED CHANGES TO LEVEL INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROLS ASSOCIATED WITH THE FOLLOWING EQUIPMENT: FEEDWATER HEATERS 1A, 1B, 1C, 2A, 2B, 2C, 3A, 3B, 3C, 5A, 5B, 6A AND 6B; HEATER DRAIN TANKS A AND B; REHEATER DRAIN TANKS A, B, C AND D; MOISTURE SEPARATOR DRAIN TANKS A, B, C AND D. IT INCLUDED REVISIONS TO SETPOINTS AND OPERATING RANGES FOR MANY OF THE LEVEL SWITCHES AND LEVEL CONTROLLERS ASSOCIATED WITH THE ABOVE EQUIPMENT. SOME OF THE LEVEL SWITCHES AND LEVEL CONTROLLERS WERE PHYSICALLY RELOCATED IN ELEVATION AS DESCRIBED BELOW. THE PHYSICAL CHANGES DID NOT REQUIRE RE-ROUTING OF PIPE TO THE LEVEL INSTRUMENTS BUT DID REQUIRE CUTTING AND RE-WELDING IN ORDER TO CHANGE THE ELEVATION OF THE INSTRUMENTS.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THIS DCP REVISED MANY OF THE SETPOINTS FOR THE HIGH-HIGH LEVEL ALARM/ISOLATION SWITCHES; HOWEVER, THE SETPOINT ELEVATIONS WERE INCREASED TO PROVIDE GREATER SEPARATION FROM NORMAL WATER LEVELS AND DECREASE THE CHANCE THAT MINOR TRANSIENTS WOULD RESULT IN ISOLATIONS. OTHER CHANGES IN THIS DCP ALSO PROMOTE STABILITY OF OPERATION AND RELIABILITY OF THE CONDENSATE/FEED WATER AND HEATER DRAIN SYSTEMS. THE CHANGES PROMOTE STABILITY OF OPERATION AND DID NOT INCREASE THE CHANCES OF LOSS OF NORMAL FEED WATER. THE CHANGES DID NOT INCREASE THE CHANCES OF SECONDARY SYSTEMS FAILURES. THE CHANGES IN THE DCP DID NOT INCREASE THE MAGNITUDE OF THE THERMAL LOAD THAT OCCURS UPON HEATER STRING ISOLATION OR HEATER DRAIN PUMP TRIP. THE DESIGN CHANGES EFFECTS ONLY NON-SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT AND INSTRUMENTATION WHICH IS NOT ASSUMED TO FUNCTION IN THE ANALYSIS. SECTION 15.2.3 OF THE FSAR EVALUATES TURBINE TRIP. THE ANALYSIS IN THIS SECTION COMPLETELY ENVELOPS ANY IMPACT THAT THE CHANGES IN THIS DCP COULD HAVE ON THE EVENT. NONE OF THE EQUIPMENT AFFECTED BY THE DCP IS ASSUMED TO FUNCTION IN THE ANALYSIS. THE COMPONENTS ARE LOCATED IN THE TURBINE BUILDING AND FAILURE WILL NOT DAMAGE SAFETY RELATED STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS OR COMPONENTS. THE CHANCES HAVE NOT INCREASED THAT INSTABILITIES IN THE NON-SAFETY SYSTEMS WILL PROPAGATE AND HAVE AN INFLUENCE ON SAFETY RELATED COMPONENTS. OTHER POSSIBLE EFFECTS THAT THE CHANGES IN THE DCP COULD HAVE ON ANY SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT FAILURE ARE ENVELOPED BY THE ANALYSES IN FSAR SECTIONS 15.1.1, 15.2.7 AND 15.2.3. THE POSSIBILITY OF INCREASED WATER VOLUMES IN THE HEATER SHELLS HAS BEEN REVIEWED AND FOUND ACCEPTABLE BY THE TURBINE MANUFACTURER THE STORED-ENERGY LEVELS ARE WITHIN THE LIMITS FOR OPERATION WITH THE EXISTING CONFIGURATION OF EXTRACTION LINE NON-RETURN VALVES. THIS ENSURES THAT TURBINE OVERSPEED DUE TO REVERSE FLOW IN THE EXTRACTION LINES DOES NOT OCCUR ON LOAD REJECTION OR TURBINE TRIP.; THUS, THE TURBINE MISSILE ANALYSIS AS DESCRIBED IN FSAR SECTION 3.5.1.3 REMAINS VALID. THE EQUIPMENT DESCRIBED IS NOT ADDRESSED IN THE BASIS FOR ANY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION. BASED ON A REVIEW OF THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS BASES THERE ARE NO REDUCTIONS IN THE MARGIN OF SAFETY IN THE BASIS FOR ANY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION.

SUBJECT: DCP: 90-V2N0147, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THIS DCP INSTALLS A MORE RELIABLE HOST FOR OPENING AND CLOSING THE CONTAINMENT EQUIPMENT HATCH. THIS CONSIST OF A 20-TON ELECTRIC HOIST WHICH HAS A DRIVE CAPABLE OF BEING OPERATED BY AIR-OPERATED POWER WRENCH IF NECESSARY UPON LOSS OF POWER TO THE ELECTRIC MOTOR.. MPL TAG #22101R4017

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE HOIST WILL ONLY BE OPERATED IN MODES 5 AND 6. FAILURE OF THE HOIST MAY CREATE THE POSSIBILITY OF THE EQUIPMENT HATCH FALLING ON THE STRUCTURAL STEEL BEAMS AND CHECKER PLATE LOCATED DIRECTLY BELOW. ALSO THE HOIST AND THE ASSOCIATED STRUCTURAL STEEL COULD BE ACCIDENTALLY DROPPED ON THE STRUCTURAL STEEL BEAMS AND CHECKER PLATE LOCATED DIRECTLY BELOW DURING THE REPLACEMENT OF THE HOIST. THE POSSIBILITY OF THESE TWO DROPS IS NOT SPECIFICALLY DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR; HOWEVER BASED ON A REVIEW OF FSAR SECTION 9.1.5.3.1.1, EITHER OF THESE ACCIDENTS WILL NOT CAUSE DAMAGE TO ANY SAFETY-RELATED EQUIPMENT REQUIRED DURING MODES 5 AND 6, AND WILL NOT PRECLUDE DECAY HEAT REMOVAL OR THE ABILITY TO MAINTAIN COLD SHUTDOWN CONDITIONS. ALSO THE CONSEQUENCES OF THESE ACCIDENTS ARE THE SAME OR LESS THAN THE PREVIOUS HOIST SYSTEM. THEREFORE, THE MODIFICATIONS DID NOT CREATE THE POSSIBILITY OF AN ACCIDENT OR EQUIPMENT MALFUNCTION NOT IMPLIED OR ANALYZED IN THE FSAR.

SUBJECT: DCP: 90-V2N0163, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1 & 2

DESCRIPTION: THIS DCP ADDED ADDITIONAL VALVES AND PIPING TO FACILITATE FASTER PREPARATION AND COMPLETION OF LOCAL LLRTS FOR THE FOLLOWING ASSOCIATED PENETRATIONS: PEN. 11A, 12A, 34, 49, 50, 63, 69A, 69B AND PEN. 78

SAFETY EVALUATION: THIS DCP DOES NOT AFFECT ANY FSAR ACCIDENT ANALYSIS NOR CREATE A CONDITION WHICH HAS NOT BEEN ANALYZED, NOR REDUCE THE MARGIN OF SAFETY ; THEREFORE THIS DCP DOES NOT RESULT IN AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION. THE NEW VALVES ADDED ARE LOCKED OPEN DURING NORMAL OPERATION.

SUBJECT: DCP: 90-VAN0108, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 2

DESCRIPTION: THIS DCP PROVIDED THE LEVEL SETPOINT AND SETPOINT DRAWINGS FOR THE MICRO FILTRATION SYSTEM. THIS DESIGN INFORMATION WAS DEVELOPED DURING THE MANUFACTURER (ABB IMPELL) AND ON SITE GPC PERSONNEL IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF SPECIFICATION X4AZ01. ALL DESIGN INFORMATION NECESSARY TO PERFORM INITIAL INSTALLATION OF THE SYSTEM WAS PROVIDED BY DCP 90-VAN0108-0-1. THE EQUIPMENT ADDRESSED BY THIS DCP IS PROJECT CLASS 427 AND NON-SAFETY RELATED.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THIS DESIGN CHANGE PROVIDES THE BALANCE OF INSTRUMENT SETPOINTS AND TANK LEVEL SET DESIGN DOCUMENTATION FOR THE RADWASTE MICRO FILTRATION SYSTEM AND ITS ASSOCIATED SYSTEM INTERFACES WITH THE DEMINERALIZER WATER SYSTEM (1418), LIQUID WASTE PROCESSING SYSTEM (1901), SERVICE AIR SYSTEM (2401), INSTRUMENT AIR SYSTEM (2420), AND AUX BUILDING FILTER EXHAUST AND CONTINUOUS EXHAUST SYSTEM (1553).

SUBJECT: DCP: 90-VCN0070, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THIS DCP MODIFIED THE PLANT MAKEUP WELL WATER SYSTEM (SYSTEM 1408). ALL MODIFICATIONS ARE TO NON-SAFETY RELATED, PROJECT CLASS 626 AND 62J EQUIPMENT/INSTRUMENTATION WITH THE EXCEPTION OF PANEL (1-1604-Q5-PCP) WHERE THE NEW INDICATOR (CLI-17426A) AND SWITCH (CLS-17426) WAS MOUNTED IS PROJECT

CLASS 11J. THE SECTION OF PANEL WHERE THESE INSTRUMENTS ARE BEING INSTALLED CONTAINS BOTH 61J AND 62J DEVICES. THE DEVICES BEING ADDED, CLI-17426A AND CLS-17426, ARE NONSAFETY-RELATED, SEISMIC CATEGORY 2, AND ARE MOUNTED AND PROTECTED BY BARRIERS TO PRECLUDE DAMAGE TO EQUIPMENT IN OTHER PANEL SECTIONS DURING A SEISMIC EVENT. CLI-17426A PROVIDES MAKE-UP WELL WATER STORAGE TANK LEVEL IN THE MAIN CONTROL ROOM TO PROVIDE MORE INFORMATION TO THE CONTROL ROOM OPERATORS ABOUT SYSTEM INVENTORY PROBLEMS IF THEY ARISE.

SAFETY EVALUATION: ALL PHYSICAL CHANGES WERE TO PIPING, CIRCUITRY, INSTRUMENTATION AND ANNUNCIATION IN THE PLANT MAKEUP WATER WELL SYSTEM. THE DEVICES ADDED , CLI-17426A AND CLS-17426, ARE NONSAFETY-RELATED, SEISMIC CATEGORY 2, AND ARE MOUNTED AND PROTECTED BY BARRIERS TO PRECLUDE DAMAGE TO EQUIPMENT IN OTHER PANEL SECTIONS DURING A SEISMIC EVENT. THE IMPACT TO THE FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM, THE POTABLE WATER SYSTEM, AND THE NSCW SYSTEM WAS CONSIDERED. OF THESE SYSTEMS, ONLY THE NSCW SYSTEM IS SAFETY-RELATED. WHILE THE NSCW'S PRIMARY SOURCE OF MAKEUP TO ITS BASIN WATER IS THE PLANT MAKEUP WELL WATER, THIS IS NOT ITS ONLY SOURCE OF WATER AND MAKEUP IS NOT REQUIRED FOR THE NSCW BASINS IN THE EVENT OF AN ACCIDENT FOR A MINIMUM OF 24 DAYS. THIS IS SUFFICIENT TIME FOR ALTERNATIVE SOURCES OF WATER TO BE MADE AVAILABLE IF THE MWWST IS INOPERABLE. THE FAILURE OF THE MWWST WILL NOT HAVE AN ADVERSE EFFECT ON A SAFETY RELATED SYSTEM. THE PIPING IS NOT LOCATED IN A SEISMIC 1, OR 2 OVER 1 AREA. THE TANK AND PIPING SIZE DID NOT CHANGE. THEREFORE, THE POTENTIAL FLOOD SOURCE WAS NOT CHANGED. THESE MODIFICATIONS CONFORM TO THE APPLICABLE DESIGN CRITERIA FOR THE MWWST AND ANNUNCIATOR SYSTEM. THE APPLICABLE DESIGN CRITERIA WAS MET, AND THE MATERIALS UTILIZED ARE COMPATIBLE FOR THEIR INTENDED SERVICE. THE SYSTEM FUNCTION WAS NOT AFFECTED AND THESE CHANGES SHOULD INCREASE THE RELIABILITY OF THE SYSTEM AND QUALITY OF THE WATER PROVIDED. THIS WAS BASED ON A REVIEW OF THE FSAR INCLUDING SECTIONS 9.2.4, 9.2.3, 9.3.2, 9.5.1, 7.0, 2.4.11, 10.3.5, 13.5, 1-1, 9.A, 1.2.10-8, 2.4.12 AND 15. A FAILURE OF THE MWWST WILL NOT DECREASE TECH SPEC SAFETY MARGINS DEFINED BY THE BASIS OF THE TECH SPECS. THIS IS BASED ON A REVIEW OF TECH SPEC BASIS, INCLUDING SECTION B3/4.7.

SUBJECT: DCP: 90-VCN0127, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THIS DCP INVOLVED REPLACEMENT OF THE FUEL HANDLING MACHINE SOLID STATE CONTROLLER AND ITS ASSOCIATED COMPONENTS WITH A PROGRAMMABLE LOGIC CONTROLLER (PLC) AND ITS ASSOCIATED COMPONENTS. THE ONLY DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE CONTROLLERS IS THAT THE SOLID STATE CONTROL WHICH IS ANALOG IS NOW CONTROLLED DIGITALLY THROUGH A PLC. ALSO INCLUDED IN THIS CHANGE WERE THE REPLACEMENT AND ADDITION OF CONTROL RELAYS ASSOCIATED WITH THE NEW CONTROLLER PHILOSOPHY. THE ORIGINAL SOLID STATE CONTROLLER WAS PROVEN TO BE INOPERABLE AND UNRELIABLE DURING UNIT REFUELING OUTAGES. THE PLC IMPROVED SYSTEM OPERABILITY, RELIABILITY, AND MAINTAINABILITY.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE FUEL HANDLING MACHINE IS A SEISMIC CATEGORY 1 SYSTEM AS DISCUSSED IN DESIGN CRITERIA DC-1010, REV. 5 AND FSAR SECTION 9.1.4.3. DESIGN IMPLEMENTATION WAS PERFORMED DURING OUTAGE ACTIVITIES AND DID NOT AFFECT ANY SAFETY-RELATED SYSTEMS OR COMPONENTS POSTULATED IN FSAR ACCIDENT ANALYSES, OR SYSTEMS OR COMPONENTS REQUIRED TO MITIGATE SUCH ACCIDENTS. ALL INTERLOCKS, PER SECL 90-348, THAT EXISTED IN THE PREVIOUS

DESIGN ARE ALSO PROVIDED IN THE PLC DESIGN. THE NEW CIRCUIT DESIGN WATCHES PLC OPERATION AND SHUTS DOWN THE SYSTEM FOR ABNORMAL CONDITIONS. SHOULD LOSS OF POWER OCCUR, THE SYSTEM INHIBITS CONTINUED OPERATION. THE PLC IMPROVES THE RELIABILITY AND OPERABILITY OF THE FUEL HANDLING MACHINE WITHOUT AFFECTING ITS LOAD CAPACITY AS DEFINED IN THE FSAR. ANY LOAD HANDLING REQUIRED DURING IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS CHANGE WAS PERFORMED IN ACCORDANCE WITH APPROVED ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES TO REDUCE THE POTENTIAL FOR A LOAD DROP. THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED BY THE BASES OF THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS IS NOT DECREASED.

SUBJECT: DCP: 90-VCN0152, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: REVISE FENCE OUTRIGGERS AND BARBED WIRE. THIS DCP CONTAINS SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THIS DCP CONTAINS SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION. IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS DCP DOES NOT INCREASE THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT OR THE PROBABILITY OF AN ACCIDENT. IT DOES NOT EFFECT EQUIPMENT, SYSTEM, OR COMPONENTS REQUIRED TO MITIGATE THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT AS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR. THE MARGIN OF SAFETY HAS NOT BEEN DECREASED AS DESCRIBED IN THE BASIS FOR ANY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION.

SUBJECT: DCP: 90-VCN0169, REVISION 1, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THIS DESIGN CHANGE PACKAGE PROVIDED THE DESIGN FOR THE INSTALLATION OF LIVE-LOAD PACKING ON THE FOLLOWING UNIT 2 VALVES: 2PDV-6173A, 2PDV-6174A, 2HV-6015, 2HV-6179, 2HV-7603A, 2HV-7603C, 2FV-0510, 2FV-0530, 2LV-5242, 2LV-5244, 2UV-4112, 2UV-4114, 2UV-4122, 2UV-4132, 2UV-4134, 2TV-0500B, 2TV-0500D, 2TV-0500F, 2TV-0500H, 2PV-0507A, 2PV-0507C, 2LV-4285, 2HV-4303, 2PDV-6126E, 2PDV-6127B, 2PDV-6173B, 2PDV-6174B, 2HV-6030, 2HV-6181, 2HV-7603B, 2HV-7603D, 2FV-0520, 2FV-0540, 2LV-5243, 2LV-5245, 2UV-4113, 2UV-4115, 2UV-4123, 2UV-4133, 2TV-0500A, 2TV-0500C, 2TV-0500E, 2TV-0500G, 2TV-0500J, 2PV-0507B, 2LV-4284, 2HV-4302, 2PDV-6126A, AND 2PDV-6127A. THE ASME SECTION III CLASS 2 AND 3 VALVES INVOLVE THE STEAM GENERATOR BLOWDOWN, AND FEED WATER AND CONDENSATE SYSTEMS, RESPECTIVELY. THE 424 VALVES INVOLVE THE MAIN STEAM, EXTRACTION STEAM, AND FEED WATER HEATER DRAIN SYSTEMS. VALVE NUMBERS 2HV-7603A, B, C, AND D ARE THE ONLY ACTIVE VALVES. THE PREVIOUS PACKING WAS REMOVED AND REPLACED WITH GRAPHITE PACKING RINGS. THE PREVIOUS GLAND STUDS WERE ALSO REPLACED. SPRINGS (BELLEVILLE WASHERS) WERE INSTALLED BETWEEN THE STUD NUT AND THE GLAND FOLLOWER. THE SPRINGS MAINTAIN A CONSTANT LOAD ON THE PACKING WHICH ASSIST IN PREVENTING THE VALVE FROM LEAKING. PER ASME SECTION XI (1983 EDITION THROUGH SUMMER 1983 ADDENDA), SUBSECTION IWA, ARTICLE 7000, SUBARTICLE 7400, THE VALVE PACKING IS EXEMPT FROM THE ASME CODE REQUIREMENTS. HOWEVER, THE LIVE-LOAD PACKING COMPONENTS HAVE THE SAME PROJECT CLASS AS THE VALVES.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE OPERABILITY OF THE VALVES IS NOT AFFECTED BY THE LIVE-LOAD PACKING. THIS WAS VERIFIED BY TEST PERFORMED ON A SAMPLE VALVE WITH LIVE-LOAD PACKING. THE TEST SHOWED THAT THE LIVE-LOAD PACKING WILL NOT CAUSE THE VALVE TO BIND. THE PACKING DOES NOT ADD ANY COMPONENT THAT WILL HAVE AN EFFECT ON THE OPERABILITY OF THE VALVE OR HAVE ANY EFFECT ON THE VALVE ITSELF THAT WOULD AFFECT THE VALVE OPERATION WHILE THE VALVE IS SUBJECTED TO A DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE. ALSO, THE VALVE PACKING AND

COMPONENTS PROCURED FOR THE LIVE-LOAD PACKING WERE QUALIFIED FOR THE APPLICABLE TEMPERATURES THAT THE VALVE IS EXPOSED TO AND THE LIVE-LOAD PACKING DOES NOT AFFECT THE RELIABILITY OF THE VALVE TO PERFORM ITS FUNCTION. THE CAPABILITY TO PERFORM VISUAL EXAMINATION OF THE VALVE PACKING FOR LEAKAGE IS ALSO NOT AFFECTED. THE ADDITION OF THE LIVE-LOAD PACKING DID NOT INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE OR CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR. THIS EVALUATION INCLUDED A REVIEW OF FSAR CHAPTERS 3, 5, 6, 9, 10, AND 15. THE LIVE-LOAD PACKING REDUCED THE POTENTIAL FOR VALVE STEM LEAKAGE. THE MARGIN OF SAFETY DEFINED BY THE BASES OF THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS IS NOT DECREASED. THIS EVALUATION INCLUDED A REVIEW OF THE BASES TO TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION SECTIONS 3/4.3, 3/4.6, AND 3/4.7.

SUBJECT: DCP: 90-VCN0176, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THIS DCP MODIFIED THE SECURITY COMPUTER PROGRAMMERS CONSOLES. THIS DCP CONTAINS SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THIS DCP CONTAINS SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION. IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS DCP DOES NOT INCREASE THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT OR THE PROBABILITY OF AN ACCIDENT. IT DOES NOT EFFECT EQUIPMENT, SYSTEM, OR COMPONENTS REQUIRED TO MITIGATE THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT AS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR. THE MARGIN OF SAFETY HAS NOT BEEN DECREASED AS DESCRIBED IN THE BASIS FOR ANY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION.

SUBJECT: DCP: 90-VCN0178, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THIS DCP ADDED 3/8" TUBING FOR TESTING THE CONTROL ROOM DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE TO ITS ADJACENT ROOMS TO ENSURE ACCURATE VERIFICATION OF THE CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY FILTRATION SYSTEMS ABILITY TO MAINTAIN POSITIVE PRESSURE IN THE CONTROL ROOM. THIS IS TO SATISFY THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REQUIREMENT 4.7.6.E.3 THAT STIPULATES THAT THE DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE BETWEEN THE CONTROL ROOM AND ITS ADJACENT ROOM BE VERIFIED. PROCEDURE 54054-1 AND -2 ARE USED TO ACCOMPLISH THIS TASK.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE TESTING PORTS REMAIN CAPPED WHEN NOT IN USE. THE PERMANENT TESTING PORT PENETRATIONS HAVE NO EFFECT ON THE CONTROL ROOM FILTRATION UNITS TO PERFORM THERE SAFETY RELATED FUNCTION. ALL TUBING PENETRATIONS THAT WERE BREACHED FOR TUBING INSTALLATION WERE RESEALED WITH THE REQUIRED MATERIAL PER SPECIFICATION AX1AG11. THIS DCP DOES NOT DECREASE THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED BY THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES IN SECTION 3/4.7.6.

SUBJECT: DCP: 91-V1N0009, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1 & 2

DESCRIPTION: THIS DCP REMOVED THE UNIT 1 RTD BYPASS SYSTEM AND REPLACED IT WITH FAST ACTING, NARROW RANGE, DUAL-ELEMENT THERMOWELL-MOUNTED RTDS INSTALLED DIRECTLY INTO THE EXISTING REACTOR COOLANT PIPING PENETRATIONS (THREE MOUNTED IN THE OLD HOT LEG SCOOP PENETRATION AND ONE MOUNTED IN THE OLD COLD LEG NOZZLE PENETRATION WITH THE CROSSOVER LINE HO1 E BEING CAPPED OFF.

SAFETY EVALUATION: REACTOR COOLANT PRESSURE BOUNDARY INTEGRITY IS MAINTAINED. REACTOR COOLANT LOOP TEMPERATURE INPUTS FOR CONTROL AND PROTECTION FUNCTIONS WILL CONTINUE TO BE SUPPLIED. ALSO OTHER EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY IS UNAFFECTED AND WILL CONTINUE TO FUNCTION AS DESIGNED. THE ARRANGEMENT OF THE RTD MEASUREMENT SYSTEM DOES NOT AFFECT THE FUNCTION OF EQUIPMENT USED IN THE MITIGATION OF THE RADIOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES OF ANY ACCIDENT. THEREFORE, THIS CHANGE DOES NOT CREATE THE POSSIBILITY OF A MALFUNCTION OF EQUIPMENT OR AN UNREVIEWED ACCIDENT NOT DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR.

SUBJECT: DCP: 91-V1N0019, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: TO PREVENT EXTRACTION STEAM FLOW FROM REVERSING AND CAUSING TURBINE OVER SPEED AFTER A TURBINE TRIP, A SPRING-ASSISTED NON RETURN VALVE IS LOCATED IN EACH EXTRACTION STEAM LINE TO THE NUMBERS 3, 4, 5, AND 6 HEATERS. DURING NORMAL OPERATION, AIR PRESSURE COUNTERACTS THE SPRING FORCE, PREVENTING THE SPRING FROM CLOSING THE NON RETURN VALVE. ON A TURBINE TRIP, LOSS OF THE EMERGENCY TRIP SYSTEM (ETS) HYDRAULIC FLUID PRESSURE ACTUATES THE AIR RELAY DUMP VALVES (ARDV). THE ARDVS VENT THE CONTROL AIR FROM THE NON RETURN VALVE ACTUATORS, WHICH ALLOWS THE SPRINGS TO ASSIST IN CLOSING THE VALVES. FOR OVER SPEED PROTECTION, THE EXTRACTION NON RETURN VALVES MUST CLOSE WITHIN TWO SECONDS. PRESSURE SWITCH PSL-7070 SENSES THE LOSS OF CONTROL AIR PRESSURE IN LINE 1-2420-832-1" AND ACTUATES SOLENOID VALVES WHICH ALSO VENT THE AIR FROM THE NON RETURN VALVE ACTUATORS. PSL-7070 ALSO INITIATES THE CLOSING OF THE EXTRACTION STEAM ISOLATION VALVES AND THE OPENING OF VARIOUS DRAIN VALVES. A PIPE SUPPORT WAS ALSO BE ADDED TO LINE 1-2420-881-1" TO RESTRAIN HORIZONTAL MOVEMENT. THIS DCP REPLACED PRESSURE SWITCH PSL-7070, WHICH WAS LOCATED IN THE TURBINE FRONT STANDARD, WITH THREE PRESSURE SWITCHES WHICH ARE LOCATED ON INSTRUMENT RACK 21, 1-1624-P5-R21. THE SET POINTS FOR THE NEW SWITCHES, PSL-7070A, B, AND C, REMAINED AT 15 PSIG, WHICH IS THE SET POINT FOR PSL-7070. BECAUSE THERE WAS NOT ENOUGH ROOM FOR THREE PRESSURE SWITCHES IN THE CURRENT LOCATION OF PSL-7070, THE PRESSURE TAP FOR THE NEW SWITCHES WAS ADDED TO LINE 1-2420-881-1", WHICH IS PART OF THE SAME AIR SYSTEM BUT IS FURTHER FROM THE ARDVS. THE PREVIOUS PRESSURE TAP FOR PSL-7070 WAS CAPPED. STAINLESS STEEL TUBING WAS INSTALLED FROM THE NEW PRESSURE TAP TO THE INSTRUMENT RACK. THE PREVIOUS DESIGN USED A SINGLE PRESSURE SWITCH, PSL-7070, AND ONE-OF-ONE LOGIC TO GENERATE THE VALVE ACTUATION SIGNALS. A MALFUNCTION OF THE PRESSURE SWITCH WOULD CAUSE EITHER A TURBINE TRIP DUE TO IMPROPER ACTUATION OF THE EXTRACTION STEAM ISOLATION VALVES OR THE LACK OF ACTUATION OF THE NON RETURN VALVE SOLENOIDS, THE EXTRACTION ISOLATION VALVES AND VARIOUS DRAIN VALVES. BY CHANGING THE TRIP LOGIC TO TWO-OF-THREE LOGIC, THE PROBABILITY OF IMPROPER ACTUATION OR LACK OF ACTUATION OF THE AFFECTED VALVES DUE TO PRESSURE SWITCH MALFUNCTION IS REDUCED.

SAFETY EVALUATION: NONE OF THE COMPONENTS ADDED OR MODIFIED BY THIS DCP ARE SAFETY RELATED. THE ADDITION OF THE PRESSURE TAP AND INSTRUMENT AIR LINE HAD A NEGLIGIBLE EFFECT ON THE CLOSING TIMES FOR THE EXTRACTION STEAM NON RETURN VALVES. THE VALVES STILL CLOSE WITHIN TWO SECONDS OF ACTUATION OF THE ARDVS. THEREFORE THERE IS NO EFFECT ON THE TURBINE OVER SPEED PROTECTION PROVIDED BY THE NON RETURN VALVES. CHANGING THE ONE-OF-ONE LOGIC, WHICH CURRENTLY GENERATES VALVE ACTUATION SIGNALS, TO A TWO-OF-THREE LOGIC WILL PROVIDE FOR MORE RELIABLE OPERATION OF THE TURBINE

EXTRACTION STEAM SYSTEM. THE POSSIBILITY OF A TURBINE TRIP DUE TO MALFUNCTION OF THE EXTRACTION ISOLATION VALVES WAS REDUCED. THE REACTOR TRIP CIRCUITRY AND REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEMS ARE NOT ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY THIS DCP. THE MARGINS OF SAFETY AS DESCRIBED IN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS DO NOT REFER TO THE TURBINE EXTRACTION STEAM SYSTEM. THE EXTRACTION STEAM SYSTEM IS MORE RELIABLE DUE TO THE CHANGE IN VALVE ACTUATION LOGIC. SINCE THE RESULTS OF A TURBINE TRIP OR TURBINE OVER SPEED EVENT ARE NOT CHANGED BY THIS DCP, THE MARGINS OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN THE BASIS FOR THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS WAS NOT REDUCED.

SUBJECT: DCP: 91-V1N0021, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THIS DCP REPLACED THE PREVIOUS STEAM CONDENSATE DRAIN POT LEVEL MEASURING INSTRUMENTATION WITH AN ELECTRONIC SYSTEM WHICH MEASURES LEVEL BY THE CONDUCTIVITY DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE STEAM AND WATER INTERFACE TO CONTROL THE OPENING AND CLOSING OF THE CONDENSATE DRAIN VALVES ON THE SECONDARY SYSTEM.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THIS DCP DOES NOT CHANGE THE WAY THE AFFECTED LEVEL SWITCHES AND THERE DRAINAGE SYSTEM COMPONENTS OPERATE OR ANY OF THERE FUNCTIONS. IT IS AN ENHANCEMENT WHICH IMPROVES RELIABILITY AND PERFORMANCE. IT DOES NOT AFFECT ANY EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY EXCEPT FOR 1-LSH-5178. 1-LSH-5178 AND ITS ASSOCIATED PIPING AND SUPPORT MODIFICATIONS MEET THE REQUIRED SEISMIC CRITERIA. ALL APPROPRIATE DESIGN CRITERIA HAVE BEEN MET BY THIS DESIGN CHANGE.

SUBJECT: DCP 91-V1N0070, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THIS DCP WILL ELIMINATE THE REDUNDANT AND UNNECESSARY MAIN TURBINE TRIP PROVIDED VIA THE 386M LOCKOUT RELAY. THIS CHANGE WILL BE MADE BY REMOVING CIRCUITS FROM THE NON-SAFETY RELATED PROTECTIVE RELAY PANEL LOCATED IN THE CONTROL ROOM.

SAFETY EVALUATION: REMOVING THE REDUNDANT TURBINE TRIP SIGNAL PROVIDED VIA THE 386M LOCKOUT RELAY WILL NOT AFFECT THE INTENDED FUNCTION OR DECREASE RELIABILITY OF THE TURBINE PROTECTION SYSTEM. THE 386M TURBINE TRIP CONTACTS DO NOT TRIP THE TURBINE SINCE THE TURBINE MUST ALREADY HAVE A TRIP SIGNAL IN ORDER TO ACTUATE THE 386M RELAY. THE CONTACTS ARE NOT NEEDED TO LOCK OUT THE TURBINE AFTER IT TRIPS SINCE THE TURBINE EMERGENCY TRIP SYSTEM CONTAINS LOCK-UP CIRCUITS AND A TRIP LATCH ROD WHICH MUST BE MANUALLY RESET. NEITHER THE TURBINE OVERSPEED PROTECTION SYSTEM NOT THE TURBINE TRIP LOGIC IS AFFECTED BY THIS CHANGE. THE SUBSEQUENT GENERATOR FIELD TRIP AND BUS TRANSFER INITIATED BY THE 386M RELAY OCCURS AFTER A TURBINE TRIP AND IS NOT AFFECTED. THE REACTOR COOLANT PUMP AND GENERATOR FIELD TRIP 30 SECOND DELAY FOLLOWING A TURBINE TRIP WITH NO ELECTRICAL FAULTS IS NOT AFFECTED. THE ANNUNCIATOR RESPONSE PROCEDURE WILL REQUIRE REVISION TO REFLECT THIS CHANGE. FSAR SECTIONS 1.9.22, 7.1, 7.2, 7.3, 7.7, 10.1, 10.2, 13.5, 15.2, 15.3.1 WERE REVIEWED AND ARE NOT AFFECTED BY THIS CHANGE OTHER THAN FOR EDITORIAL CORRECTIONS TO TWO DRAWINGS.

SUBJECT: DCP: 91-V1N0071, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THIS DCP INSTALLS A MORE RELIABLE HOIST FOR OPENING AND CLOSING THE CONTAINMENT EQUIPMENT HATCH. THIS CONSIST OF A 20-TON ELECTRIC HOIST WHICH HAS A DRIVE CAPABLE OF BEING OPERATED BY AIR-OPERATED POWER WRENCH IF NECESSARY UPON LOSS OF POWER TO THE ELECTRIC MOTOR. MPL TAG # 12101R4017

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE HOIST WILL ONLY BE OPERATED IN MODES 5 AND 6. FAILURE OF THE HOIST MAY CREATE THE POSSIBILITY OF THE EQUIPMENT HATCH FALLING ON THE STRUCTURAL STEEL BEAMS AND CHECKER PLATE LOCATED DIRECTLY BELOW. ALSO THE HOIST AND THE ASSOCIATED STRUCTURAL STEEL COULD BE ACCIDENTALLY DROPPED ON THE STRUCTURAL STEEL BEAMS AND CHECKER PLATE LOCATED DIRECTLY BELOW DURING THE REPLACEMENT OF THE HOIST. THE POSSIBILITY OF THESE TWO DROPS IS NOT SPECIFICALLY DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR; HOWEVER BASED ON A REVIEW OF FSAR SECTION 9.1.5.3.1.1, EITHER OF THESE ACCIDENTS WILL NOT CAUSE DAMAGE TO ANY SAFETY-RELATED EQUIPMENT REQUIRED DURING MODES 5 AND 6, AND WILL NOT PRECLUDE DECAY HEAT REMOVAL OR THE ABILITY TO MAINTAIN COLD SHUTDOWN CONDITIONS. ALSO THE CONSEQUENCES OF THESE ACCIDENTS ARE THE SAME OR LESS THAN THE PREVIOUS HOIST SYSTEM. THEREFORE, THE MODIFICATIONS DID NOT CREATE THE POSSIBILITY OF AN ACCIDENT OR EQUIPMENT MALFUNCTION NOT IMPLIED OR ANALYZED IN THE FSAR.

SUBJECT: DCP: 91-V1N0073, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THE PREVIOUS SECONDARY PLANT DISSOLVED OXYGEN ANALYZERS CONSISTING OF SAMPLE CABINETS AE-9521, AE-9528, AND AE-20187, AITS-9521, AITS-9528, AITS-20187 ARE NO LONGER MANUFACTURED OR SUPPORTED BY THE VENDOR, HAYS INSTRUMENT CO. THIS DCP REPLACED THE THREE PREVIOUS INDIVIDUAL HAYS OXYGEN ANALYZER ASSEMBLIES WITH A STATE OF THE ART MULTICHANNEL DISSOLVED OXYGEN ANALYZER MANUFACTURED BY ORBISPHERE LABORATORIES (MODEL 2620-5). THE NEW UNIT IS CONFIGURED WITH THREE CHANNELS, WITH THE CAPABILITY TO BE EXPANDED TO FIVE CHANNELS.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THIS DESIGN CHANGE IS CONSIDERED EQUIVALENT TO THE PREVIOUS ACCEPTABLE CONDITIONS AND REPRESENTS NO POSSIBLE ADVERSE EFFECTS WHICH COULD INCREASE THE RADIOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES OF ANY ACCIDENT EVALUATED IN THE FSAR.

SUBJECT: DCP: 91-V1N0078, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1 & 2

DESCRIPTION: THIS DCP ADDED ADDITIONAL VALVES AND PIPING TO FACILITATE FASTER PREPARATION AND COMPLETION OF LOCAL LLRTS FOR THE FOLLOWING ASSOCIATED PENETRATIONS: PEN. 34, 49, 50, AND PEN. 78

SAFETY EVALUATION: THIS DCP DOES NOT AFFECT ANY FSAR ACCIDENT ANALYSIS NOR CREATE A CONDITION WHICH HAS NOT BEEN ANALYZED, NOR REDUCE THE MARGIN OF SAFETY ; THEREFORE THIS DCP DOES NOT RESULT IN AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION. THE NEW VALVES ADDED IS LOCKED OPEN DURING NORMAL OPERATION.

SUBJECT: DCP: 91-V1N0086, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: A 2" SERVICE AIR LINE, 1-2401-L4-633, AND ISOLATION VALVE, 1-2401-U4-682, WAS ADDED TO EXISTING SERVICE AIR HEADER, 1-2401-521-4", LOCATED IN THE SOUTH MAIN STEAM TUNNEL, 2T1. THIS ADDITIONAL LINE PROVIDES A COMPRESSED AIR SUPPLY FOR SLUDGE LANCING OF THE STEAM GENERATORS DURING REFUELING OUTAGES. THE SERVICE AIR LINE, PIPING CLASS LLO, WAS ROUTED TO AN AREA ABOVE THE STEAM TUNNEL GRATING WHERE AN ISOLATION VALVE AND THREADED END CAP CAN BE EASILY ACCESSED FOR CONNECTION TO THE SLUDGE LANCING EQUIPMENT. THREE PIPE SUPPORTS WERE ADDED FOR THE 2" SERVICE AIR LINE TO MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF SUPPORTING PROJECT CLASS 626 PIPE.

SAFETY EVALUATION: INSTALLING AN ADDITIONAL SERVICE AIR CONNECTION ON AN EXISTING HEADER DID NOT IMPACT THE OPERATION OR THE RELIABILITY OF THE COMPRESSED AIR SYSTEM. THE MODIFICATION MEETS ALL ORIGINAL DESIGN CRITERIA. USE OF THE AIR CONNECTION IS INTENDED TO BE DURING REFUELING OUTAGES. THE ADDITIONAL DEMAND ON THE SERVICE AIR PORTION OF THE COMPRESSED AIR SYSTEM WILL NOT AFFECT PLANT INSTRUMENT AIR. THE COMPRESSED AIR SYSTEM HAS ADEQUATE CAPACITY TO SUPPLY BOTH INSTRUMENT AIR TO INSTRUMENTS AND VALVE OPERATORS THROUGHOUT THE UNIT AND SERVICE AIR FOR SLUDGE LANCING. IN ORDER TO PROVIDE FOR THE CONSERVATION OF COMPRESSED AIR IN THE EVENT OF EXCESSIVE SERVICE AIR DEMAND, THE HEADER TO THE SERVICE AIR DRYERS IS AUTOMATICALLY ISOLATED WHEN A PRESSURE SWITCH SENSES SERVICE AIR PRESSURE DECREASE TO APPROXIMATELY 80 PSIG. THE PORTION OF THE LINE THAT IS ABOVE THE GRATING IS LOCATED APPROXIMATELY 3'-6" FROM THE AUXILIARY BUILDING AND IS NOT IN DANGER OF BEING DAMAGED BY VEHICLES OR EQUIPMENT IN THE AREA. THE COMPRESSED AIR SYSTEM IS NOT REQUIRED TO MITIGATE THE CONSEQUENCES OF ANY ACCIDENTS. NO EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY RELIES ON COMPRESSED AIR IN ORDER TO PERFORM ITS SAFETY FUNCTION. SUPPLYING SERVICE AIR TO THE SLUDGE LANCING TRAILER DURING OUTAGES HAS NO EFFECT ON PLANT EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY BECAUSE THE COMPRESSED AIR SYSTEM IS SIZED ADEQUATELY TO SUPPLY INSTRUMENT AIR AND SERVICE AIR THROUGHOUT THE PLANT FOR VARIOUS USES, INCLUDING SLUDGE LANCING. NEITHER THE CONFIGURATION NOR THE OPERATION OF THE SERVICE AIR SYSTEM ARE COVERED IN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS.

SUBJECT: DCP: 91-V1N0088, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THIS DCP DELETED THE NEGATIVE FLUX RATE REACTOR TRIP (NFRT) THUS IMPROVING THE PLANTS RELIABILITY AND AVAILABILITY BY ELIMINATING INADVERTENT REACTOR TRIPS CAUSED BY HIGH NEGATIVE FLUX RATES.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THIS DCP DOES CREATE A CHANGE TO THE PLANT AS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR PER SECTIONS 7.2, 15.0, 15.4, AND 16.3 AND TABLES 7.2.1-1, 7.2.1-3, 7.2.2-1, 15.0.1-10, 15.0.6-1, 15.0.8-1, AND 16.3-1 WHICH HAVE BEEN CHANGED ACCORDINGLY. THE EVALUATION FOR THE EFFECTS OF ELIMINATING THE NFRT FUNCTION ON THE LOCA AND THE NON-LOCA TRANSIENTS HAS TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT THE APPLICABLE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS AND HAS BOUNDED THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH THE SPECIFICATIONS PERMIT SAFE OPERATION. THESE EVALUATIONS DETERMINED THAT THE APPLICABLE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION DNB DESIGN BASES WITH THE NFRT REMOVAL WERE MAINTAINED WITHIN THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN TECH. SPECS.

SUBJECT: DCP: 91-VIN0093, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: AS PART OF THE PIPE SNUBBER REDUCTION PROGRAM, THIS DCP DELETED/CHANGED/ADDED CERTAIN PIPE SUPPORTS WITHIN THE AUXILIARY COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM INSIDE THE UNIT 1 CONTAINMENT BUILDING. THERE ARE NO CHANGES TO THE SYSTEM PIPING OR COMPONENTS OTHER THAN TO THE SPECIFIED PIPE SUPPORTS. TWO WELDED LUGS ARE BEING ADDED TO THE PIPE FOR SUPPORT NO. V1-1217-073-H616. TECH. SPEC. 3/4 7.8 REQUIRES THAT ALL APPLICABLE SNUBBERS BE VISUALLY INSPECTED AT LEAST ONCE EVERY 18 MONTHS. A HIGH FAILURE RATE COULD REQUIRE A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF SNUBBERS TO BE TESTED, WHICH COULD POTENTIALLY EXTEND THE REFUELING OUTAGE. PIPING SYSTEM RE-ANALYSIS, WITH THE INTENT TO OPTIMIZE THE DESIGN AND REDUCE THE QUANTITY OF SNUBBERS USING HIGHER DAMPING RESPONSE SPECTRA PERMITTED BY ASME CODE CASE N-411, HAS RESULTED IN THE ELIMINATION OF SNUBBERS FROM THE SYSTEM WHILE MAINTAINING STRESSES WITHIN CODE ALLOWABLES. THE LONG TERM BENEFIT INCLUDES A REDUCTION IN PERSONNEL RADIATION EXPOSURE OVER THE LIFE OF THE PLANT DUE TO A REDUCTION IN THE NUMBER OF SNUBBERS REQUIRING TESTING AND MAINTENANCE.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THIS DCP INVOLVED THE PIPING AND SUPPORTS ASSOCIATED WITH THE AUXILIARY COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM. IT HAS BEEN DEMONSTRATED BY THE CALCULATIONS IDENTIFIED IN THE CALCULATION RECORD FOR THIS DCP THAT THE CALCULATED DESIGN STRESSES ASSOCIATED WITH THE AUXILIARY COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM ARE STILL WITHIN THE CODE ALLOWABLES AND ARE CONSISTENT WITH THE ORIGINAL DESIGN BASES FOR THE SYSTEM. THEREFORE, THERE WAS NO INCREASE IN THE PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE OF AN ACCIDENT AS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR. THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE ACCIDENTS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR WERE NOT AFFECTED BY THIS DCP SINCE THE PIPE SUPPORT MODIFICATIONS ARE DESIGNED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE DESIGN CRITERIA IDENTIFIED IN THE DESIGN INPUT RECORD AND THE MODIFICATIONS DO NOT AFFECT THE SYSTEM FUNCTION OR OPERATION. SYSTEMS REQUIRED TO MITIGATE A DESIGN BASIS ACCIDENT WERE NOT ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY THIS DESIGN MODIFICATION. THE RESULTS OF THE PIPING REANALYSIS AND PIPE SUPPORT CALCULATIONS DEMONSTRATE THAT THE CHANGES MADE BY THIS DCP DO NOT ADVERSELY AFFECT ANY EQUIPMENT OR COMPONENT ASSUMED TO FUNCTION IN ACCIDENTS ANALYZED IN THE FSAR. THE PIPE STRESS ANALYSIS AND PIPE SUPPORT CALCULATIONS SUBSTANTIATE THAT THE MODIFICATIONS MADE BY THIS DCP WERE COMPLETED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE DESIGN CRITERIA AND THE CODES AND STANDARDS APPLICABLE TO VEGP (AND AS IDENTIFIED IN THE DESIGN INPUT RECORD). THESE CRITERIA ESTABLISH THE DESIGN BASES (INCLUDING PIPE AND SUPPORT ALLOWABLE STRESSES) FOR THE PIPE STRESS ANALYSIS AND PIPE SUPPORT CALCULATIONS. INHERENT IN THESE DESIGN BASES IS THE SAME MARGIN OF SAFETY AS THE ORIGINAL DESIGN.

SUBJECT: DCP: 91-VIN0111, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THIS DCP PROVIDED THE DOCUMENTATION NECESSARY TO CORRECT THE WIRING PROBLEM OF SEPARATION, OF THE POWER FAILURE ALARM FROM THE STEAM GENERATOR LEVEL CONTROL/INDICATION SIGNAL FOR L-552.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THIS CHANGE DOES NOT AFFECT THE OPERATION OR CHANGE THE FUNCTION OF THE STEAM GENERATOR LEVEL CIRCUIT. THE CHANGE CORRECTS THE WIRING PROBLEM SO THAT THE POWER FAILURE ALARM CIRCUIT AND THE STEAM GENERATOR LEVEL CIRCUIT WILL FUNCTION PER THEIR DESIGN INTENT.

THEREFORE THIS CHANGE DOES NOT AFFECT THE ACCIDENT ANALYSIS, PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE OF AN ACCIDENT OR INCREASE THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT AS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR NOR DOES IT CREATE AN UNPOSTULATED ACCIDENT NOT DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR.

SUBJECT: DCP: 91-V1N0119, REVISION 1, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THE TURBINE PLANT COOLING WATER SYSTEM (TPCWS), SYSTEM 1405, IS DESIGNED TO SUPPLY COOLING WATER TO VARIOUS HEAT EXCHANGERS THROUGHOUT THE TURBINE BUILDING, CONTROL BUILDING, AND AUXILIARY BUILDING DURING ALL MODES OF NORMAL PLANT OPERATION AND POWER GENERATION. THE SYSTEM CONSISTS OF TWO 100% CAPACITY TPCW PUMPS, 1-1405-P4-501 AND 502 (ONE IS A BACKUP), AND ASSOCIATED PIPING, VALVES, CONTROLS, AND INSTRUMENTATION. THE POWER SUPPLY FOR TPCW PUMP 1-1405-P4-501 DISCHARGE VALVE 1HV-6798 WAS CHANGED FROM MCC 1NBT (FED BY 4160V SWITCH GEAR 1NA04) LOCATED IN THE CHEMICAL ELECTRICAL BUILDING TO MCC ANBK (FED BY 4160V SWITCH GEAR 2NA01) LOCATED IN THE DIESEL FIRE PUMP HOUSE NO. 2. A DESIGN CHANGE OF THIS NATURE HAS BEEN PERFORMED ON UNIT 2 (DCP 91-V2N0120-1-1). THE VALVE CONTINUES TO OPERATE AS BEFORE, OPENING AUTOMATICALLY WHEN PUMP 501 STARTS AND CLOSING WHEN PUMP 501 STOPS. CURRENTLY, MCC 1NBT (FED BY 4160V SWITCH GEAR 1NA04) SUPPLIES POWER TO TPCW PUMP 1-1405-P4-502 DISCHARGE VALVE 1HV-6799, AS WELL AS TPCW PUMP 1-1405-P4-501 (THE ALTERNATE PUMP) DISCHARGE VALVE 1HV-6798. IN THE EVENT OF LOSS OF POWER AT 1NA04 (WHICH FEEDS PUMP 502), TPCW PUMP 501 WOULD BE STARTED; HOWEVER, ITS DISCHARGE VALVE WOULD REMAIN CLOSED. THE ONLY TPCW FLOW WOULD BE THROUGH THE MINIMUM FLOW LINE, RESULTING IN A LOSS OF COOLING TO THE VARIOUS EQUIPMENT THAT DEPEND ON TPCW FOR HEAT REMOVAL. MCC ANBK IS FED FROM 4160V SWITCH GEAR 2NA01, WHICH IS INDEPENDENT OF 1NA04.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE ONLY CHANGE MADE WAS THE POWER SUPPLY TO TPCW PUMP 1-1405-P4-501 DISCHARGE VALVE 1HV-6798. FAILURE OF THE SUBJECT VALVE COULD AFFECT THE EQUIPMENT THAT DEPENDS ON COOLING BY TPCW. NONE OF THE AFFECTED EQUIPMENT, HOWEVER, IS SAFETY-RELATED. FAILURE OF THE TPCW DISCHARGE VALVE, WILL NOT COMPROMISE A SAFETY-RELATED SYSTEM OR PREVENT SAFE SHUTDOWN OF THE PLANT. THE EQUIPMENT AFFECTED BY THIS DESIGN CHANGE IS NOT ASSUMED TO FUNCTION IN AN ACCIDENT ANALYZED IN CHAPTER 15 OF THE FSAR. IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS DESIGN CHANGE WILL NOT CAUSE THE MALFUNCTION OF OTHER EQUIPMENT THAT IS ASSUMED TO FUNCTION. THE TPCW SYSTEM IS NEITHER REQUIRED FOR THE SAFE SHUTDOWN OF THE PLANT NOR DOES IT HAVE A SAFETY DESIGN BASIS. CHANGING THE POWER SUPPLY TO DISCHARGE VALVE 1HV-6798 DID NOT CREATE THE POSSIBILITY OF AN ACCIDENT OF A DIFFERENT TYPE THAN PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED IN THE FSAR. SHOULD THE CHANGE IN POWER SUPPLY TO THE AFFECTED VALVE RESULT IN FAILURE OF THE VALVE TO ACTUATE AND FAILURE OF TPCW TO DELIVER COOLING WATER TO ITS LOADS, THERE WOULD BE NO EFFECT THAT WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO AN ACCIDENT SCENARIO NOT ADDRESSED IN THE FSAR BECAUSE THE EQUIPMENT THAT DEPENDS ON COOLING BY TPCW IS NOT SAFETY-RELATED AND IS NOT RELIED UPON FOR SAFE SHUTDOWN OF THE PLANT. THIS DESIGN CHANGE DID NOT REDUCE THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION SAFETY MARGINS SINCE THE SYSTEM AFFECTED, SYSTEM 1405, DOES NOT HAVE A SAFETY DESIGN BASES, AND THIS MODIFICATION MEETS ALL OF THE APPROPRIATE DESIGN CRITERIA.

SUBJECT: DCP: 91-V1N0128, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THIS DESIGN CHANGE REPLACES THE MAIN FEED WATER ISOLATION VALVE (MFIV) HYDRAULIC FLUID RESERVOIR FILLER/BREATHING CAP WITH A DESICCANT TYPE FILTER/BREATHING. THE VALVE TAG NUMBERS ARE 1HV-5227, 1HV-5228, 1HV-5229, AND 1HV-5230. THE PROJECT CLASS OF THE FILTER/BREATHING WAS DOWNGRADED FROM 212 TO 62J. THE DESICCANT FILTER/BREATHING HELPS PREVENT THE INTRUSION OF MOISTURE AND AIRBORNE PARTICLES INTO THE HYDRAULIC FLUID RESERVOIR. INVESTIGATIONS OF ACTUATOR FAILURES IN SIMILAR VALVES HAVE FOUND THAT HIGH MOISTURE CONTENTS IN THE ACTUATOR HYDRAULIC FLUID RESULTED IN CHEMICAL AND PHYSICAL DEGRADATION OF THE FLUID, CAUSING CORROSION AND FOULING OF THE ACTUATOR COMPONENTS.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE DESICCANT FILTER/BREATHING WAS ATTACHED TO THE TOP OF THE HYDRAULIC RESERVOIR. A FAILURE OF THE FILTER/BREATHING WILL NOT PREVENT THE MFIV FROM CLOSING DURING AN ACCIDENT SINCE IT IS NOT PART OF THE FLOW PATH OF THE HYDRAULIC FLUID DURING CLOSURE. THERE WOULD STILL BE ADEQUATE VENTING. THE PREVIOUS FILLER/BREATHING IS A REMOVABLE METAL CAP WEIGHING APPROXIMATELY ONE POUND. IT IS PROJECT CLASS 212 AND WAS SEISMICALLY AND ENVIRONMENTALLY QUALIFIED BY THE VALVE SUPPLIER. THE NEW DESICCANT FILTER/BREATHING IS A COMMERCIAL GRADE REPLACEMENT AND HAS BEEN RECLASSIFIED AS PROJECT CLASS 62J BY CALCULATION THE STAINLESS STEEL SUPPORT ADAPTER BOLTS ONTO THE EXISTING HYDRAULIC RESERVOIR COVER PLATE USING SIX MACHINE SCREWS. NO MODIFICATION OF THE RESERVOIR IS REQUIRED. THE FUNCTION OF THE DESICCANT FILTER/BREATHING WILL NOT IMPAIR THE OPERATION OF THE MFIV ACTUATOR. THE HYDRAULIC FLUID, OR THE FLUID RESERVOIR. SINCE IT ATTACHES TO THE TOP OF THE RESERVOIR, IT IS LOCATED ABOVE THE FLUID LEVEL DURING ALL MODES OF OPERATION AND WILL NOT ADVERSELY AFFECT THE OPERATION OF THE ACTUATOR OR VALVE AS ANALYZED IN THE FSAR. BASED ON REVIEW OF FMEA CALCULATION MX4CPS.0075.377, REVISION B1, AND FSAR SECTIONS 6.2.4, 7.3.8, AND 10.4.7, THIS DESIGN CHANGE WILL NOT ADVERSELY AFFECT THE OPERATION AND EQUIPMENT QUALIFICATION OF THE MFIVS. THEREFORE IT WILL NOT CREATE THE POSSIBILITY OF A DIFFERENT TYPE ACCIDENT. THE DESICCANT FILTER/BREATHING HELPS TO PREVENT DEGRADATION OF THE HYDRAULIC FLUID AND, THEREFORE, HELP TO PREVENT MALFUNCTION OF THE MFIV ACTUATORS. AS STATED ABOVE, FAILURE OF THE FILTER/BREATHING HAS NO ADVERSE EFFECT ON THE FUNCTION OF THE MFIVS, NOR DOES IT REDUCE THE MARGIN OF SAFETY DEFINED IN THE BASES OF ANY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION. THIS INCLUDES REVIEW OF SECTION 3/4.3.2.

SUBJECT: DCP: 91-VIN0138, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: WESTINGHOUSE HAS IDENTIFIED A PROBLEM WITH MODEL NUMBERS CA, CA16, CO, COM5, COO, COV, CF1, CV, CVE, CVQ, AND CW PROTECTIVE RELAYS THAT THEY MANUFACTURE. THE PROBLEM IS CRACKING OF THE MOVING CONTACT SUPPORT INSIDE THESE RELAYS. THIS CRACKING IS CAUSED BY STRESS IN THE SUPPORT INTRODUCED IN THE MANUFACTURING PROCESS AND THE ADDITION OF AMMONIA FROM SOME OTHER SOURCES. THE COMBINATION OF THE STRESS AND THE AMMONIA WILL CAUSE THE MOVING CONTACT SUPPORT TO FAIL. THE RELAYS THAT HAVE THE NEW HOLDING CLAMP INSTALLED ARE PROJECT CLASS 11E AND 62E. WESTINGHOUSE HAS PROVIDED DESIGN (TECHNICAL BULLETIN NSD-TB-89-09-R3) TO ADD A NEW HOLDING CLAMP OVER THE MOVING CONTACT. SUPPORT TO PREVENT THE FAILURE OF THE MOVING CONTACT THE RELAYS WERE REMOVED FROM SERVICE FOR THE ADDITION OF THE NEW HOLDING CLAMP AND RE-CALIBRATED. THE CURVES OF THESE RELAYS ARE NOT AFFECTED BY THIS NEW HOLDING CLAMP. THEREFORE A CHANGE IN THE RELAY SET POINTS WAS NOT REQUIRED. THE RE-CALIBRATION IS TO ENSURE THAT THE RELAY

IS SET CORRECTLY AND OPERATES PROPERLY AFTER MODIFICATION. THE RELAYS LISTED IN WESTINGHOUSE TECHNICAL BULLETIN NDS-TB-89-09-R3 HAVE A KNOWN FAILURE MODE THAT CAN BE PREVENTED. THE RELAYS MANUFACTURED AFTER JANUARY 1988 HAVE A NEW MATERIAL FOR THE MOVING CONTACT SUPPORT TO PREVENT THIS FAILURE FROM OCCURRING. THE PRE-JANUARY 1988 RELAYS CAN HAVE A NEW HOLDING CLAMP INSTALLED TO PREVENT THIS FAILURE OR MUST HAVE THE MOVING CONTACT SUPPORT INSPECTED ANNUALLY. THE INSPECTION IS TO ENSURE A FAILURE OF THE MOVING CONTACT SUPPORT IS NOT IMMINENT. BY INSTALLING THE NEW HOLDING CLAMP IN THESE RELAYS, THE PLANT WAS NOT REQUIRED TO ANNUALLY INSPECT THESE RELAYS.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE CHANGE TO THESE RELAYS ENSURE THE RELAYS WILL PERFORM THEIR INTENDED FUNCTION TO ISOLATE ELECTRICAL PROBLEMS SUCH AS SHORT CIRCUITS, OVER CURRENTS, ETC. THE SECURITY OF THESE RELAYS (ABILITY TO AVOID MISOPERATION) REMAINS UNCHANGED BY THE ADDITION OF THE NEW HOLDING CLAMPS. THE NEW HOLDING CLAMP PREVENTS FAILURE OF THE MOVING CONTACT SUPPORT AND ENSURE THE MOVING CONTACT CAN PERFORM ITS INTENDED FUNCTION OF ISOLATING ELECTRICAL PROBLEMS. THE PURPOSE OF PROTECTIVE RELAYS IS TO LIMIT THE DAMAGE TO THE PROTECTED EQUIPMENT AND PROTECT THE POWER SOURCE OF THE EQUIPMENT. THE PROTECTION OF THE POWER SOURCE HELPS TO ENSURE THAT THERE IS ELECTRICAL POWER FOR THE OTHER PLANT EQUIPMENT. ADDING THE NEW HOLDING CLAMP TO THESE RELAYS DOES NOT CHANGE THE OPERATION, CALIBRATION, AND QUALIFICATION OF THE RELAY. THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN THE BASES OF TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION IS NOT REDUCED.

SUBJECT: DCP: 91-VIN0140, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: A TRANSFER SWITCH WAS ADDED TO PROVIDE DIESEL-BACKED POWER FROM UNIT 2 TO POWER CONTROL ROOM LIGHTING IN CASE OF STATION BLACKOUT (SBO). THE TRANSFER SWITCH ALLOWS THE CONTROL ROOM LIGHTING TO BE POWERED FROM EITHER UNIT AND PROVIDES CHARGING TO CONTROL ROOM LIGHTING BATTERY BACKUP. IN ADDITION EMERGENCY LIGHTING WAS ADDED TO AREAS THAT REQUIRE VALVE MANIPULATION UNDER LOSS OF RHR CONDITIONS. THESE VALVES ARE 1HV-8821A & B, 1HV-8812A & B, 1HV-8802A & B, AND 1HV-8809A & B.

SAFETY EVALUATION: LIGHTING IS NOT AN INITIATOR OF AN ACCIDENT EVALUATED IN THE FSAR. THE TRANSFER SWITCH MEETS THE FIRE PROTECTION/SAFE SHUTDOWN REQUIREMENTS OF ENSURING ONE SET OF CEILING FIXTURES IS AVAILABLE IN THE CONTROL ROOM EXCEPT DURING A FIRE REQUIRING CONTROL ROOM EVACUATION. THE LIGHTING SYSTEM IS NOT USED IN MITIGATING THE RADIOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT. THE NORMAL AND EMERGENCY LIGHTING, THAT WAS ADDED FOR VALVE MANIPULATION, IS POWERED FROM NON-SAFETY RELATED POWER AND DOES NOT EFFECT THE OPERATION OF THE VALVES (1HV-8802A/B, 1HV-8821A/B, 1HV-8812A/B, AND 1HV-8809A/B). THE ADDED LOADING FROM THE CONTROL ROOM LIGHTING ON THE DIESEL GENERATOR WAS CALCULATED PER X3CE01 AND HAS NO IMPACT ON THE DIESEL GENERATOR LOADING. ALL LIGHTING ADDITIONS WERE SEISMICALLY MOUNTED AS REQUIRED. THE CONTROL ROOM LIGHTING MAINTAINS SEPARATE TRAIN BACKED LIGHTING TO ENSURE A FIRE EVENT WILL NOT IMPAIR SAFE SHUTDOWN FORM THE CONTROL ROOM. THEREFORE THIS DCP DOES NOT EFFECT ANY SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT OR ITS ABILITY TO PERFORM ITS SAFETY RELATED FUNCTION, ANY ACCIDENT ANALYSIS, OR THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED BY ANY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES.

SUBJECT: DCP: 91-V2N0141, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: A TRANSFER SWITCH WAS ADDED TO PROVIDE DIESEL-BACKED POWER FROM UNIT 1 TO POWER CONTROL ROOM LIGHTING IN CASE OF STATION BLACKOUT (SBO). THE TRANSFER SWITCH ALLOWS THE CONTROL ROOM LIGHTING TO BE POWERED FROM EITHER UNIT AND PROVIDES CHARGING TO CONTROL ROOM LIGHTING BATTERY BACKUP. IN ADDITION EMERGENCY LIGHTING WAS ADDED TO AREAS THAT REQUIRE VALVE MANIPULATION UNDER LOSS OF RHR CONDITIONS. THESE VALVES ARE 2HV-8821A & B, 2HV-8812A & B, 2HV-8802A & B, AND 2HV-8809A & B; AND TO THE BORIC ACID STORAGE TANK ROOM D09. TO FACILITATE PLACEMENT OF A TEMPORARY HEATER DURING LOSP. NORMAL LIGHTING IS ADDED TO CONTROL BUILDING ROOM 224 TO FACILITATE FUSE REMOVAL AND CABLE TERMINATION.

SAFETY EVALUATION: LIGHTING IS NOT AN INITIATOR OF AN ACCIDENT EVALUATED IN THE FSAR. THE TRANSFER SWITCH MEETS THE FIRE PROTECTION/SAFE SHUTDOWN REQUIREMENTS OF ENSURING ONE SET OF CEILING FIXTURES IS AVAILABLE IN THE CONTROL ROOM EXCEPT DURING A FIRE REQUIRING CONTROL ROOM EVACUATION. THE LIGHTING SYSTEM IS NOT USED IN MITIGATING THE RADIOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT. THE NORMAL AND EMERGENCY LIGHTING, THAT WAS ADDED FOR VALVE MANIPULATION, IS POWERED FROM NON-SAFETY RELATED POWER AND DOES NOT EFFECT THE OPERATION OF THE VALVES (2HV-8802A/B, 2HV-8821A/B, 2HV-8812A/B, AND 2HV-8809A/B). THE ADDED LOADING FROM THE CONTROL ROOM LIGHTING ON THE DIESEL GENERATOR WAS CALCULATED PER X3CE01 AND HAS NO IMPACT ON THE DIESEL GENERATOR LOADING. ALL LIGHTING ADDITIONS WERE SEISMICALLY MOUNTED AS REQUIRED. THE CONTROL ROOM LIGHTING MAINTAINS SEPARATE TRAIN BACKED LIGHTING TO ENSURE A FIRE EVENT WILL NOT IMPAIR SAFE SHUTDOWN FROM THE CONTROL ROOM. THEREFORE THIS DCP DOES NOT EFFECT ANY SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT OR ITS ABILITY TO PERFORM ITS SAFETY RELATED FUNCTION, ANY ACCIDENT ANALYSIS, OR THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED BY ANY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES. DURING INSTALLATION PENETRATION SEALS WILL BE BREACHED WHICH FORM PART OF THE FIRE AREA BOUNDARY, BUT ARE ABOVE FLOOD LEVELS. A FIRE WATCH WILL BE POSTED WHILE THE BARRIERS ARE BREACHED.

SUBJECT: DCP: 91-V1N0146, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: DUE TO THE PREVIOUS FLOW SWITCHES, FOR MAIN GENERATOR STATOR COOLING HIGH VOLTAGE BUSHING FLOW AND EXCITER RECTIFIER FLOW, NO LONGER BEING MANUFACTURED AND A SINGLE FAILURE 1 OUT OF 1 LOGIC TO TRIP CONFIGURATION; THIS DCP INSTALLED DIFFERENTIAL FLOW ORIFICES AND DIFFERENTIAL INDICATING SWITCHES UTILIZING A 2 OUT OF 3 TRIPPING LOGIC .

SAFETY EVALUATION: THIS IS A CHANGE TO THE PLANT AS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR AND FIGURES 10.2.2-1 (SHEET 8 OF 9) (2X4DB193) AND 10.2.2-3 (2X5DN203-1) HAD TO BE REVISED. THIS DCP DOES NOT CREATE A CHANGE TO ANY PROCEDURE AS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR. IT DOES NOT AFFECT SYSTEM OPERATION, ACCIDENT ANALYSIS, PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE OF AN ACCIDENT OR INCREASE THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT AS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR NOR DOES IT CREATE AN UNPOSTULATED ACCIDENT NOT DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR

SUBJECT: DCP: 91-V1N0149, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THIS DESIGN CHANGE INSTALLED COOLING FANS IN THE REFUELING MACHINE CONSOLE TO IMPROVE COOLING AIR FLOW. THE REFUELING MACHINE POSITIONING SYSTEM WAS IMPROVED BY REPLACING THE PREVIOUS ENCODER CHIP WITH A FUNCTIONALLY IDENTICAL CHIP WITH IMPROVED NOISE IMMUNITY AND REPLACEMENT OF CABLE AND CONNECTORS FOR THE HOIST POSITION ENCODER CIRCUITS. THE CABLE WAS REROUTED FOR BETTER NOISE PERFORMANCE. THIS CHANGE ALSO PROVIDED PERMANENT SOUND POWERED TELEPHONE COMMUNICATIONS ON THE REFUELING MACHINE. THE REFUELING MACHINE IS SEISMIC CATEGORY 2 EQUIPMENT WHICH WAS DESIGNED TO SATISFY SEISMIC 2/1 REQUIREMENTS. WESTINGHOUSE HAS EVALUATED THE ADDITIONAL WEIGHT FROM THE COMMUNICATIONS AND POWER CIRCUIT AND DETERMINED THERE IS NO ADVERSE EFFECT ON THE STRUCTURAL ADEQUACY OF THE REFUELING MACHINE.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THIS DESIGN CHANGE IMPROVED THE RELIABILITY OF THE SIGMA REFUELING MACHINE. THE ADDITION OF THE COOLING FANS, REPLACEMENT OF THE ENCODER PULSE COUNTING CHIP, AND REPLACEMENT OF CABLE AND CONNECTORS WITH IMPROVED CABLE ROUTING INCREASED THE ACCURACY OF FUEL PLACEMENT BY REDUCING THE HOIST POSITIONING ENCODER CIRCUIT'S SUSCEPTIBILITY TO RADIATED NOISE. THESE CHANGES DID NOT AFFECT THE REFUELING MACHINE FUNCTIONAL DESIGN OR OPERATION. ALL REFUELING MACHINE SAFETY FEATURES AS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR ARE PRESERVED WITH THIS DESIGN CHANGE. THIS DESIGN CHANGE HAS NO IMPACT ON CONDITIONS ASSUMED IN THE ACCIDENT ANALYSIS FOR A DROPPED FUEL ASSEMBLY SINCE THESE CONDITIONS DO NOT INVOLVE THE REFUELING MACHINE. THIS DESIGN CHANGE DOES NOT AFFECT THE REFUELING MACHINE'S ABILITY TO HOLD A FUEL ASSEMBLY. THIS DESIGN CHANGE RESULTED IN AN IMPROVEMENT IN THE RELIABILITY OF THE REFUELING MACHINE DUE TO THE REDUCTION IN HEAT RELATED CONSOLE SCREEN FAILURES AND THE IMPROVED NOISE RESISTANCE OF THE POSITIONING CIRCUITS. THE SEISMIC ANALYSIS AND ELECTRICAL/MECHANICAL CAPABILITIES OF THE REFUELING MACHINE WERE UNAFFECTED BY THIS CHANGE. THIS DESIGN CHANGE DID NOT AFFECT THE FUNCTIONAL OR OPERATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE REFUELING MACHINE. THE ADDITION OF THE SOUND POWERED TELEPHONE CIRCUIT TO THE REFUELING MACHINE DID NOT INTERFACE WITH OTHER EQUIPMENT AND DID NOT AFFECT SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT OR FUNCTIONS. THE PROBABILITY OF A MALFUNCTION OF EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY WAS NOT INCREASED. THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION FOR REFUELING OPERATIONS 3/4.9 SPECIFIES LOAD LIMITATIONS OF 3900 LBS. FOR THE SIGMA REFUELING MACHINE. THESE LIMITATIONS WERE NOT AFFECTED BY THIS DESIGN CHANGE. THE REFUELING MACHINE CONTINUES TO BE CAPABLE OF COMPLYING WITH THE LCO AND SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS STATED IN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS.

SUBJECT: DCP: 91-V1N0162, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THIS DESIGN CHANGE INCREASED THE PRESSURIZER PRESSURE SAFETY INJECTION BLOCK PERMISSIVE P-11 SETPOINT FROM 1970 TO 2000 PSIG.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE P-11 SETPOINT CHANGE DOES NOT INCREASE THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED IN THE FSAR. THE P-11 SETPOINT IS NOT USED IN ANY VEGP FSAR ACCIDENT ANALYSIS. THIS CHANGE WIDENS THE BAND IN WHICH THE LOW PRESSURE SI ACTUATION MAY BE BLOCKED; AS A RESULT, THE LIKELIHOOD OF AN INADVERTENT LOW PRESSURE SI ON COOLDOWN IS REDUCED. THEREFORE, THE ACTIVITY DOES NOT INCREASE THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED IN THE FSAR.

SUBJECT: DCP: 91-V1N0165, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THIS DCP REPLACED THE OLD HEAT TRACING CABLE (PROJECT CLASS 62E) WITH CABLE RATED FOR HIGHER TEMPERATURE ON AUX. FEED WATER LINES 1-1302-29, 30, 31, 32 LOCATED IN THE AUX. FEED WATER PENETRATION ROOMS # R-A56 (CONTROL BUILDING) AND R-A11 & R-A12 (AUX. BUILDING). THE HEAT TRACING, AS APPLIED TO THE AUX FEED WATER PIPES, PROVIDES FREEZE PROTECTION BY MAINTAINING A MINIMUM TEMPERATURE OF 43 DEG. F ON THE PIPE THROUGH PIPE-SENSED THERMOSTATIC CONTROLS ON THE HEATER CABLE CIRCUITS. THE NEW CABLE IS LYING DIRECTLY ON TOP OF THE PIPE AND STRAPPED IN PLACE AT ONE FOOT INTERVALS USING STAINLESS STEEL BANDING, THEN COVERED WITH ORIGINAL TYPE INSULATION. EXISTING JUNCTION BOXES WERE USED TO TERMINATE CABLE ENDS. THE NEW HEATER CIRCUITS HAVE A TOTAL HEAT OUTPUT APPROXIMATELY EQUAL TO THAT OF THE ORIGINAL CIRCUITS. THE TOTAL LOAD ON ANY CIRCUIT IS WITHIN +/- ONE AMP OF THE ORIGINAL CIRCUIT LOADS, AND IN NO CASE IS THE TOTAL LOAD FOR ANY CIRCUIT GREATER THAN 5 AMPS. THE HEAT TRACING CABLE REPLACED WAS APPLIED TO APPROXIMATELY THE FIRST FIFTY FEET OF AUX. FEED WATER PIPE FROM THE POINT AT WHICH THE AUX. FEED WATER LINE ATTACHES TO THE MAIN FEED WATER LINE. THE OLD CABLE WAS BEING DAMAGED BY HIGH TEMPERATURE IMPOSED BY THE MAIN FEED WATER LINE, WHICH OPERATES AT UP TO 440 DEG. F. THE OLD TEFLON HEATER CABLE WAS RATED FOR A MAXIMUM TEMPERATURE OF 302 DEG. F. THE NEW CABLE CAN OPERATE ABOVE 450 DEG. F.

SAFETY EVALUATION: CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS OF THE NEW HEAT TRACING ARE LESS COMBUSTIBLE THAN THE ORIGINAL (STAINLESS STEEL AND MINERAL INSULATION). THE NEW TRACE FUNCTIONS IN A MANNER IDENTICAL TO THE ORIGINAL TRACE. AUTOMATIC CONTROLS SHUT OFF THE HEAT TRACING WHEN SENSED PIPE TEMPERATURE EXCEEDS THE 43 DEG. F SET POINT OF THE TEMPERATURE CONTROLLER (FREEZE PROTECTION). CURRENT IN THE HEAT TRACING CIRCUIT IS SENSED AND FAILURE OF THE CIRCUIT IS ALARMED. FAILURE ALARMS IN THE NEW CIRCUITS ARE LESS AMBIGUOUS THAN THE ORIGINAL SINCE ANY FAILURE ON THE NEW SERIES CABLE WILL CAUSE ALL CURRENT FLOW IN THE CIRCUIT TO CEASE. NO INCREASE IN CORROSION ACTIVITY IS ANTICIPATED AS A RESULT OF THE APPLICATION OF THE 304L STAINLESS STEEL HEATER CABLE TO THE SA106 GRADE B CARBON STEEL PIPE. HEAT TRACING DOES NOT CONTRIBUTE TO THE CONSEQUENCES AS EVALUATED. INCLUDES REVIEW OF FSAR SECTION 15.1 & 15.2. SINCE THE NEW HEAT TRACING IS ABLE TO WITHSTAND HIGHER TEMPERATURES THAN THE ORIGINAL TRACE, THE NEW TRACE IS MORE RELIABLE, THEREFORE MALFUNCTION DUE TO FREEZING IS LESS-PROBABLE. HEAT TRACING DOES NOT AFFECT CONSEQUENCES OF A MALFUNCTION OF PIPING EQUIPMENT AS EVALUATED. INCLUDES REVIEW OF FSAR SECTION 15.1, 15.2. NO PIPING, EQUIPMENT, OR INSTRUMENTATION ASSOCIATED WITH THE PIPING EXCEPT THE HEAT TRACING WAS MODIFIED OR ITS OPERATION CHANGED AS A RESULT OF THIS CHANGE OUT. NO PIPING, EQUIPMENT, OR INSTRUMENTATION ASSOCIATED WITH THE PIPING EXCEPT THE HEAT TRACING WAS MODIFIED OR ITS OPERATION CHANGED AS A RESULT OF THIS CHANGE OUT. NO NEW TYPES OF ACCIDENTS ARE CREATED.

SUBJECT: DCP 91-V1N0166, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THIS DCP MAKES SEVERAL CHANGES TO THE TURBINE BUILDING TO AUXILIARY BUILDING TRAIN A TUNNEL VENTILATION SYSTEM. THESE CHANGES ARE TO ADD A NEW TEMPERATURE SWITCH WITH A HIGH TEMPERATURE ALARM IN THE AUXILIARY BUILDING END, DELETE THE LOW TEMPERATURE SETPOINT CONTROL OF THE

EXISTING SWITCH, THE EXISTING THREE POSITION VENTILATION FAN CONTROL SWITCH WILL BE REPLACED WITH A TWO POSITION SWITCH AND WILL BE NORMALLY IN THE 'STOP' POSITION. THERE WILL NO LONGER BE AN INDICATION ON THE SYSTEM STATUS MONITOR PANEL THAT THE CONTROL SWITCH HAS BEEN PLACED IN THE 'STOP' POSITION. THESE CHANGES ARE SAFETY RELATED AND SEISMIC CATEGORY 1.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THIS CHANGE CORRECTS TWO CONCERNS. A FIRE DOOR BLOCKS THE FLOW OF AIR FROM ONE END OF THE TUNNEL TO THE OTHER, AND THE FAN IS CURRENTLY DESIGNED TO START AT A LOW TEMPERATURE OF 17 DEGREES F. THE DESIRED OPERATION, AS DESCRIBED IN FSAR SECTION 9.4.9.2.2.3, IS FOR THE FAN TO BE MANUALLY STARTED AFTER RECEIPT OF A HIGH-TEMPERATURE ALARM (100 DEGREES F) IN THE CONTROL ROOM. THE RESPONSE TO THE ALARM AS DESCRIBED IN PROCEDURE 17051-1 WILL BE TO OPEN THE FIRE DOOR, ESTABLISH A FIRE WATCH AND MANUALLY START THE VENTILATION FAN FROM THE CONTROL ROOM. THE ADDITION OF THE NEW TEMPERATURE SWITCH WILL BE AN AID IN DETERMINING A TRUE HIGH-TEMPERATURE CONDITION IN THE TUNNEL. CHANGING THE CONTROL SWITCH FROM THREE POSITION TO TWO POSITION WILL PROVIDE THE DESIRED, MANUAL "START-STOP" OPERATION. THIS CHANGE WILL MINIMIZE DEAD-HEAD OPERATION OF THE FAN AND WILL ALLOW FOR A MORE ACCURATE ASSESSMENT OF TUNNEL TEMPERATURE. FAILURE OF THE VENTILATION SYSTEM COULD RESULT IN A DECREASE IN THE ELECTRICAL CABLE LIFE EXPECTANCY, BUT WOULD NOT CAUSE AN ACCIDENT. TUNNEL TEMPERATURE SHOULD BE MAINTAINED AT OR BELOW 120 DEGREES F DUE TO THE EFFECTS OF ELEVATED TEMPERATURE ON CABLE IMPEDANCE AND CABLE LIFE EXPECTANCY. WITH THE TUNNEL TEMPERATURE AT 120 DEGREES F, CABLES IN THE TRAIN A TUNNEL ARE SIZED ADEQUATELY TO PROVIDE THE NEEDED VOLTAGE. WITH NORMAL (NON-SAFETY RELATED VENTILATION) THE TUNNEL TEMPERATURE WILL NOT EXCEED THE HIGH TEMPERATURE SETPOINT. WITHOUT NORMAL VENTILATION, IT REQUIRES MORE THAN THREE DAYS FOR THE TEMPERATURE TO EXCEED THE SETPOINT (BASED ON ANALYSIS AND ACTUAL TEMPERATURE MEASUREMENTS). SINCE THIS IS AN ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES VENTILATION SYSTEM THAT WILL NOT RECEIVE AN AUTOMATIC START SIGNAL, THE TUNNEL TEMPERATURE WILL BE MONITORED AS REQUIRED BY SITE PROCEDURES, IN THE EVENT THE NORMAL VENTILATION SYSTEM IS NOT AVAILABLE. ALTHOUGH BYPASS OF THE TUNNEL VENTILATION SYSTEM IS NO LONGER ANNUNCIATED ON THE SYSTEM STATUS MONITOR PANEL, LOSS OF POWER TO THE FAN IS ANNUNCIATED. THIS CHANGE WILL NOT AFFECT THE SYSTEMS COOLING CAPABILITIES. PENETRATION SEALS, WHEN BREACHED WILL BE RESEALED PER PLANT PROCEDURES. ELECTRICAL SEPARATION IS MAINTAINED. EQUIPMENT ADDED TO SUPPORT THE PROPOSED CHANGE HAS THE NECESSARY QUALIFICATIONS TO SUPPORT THE SAFETY RELATED CLASSIFICATION OF THE VENTILATION SYSTEM.

SUBJECT: DCP: 91-V1N0170, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THE PREVIOUS FLOOR DRAIN TANK PUMP, TAG NUMBER 1-1901-P6-008, WAS REPLACED WITH AN IDENTICAL PUMP AND MOTOR. THE NEW PUMP AND MOTOR ARE IDENTICAL TO THE PREVIOUS EQUIPMENT, THE SYSTEM OPERATIONAL PARAMETERS DID NOT CHANGE. THE FLOOR DRAIN TANK PUMP IS PROJECT CLASSIFICATION 427. THE REPLACEMENT EQUIPMENT WAS PROCURED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF REGULATORY GUIDE 1.143 AND THE HYDRAULIC INSTITUTE STANDARDS. THE PREVIOUS FLOOR DRAIN TANK PUMP WAS DAMAGED AND NOT CAPABLE OF OPERATING AT THE DESIGN CONDITIONS. AS A RESULT, THE OUTPUT AT THE ALTERNATE RADWASTE BUILDING WAS LESS THAN THE REQUIRED FLOW. VALUABLE TIME WAS LOST IN THE PROCESSING OF LIQUID WASTES.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE FLOOR DRAIN TANK PUMP IS NON-SAFETY RELATED. THE PORTION OF THE LIQUID RADWASTE SYSTEM WHICH CONTAINS THE FLOOR DRAIN TANK PUMP PERFORMS NO SAFETY FUNCTION. WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE PROCUREMENT DESIGN CODE, THE NEW PUMP IS AN IDENTICAL REPLACEMENT FOR THE PREVIOUS PUMP. IN ADDITION, THE NEW PUMP MEETS ALL OPERATIONAL AND FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR THE LIQUID WASTE PROCESSING SYSTEM NO. 1901, INCLUDING REGULATORY GUIDE 1.143. THE OPERATION AND RESPONSE OF THE LIQUID WASTE PROCESSING SYSTEM WILL NOT CHANGE DUE TO REPLACEMENT OF THE FLOOR DRAIN PUMP. THE EQUIPMENT DESIGN PARAMETERS AND, CONSEQUENTLY, THE FLOW RATES AND ISOTOPIC CONCENTRATIONS IN LIQUID WASTES AS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR HAVE NOT CHANGED. THE FLOOR DRAIN TANK PUMP IS NONSAFETY RELATED AND IS NOT ASSUMED TO FUNCTION IN ACCIDENTS ANALYZED IN THE FSAR (REFERENCE FSAR SECTION 15.7.1 THROUGH 15.7.3). FURTHERMORE, SINCE THIS IS AN IDENTICAL REPLACEMENT (WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE PROCUREMENT DESIGN CODE), THERE IS NO ADVERSE IMPACT TO THE OPERATION OF THE SYSTEM. THE DESIGN PARAMETERS AND ISOTOPIC CONCENTRATIONS IN THE LIQUID WASTES ARE UNAFFECTED BY THIS CHANGE. TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION SECTION 3/4.11.1 ADDRESSES THE HANDLING OF LIQUID EFFLUENTS. REPLACEMENT OF THE FLOOR DRAIN TANK PUMP DID NOT CHANGE THE OPERATION OF THE LIQUID WASTE PROCESSING SYSTEM.

SUBJECT: DCP: 91-VIN0172, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THIS DCP INSTALLED A 3" VENT LINE ON WASTE MONITOR TANKS 11901T6-009 & 010 TO THE AUXILIARY BUILDING VENTILATION SYSTEM VIA THE EXHAUST BUILDING REGISTER LOCATED IN EACH WASTE MONITOR TANK ROOM. (C-81 & C-82) NO EXISTING OPENING COULD BE USED FOR THIS MODIFICATION SO A NEW THREE INCH NOZZLE WAS ADDED. TO FACILITATE FLOW THROUGH THE VENT LINE, THE PREVIOUS ONE INCH OVERFLOW/VENT LINE ON EACH TANK WAS REMOVED AND THE NOZZLE CAPPED. AN ADDITIONAL NEW THREE INCH NOZZLE AND PIPING WAS INSTALLED ADJACENT TO THE PREVIOUS ONE INCH OVERFLOW/VENT LINE TO SERVE AS THE TANK OVERFLOW AND THE SOURCE OF PURGE AIR.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THIS CHANGE DOES NOT CONTRIBUTE TO THE POSTULATED FAILURE OF ANY TANKS, THEREFORE DOES NOT INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OF THE OCCURRENCE OF SUCH ACCIDENTS AS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR. THE WASTE MONITOR TANKS ARE NOT USED TO MITIGATE THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT ANALYZED IN THE FSAR. WHILE BEING A MORE DIRECT PATH, IT DOES NOT INCREASE THE TOTAL RADIOACTIVITY THAT IS EXHAUSTED BY THE VENTILATION SYSTEM. THE PIPING ANALYSIS FOR THE WASTE MONITOR TANK ROOMS HAS NOT CHANGED. THE NEW PIPING IS DESIGNED TO THE SAME SEISMIC REQUIREMENTS (CATEGORY 2) AS THE OLD SYSTEM. THIS DESIGN DOES NOT CHANGE THE FUNCTION OF THE LIQUID WASTE PROCESSING SYSTEM OR THE WASTE MONITOR TANKS, THE EXISTING FAILURE ANALYSIS STILL APPLIES. THIS DCP DOES NOT EFFECT ANY COMPONENT REQUIRED FOR SAFE SHUTDOWN OF THE PLANT. THIS DESIGN CHANGE WILL NOT REDUCE THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN THE BASES OF TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS. THIS IS BASED ON A REVIEW OF T.S. SECTION 3/4.11.1. ALSO REVIEWS OF FSAR SECTIONS 2.2, 2.3, 9.4, 11.2, AND 15.7.

SUBJECT: DCP: 91-VIN0174, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: TWO (2) TIME DELAY PRINTED CIRCUIT BOARDS WERE INSTALLED IN SPARE SLOTS OF THE NIS CABINET N50 DRAWER. THESE BOARDS

PROVIDE AN ADJUSTABLE INHIBIT CONTROL OVER THE FLUX DEVIATION DRAWER QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO-(QPTR) DEVIATION RELAY ALARM OUTPUTS. THIS CHANGE WAS MADE TO PREVENT QPTR NUISANCE ALARMS WHICH ARE GENERATED FROM THE NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION SYSTEM (NIS) FLUX DEVIATION DRAWER. THESE ALARMS WERE ACTIVATED WHEN THE INSTANTANEOUS QPTR WAS CALCULATED BY THE NIS EXCORE DETECTORS AND EXCEEDS 2% OF THE STEADY STATE CONDITION. AT PLANT VOGTLE THERE IS A REACTOR VESSEL LOWER PLENUM VORTEX FLOW ANOMALY, THAT IN CONJUNCTION WITH NORMAL NIS CALIBRATION TOLERANCES, CAUSES A QPTR NUISANCE ALARM.

SAFETY EVALUATION: ONLY ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS WERE ADDED TO THE NON-SAFETY RELATED FLUX DEVIATION AND MISCELLANEOUS CONTROL DRAWER. THIS DRAWER DOES NOT PROVIDE A PRIMARY OR DIVERSE PROTECTIVE FUNCTION. THERE WERE NO FUNCTIONAL CHANGES MADE TO THE SAFETY-RELATED PORTION OF THE NIS. THIS ACTIVITY DID NOT MOVE OR CHANGE THE PHYSICAL SEPARATION BARRIER BETWEEN THE NON-SAFETY RELATED FLUX DEVIATION AND MISCELLANEOUS CONTROL DRAWER AND THE SAFETY-RELATED POWER RANGE DRAWERS. WESTINGHOUSE SUPPORTS THE USE OF QPTR VALUES GENERATED BY PROTEUS TO SOUND AN ALARM BASED ON ONE MINUTE AVERAGED NIS SIGNALS. THE FUNCTION PROVIDED BY THE DELAY CARDS CAN PERFORM A TIME DELAY ALARM INDEPENDENTLY OF THE AVERAGING FUNCTION CURRENTLY BEING GENERATED BY THE PROTEUS. ACCORDING TO TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION SECTION 4.2.4.1.B WHEN THE QPTR ALARM IS INOPERABLE, PRIOR TO USING THE PROTEUS PLANT COMPUTER, THE QPTR WAS DETERMINED TO BE WITHIN ITS LIMITS BY "CALCULATING THE RATIO AT LEAST ONCE PER 12 HOURS DURING STEADY STATE OPERATION." THIS STATEMENT ALLOWS THE USE OF UP TO A SIX MINUTE DELAY IN THE INSTANTANEOUS NIS GENERATED QPTR ALARM. REAL EVENTS, SUCH AS DROPPED RODS OR LOCAL FUEL ASSEMBLY FLOW BLOCKAGE, WILL LAST LONGER THAN THE TIME DELAY AND WOULD PRODUCE AN ALARM SOONER THAN THE ACCEPTABLE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CALCULATION METHOD. THIS DRAWER DOES NOT PROVIDE A PRIMARY OR DIVERSE PROTECTIVE FUNCTION WHICH IS RELIED UPON TO BRING THE PLANT TO A SAFE SHUTDOWN CONDITION OR TO MITIGATE THE RELEASE OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL TO THE ATMOSPHERE. THE STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY OF THE NIS IS MAINTAINED. NONE OF THE LIMITS OR ACTION STATEMENTS IDENTIFIED IN TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3/4 2.4 ARE AFFECTED BY THIS DCP. THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN THE BASES TO ANY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS HAVE NOT BEEN REDUCED.

SUBJECT: DCP: 91-VIN0194, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: RADIATION MONITOR 2562 MONITORS CONTAINMENT ATMOSPHERE. WESTINGHOUSE CALLS THE COMPUTER PART OF THE RADIATION MONITORS A DPM. 1RX-2562 IS THE DPM FOR RADIATION MONITOR 2562. 1RX-2562 IS NOW LOCATED IN THE AUX BUILDING ROOM B08. THE HVAC FOR THIS ROOM IS DESIGNED TO MAINTAIN A TEMPERATURE OF 100 DEGREES OR BELOW. UNDER ABNORMAL CONDITIONS THE TEMPERATURE COULD BE 120 DEGREES. THE COMPUTER PART OF RADIATION MONITOR, PANEL 1RX-2562, IS IN THIS HOT ENVIRONMENT AND IS BELIEVED TO HAVE A REDUCED LIFE SPAN BECAUSE OF THE TEMPERATURE. THE DPM WAS MOVED TO AUX BUILDING ROOM B13 WHICH IS MUCH COOLER. THE DPM WAS REMOVED FROM ITS EXISTING LOCATION AND SEISMICALLY MOUNTED IN AUX BUILDING ROOM

B13. A NEW JUNCTION BOX WAS SEISMICALLY MOUNTED WHERE THE DPM WAS MOUNTED. ALL INSTRUMENT SECTIONS OF THIS RADIATION MONITOR ARE PROJECT CLASS 61J. THE CONDUITS, CABLES, CONNECTORS, AND JUNCTION BOX ARE PROJECT CLASS 62E BUT ARE SEISMICALLY MOUNTED. THE PENETRATION SEALS ARE PROJECT CLASS 62C. THE COMPUTER FOR RADIATION MONITOR WAS LOCATED IN AUX BUILDING ROOM RB08. THIS ROOM NORMALLY RUNS AT A TEMPERATURE OF APPROXIMATELY 100 DEGREES. AUX BUILDING ROOM RB13 IS SIGNIFICANTLY COOLER DURING NORMAL PLANT OPERATION. THE COMPUTER PART FOR RADIATION MONITOR 2562 WAS MOVED TO THIS COOLER ROOM TO INCREASE THE LIFE OF THE COMPUTER AND IMPROVE WORKING CONDITIONS FOR THE PERSONNEL THAT WORK ON THIS RADIATION MONITOR.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE COMPUTER, JUNCTION BOX, AND ALL NEW CONDUITS ARE SEISMICALLY MOUNTED TO PREVENT THEM FROM AFFECTING ANY SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT. THIS DESIGN CHANGE MAINTAINS THE ELECTRICAL ISOLATION AND SEPARATION OF THE SAFETY AND NON SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT. THE RADIATION MONITOR IS NOT REQUIRED FOR THE MITIGATION OF ANY ACCIDENTS. IT CAN BE AND IS USED TO MONITOR FOR RCS LEAKAGE AS REQUIRED BY THE TECH SPEC BUT DOES NOT CAUSE ANY EQUIPMENT TO ACTUATE FOR PROTECTION OF THE REACTOR. IT IS ALSO NOT REQUIRED FOR MONITORING ANY PLANT PARAMETER IN A POST-EVENT CONDITION. THIS EQUIPMENT IS USED TO MONITOR CONTAINMENT FOR AIRBORNE RADIATION, IT DOES NOT HAVE A CONTROL FUNCTION, AND CAN NOT CAUSE RADIATION ACCIDENTS. THE COMPUTER IS ALREADY ELECTRICALLY ISOLATED AND TRAIN SEPARATED FROM THE SAFETY RELATED POWER SOURCE AND CAN NOT AFFECT ANY SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT ELECTRICALLY. THE IMPROVEMENT TO THE OPERATING CONDITION OF RADIATION MONITOR 2562 COMPUTER IMPROVES ITS ABILITY TO MEET THE OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS PLACED ON THIS RADIATION MONITOR BY TECH SPECS.

SUBJECT: DCP: 91-V1N0199, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THE CHANGE ACTIVATED THE TURBINE-GENERATOR POWER SYSTEM STABILIZER (PSS) WHICH WAS PROVIDED WITH THE GENERATOR VOLTAGE-REGULATOR CONTROLS (A PORTION OF THE EXCITATION SYSTEM). ACTIVATION OF THE PSS REQUIRED INITIAL SETUP OF THE PSS AS OUTLINED IN THE INSTRUCTION MANUAL (GEK-83807) AND ON-LINE CALIBRATION OF THE PSS CIRCUIT BOARDS. THE CONSTANTS NECESSARY FOR ON-LINE CALIBRATION WERE PROVIDED AS A SET POINT DRAWING IN THE DCP. THE CHANGE ALSO REVISED THE TERMINATION OF WIRE NUMBER 26 WHICH IS CONNECTED BETWEEN THE CEILING SENSING AND WASHOUT AND OUTPUT BOARDS OF THE PSS. THE WIRING TERMINATION BETWEEN THE WASHOUT AND OUTPUT BOARD AND THE CEILING SENSING BOARD WERE MADE AT THE MANUFACTURER'S (GE) SUGGESTION. BY MOVING WIRE NUMBER 26, THE CEILING SENSING BOARD IS NOW ABLE TO SUPERVISE THE LAST STAGE OF THE WASHOUT AND OUTPUT BOARD, THEREBY PROVIDING A MORE COMPLETE PROTECTION FOR THE PSS AGAINST INTERNAL FAILURES

SAFETY EVALUATION: A PSS FAILURE IS ANNUNCIATED ON ANNUNCIATOR ALB31 (1X5DM207, SHEET 23), WINDOW D03 (GENERATOR VOLTAGE REGULATOR ALARM) AND INDICATED BY A FLASHING LIGHT-EMITTING DIODE (LED) IN THE REGULATOR CUBICLE. ALTHOUGH NOT DESIRABLE DURING NORMAL PSS OPERATION, THE FAILURE ALARM CAN BE DISABLED AT THE PSS USING THE ALARM LOCKOUT SWITCH. IF THIS HAPPENS THE ALARM LOCKOUT IS ANNUNCIATED ON ALB31, WINDOW D04 (GENERATOR VOLTAGE

REGULATOR ALARM LOCKOUT). ANNUNCIATOR ALB31 IS LOCATED ON THE ELECTRICAL AUXILIARY BOARD (QEAB). CHANGING THE TERMINATION OF WIRE 26 BETWEEN THE CEILING SENSING AND WASHOUT AND OUTPUT CIRCUIT BOARDS PROVIDES AN ENHANCED SUPERVISION OF THE WASHOUT OUTPUT CIRCUIT BOARD SUCH THAT A FAILURE OF THE FINAL STAGE OF THE WASHOUT AND OUTPUT CIRCUIT BOARD WILL BE DETECTED. ACTIVATION OF THE PSS DOES NOT AFFECT OVER SPEED PROTECTION. THEREFORE, THE TURBINE MISSILE EVALUATION EVALUATED IN FSAR SECTION 3.5.1.3 IS NOT AFFECTED. NEITHER OPERATION NOR FAILURE OF THE PSS WILL NEGATIVELY AFFECT TURBINE-GENERATOR OPERATION OR ITS INTERACTION WITH THE REACTOR. THE TURBINE-GENERATOR IS NOT EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY AND NEITHER OPERATION NOR FAILURE OF THE PSS WILL NEGATIVELY AFFECT TURBINE-GENERATOR OPERATION, INCLUDING OVER SPEED PROTECTION. ALSO, AS STATED IN FSAR SECTIONS 10.1.2 AND 10.2.1.2, THE TURBINE-GENERATOR HAS LOAD-FOLLOWING CHARACTERISTICS CONSISTENT WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE NSSS AND THE TURBINE-GENERATOR SYSTEM IS DESIGNED IN CONCERT WITH THE INTERFACE AND SYSTEM DESIGN REQUIREMENTS OF THE NSSS. TURBINE OVER SPEED, DISCUSSED IN TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION SECTION 3/4.3.4, IS NOT AFFECTED BY OPERATION OF THE PSS. THE ACTIVITY DID NOT REDUCE THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN THE BASIS FOR ANY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION.

SUBJECT: DCP: 91-V1N0202, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THIS DCP INSTALLED A FULLY REDUNDANT COMPUTER SYSTEM WHICH, WHEN ACTIVATED, RETRIEVES INFORMATION FROM THE EMERGENCY RESPONSE FACILITIES COMPUTERS SYSTEM FOR THE AFFECTED UNIT AND TRANSMIT IT OVER THE DEDICATED ERDS TELEPHONE LINE TO THE NRC. THE DEDICATED TELEPHONE LINES ARE PART OF THE FTS-2000 TELEPHONE SYSTEM WHICH IS ALREADY INSTALLED IN THE TSC. THIS MODIFICATION MEETS THE NEW REQUIREMENTS AS SET FORTH BY THE CHANGES TO 10CFR50 APPENDIX E SECTION VI WHICH STATED THAT NUCLEAR FACILITIES MUST TRANSMIT REAL-TIME DATA TO THE NRC OPERATIONS CENTER WITHIN ONE HOUR AFTER THE DECLARATION OF AN ALERT OR HIGHER CLASSIFICATION.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THIS DCP IMPLEMENTED A CHANGE TO THE PLANT THAT WILL BE INCORPORATED TO THE FSAR AND EMERGENCY PLAN WITH DCP 91-V2N0203-0-1. THIS SYSTEM PROVIDES NO MECHANISMS BY WHICH AN INCREASE IN THE PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE OF AN ACCIDENT COULD OCCUR AS IT IS ELECTRICALLY ISOLATED AND NOT LOCATED NEAR ANY SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT USED IN THE FSAR ACCIDENT ANALYSIS. IT IS NOT USED OR ASSUMED FOR ACCIDENT MITIGATION. ADDITIONAL HEAT LOADS FOR THE TSC HAVE BEEN EVALUATED TO BE WITHIN THERE LIMITS SO AS NOT TO EFFECT TSC HABITABILITY. THIS MODIFICATION DOES NOT DIRECTLY INTERFACE WITH ANY SYSTEM IDENTIFIED IN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS.

SUBJECT: DCP: 91-V1N0228, REVISION 1, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THIS DCP INSTALLED SEALS, TO PREVENT MOISTURE INTRUSION FROM STEAM, ON ASCO SOLENOIDS 1-HY-8888, 1-HY-8964, 1-FY-510A., 1FY-520A, 1FY-530A, 1FY-540A, 1LY-5242A, 1LY-5243A, 1LY-5244A, 1LY-5245A, 1HY-15196A, 1-HY-15197A, 1HY-15198A, 1HY-15199A, AND 1HY-8145. THESE VALVE SOLENOIDS WERE DISCOVERED TO BE SUSCEPTIBLE TO MOISTURE INTRUSION WHICH COULD ELECTRICALLY SHORT OUT THE CONTROL POWER TO THESE VALVES AS FOUND IN THE "MOISTURE INTRUSION BROADNESS REVIEW PER REA VG-680

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE PROBABILITY OF AN ACCIDENT IS NOT CHANGED BY THE ADDITION OF THE SEALS TO THE SOLENOIDS. THIS IMPROVES THE RELIABILITY OF THE PAMS INDICATION DUE TO THE INCREASE IN THE ENVIRONMENTAL INTEGRITY. THIS CHANGE DOES NOT AFFECT SYSTEM OPERATION, ACCIDENT ANALYSIS, PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE OF AN ACCIDENT OR INCREASE THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT AS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR NOR DOES IT CREATE AN UNPOSTULATED ACCIDENT NOT DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR.

SUBJECT: DCP: 91-V1N0233, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: REDUCE REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) AVERAGE TEMPERATURE (TAVG) FROM 588.4 °F TO 586.4 °F. THE REDUCTION IN TAVG WAS ACCOMPLISHED BY ADJUSTING THE REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM BORON CONCENTRATION. THIS DESIGN CHANGE PACKAGE DID NOT REQUIRE PHYSICAL PLANT MODIFICATIONS BUT REQUIRED SET POINT ADJUSTMENTS WITHIN THE 7300 CONTROL SYSTEM CABINETS. THE CHANGE TO TAVG RESULTED IN CHANGES TO THE STEAM GENERATOR OUTLET CONDITIONS AS FOLLOWS: STEAM GENERATOR OUTLET STEAM PRESSURE (AT THE NOZZLE): 982 PSIA, STEAM FLOW RATE AT THE STEAM GENERATOR OUTLET: 15.13 X 10⁶ LBS./HOUR (TOTAL FOR FOUR STEAM GENERATORS) RECURRING OTDT/OPDT TURBINE RUN BACK ALARMS HAVE RESULTED AT VOGTLE UNIT 1, AFTER LOADING OF VANTAGE 5 TRANSITION CORE AND REMOVAL OF THE RTD BYPASS SYSTEM, COMPLETED DURING THE THIRD REFUELING OUTAGE. IN AN ATTEMPT TO ELIMINATE THE TURBINE RUN BACK ALARMS, THE SET POINT MARGIN BETWEEN ALARM AND THE OPDT/OTDT REACTOR TRIPS WAS REDUCED TO 1% BY DCR 91-V1N0225. TO REGAIN MARGIN TO REACTOR TRIP, IT HAS BEEN TO MAINTAIN THE NOMINAL TAVG FOR PROTECTION FUNCTIONS AT THE CURRENT NOMINAL VALUE OF 588.4 F AND RE-CONFIGURE THE CONTROL SYSTEMS TO OPERATE THE PLANT AT A TAVG OF 586.4 °F. THIS 2 DEGREE DIFFERENCE IN PROTECTION VERSUS CONTROL TAVG SHOULD ACHIEVE THE EQUIVALENT MARGIN TO TRIP WHICH EXISTED PRIOR TO CHANGING THE OPDT/OTDT TURBINE RUN BACK ALARM SET POINTS.

SAFETY EVALUATION: SET POINT VALUES OR CHANGES TO SET POINTS TO ACCOMMODATE THE CHANGE TO TAVG DID NOT INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OF AN ACCIDENT PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED IN THE FSAR. NO NEW PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS ARE BEING IMPOSED ON ANY SYSTEM OR COMPONENTS SUCH THAT THE DESIGN CRITERIA WILL BE EXCEEDED. THE TEMPERATURE REDUCTION DOES NOT CREATE A CONDITION WHERE THE DESIGN, MATERIAL OR CONSTRUCTION STANDARDS THAT WERE APPLICABLE TO THE ORIGINAL DESIGN ARE ALTERED. THE REVISED VALUE FOR TAVG IS BOUNDED BY THE ACCIDENT ANALYSES PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED IN THE FSAR. THE RADIOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES OF A STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE HAVE BEEN ADDRESSED (REFERENCE SECL 91-448) FOR A BOUNDING TEMPERATURE REDUCTION WHICH DEMONSTRATES THAT DOSE CRITERIA ARE NOT EXCEEDED. RADIOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES OF OTHER TRANSIENTS ARE NOT DEPENDENT ON INITIAL RCS TEMPERATURES AND THE CURRENT ANALYSES OF RECORD REMAIN VALID. NO ADVERSE EFFECT ON THE REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM HAS BEEN CREATED AS A RESULT OF THIS MODIFICATION. COMPONENT AND SYSTEM INTEGRITY ARE MAINTAINED AND PERFORMANCE WAS NOT ADVERSELY AFFECTED. IN ADDITION, AS SPECIFIED IN SECL 91-448, THE TAVG REDUCTION DOES NOT EXPOSE EQUIPMENT USED IN ACCIDENT MITIGATION TO AN ADVERSE ENVIRONMENT FOR WHICH IT HAS NOT BEEN PREVIOUSLY QUALIFIED. EVALUATIONS OF EQUIPMENT PERFORMANCE AND INTEGRITY PRESENTED IN SECL 91-448 HAVE CONCLUDED THAT THEIR ROLE IN THE CONTROL OF RADIOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES IS NOT ALTERED. NO NEW EQUIPMENT MALFUNCTIONS HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED THAT WILL AFFECT FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER INTEGRITY. THE

TEMPERATURE REDUCTION DID NOT AFFECT THE ABILITY OF EQUIPMENT TO PERFORM ITS INTENDED SAFETY FUNCTION NOR DOES IT CREATE FAILURE MODES THAT COULD ADVERSELY AFFECT SAFETY-RELATED EQUIPMENT. CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT CHANGES ARE REQUIRED AS A RESULT OF THIS TEMPERATURE REDUCTION AND WILL BE PERFORMED IN ACCORDANCE WITH TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION SECTION 6.8.1.6. THEREFORE, THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN THE BASIS OF THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION HAS NOT BEEN REDUCED.

SUBJECT: DCP: 91-V2N0008, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THIS DCP REMOVED THE UNIT 2 RTD BYPASS SYSTEM AND REPLACED IT WITH FAST ACTING, NARROW RANGE, DUAL-ELEMENT THERMOWELL-MOUNTED RTDS INSTALLED DIRECTLY INTO THE EXISTING REACTOR COOLANT PIPING PENETRATIONS (THREE MOUNTED IN THE OLD HOT LEG SCOOP PENETRATION AND ONE MOUNTED IN THE OLD COLD LEG NOZZLE PENETRATION WITH THE CROSSOVER LINE HOLE BEING CAPPED OFF.

SAFETY EVALUATION: REACTOR COOLANT PRESSURE BOUNDARY INTEGRITY IS MAINTAINED. REACTOR COOLANT LOOP TEMPERATURE INPUTS FOR CONTROL AND PROTECTION FUNCTIONS CONTINUE TO BE SUPPLIED. ALSO OTHER EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY IS UNAFFECTED AND CONTINUE TO FUNCTION AS DESIGNED. THE ARRANGEMENT OF THE RTD MEASUREMENT SYSTEM DOES NOT AFFECT THE FUNCTION OF EQUIPMENT USED IN THE MITIGATION OF THE RADIOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES OF ANY ACCIDENT. THEREFORE, THIS CHANGE DOES NOT CREATE THE POSSIBILITY OF A MALFUNCTION OF EQUIPMENT OR AN UNREVIEWED ACCIDENT NOT DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR.

SUBJECT: DCP: 91-V2N0020, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

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

PSL-7070, AND ONE-OF-ONE LOGIC TO GENERATE THE VALVE ACTUATION SIGNALS. A MALFUNCTION OF THE PRESSURE SWITCH WOULD CAUSE EITHER A TURBINE TRIP DUE TO IMPROPER ACTUATION OF THE EXTRACTION STEAM ISOLATION VALVES OR THE LACK OF ACTUATION OF THE NON RETURN VALVE SOLENOIDS, THE EXTRACTION ISOLATION VALVES AND VARIOUS DRAIN VALVES. BY CHANGING THE TRIP LOGIC TO TWO-OF-THREE LOGIC, THE PROBABILITY OF IMPROPER ACTUATION OR LACK OF ACTUATION OF THE AFFECTED VALVES DUE TO PRESSURE SWITCH MALFUNCTION IS REDUCED.

SAFETY EVALUATION: NONE OF THE COMPONENTS ADDED OR MODIFIED BY THIS DCP ARE SAFETY RELATED. THE ADDITION OF THE PRESSURE TAP AND INSTRUMENT AIR LINE HAD A NEGLIGIBLE EFFECT ON THE CLOSING TIMES FOR THE EXTRACTION STEAM NON RETURN VALVES. THE VALVES STILL CLOSE WITHIN TWO SECONDS OF ACTUATION OF THE ARDVS. THEREFORE THERE IS NO EFFECT ON THE TURBINE OVER SPEED PROTECTION PROVIDED BY THE NON RETURN VALVES. CHANGING THE ONE-OF-ONE LOGIC, WHICH CURRENTLY GENERATES VALVE ACTUATION SIGNALS, TO A TWO-OF-THREE LOGIC PROVIDE FOR MORE RELIABLE OPERATION OF THE TURBINE EXTRACTION STEAM SYSTEM. THE POSSIBILITY OF A TURBINE TRIP DUE TO MALFUNCTION OF THE EXTRACTION ISOLATION VALVES WAS REDUCED. THE REACTOR TRIP CIRCUITRY AND REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEMS ARE NOT ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY THIS DCP. THE MARGINS OF SAFETY AS DESCRIBED IN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS DO NOT REFER TO THE TURBINE EXTRACTION STEAM SYSTEM. THE EXTRACTION STEAM SYSTEM IS MORE RELIABLE DUE TO THE CHANGE IN VALVE ACTUATION LOGIC. SINCE THE RESULTS OF A TURBINE TRIP OR TURBINE OVER SPEED EVENT ARE NOT CHANGED BY THIS DCP, THE MARGINS OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN THE BASIS FOR THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS WAS NOT REDUCED.

SUBJECT: DCP: 91-V2N0023, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THIS DCP REPLACED THE PREVIOUS STEAM CONDENSATE DRAIN POT LEVEL MEASURING INSTRUMENTATION (MANUFACTURER-MAGNETROL) WITH AN ELECTRONIC SYSTEM THAT MEASURES LEVEL BY DETECTING THE ELECTROLYTIC CONDUCTIVITY DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE STEAM AND WATER INTERFACE. THE LEVEL SWITCH CONTROLS THE OPENING AND CLOSING OF THE CONDENSATE DRAIN VALVES. THE NEW YARWAY/AQUARIAN 1000 LEVEL SWITCHES, CONSISTING OF A MODULE AND TWO LEVEL PROBES.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THIS DCP ALLOWS THE STEAM CONDENSATE DRAIN POT LEVEL SYSTEM TO OPERATE PROPERLY PER ITS DESIGN FUNCTION. THIS CHANGE DOES NOT ADD ANY NEW ACCIDENT SOURCES NOR DOES IT ALTER THE OPERATION OR DESIGN OF ANY EQUIPMENT ASSUMED TO FUNCTION IN AN ACCIDENT. THE OPERATION OF THESE LEVEL SWITCHES AND THEIR COMPANION VALVES IS NOT ASSUMED BY ANY ACCIDENT ANALYSIS IN THE FSAR. THESE LEVEL SWITCHES DO NOT PERFORM A SAFETY RELATED FUNCTION. THESE VALVES ARE NOT REQUIRED TO OPERATE DURING ACCIDENT CONDITIONS. THE LEVEL SWITCH AND ASSOCIATED CONTROL AND POWER FOR THE DRAIN VALVE ARE NON-SAFETY RELATED. A REVIEW OF THE FSAR INCLUDING SECTION 10.2 AND CHAPTERS 7 AND 15 SHOWS THAT THE CHANGES ASSOCIATED WITH THIS DESIGN CHANGE DID NOT INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE OF A MALFUNCTION OF EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED IN THE FSAR. THIS DESIGN CHANGE ENHANCES THE RELIABILITY AND PERFORMANCE OF THE STEAM CONDENSATE DRAIN POT LEVEL INSTRUMENTATION SYSTEM. FAILURE EFFECTS OF MAJOR COMPONENTS IN THE MAIN STEAM SYSTEM ARE ANALYZED IN FSAR TABLE 10.3.3-1. THESE EFFECTS ARE UNCHANGED BY THIS DCP. THE LEVEL INSTRUMENTATION

IN THE TURBINE BUILDING AND ITS ASSOCIATED PIPING AND SUPPORT MODIFICATION PER THIS DCP WILL NOT CREATE THE POSSIBILITY OF A MALFUNCTION OF EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY. ALL APPROPRIATE DESIGN CRITERIA HAVE BEEN MET BY THIS DESIGN CHANGE. THE MARGIN OF SAFETY DEFINED BY THE BASES OF TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS INCLUDING THE BASES TO 3/4.3 AND 3/4.7 IS NOT DECREASED SINCE THE DESIGN CHANGES ASSURE THAT THE STEAM DRAIN POT SYSTEM OPERATES CORRECTLY. THE LEVEL SWITCHES ARE NON-SAFETY RELATED AND THEIR FAILURE DID NOT COMPROMISE ANY SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT OR PREVENT A SAFE SHUTDOWN OF THE PLANT.

SUBJECT: DCP: 91-V2N0024, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THIS DCP REPLACED THE OLD STEAM CONDENSATE DRAIN POT LEVEL MEASURING INSTRUMENTATION WITH ELECTRONIC SYSTEM WHICH MEASURES LEVEL BY DETECTING THE ELECTROLYTIC CONDUCTIVITY DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE STEAM AND THE WATER INTERFACE. THE LEVEL SWITCH CONTROLS THE OPENING AND CLOSING OF THE CONDENSATE DRAIN VALVES FOR THE FOLLOWING LEVEL SWITCHES: 2LS-3145, 2LS-3147, 2LS-6271, 2LS-6273, 2LS-6276, 2LS-6287, 2LS-6281, 2LS-6288, 2LSH-5178, AND 2LSH-5179.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE LEVEL SWITCHES ARE NON-SAFETY RELATED AND DO NOT COMPROMISE ANY SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT OR PREVENT A SAFE SHUTDOWN OF THE PLANT.

SUBJECT: DCP: 91-V2N0044, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THIS DESIGN CHANGE MODIFIED THE REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) BACKFLUSHABLE FILTER (2-1208-F4-001) IN THE LETDOWN LINE TO ALLOW INSTALL OF AN ADAPTER PLATE IN THE FILTER HOUSING TO ALLOW A PALL FILTER CO. CARTRIDGE FILTER TO BE INSTALLED AND MODIFIED THE VESSEL CLOSURE HEAD TO UTILIZE A HINGED HEAD WITH SWING BOLTS. A CARTRIDGE FILTER ELEMENT CAN NOW BE USED IN THE RCS FILTER TO ALLOW REMOVAL OF SMALLER PARTICLES FROM THE RCS WHICH REDUCE THE OVERALL RADIATION DOSE FROM THE RCS. THE PROJECT CLASS OF THE FILTER AND APPLICABLE FILTER PIPING/VALVES BEING MODIFIED IS 212 AND THE NITROGEN PIPING REMOVED, THAT WAS USED FOR BACKFLUSHING WAS PROJECT CLASS 424.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE MODIFICATIONS WERE PERFORMED TO COMPLY WITH ALL APPLICABLE ORIGINAL DESIGN CRITERIA AND CODES. THE OPERATION OF THE VALVES WAS CHANGED SO THE RCS INLET AND OUTLET VALVES FAIL CLOSED AND THE BYPASS VALVE FAILS OPEN. THIS PREVENTS THE INLET AND OUTLET VALVES FROM OPENING WHILE THE FILTER HEAD IS OPEN WHICH COULD CAUSE RCS FLUID TO SPILL INTO THE AREA. NO EQUIPMENT OR COMPONENTS REQUIRED TO MITIGATE AN ACCIDENT ARE LOCATED IN THE FILTER PIT THAT COULD AFFECT THE SAFE SHUTDOWN OF THE REACTOR SHOULD A FAILURE OCCUR DURING THE FILTER CARTRIDGE REPLACEMENT THAT COULD DAMAGE THE FILTER VESSEL OR ASSOCIATED PIPING LOCATED IN THE FILTER VESSEL PIT. THIS DESIGN CHANGE DID NOT MODIFY OR CHANGE ANY EQUIPMENT OR COMPONENT REQUIRED TO MITIGATE AN ACCIDENT NOR IT ADVERSELY AFFECT THE OPERATION OR FUNCTION OF ANY EQUIPMENT OR COMPONENT REQUIRED TO MITIGATE AN ACCIDENT. THE HOIST LOAD PATH HAS BEEN EVALUATED AND A DROP FROM THE MAXIMUM HEIGHT DID NOT RESULT IN THE LOSS OF REDUNDANT TRAINS OF SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT. THE RCS FILTER IS NOT

REQUIRED TO PERFORM ANY FUNCTION OTHER THAN MAINTAIN PRESSURE BOUNDARY INTEGRITY TO MITIGATE AN ACCIDENT. THE MODIFICATION TO THE RCS FILTER COMPLIES WITH THE ORIGINAL APPLICABLE DESIGN CRITERIA AND CODES. THIS DESIGN CHANGE DOES NOT HAVE ANY ADVERSE EFFECT ON ANY EQUIPMENT OR COMPONENT REQUIRED TO MITIGATE AN ACCIDENT NOR DOES IT INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OF AN ACCIDENT EITHER NOT IDENTIFIED OR IDENTIFIED IN THE DESIGN BASIS OF THE PLANT THAT WOULD JEOPARDIZE THE SAFETY OF THE PUBLIC. THEREFORE, THIS DESIGN CHANGE DOES NOT REDUCE THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN THE BASIS FOR ANY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION.

SUBJECT: DCP: 91-V2N0055, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THIS CHANGE REPLACED FIVE CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM (CVCS-SYSTEM NO. 1208) ROCKWELL DIAPHRAGM VALVES WITH GATE VALVES. THE VALVES ARE ASSOCIATED WITH THE CHEMICAL MIXING TANK (2-1208T6-005), SEE P&ID 2X4DB116-1. THIS FIVE GALLON TANK, DEPENDING ON PLANT MODE, IS USED IN THE PREPARATION OF CAUSTIC SOLUTIONS FOR PH CONTROL, HYDRAZINE SOLUTION FOR OXYGEN SCAVENGING, AND CHEMICALS FOR CORROSION PRODUCT OXIDATION DURING A REFUELING SHUTDOWN. THE VALVE TAG NUMBERS, SIZES AND PROJECT CLASSIFICATIONS ARE: VALVES TAG # 2-1208-U4-176, 2-1208-U4-178, 2-1208-U4-179, 2-1208-U4-180, 2-1208-U4-181. THE PREVIOUS INSTALLED DIAPHRAGM VALVES HAVE EXCESSIVE LEAKAGE PASS THEIR SEATS. FURTHERMORE, BASED ON TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.4.1.4.2 AND 3.9.1, IN PLANT MODE 5 WITH THE REACTOR COOLANT LOOPS NOT FILLED, AND IN MODE 6, VALVE 2-1208-U4-176 IS REQUIRED TO BE CLOSED AND SECURED IN POSITION IN ORDER TO PRECLUDE A BORON DILUTION EVENT. IT WAS DIFFICULT TO MEET THE INTENT OF THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS WITH EXCESSIVE VALVE LEAKAGE. THE REPLACEMENT VALVE FOR 2-1208-U4-176 IS PROVIDED WITH A LOCKING DEVICE WHICH CAN BE USED TO SECURE THE VALVE POSITION.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE NEW GATE VALVES MEET THE DESIGN, MATERIAL, QUALITY AND CONSTRUCTION STANDARDS APPLICABLE TO THE CVCS. THE NEW GATE VALVES ARE FUNCTIONALLY EQUIVALENT TO THE DIAPHRAGM VALVES. THE ADDITIONAL WEIGHT (2.5 TO 5 POUNDS) FOR EACH GATE VALVE HAS BEEN EVALUATED FOR IMPACT ON PIPE STRESS ANALYSIS AND SUPPORT LOADING AND HAS BEEN FOUND ACCEPTABLE. THE NEW VALVES MINIMIZE SEAT LEAKAGE THE GATE VALVES ARE EXPOSED TO CHEMICALS MIXED WITH WATER FROM THE RMWST. THE VALVE MATERIALS ARE COMPATIBLE WITH THE CHEMICAL SOLUTIONS BEING USED. THE RMWST RECEIVES ITS WATER FROM THE PLANT DEMINERALIZED WATER STORAGE AND DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (SYSTEM NO. 1418) AND FROM THE LIQUID WASTE SYSTEM (SYSTEM NO. 1901). BASED ON FSAR SECTION 12.2, THE RMWST IS EXPECTED TO CONTAIN LOW LEVELS OF RADIOACTIVITY. THEREFORE, ANY RADIOACTIVITY WITHIN THE RMWST COULD BE TRANSFERRED TO THE CHEMICAL MIXING TANK. FSAR SECTION 9.3.4.1.2.5.25 INDICATES WHERE PRESSURE AND TEMPERATURE CONDITIONS PERMIT, DIAPHRAGM-TYPE VALVES ARE USED TO ESSENTIALLY ELIMINATE LEAKAGE TO THE ATMOSPHERE. REPLACEMENT OF THE DIAPHRAGM VALVES WITH GATE VALVES IS ACCEPTABLE SINCE THE CHEMICAL MIXING TANK CONTAINS LOW LEVELS OF RADIOACTIVITY ONLY, AND EXTERNAL (STEM) LEAKAGE, IF ANY, WILL BE COLLECTED BY THE FLOOR DRAIN SYSTEM AND THEN PROCESSED BY THE LIQUID WASTE SYSTEM. THE REPLACEMENT OF

DIAPHRAGM VALVES WITH GATE VALVES DID NOT ALTER OR INTERFERE WITH THE SAFETY RELATED FUNCTIONS OF THE CVCS. NO NEW ACCIDENT INITIATION OR FAILURE MECHANISM HAS BEEN ADDED AS A RESULT OF THE DESIGN CHANGE. THE MODIFICATIONS REQUIRED BY THIS DCP HAVE BEEN IMPLEMENTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PLANT APPROVED SPECIFICATIONS AND PROCEDURES WHICH RESULT IN A DESIGN THAT IS IN COMPLIANCE WITH EXISTING PLANT DESIGN REQUIREMENTS. FURTHERMORE, APPLICABLE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS, 3.4.1.4.2 AND 3.9.1, INCLUDING THE CORRESPONDING BASIS, HAVE BEEN REVIEWED AND IT HAS BEEN DETERMINED THAT THEY ARE NOT AFFECTED BY THIS CHANGE.

SUBJECT: DCP: 91-V2N0074, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THE PREVIOUS SECONDARY PLANT DISSOLVED OXYGEN ANALYZERS CONSISTING OF SAMPLE CABINETS AE-9521, AE-9528, AND AE-20187, AITS-9521, AITS-9528, AITS-20187 ARE NO LONGER MANUFACTURED OR SUPPORTED BY THE VENDOR, HAYS INSTRUMENT CO. THIS DCP REPLACED THE THREE PREVIOUS INDIVIDUAL HAYS OXYGEN ANALYZER ASSEMBLIES WITH A STATE OF THE ART MULTICHANNEL DISSOLVED OXYGEN ANALYZER MANUFACTURED BY ORBISPHERE LABORATORIES (MODEL 2620-5). THE NEW UNIT IS CONFIGURED WITH THREE CHANNELS, WITH THE CAPABILITY TO BE EXPANDED TO FIVE CHANNELS.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THIS DESIGN CHANGE IS CONSIDERED EQUIVALENT TO THE PREVIOUS ACCEPTABLE CONDITIONS AND REPRESENTS NO POSSIBLE ADVERSE EFFECTS WHICH COULD INCREASE THE RADIOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES OF ANY ACCIDENT EVALUATED IN THE FSAR.

SUBJECT: DCP: 91-V2N0087, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: A 2" SERVICE AIR LINE, 2-2401-L4-650, AND ISOLATION VALVE, 2-2401-U4-682, WAS ADDED TO EXISTING SERVICE AIR HEADER, 2-2401-521-4", LOCATED IN THE SOUTH MAIN STEAM TUNNEL, 2T1. THIS ADDITIONAL LINE PROVIDES A COMPRESSED AIR SUPPLY FOR SLUDGE LANCING OF THE STEAM GENERATORS DURING REFUELING OUTAGES. THE SERVICE AIR LINE, PIPING CLASS LLO, WAS ROUTED TO AN AREA ABOVE THE STEAM TUNNEL GRATING WHERE AN ISOLATION VALVE AND THREADED END CAP CAN BE EASILY ACCESSED FOR CONNECTION TO THE SLUDGE LANCING EQUIPMENT. THREE PIPE SUPPORTS WERE ADDED FOR THE 2" SERVICE AIR LINE TO MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF SUPPORTING PROJECT CLASS 626 PIPE.

SAFETY EVALUATION: INSTALLING AN ADDITIONAL SERVICE AIR CONNECTION ON AN EXISTING HEADER DID NOT IMPACT THE OPERATION OR THE RELIABILITY OF THE COMPRESSED AIR SYSTEM. THE MODIFICATION MEETS ALL ORIGINAL DESIGN CRITERIA. USE OF THE AIR CONNECTION IS INTENDED TO BE DURING REFUELING OUTAGES. THE ADDITIONAL DEMAND ON THE SERVICE AIR PORTION OF THE COMPRESSED AIR SYSTEM WILL NOT AFFECT PLANT INSTRUMENT AIR. THE COMPRESSED AIR SYSTEM HAS ADEQUATE CAPACITY TO SUPPLY BOTH INSTRUMENT AIR TO INSTRUMENTS AND VALVE OPERATORS THROUGHOUT THE UNIT AND SERVICE AIR FOR SLUDGE LANCING. IN ORDER TO PROVIDE FOR THE CONSERVATION OF COMPRESSED AIR IN THE EVENT OF EXCESSIVE SERVICE AIR DEMAND, THE HEADER TO THE SERVICE AIR DRYERS IS AUTOMATICALLY ISOLATED WHEN A PRESSURE SWITCH SENSES SERVICE AIR PRESSURE DECREASE TO APPROXIMATELY 80 PSIG. THE PORTION OF THE LINE THAT IS ABOVE THE GRATING IS LOCATED APPROXIMATELY 3'-6" FROM THE AUXILIARY BUILDING AND IS NOT IN DANGER OF BEING DAMAGED BY VEHICLES OR EQUIPMENT IN THE AREA. THE

COMPRESSED AIR SYSTEM IS NOT REQUIRED TO MITIGATE THE CONSEQUENCES OF ANY ACCIDENTS. NO EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY RELIES ON COMPRESSED AIR IN ORDER TO PERFORM ITS SAFETY FUNCTION. SUPPLYING SERVICE AIR TO THE SLUDGE LANCING TRAILER DURING OUTAGES HAS NO EFFECT ON PLANT EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY BECAUSE THE COMPRESSED AIR SYSTEM IS SIZED ADEQUATELY TO SUPPLY INSTRUMENT AIR AND SERVICE AIR THROUGHOUT THE PLANT FOR VARIOUS USES, INCLUDING SLUDGE LANCING. NEITHER THE CONFIGURATION NOR THE OPERATION OF THE SERVICE AIR SYSTEM ARE COVERED IN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS.

SUBJECT: DCP: 91-V2N0114, REVISION 1, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: DCP 90-V2N0166-0-1 ADDED NORMALLY CLOSED MANUAL ISOLATION VALVES IN THE PNEUMATIC LINES OF THE JACKET WATER SENSORS TO DISABLE THESE SENSORS DURING EMERGENCY STARTS. DURING NON-EMERGENCY STARTS, THESE VALVES CAN BE MANUALLY OPENED TO ENABLE THE HIGH TEMPERATURE JACKET WATER TRIPS. THE CHANGE OF CONVERTING THE JACKET WATER SENSORS TO GROUP II AUTOMATICALLY DISABLES THE TRIPS DURING EMERGENCY STARTS, AND ENABLE THE TRIPS DURING NORMAL STARTS. THIS CHANGE ALSO PLACES THE SENSORS IN THE TEST BYPASS CIRCUITRY. THIS CHANGE MEETS THE REQUIREMENTS OF REG. GUIDE 1.9. ABNORMAL VALUES OF JACKET WATER TEMPERATURE (190°F AND 200°F) ARE ALARMED LOCALLY AND IN THE MAIN CONTROL ROOM. THE FIRST-OUT CONNECTION TO THE LOW PRESSURE JACKET WATER ANNUNCIATOR ON BOTH D/GS IS BEING DISCONNECTED BECAUSE IT IS NOT A TRIP ALARM AND ONLY TRIP ALARMS SHOULD BE INPUT TO THE FIRST-OUT CIRCUITRY. THE VALVES ISOLATE EACH LINE FROM THE CENTRAL AIR SUPPLY LINE, AND THE VALVED TEST TEES ALLOW FOR AN EASY CONNECTION OF THE TEST EQUIPMENT. SINCE THE JACKET WATER SENSORS ARE BEING ADDED TO GROUP II, A MAKE-UP AIR LINE WITH A 0.006" ORIFICE WAS ADDED TO LINE E16-B.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE CONVERSION OF THE HIGH JACKET WATER TEMPERATURE SENSORS TO A GROUP II TRIP DID NOT INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE OF ANY ACCIDENT DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR, INCLUDING THOSE DISCUSSED IN CHAPTERS 8, 9, OR 15. THESE CHANGES ONLY ENHANCED THE PERFORMANCE OF THE DIESEL GENERATOR BY DECREASING THE PROBABILITY OF AN INADVERTENT DIESEL GENERATOR TRIP DURING AN EMERGENCY START. THE OPERATOR CAN STILL MANUALLY TRIP THE DIESEL UPON RECEIPT OF A HIGH JACKET WATER TEMPERATURE ALARM, AND THUS PROTECTING THE ENGINE FROM DAMAGE WHILE THE CAUSE OF THE HIGH JACKET WATER TEMPERATURE ALARM IS BEING INVESTIGATED. THE DISCONNECTION OF THE FIRST OUT CIRCUITRY FROM THE LOW PRESSURE JACKET WATER ANNUNCIATOR DID NOT AFFECT THE PERFORMANCE OR OPERATION OF THE D/G. THE LOW PRESSURE JACKET WATER TRIP ANNUNCIATOR INPUT TO THE FIRST-OUT CIRCUITRY REMAINS. THE ADDITION OF THE VALVED TEST TEES AND MANUAL ISOLATION VALVES IN THE AIR SUPPLY LINES ONLY AFFECTS THE LEAK TESTING OF THE ASSOCIATED LINES AND SENSORS. DURING NORMAL D/G OPERATION, THESE COMPONENTS ARE NOT ACTIVE. ALL OF THE CHANGES MADE TO CONVERT THE HIGH JACKET WATER TEMPERATURE SENSORS TO GROUP II SENSORS ARE SEISMICALLY AND ENVIRONMENTALLY QUALIFIED FOR THE DIESEL GENERATOR ENVIRONMENT AND THE D/G CONTROL PANEL'S OPERABILITY DURING AND AFTER A SEISMIC EVENT IS NOT ADVERSELY AFFECTED. THIS CHANGE DID NOT INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OF A MALFUNCTION OF THE DIESEL ENGINE OR ANY OTHER EQUIPMENT OR COMPONENTS AS ANALYZED IN THE FSAR. THIS CHANGE DECREASED THE PROBABILITY OF THE D/G TRIPPING ON EMERGENCY START. THE HIGH TEMPERATURE JACKET WATER SENSOR DESIGN CHANGE DID NOT DECREASE THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED BY THE BASIS OF THE TECH SPECS INCLUDING THE BASES FOR 3/4.4, 3/4.5, 3/4.8, 3/4.9, OR THE BASES FOR

THE SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT IN 3/4.8.1. THE MARGIN OF SAFETY OF THE REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM, EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM AND REFUELING OPERATION IS RELATED TO THE AVAILABILITY OF THE SITE ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEM TO PROVIDE SUFFICIENT POWER TO THE SAFETY-RELATED EQUIPMENT REQUIRED FOR THE SAFE SHUTDOWN OF THE FACILITY AND THE MITIGATION AND CONTROL OF ACCIDENT CONDITIONS WITHIN THE FACILITY. A LOSS OF OFF SITE POWER IS A CONTRIBUTING EVENT DURING OTHER POSTULATED ACCIDENTS. THE OPERABILITY OF THE ON SITE A.C. POWER SOURCE WAS NOT DEGRADED BY IMPLEMENTING THIS DESIGN CHANGE.

SUBJECT: DCP: 91-V2N0120, REVISION 1, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THE TURBINE PLANT COOLING WATER SYSTEM (TPCWS), SYSTEM 1405, IS DESIGNED TO SUPPLY COOLING WATER TO VARIOUS HEAT EXCHANGERS THROUGHOUT THE TURBINE BUILDING, CONTROL BUILDING, AND AUXILIARY BUILDING DURING ALL MODES OF NORMAL PLANT OPERATION AND POWER GENERATION. THE SYSTEM CONSISTS OF TWO 100% CAPACITY TPCW PUMPS, 2-1405-P4-501 AND 502 (ONE IS A BACKUP), AND ASSOCIATED PIPING, VALVES, CONTROLS, AND INSTRUMENTATION. THE POWER SUPPLY FOR TPCW PUMP 2-1405-P4-501 DISCHARGE VALVE 2HV-6798 WAS CHANGED FROM MCC 2NBT (FED BY 4160V SWITCH GEAR 2NA04) LOCATED IN THE CHEMICAL ELECTRICAL BUILDING TO MCC ANBK (FED BY 4160V SWITCH GEAR 2NA01) LOCATED IN THE DIESEL FIRE PUMP HOUSE NO. 2. A DESIGN CHANGE OF THIS NATURE HAS BEEN PERFORMED ON UNIT 1 (DCP 91-V1N0119-1-1). THE VALVE CONTINUES TO OPERATE AS BEFORE, OPENING AUTOMATICALLY WHEN PUMP 501 STARTS AND CLOSING WHEN PUMP 501 STOPS. CURRENTLY, MCC 2NBT (FED BY 4160V SWITCH GEAR 2NA04) SUPPLIES POWER TO TPCW PUMP 2-1405-P4-502 DISCHARGE VALVE 2HV-6799, AS WELL AS TPCW PUMP 2-1405-P4-501 (THE ALTERNATE PUMP) DISCHARGE VALVE 2HV-6798. IN THE EVENT OF LOSS OF POWER AT 2NA04 (WHICH FEEDS PUMP 502), TPCW PUMP 501 WOULD BE STARTED; HOWEVER, ITS DISCHARGE VALVE WOULD REMAIN CLOSED. THE ONLY TPCW FLOW WOULD BE THROUGH THE MINIMUM FLOW LINE, RESULTING IN A LOSS OF COOLING TO THE VARIOUS EQUIPMENT THAT DEPEND ON TPCW FOR HEAT REMOVAL. MCC ANBK IS FED FROM 4160V SWITCH GEAR 2NA01, WHICH IS INDEPENDENT OF 2NA04.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE ONLY CHANGE MADE WAS THE POWER SUPPLY TO TPCW PUMP 2-1405-P4-501 DISCHARGE VALVE 2HV-6798. FAILURE OF THE SUBJECT VALVE COULD AFFECT THE EQUIPMENT THAT DEPENDS ON COOLING BY TPCW. NONE OF THE AFFECTED EQUIPMENT, HOWEVER, IS SAFETY-RELATED. FAILURE OF THE TPCW DISCHARGE VALVE, WILL NOT COMPROMISE A SAFETY-RELATED SYSTEM OR PREVENT SAFE SHUTDOWN OF THE PLANT. THE EQUIPMENT AFFECTED BY THIS DESIGN CHANGE IS NOT ASSUMED TO FUNCTION IN AN ACCIDENT ANALYZED IN CHAPTER 15 OF THE FSAR. IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS DESIGN CHANGE WILL NOT CAUSE THE MALFUNCTION OF OTHER EQUIPMENT THAT IS ASSUMED TO FUNCTION. THE TPCW SYSTEM IS NEITHER REQUIRED FOR THE SAFE SHUTDOWN OF THE PLANT NOR DOES IT HAVE A SAFETY DESIGN BASIS. CHANGING THE POWER SUPPLY TO DISCHARGE VALVE 2HV-6798 DID NOT CREATE THE POSSIBILITY OF AN ACCIDENT OF A DIFFERENT TYPE THAN PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED IN THE FSAR. SHOULD THE CHANGE IN POWER SUPPLY TO THE AFFECTED VALVE RESULT IN FAILURE OF THE VALVE TO ACTUATE AND FAILURE OF TPCW TO DELIVER COOLING WATER TO ITS LOADS, THERE WOULD BE NO EFFECT THAT WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO AN ACCIDENT SCENARIO NOT ADDRESSED IN THE FSAR BECAUSE THE EQUIPMENT THAT DEPENDS ON COOLING BY TPCW IS NOT SAFETY-RELATED AND IS NOT RELIED UPON FOR SAFE SHUTDOWN OF THE PLANT. THIS DESIGN CHANGE DID NOT REDUCE THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION SAFETY MARGINS SINCE THE SYSTEM AFFECTED, SYSTEM 1405, DOES NOT HAVE A SAFETY DESIGN BASES, AND THIS MODIFICATION MEETS ALL OF THE APPROPRIATE DESIGN CRITERIA.

SUBJECT: DCP: 91-V2N0143, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THIS DESIGN CHANGE PACKAGE MODIFIED THE BRACKET (HANGER) FOR THE SPENT FUEL HANDLING TOOL (TAG NO. 2-2204-A6-001) IN THE UNIT 2 TRANSFER CANAL. IN ITS OLD CONFIGURATION THE SPENT FUEL HANDLING TOOL HANGER REQUIRED THAT AN OPERATOR LEAN OVER THE HAND RAIL AND TRANSFER CANAL TO TAKE THE TOOL ON AND OFF THE HANGER. THIS WAS AN UNSAFE CONDITION FOR PLANT PERSONNEL. THE PROJECT CLASS FOR THE SPENT FUEL HANDLING TOOL HANGER IS 62C. THE SPENT FUEL HANDLING TOOL HANGER IS A SEISMIC CATEGORY 2 OVER 1 COMPONENT.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE ATTACHMENT LOCATION OF THE HANGER TO THE FUEL HANDLING BUILDING FLOOR DID NOT CHANGE. THIS HANGER WAS ADDED DURING CONSTRUCTION AND THE IMPACT ON THE ACCIDENTS PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED IN THE FSAR WERE ADDRESSED DURING DESIGN. THE REVISED STORAGE HEIGHT OF THE SPENT FUEL HANDLING TOOL WAS VERIFIED TO BE LESS THAN THE STORAGE HEIGHTS OF THE THIMBLE PLUG TOOL, THE RCCA TOOL, AND THE BPRA TOOL. AS A RESULT, THE MODIFICATION BY THIS DCP IS ENVELOPED BY THE OTHER EXISTING TOOL STORAGE HEIGHTS AND THEREFORE IS WITHIN THE MAXIMUM DROP HEIGHT CRITERIA AS STATED IN SECTION 9.1.4.6 OF THE FSAR. THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS DO NOT ADDRESS THE SPENT FUEL HANDLING TOOL OR ITS HANGER.

SUBJECT: DCP: 91-V2N0157, REVISION 1, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THE DESIGN CHANGE REMOVED PRESSURE RELIEF VALVES 2PSV-8510A AND 2PSV-8510B FROM THE CENTRIFUGAL CHARGING PUMP (CCP) ALTERNATE MINIFLOW LINES TO THE REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK (RWST). THE PIPING BETWEEN THE RELIEF VALVES AND UPSTREAM MOV'S 2HV-8509A AND 2HV-8509B WAS DOWNGRADED FROM PROJECT CLASS 212 TO PROJECT CLASS 414. LOGIC WAS ADDED TO THE OPERATION OF MOV'S 2HV-8508A AND 2HV-8508B SUCH THAT THESE MOV'S OPERATE IN A PRESSURE CONTROL MODE FOLLOWING A SAFETY INJECTION (SI) ACTUATION; IN THIS MODE THE MOV'S OPEN AND CLOSE BASED ON CCP DISCHARGE PRESSURE. A PRESSURE SWITCH, 2PS-8508A(B), WAS ADDED AT THE CCP DISCHARGE HEADER OF EACH TRAIN TO CONTROL OPERATION OF THE ASSOCIATED MOV. HANDSWITCHES 2HS-8508A AND 2HS-8508B WERE REPLACED WITH SWITCHES WHICH HAVE AN ADDITIONAL A PULL TO LOCK FUNCTION. THE PULL TO LOCK POSITION IS USED TO MANUALLY ENABLE THE OPERATION OF 2HV-8508A AND 2HV-8508B IN THE PRESSURE CONTROL MODE. A WHITE LIGHT WAS ALSO BE ADDED AT EACH HANDSWITCH TO INDICATE WHEN THE PRESSURE CONTROL MODE IS ENABLED. THE HANDSWITCHES ARE PROJECT CLASS 11E.

SAFETY EVALUATION: CVCS MALFUNCTIONS THAT RESULT IN A DECREASE IN THE BORON CONCENTRATION OF THE REACTOR COOLANT, ANALYZED IN FSAR SUBSECTION 15.4.6, WERE NOT AFFECTED BY THE DESIGN CHANGE. THE DESIGN CHANGE DID NOT AFFECT THE CONCENTRATION OF BORON IN THE REACTOR MAKEUP COOLANT AND DID NOT AFFECT THE LIKELIHOOD OF A BORON DILUTION EVENT. THE DESIGN CHANGE INVOLVES COMPONENTS WHICH FORM A PART OF THE ECCS BUT DID NOT INVOLVE INPUT TO THE ECCS ACTUATION SYSTEM. THE LIKELIHOOD OF INADVERTENT ECCS ACTUATION HAS NOT BEEN INCREASED. SIMILARLY, THE CHANGE IS OF SUCH A NATURE THAT THE LIKELIHOOD OF CVCS MALFUNCTIONS THAT COULD RESULT IN INCREASED RCS INVENTORY WERE NOT INCREASED. DURING NORMAL OPERATION, CHARGING PUMP FLOW IS UNAFFECTED BY THE DESIGN CHANGE; MOV'S

2HV-8508A/B WERE CLOSED AND UNAFFECTED BY CCP DISCHARGE PRESSURE. THE PULL TO LOCK POSITION WAS ADDED BY THE DESIGN CHANGE BUT IS ONLY USED DURING ABNORMAL CONDITIONS. UNLIKE THE PREVIOUS DESIGN, THE PULL TO LOCK POSITION COULD ALLOW A MOV TO OPEN WHILE IN A NORMAL CHARGING CONFIGURATION. HOWEVER, MOVEMENT OF THE HANDSWITCH TO THIS POSITION WOULD REQUIRE A DELIBERATE ACTION; FURTHERMORE, THIS ACTION WOULD BE IMMEDIATELY ANNUNCIATED BY THE MONITOR LIGHT DISPLAY FOR THIS VALVE, AND WOULD BE DETECTABLE BY THE ILLUMINATION OF THE WHITE LIGHT AT THE HANDSWITCH. THE HANDSWITCH ALLOWS CLOSURE OF THE MOV AND DISABLING OF THE PRESSURE CONTROL MODE (WITH NO SI PRESENT). THE CHANGE AFFECTS THE DESIGN AND OPERATION OF THE CCP ALTERNATE MINIFLOW PATH FOR EACH TRAIN. THE PERFORMANCE OF THE ECCS WAS NOT REDUCED COMPARED TO THE PREVIOUS CONFIGURATION, HOWEVER. THE FLOW RATE THROUGH THE ALTERNATE MINIFLOW PATH IS REGULATED BY FLOW ORIFICE 2FO-10120(10121) AND IS LESS THAN THE FLOW WHICH PREVIOUSLY PASSED THROUGH RELIEF VALVE 2PSV-8510A(B) AND ALLOWS A SLIGHTLY GREATER ECCS FLOW TO THE RCS THAN THE PREVIOUS CONFIGURATION. THE MODIFIED DESIGN ECCS PERFORMANCE IS BETTER THAN THE PREVIOUS CONFIGURATION. THE MODIFIED DESIGN DID NOT DEGRADE THE PERFORMANCE OF THE CVCS DURING OTHER ABNORMAL EVENTS FOR WHICH ALTERNATE MINIFLOW MAY BE NEEDED, SUCH AS SAFETY GRADE CHARGING FOLLOWING LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR OR A SAFETY GRADE COLD SHUTDOWN. THE CONCLUSIONS OF THE ACCIDENT ANALYSES AS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR WERE NOT ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY THE CHANGE. IN THE PREVIOUS DESIGN, FLOW THROUGH THE ALTERNATE MINIFLOW PATH WAS REGULATED BY THE RELIEF VALVE AND EXCEEDS THE REQUIRED FLOW. WITH THE MODIFIED DESIGN, THE FLOW IS LESS THAN THE FLOW PREVIOUSLY OBTAINABLE THROUGH THE RELIEF VALVE, BUT EASILY SATISFIES PUMP REQUIREMENTS. THESE MOVES ARE NOT SUBJECT TO THE POSSIBILITY OF MOTOR DAMAGE FROM SUSTAINED OPERATION. THE MOVES HAVE ALSO BEEN EVALUATED TO ENSURE THAT THE ACTUATORS WERE PROPERLY SIZED FOR THE MODIFIED APPLICATION. PIPING CHANGES TO SAFETY RELATED PIPING HAVE BEEN ANALYZED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE APPLICABLE ASME CODE. SAFETY RELATED COMPONENTS THAT WERE ADDED BY THE CHANGE WERE SEISMICALLY AND ENVIRONMENTALLY QUALIFIED FOR THE APPLICATION. THE MODIFIED DESIGN PROVIDES A MORE POSITIVE INDICATION OF ACTUAL FLOW THROUGH THE ALTERNATE MINIFLOW PATH DUE TO THE FACT THAT THE PREVIOUS DESIGN DID NOT PROVIDE ANY INDICATION OF RELIEF VALVE POSITION. A SINGLE FAILURE OF ANY OF THE ISOLATION MOVES OR A SINGLE OPERATOR ERROR DOES NOT LEAD TO RELEASE OF RADIOACTIVE FLUID TO THE RWST. THE FAILURE EFFECTS OF OTHER COMPONENTS SUCH AS ELECTRICAL RELAYS AND HANDSWITCHES USED IN THE MOV CIRCUITRY WERE ENVELOPED BY THE PREVIOUS FMEA ANALYSIS AND DID NOT LEAD TO NEW TYPES OF FAILURE. THE DESIGN CHANGES WERE TRAIN ORIENTED SUCH THAT MALFUNCTIONS OF THE AFFECTED COMPONENTS IN ONE TRAIN CANNOT DEGRADE THE OTHER TRAIN. THE DESIGN CHANGES IMPROVES SYSTEM RELIABILITY. THE CHANGES HAVE BEEN EVALUATED FOR HAZARDS EFFECTS AND FAILURE EFFECTS; THE CONSEQUENCES WERE BOUNDED BY PREVIOUS ANALYSES AND WERE OF SUCH A NATURE THAT NO NEW TYPE OF FAILURES WERE CREATED. THESE BASES ULTIMATELY REQUIRE THAT SUFFICIENT CORE COOLING CAPABILITY IS AVAILABLE IN THE EVENT OF AN ACCIDENT TO LIMIT PEAK CLADDING TEMPERATURES TO ACCEPTABLE LIMITS. THE CCP ALTERNATE MINIMUM FLOW LINES AND COMPONENTS MUST FUNCTION TO PROVIDE PROTECTION WHEN REQUIRED TO THE CCPS AGAINST DEADHEADING CONDITIONS; THE MINIMUM FLOW LINES AND COMPONENTS MUST ALSO FUNCTION TO LIMIT PUMP RUNOUT AND TO ENSURE THERE IS SUFFICIENT ECCS INJECTION FLOW TO THE RCS WHEN REQUIRED. THE DESIGN CHANGES HAVE BEEN EVALUATED TO PERFORM THESE FUNCTIONS AS INTENDED AND DO NOT CONSTITUTE ANY REDUCTION IN THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN THE BASES TO THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS.

SUBJECT: DCP: 91-V2N0173, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THIS DCP INSTALLED A THREE INCH VENT LINE FOR WASTE MONITOR TANKS 21901T6009, 21901T6010, A1901T4012, AND A1901T4013; THE VENT LINE WAS CONNECTED TO THE AUXILIARY BUILDING HVAC EXHAUST REGISTER LOCATED IN EACH ROOM. NO OPENING EXISTED FOR THE 5000 GALLON UNIT 2 TANKS SO A NEW THREE INCH NOZZLE HAD TO BE ADDED TO BOTH OF THESE TANKS. THE COMMON 20000 GALLON TANKS HAD THERE EXISTING 3 INCH VENT LINES ROUTED TO THE EXHAUST REGISTER IN THERE ASSOCIATED ROOMS.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE ADDED VENTS ARE OF A PASSIVE TYPE AND DO NOT HAVE ANY EFFECT ON THE FUNCTION OR OPERATION OF THE AUXILIARY BUILDING VENTILATION SYSTEM OR THE LIQUID WASTE PROCESSING SYSTEM (LWPS). THE NORMAL AUXILIARY BUILDING VENTILATION SYSTEM IS NOT THE SOURCE OF ANY ACCIDENT EVALUATED IN THE FSAR. FSAR SECTIONS 15.7.2 AND 15.7.3 POSTULATE A TANK FAILURE WITHIN THE LWPS. THE TANK THAT IS ASSUMED TO FAIL IS THE RECYCLE HOLDUP TANK; THIS WAS CHOSEN BECAUSE IT HAS THE HIGHEST RADIOACTIVE INVENTORY, AND ITS FAILURE WOULD BE THE WORSE CASE SCENARIO. SINCE THIS CHANGE WILL NOT CONTRIBUTE TO THE POSTULATED FAILURE OF ANY TANKS, IT WILL NOT AFFECT THE BASES FOR THE ACCIDENTS EVALUATED IN THE FSAR AND THEREFORE DOES NOT INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE OF SUCH ACCIDENTS. FSAR SECTIONS 2.2, 2.4, 9.4, 11.2, AND 15.7 WERE REVIEWED. IT DOES NOT EFFECT THE OPERATION OF ANY SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT TO MITIGATE THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT AND DOES NOT DECREASE THE MARGIN OF SAFETY DEFINED IN ANY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES.

SUBJECT: DCP: 91-V2N0191, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THIS DESIGN CHANGE REPLACED THE FOUR (4) PREVIOUS THREE-WAY VALVES ASSOCIATED WITH THE FUEL POOL GATE SEALS SERVICE AIR SUPPLY WITH EIGHT (8) INDIVIDUAL VALVES FOR ISOLATION AND VENT/BLEED. THE NEW VALVES ARE WHITEY (SWAGELOK) 1/4", SS, NEEDLE TYPE, WITH A BALL TIP STEM, AND NPT INLET/OUTLET CONNECTIONS. THESE VALVES PROVIDE POSITIVE VENT/BLEED AND POSITIVE ISOLATION CAPABILITY FOR THE AIR SUPPLY TO THE GATE SEALS. IN ADDITION, THESE VALVES HAVE LOCKING HANDLES FOR USE WITH EITHER A LANYARD TYPE RETAINING PIN OR A PADLOCK. VALVES WHICH ARE REPLACED BY THIS DCP ARE 2-2401-U4-046, -047, -240, AND -242.

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

CHANGE UPGRADES THE SPENT FUEL POOL GATE SEAL SUPPLY AIR RELIABILITY BY REMOVING THE POSSIBILITY OF A LOSS OF SUPPLY AIR DUE TO INADVERTENT OPERATION OF THE CONTROL VALVE. THE NEW VALVES ARE SUITABLE FOR THE SERVICE AND NO RELIANCE IS MADE ON THEIR POST-ACCIDENT OPERATIONS. THIS CHANGE DID NOT REDUCE THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN THE BASIS FOR ANY OF THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS, INCLUDING THE BASIS FOR 3/4.9.

SUBJECT: DCP: 91-V2N0200, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THIS DCP DEVELOPS THE SETPOINTS FOR AND PLACES INSERVICE THE MAIN GENERATOR POWER SYSTEM STABILIZER (PSS)

SAFETY EVALUATION: DURING ABNORMAL TRANSMISSION SYSTEM CONDITIONS IN WHICH DYNAMIC OSCILLATIONS COULD OCCUR ON THE VEGP 230KV ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS THE PSS IS AN AID IN REDUCING THESE OSCILLATIONS AND ASSIST IN MAINTAINING POWER SYSTEM STABILITY. THE ACTIVATION OF THE PSS DOES NOT AFFECT THE ACCIDENT ANALYSIS OF THE FSAR, TURBINE OVERSPEED PROTECTION, OR ANY PROTECTIVE FEATURES ASSOCIATED WITH THE GENERATOR EXCITATION SYSTEM.

SUBJECT: DCP: 91-V2N0203, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THIS DCP INSTALLED A FULLY REDUNDANT COMPUTER SYSTEM WHICH, WHEN ACTIVATED, WILL RETRIEVE INFORMATION FROM THE EMERGENCY RESPONSE FACILITIES COMPUTERS SYSTEM FOR THE AFFECTED UNIT AND TRANSMIT IT OVER THE DEDICATED ERDS TELEPHONE LINE TO THE NRC. THE DEDICATED TELEPHONE LINES ARE PART OF THE FTS-2000 TELEPHONE SYSTEM WHICH IS ALREADY INSTALLED IN THE TSC. THIS MODIFICATION MEETS THE NEW REQUIREMENTS AS SET FORTH BY THE CHANGES TO 10CFR50 APPENDIX E SECTION VI WHICH STATED THAT NUCLEAR FACILITIES MUST TRANSMIT REAL-TIME DATA TO THE NRC OPERATIONS CENTER WITHIN ONE HOUR AFTER THE DECLARATION OF AN ALERT OR HIGHER CLASSIFICATION.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THIS DCP DOES IMPLEMENT A CHANGE TO THE PLANT THAT WILL BE INCORPORATED TO THE FSA~~R~~ AND EMERGENCY PLAN WITH DCP 91-V1N0202-0-1. THIS SYSTEM PROVIDES NO MECHANISMS BY WHICH AN INCREASE IN THE PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE OF AN ACCIDENT COULD OCCUR AS IT IS ELECTRICALLY ISOLATED AND NOT LOCATED NEAR ANY SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT USED IN THE FSAR ACCIDENT ANALYSIS. IT IS NOT USED OR ASSUMED FOR ACCIDENT MITIGATION. ADDITIONAL HEAT LOADS FOR THE TSC HAVE BEEN EVALUATED TO BE WITHIN THERE LIMITS SO AS NOT TO EFFECT TSC HABITABILITY. THIS MODIFICATION DOES NOT DIRECTLY INTERFACE WITH ANY SYSTEM IDENTIFIED IN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS.

SUBJECT: DCP: 91-V2N0205, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THIS DESIGN CHANGE PROVIDED IMPROVED PERFORMANCE OF THE TERRY TURBINE. THIS WAS ACCOMPLISHED BY REROUTING THE HIGH PRESSURE LEAK OFF LINE (2-1302-L4-126-1") AND LOW PRESSURE LEAK OFF LINE (2-1302-L4-125-1 1/2") SEPARATELY, AS RECOMMENDED BY DRESSER RAND IN THEIR INSTRUCTION MANUAL 1X4AF03-224. THE LOW PRESSURE DRAIN LINE WAS DISCONNECTED FROM LINE 126-2" AND ROUTED SEPARATELY TO THE BUILDING WAS RELOCATED TO ACCOMMODATE THE NEW DRAIN LINE (125-1 1/2") THROUGH THE EXISTING PENETRATION. IMPLEMENTATION

OF THIS MODIFICATIONS SATISFIES DRESSER RAND'S RECOMMENDATION FOR DRAINING THESE LEAK OFF LINES SEPARATELY.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE SEISMIC DESIGN REQUIREMENTS HAVE BEEN MAINTAINED FOR THE MODIFIED LINES. THE PIPING AND FITTINGS HAVE THE SAME PROJECT CLASS, PRESSURE, AND TEMPERATURE RATING PREVIOUSLY USED FOR THE SYSTEM. THE DRAIN LINES MODIFIED HAVE NO FUNCTION EXCEPT HELPING TO MAINTAIN THE TERRY TURBINE IN GOOD OPERATIONAL CONDITION BY DRAINING THE STEAM LEAKOFFS ADEQUATELY AND TO IMPROVE THE ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS IN THE ROOM BY ROUTING THE STEAM LEAK OFF OUTSIDE THE ROOM. THIS MODIFICATION ALLOWS THE DRAIN LINES TO BETTER PERFORM THEIR INTENDED FUNCTION. THE PENETRATION WAS RE-SEALED TO ITS ORIGINAL CRITERIA SO THAT THE FLOODING CHARACTERISTICS OF ROOMS 104 AND 106 WERE NOT IMPACTED BY THE MODIFICATION. THE DESIGN CHANGE PROVIDES A BETTER DRAINAGE SYSTEM AS RECOMMENDED BY THE SUPPLIER OF THE TERRY TURBINE. THE DESIGN CHANGE DOES NOT DEGRADE THE CAPABILITY OF THE TURBINE. THE DRAIN LINE IS SLOPED FOR CONTINUOUS DRAIN. THE SEPARATE DRAIN LINES RESULT IN REDUCED BACK PRESSURE AND REDUCED VALVE PACKING LEAKS AND STEAM SEAL LEAKS. THE REDUCTION IN BACK PRESSURE ALSO REDUCES THE CORROSION PROBLEM WITH THE TURBINE GOVERNOR VALVE STEM. EACH DRAIN LINE HAS A 1/4" HOLE DRILLED JUST ABOVE THE HIGHEST WATER LEVEL IN THE SUMP TO PREVENT ANY BACK FLOW DUE TO THE SIPHONING EFFECT THAT MAY BE CAUSED BY STEAM CONDENSING IN THE DRAIN LINES. THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT INVOLVE ANY EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY WHICH HAS NOT BEEN EVALUATED BEFORE. THE NEW DRAIN LINE WAS INSULATED FOR PERSONNEL PROTECTION. THE MODIFICATION DOES NOT AFFECT THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DESCRIBED IN THE BASES FOR ANY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BECAUSE THE CHANGE MEETS THE SAME DESIGN, INSTALLATION, INSPECTION AND TESTING REQUIREMENTS AS THE ORIGINAL DESIGN.

SUBJECT: DCP: 91-VAN0148, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THIS DCP INSTALLED A SECURITY ACAT AND THE ACCOMPANYING SECURITY ALARM DEVICES TO PROVIDE CONTROLLED ACCESS THROUGH DOOR C-102.

SAFETY EVALUATION: IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS DCP DOES NOT INCREASE THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT OR THE PROBABILITY OF AN ACCIDENT. IT DOES NOT EFFECT EQUIPMENT, SYSTEM, OR COMPONENTS REQUIRED TO MITIGATE THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT AS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR. THE MARGIN OF SAFETY HAS NOT BEEN DECREASED AS DESCRIBED IN THE BASIS FOR ANY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION.

SUBJECT: DCP: 91-VAN0181, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 2

DESCRIPTION: CCTV SWITCHER UPGRADE AND CAMERA ADDITION. THIS DCP CONTAINS SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THIS DCP CONTAINS SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION. IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS DCP DOES NOT INCREASE THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT OR THE PROBABILITY OF AN ACCIDENT. IT DOES NOT EFFECT EQUIPMENT, SYSTEM, OR COMPONENTS REQUIRED TO MITIGATE THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT AS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR. THE MARGIN OF SAFETY HAS NOT BEEN DECREASED AS DESCRIBED IN THE BASIS FOR ANY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION.

SUBJECT: DCP: 92-V1N0023, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THIS DCP INSTALLED AN ISOLATION TRANSFORMER AND POWER CONDITIONER IN THE DMIMS PANEL, TAG NO. 1-1610-Q5-LPM AND GROUNDED THE SECONDARY SIDE OF THE ISOLATION TRANSFORMER. THE POWER TO THE DMIMS PANEL IS DERIVED FROM THE NEW ISOLATION TRANSFORMER/POWER CONDITIONER. THE DMIMS PANEL IS LOCATED IN THE MAIN CONTROL ROOM.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE DIGITAL METAL IMPACT MONITORING SYSTEM (DMIMS) IS A PASSIVE PROJECT CLASS 62E SYSTEM DESIGNED TO LISTEN FOR THE IMPACT OF POTENTIAL LOOSE PARTS MOVING ABOUT WITHIN THE REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM. THERE ARE NO INTERACTIONS BETWEEN THE DMIMS COMPONENTS AND ANY ACTIVE EQUIPMENT OR COMPONENTS OF SYSTEMS IMPORTANT TO SAFETY. FAILURE OR DETERIORATION OF DMIMS COMPONENTS DID NOT AFFECT ANY SYSTEMS, EQUIPMENT, COMPONENTS OR STRUCTURES IMPORTANT TO SAFETY. THIS DCP ADDED COMPONENTS, WHICH ARE PHYSICALLY AND FUNCTIONALLY CONTAINED ENTIRELY WITHIN THE DMIMS PANEL, AND ARE ISOLATED FROM ANY INTERACTION WITH SYSTEMS IMPORTANT TO SAFETY. THE DCP ACTUALLY INCREASES THE RELIABILITY OF THE DMIMS BY REDUCING THE HARMONIC DISTORTION SEEN AT THE DMIMS POWER SUPPLY. IN THE PAST THIS DISTORTION WAS THE ROOT CAUSE OF DMIMS MICROPROCESSOR FAILURE. BASED ON THE ISOLATED NATURE OF THE CHANGES AND THE PASSIVE FUNCTION OF THE DMIMS THERE ARE NO REDUCTIONS IN THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN THE BASIS FOR ANY TECH SPEC.

SUBJECT: DCP: 92-V1N0043, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THIS DCP CHANGED THE NON-1E TRANSFORMER IN THE FOLLOWING GENERAL ELECTRIC (G.E.) DRY TYPE TRANSFORMERS: 1NB03X, 1NB10X, AND 1NB11X. THEY WERE REPLACED WITH ABB SUPPLIED DRY TYPE CORE AND CORE ASSEMBLIES DESIGNED TO BE INSTALLED IN THE OLD G.E. TRANSFORMER CASES. ALSO A TEMPERATURE MONITOR WAS ADDED TO EACH TRANSFORMER WHICH CAN MONITOR ALL THREE CORE WINDING TEMPERATURES.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE CRITICAL TRANSFORMERS AND THE LOADS SUPPLIED FROM THESE TRANSFORMERS ARE NOT REQUIRED TO FUNCTION FOR ACCIDENT MITIGATION OR FOR SAFE SHUTDOWN. THE LOSS OF ANY NON-1E TRANSFORMER IS BOUNDED BY THE LOSS OF NONEMERGENCY AC POWER TO THE PLANT AUXILIARIES ANALYSES. THE REPLACEMENT CORE AND COIL ASSEMBLY IS ELECTRICALLY EQUIVALENT TO THE PREVIOUS CORE AND COIL ASSEMBLY. THE NEW TRANSFORMERS CANNOT FAIL IN A DIFFERENT WAY FROM THE PREVIOUS TRANSFORMERS. THE NEW TRANSFORMERS GIVE OFF LESS HEAT AND HAVE HEAVIER WINDINGS AND ARE EXPECTED TO BE MORE RELIABLE. THEREFORE THIS DCP DOES NOT INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE OF A MALFUNCTION OF EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY; IT DOES NOT INCREASE THE CONSEQUENCES OF A MALFUNCTION OF EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED IN THE FSAR. THIS DCP DOES NOT CREATE THE POSSIBILITY OF A DIFFERENT TYPE OF ACCIDENT. THIS DCP DOES NOT EFFECT SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT AND IT DOES NOT DECREASE THE MARGIN OF SAFETY DEFINED BY THE BASES OF ANY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION.

SUBJECT: DCP: 92-V1N0043, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 2

DESCRIPTION: THIS DESIGN CHANGE AFFECTED A NON-1E TRANSFORMER ONLY. THE DESIGN CHANGE REPLACED THE G.E. SUPPLIED CORE AND COIL ASSEMBLY FOR DRY TYPE TRANSFORMER 1NBL2X1 WITH A DRY TYPE CORE AND COIL ASSEMBLY SUPPLIED BY ABB. THE ABB SUPPLIED DRY TYPE CORE AND COIL ASSEMBLY IS DESIGNED TO BE INSTALLED IN THE EXISTING G.E. TRANSFORMER CASE. THE NEW CORE AND COIL ASSEMBLY IS APPROXIMATELY 55% HEAVIER THAN THE G.E. CORE AND COIL ASSEMBLY. THE NEW EQUIPMENT LOAD (WEIGHT) WAS COMPARED TO THE DESIGN ALLOWABLES (CONTAINED IN THE APPROPRIATE DESIGN CRITERIA AND WAS FOUND ACCEPTABLE. THE PROJECT CLASS OF THE TRANSFORMER IS 62E, AND IS LOCATED IN A CATEGORY 2 AREA. NO CHANGES TO THE TRANSFORMER MOUNTING OR FOUNDATION WERE REQUIRED. THE ENCLOSURE WAS MODIFIED TO ACCEPT THE NEW TEMPERATURE MONITOR FURNISHED WITH THE ABB TRANSFORMER. THE MONITOR ALSO PROVIDES CONTROL FOR OPERATION OF THE TRANSFORMER FANS, A HIGH TEMPERATURE ALARM, AND A TRIP CIRCUIT. THE FAN AND HIGH TEMPERATURE ALARM CIRCUITS WERE CONNECTED TO FUNCTION IN THE SAME WAY AS THE G.E. TEMPERATURE MONITOR. THE TRIP CIRCUIT WAS NOT WIRED. THE SET POINT TEMPERATURES FOR THE FAN CONTROL AND ALARM ARE 120°C AND 200°C, RESPECTIVELY, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE VENDOR'S RECOMMENDATION FOR 80°C RISE TRANSFORMERS.

SAFETY EVALUATION: TRANSFORMER 1NBL2X1, AND THE LOADS SUPPLIED FROM THIS TRANSFORMER ARE NOT REQUIRED TO FUNCTION FOR ACCIDENT MITIGATION OR FOR SAFE SHUTDOWN. THE LOSS OF ANY NON-1E TRANSFORMER IS BOUNDED BY THE LOSS OF NON-EMERGENCY AC POWER TO THE PLANT AUXILIARIES. THIS ACCIDENT IS EVALUATED IN FSAR SECTION 15.2.6. THE CHANGES MADE BY THIS DCP DID NOT INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OF THE LOSS OF NON-1E POWER AND MAKES THE LIGHTING TRANSFORMER MORE RELIABLE. THE ABB CORE AND COIL ASSEMBLY IS ELECTRICALLY EQUIVALENT TO THE G.E. CORE AND COIL ASSEMBLY. BREAKER AND FUSE COORDINATION WAS UNAFFECTED BY THIS REPLACEMENT. THE TRANSFORMER IS SEISMIC CATEGORY 2, PROJECT CLASS 62E, AND LOCATED IN SEISMIC CATEGORY 2 AREA. THE NEW TRANSFORMER CANNOT FAIL IN A DIFFERENT WAY THAN THE G.E. TRANSFORMER. THE ABB TRANSFORMER PERFORMS THE SAME FUNCTION AS THE G.E. TRANSFORMER, BUT IS EXPECTED TO BE MORE RELIABLE SINCE IT GIVES OFF LESS HEAT AND HAS IMPROVED INSULATION. THE ADDITIONAL WEIGHT OF THE TRANSFORMER WAS EVALUATED ON THE BUILDING STRUCTURE AND FOUND TO BE ACCEPTABLE. TRANSFORMER 1NBL2X1 DOES NOT SUPPLY SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT REQUIRED FOR SAFE SHUTDOWN OR MITIGATION AND CONTROL OF ACCIDENT CONDITIONS, AND IT REMAINS ELECTRICALLY ISOLATED FROM SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT.

SUBJECT: DCP: 92-V1N0058, REVISION 1, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THIS DCP REVISES THE AUTOMATIC OPERATION OF THE SPRAY VALVE AND THE RESPECTIVE NORTHWEST CELL FAN IN THE TRAIN "A" AND "B" NUCLEAR SERVICE COOLING TOWERS. THE NORTHWEST CELL FAN WILL NOW START SHORTLY AFTER THE SPRAY VALVE STARTS TO OPEN AND STOPS WITH THE CLOSING OF THE VALVE. IT ALSO REVISES THE AMBER LIGHT AND SWITCHGEAR TROUBLE ALARM CIRCUITRY ASSOCIATED WITH EACH NSCT FAN MOTOR. AS A FINAL CHANGE THIS DCP ADDS TELLUS 68 TO THE LIST OF VENDOR RECOMMENDED LUBRICATING OILS FOR THE NSCT FAN GEAR REDUCERS.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THESE CHANGES DID NOT INTRODUCE A RADIOLOGICAL RELEASE PATH NOT PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED IN THE FSAR, AND THE NSCW SYSTEM'S

FUNCTION AS THE ULTIMATE HEAT SINK IS NOT ADVERSELY AFFECTED. THE NEW OPERATIONAL SCHEME WILL NEITHER CAUSE SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT TO OPERATE OUTSIDE DESIGN LIMITS NOR DEGRADE SYSTEM OR EQUIPMENT REDUNDANCY. CONTROL OF THE NEW LUBRICANT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE SITE QA PROGRAM ENSURES APPROVED AND QUALIFIED LUBRICANT IS USED.

SUBJECT: DCP: 92-V1N0077, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THIS DESIGN CHANGE ADDED A PERMANENT JACKET WATER CHEMICAL ADDITION SYSTEM TO EACH EMERGENCY DIESEL-GENERATOR (D/G) TRAIN, SYSTEM 2403. EACH SYSTEM INCLUDES A MIXING TANK, AN INJECTION PUMP, A RECIRCULATION LINE WITH FLOW ORIFICE AND CONNECTING VALVES AND PIPING, ALL PROJECT CLASS 626. ALSO INCLUDED IN EACH SYSTEM IS A PUMP MOTOR, MOTOR STARTER WITH START/STOP PUSH-BUTTONS, DISCONNECT SWITCH AND A 120-VOLT POWER SUPPLY, ALL PROJECT CLASS 62E. A NORMALLY CLOSED, MANUAL JACKET WATER ISOLATION VALVE, PROJECT CLASS 013, WAS ADDED TO MAINTAIN THE BOUNDARY OF THE SAFETY RELATED JACKET WATER SYSTEM. A VALVE WAS ADDED TO AN EXISTING PLANT DEMINERALIZED WATER VENT LINE, SYSTEM 1418, PROJECT CLASS 626, IN THE D/G ROOM ASSOCIATED WITH EACH TRAIN. THESE LINES PROVIDE READY ACCESS TO THE DEMINERALIZED WATER IF NEEDED TO AID IN THE CHEMICAL MIXING OPERATION. THE NEW SYSTEM PUMPS CORROSION INHIBITING CHEMICALS INTO THE ASSOCIATED D/G JACKET WATER CROSSOVER PIPING.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE ADDITION OF THE JACKET WATER CHEMICAL ADDITION CONNECTING PIPING, POWER SUPPLY AND ACCESS TO PLANT DEMINERALIZED WATER DID NOT INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OF THE OCCURRENCE OF AN ACCIDENT PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED IN THE FSAR. THE SAFETY RELATED BOUNDARY OF THE JACKET WATER SYSTEM IS MAINTAINED BY A NEW CLASS 013 ISOLATION VALVE. BEYOND THIS VALVE THE COMPONENTS ARE NON-SAFETY RELATED. THE SEPARATION OF ALL SAFETY RELATED CIRCUITS IS NOT AFFECTED BY THE ADDITION OF THE NEW SYSTEM. ALTHOUGH THE NEW SYSTEM IS IN PROXIMITY TO A SAFETY RELATED SUPPORT FOR THE D/G EXHAUST SYSTEM THE NEW SYSTEM IS SUPPORTED SUCH THAT IT WILL NOT FALL ON OR DAMAGE THE SAFETY RELATED SUPPORT DURING A SAFE SHUTDOWN EVENT (SSE). EVEN IF AN SSE OCCURRED DURING THE INJECTION OPERATION WITH THE TANK FILLED WITH CORROSION INHIBITOR, NEITHER THE TANK SKID NOR ITS CHEMICAL CONTENTS WILL DAMAGE THE D/G EXHAUST SYSTEM SUPPORT NEAR THE TANK OR ANY OTHER SAFETY RELATED SYSTEM OR COMPONENT. THE NEW CHEMICAL ADDITION PUMP TO THE JACKET WATER SYSTEM IS SEISMICALLY SUPPORTED. THE SYSTEM DOES NOT REDUCE THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN THE BASES FOR ANY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS. THE D/G'S ARE REQUIRED TO REMAIN OPERABLE IN THE EVENT OF A LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER AND THEIR ABILITY TO REMAIN OPERABLE IS NOT REDUCED BY THIS DESIGN CHANGE. THE DESIGN CHANGE INCORPORATES A NIPPLE AND AN ISOLATION VALVE WHICH ARE PROJECT CLASS 013 AND WHICH MAINTAIN THE BOUNDARY OF THE SAFETY RELATED JACKET WATER SYSTEM.

SUBJECT: DCP: 92-V1N0131, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THIS DCP REPLACED A PORTION OF THE SUCTION PIPING TO THE CCW RADIATION MONITOR SKIDS 11609S5008 AND 11609S5009. THE NEW DESIGN IS CONFIGURED TO ENSURE ADEQUATE WATER SUPPLY TO THE PROCESS RADIATION

MONITOR PUMPS. THIS CHANGE ALSO ADDED ONE VENT VALVE TO EACH OF THE 20" DIAMETER CCW TRAIN A AND B HEADER.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE FUNCTION OF THE CCW RADIATION MONITOR SYSTEM HAS NOT BEEN ADVERSELY AFFECTED. THE SAME RIGID STANDARDS USED FOR CONSTRUCTION ORIGINALLY WERE ALSO USED FOR THIS DESIGN CHANGE. THE REROUTING OF THE SUCTION PIPING HAS IMPROVED THE RELIABILITY OF THE RADIATION MONITOR SYSTEM TO DETECT RADIATION IN THE CCW SYSTEMS. WITH A CONTINUOUS SUPPLY OF WATER THESE RADIATION MONITORS WILL PERFORM THEIR INTENDED FUNCTION WITH GREATER RELIABILITY. THE PROJECT CLASS OF THE NEW PIPING AND VALVES IS 313. PER A REVIEW OF TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS AND THEIR BASES, INCLUDING SECTION 3/4.7.3, THIS CHANGE DOES NOT AFFECT THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN THE BASIS FOR ANY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION.

SUBJECT: DCP: 92-VIN0132, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THIS DCP ADDED A BYPASS LINE ON THE UNIT 1 TURBINE PLANT COOLING WATER (TPCW) SYSTEM PIPING TO THE NORMAL CHILLERS. THE TPCW SYSTEM IS SYSTEM 1405, PROJECT CLASS 626. THE BYPASS LINE TAKES OFF FROM THE 24" TPCW HEADER (LINE 1-1405-L4-526) JUST UPSTREAM OF CHECK VALVE 1-1405-U4-508, AND TIES BACK INTO THE 24" TPCW RETURN FROM THE NORMAL CHILLERS HEADER (LINE 1-1405-L4-524) DOWNSTREAM OF CHECK VALVE 1-1405-U4-507. THE AFFECTED PIPING IS LOCATED ON LEVEL A OF THE UNIT 1 TURBINE BUILDING NEAR THE UNIT 1/2 BOUNDARY. THE 24" BYPASS LINE INCLUDED A MANUALLY OPERATED 10" THROTTLING VALVE. THE NEW PIPING IS PROJECT CLASSIFICATION 626. ALSO UNDER THIS DCP, P&ID 1X4DB151-1 WAS CORRECTED TO SHOW THAT LINE NUMBER A-1405-L4-525, WHICH IS THE COMMON HEADER THROUGH WHICH UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 TPCW FLOWS TO THE NORMAL CHILLERS, EXTENDS TO VALVE A-HV-6712 AND NOT TO CHECK VALVE 1-1405-U4-508.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THIS DESIGN CHANGE DID NOT INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE OF AN ACCIDENT DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR INCLUDING CHAPTER 15 (ACCIDENT ANALYSES). CHANGES WERE TO PIPING IN THE TURBINE PLANT COOLING WATER SYSTEM, WHICH IS A NON-SAFETY RELATED SYSTEM. FAILURE OF THE TPCW PIPING COULD AFFECT ALL OF THE SYSTEMS WHICH DEPEND ON TPCW FOR COOLING WATER, INCLUDING THE NORMAL CHILLERS. NONE OF THESE SYSTEMS ARE SAFETY-RELATED. THUS, FAILURE OF THE TPCW PIPING WILL NOT COMPROMISE A SAFETY-RELATED SYSTEM OR PREVENT SAFE SHUTDOWN OF THE PLANT. THE NEW PIPING, WHICH IS LOCATED IN THE TURBINE BUILDING, MEETS THE SAME DESIGN CRITERIA AS THE EXISTING SYSTEM (I.E. PRESSURE, TEMPERATURE, MATERIALS AND SUPPORTS). THE DCP DID NOT DECREASE TECH SPEC SAFETY MARGINS SINCE THE SYSTEMS AFFECTED, SYSTEMS 1405 AND 1407, HAVE NO SAFETY DESIGN BASES. THE NEW VALVE AND PIPING MEET ALL THE ORIGINAL DESIGN CRITERIA FOR THESE SYSTEMS. THIS IS BASED ON A REVIEW OF TECH SPEC BASES, INCLUDING B3/4.7.

SUBJECT: DCP: 92-VIN0138, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THIS DCP DETERMINES AND ISSUES THE NEW MINIMUM REQUIRED AND MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE THRUST VALUES FOR VALVES 1HV-8701A & B, 1HV-8702A & B, TO ASSIST IN THE SETUP OF THESE VALVES WITH THE MOVATS DIAGNOSTIC TESTING EQUIPMENT. THERE IS NO CHANGE IN SYSTEM OPERATION OR RESPONSE AS A RESULT OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS DCP.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THIS CHANGE DOES NOT MODIFY THE FUNCTION OF THE VALVES, ONLY THE REQUIRED ALLOWABLE THRUST VALUES. THE NEW VALUES ARE ADEQUATE TO ENSURE THE VALVES WILL OPERATE AS REQUIRED THIS CHANGE DOES NOT AFFECT SYSTEM OPERATION, ACCIDENT ANALYSIS, PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE OF AN ACCIDENT OR INCREASE THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT AS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR NOR DOES IT CREATE AN UNPOSTULATED ACCIDENT NOT DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR.

SUBJECT: DCP: 92-VIN0143, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THIS DESIGN CHANGE PACKAGE ADDS SIX (6) CONICAL-SHAPED RESTRICTION FLOW ORIFICES (THREE PER TRAIN) TO THE SLOW FILL LINES OF THE UNIT 1 NUCLEAR SERVICE COOLING WATER (NSCW) SYSTEM. THE LINES TO WHICH THESE ORIFICES WERE ADDED ARE LOCATED IN THE NSCW COOLING TOWER STRUCTURE AND ARE LISTED BELOW: TRAIN "A": 1FO-5725, 1FO-5726, 1FO-5727, TRAIN "B": 1FO-5728, 1FO-5729, 1FO-5730. THE ADDITION OF THESE ORIFICES LESSEN THE HYDRAULIC TRANSIENTS THAT HAVE OCCURRED IN THESE LINES. CURRENTLY, WHEN ONE NSCW PUMP TRIPS, AND ANOTHER PUMP STARTS, WATER HAMMER IS EXPERIENCED IN THE SLOW FILL LINES DUE TO FLOW REVERSAL AND FAST CLOSURE OF THE CHECK VALVES. THE INSTALLATION OF THESE CONICAL ORIFICES REDUCE THE MAGNITUDE OF THE WATER HAMMER BY LIMITING THE RATE OF REVERSE FLOW.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THIS DESIGN CHANGE HAD NO EFFECT ON THE HIGH ENERGY LINE BREAK ANALYSES. IN THE EVENT OF A MODERATE ENERGY LINE CRACK WHICH, IN THE WORST CASE, WOULD DISABLE AN ENTIRE TRAIN, THE ALTERNATE TRAIN WOULD BE CAPABLE OF ACHIEVING SAFE SHUTDOWN BASED ON THE DESIGN CRITERIA (DC-1202). IN ADDITION, THE MODIFICATION MEETS THE SEISMIC CATEGORY 1 DESIGN REQUIREMENTS APPLICABLE TO THE NSCW SYSTEM. SECTIONS 9.2.1, 9.2.5 AND 15.0 WERE REVIEWED. IT DOES NOT AFFECT ANY EQUIPMENT USED TO MONITOR OR MITIGATE THE EFFECTS OF RADIATION LEAKAGE. POST-ACCIDENT PERFORMANCE OF THE SYSTEM WAS NOT AFFECTED. IN ADDITION, NO NEW FAILURE MODES HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED WHICH COULD RESULT IN MORE SEVERE CONSEQUENCES THAN ASSUMED IN THE SAFETY ANALYSIS. THE RELIABILITY OF THE NSCW SYSTEM TO PERFORM IN A SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPACITY WAS NOT IMPAIRED AS A RESULT OF THIS CHANGE. THE FLANGE ASSEMBLY AND ITS INSTALLATION ADHERES TO ASME CODE SECTION III (CLASS 3) AS DEFINED IN THE PIPING SPECIFICATIONS. THE INTENDED FUNCTION OF THE SLOW FILL LINES IN THE NSCW SYSTEM WAS MAINTAINED AFTER THIS MODIFICATION IS PERFORMED. THERE ARE NO MARGINS OF SAFETY ASSOCIATED WITH THE SLOW FILL LINES. TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES 3/4.7.4 AND 3/4.7.5 WERE REVIEWED

SUBJECT: DCP: 92-VIN0144, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THIS DCP LOWERS THE TOTAL KVA RATING OF THREE SOLA FERRO RESONANT TRANSFORMER BANKS 1NBS18X, 1NBS21X, AND 1NBR21X, ANBU04X, ANBU08X, AND ANBL11X BY DECREASING THE NUMBER OF TRANSFORMERS IN EACH BANK. THIS INCREASES THE LOAD ON EACH TRANSFORMER WHICH ATTRIBUTES TO A MORE STABLE OPERATION AND INCREASES THE RELIABILITY OF THE TRANSFORMER BANK.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THIS DCP DOES RESULT IN A CHANGE TO THE FACILITY PER FSAR FIGURE 8.3.1-2 BUT DOES NOT RESULT IN A CHANGE TO ANY PROCEDURE AS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR. IT DOES NOT AFFECT SYSTEM OPERATION, ACCIDENT ANALYSIS, PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE OF AN ACCIDENT OR INCREASE THE

CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT AS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR NOR DOES IT CREATE AN UNPOSTULATED ACCIDENT NOT DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR.

SUBJECT: DCP: 92-V1N0151, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THE EXISTING UNIT 1 PERMS PLANT VENT FLOW MONITOR 1FT-12442, PROJECT CLASS 62J, DOES NOT PROVIDE AN ADEQUATE READING OF AIR FLOW IN THE PLANT VENT STACK PROJECT CLASS 616, AS REQUIRED BY CHEMISTRY. THIS DCP REPLACED THE PREVIOUS FLOW TRANSMITTER AND ELEMENT WITH A FLUID COMPONENTS, INC. (FCI) MODEL MT86 THERMAL MASS FLOW METER. TO ENSURE A MORE ACCURATE READING, THE SINGLE PROBE, SINGLE ELEMENT ARRANGEMENT OF THE ORIGINAL DESIGN WAS REPLACED BY A TWO PROBE DESIGN WITH EACH PROBE CONTAINING FOUR ELEMENTS. THE MULTIPLE READINGS ARE AVERAGED TO PROVIDE A SINGLE 4-20 MA SIGNAL TO THE RADIATION MONITOR 1RX-12442, PROJECT CLASS 62J.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THIS DESIGN INVOLVED THE PLANT VENT FLOW TRANSMITTER AND FLOW ELEMENT 1FT/FE 12442 WHICH ARE NOT ADDRESSED IN ANY ACCIDENT ANALYSIS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR. THE PAMS RADIATION MONITOR 12444 USES A DIFFERENT FLOW MONITOR IS NOT AFFECTED BY THIS CHANGE. THE DESIGN DOES NOT AFFECT THE OPERABILITY OF THE ORIGINAL SYSTEM. THE MATRIX CONFIGURATION IS AN ENHANCEMENT OVER THE SINGLE ELEMENT DESIGN DUE TO THE GREATER NUMBER OF SENSING POINTS IN THE PLANT VENT DUCT. THE LOCATION OF THE NEW SENSING PROBES IN RELATION TO THE ISOKINETIC NOZZLES WAS REVIEWED AND FOUND TO HAVE NO IMPACT ON THE FUNCTIONAL CAPABILITY OF THE ISOKINETIC NOZZLES. THE NEW SENSING PROBES ARE MOUNTED TO SEISMIC 2 OVER 1 CRITERIA AND WILL NOT FALL DURING A SEISMIC EVENT. THESE PROBES ARE LOCATED BELOW THE ISOKINETIC NOZZLES. THE INSTRUMENTS ASSOCIATED WITH THIS CHANGE DO NOT PROVIDE ANY CONTROL FUNCTIONS WHICH MAY AFFECT ANY EQUIPMENT OR COMPONENTS ASSUMED TO FUNCTION IN ACCIDENTS ANALYZED IN THE FSAR. THE NEW RANGE ENCOMPASSES THE DESIGN MAXIMUM AND MINIMUM DESIGN FLOW. FLOW MONITOR 12835 IS THE PAMS INSTRUMENT FOR THE PLANT VENT. UPON REVIEW OF TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION SECTIONS 3/4.3.3.10 AND 3/4.11.2, THIS DESIGN HAS NO IMPACT ON THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED BY THE BASES FOR ANY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION. THE EXPECTED FLOW RATE IS WITHIN THE NEW RANGE AND THE NEW INSTRUMENT PROVIDES A MORE ACCURATE FLOW MEASUREMENT.

SUBJECT: DCP: 92-V1N0156, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: SEQUENCE 1 OF THIS DESIGN CHANGE PACKAGE ADDED AN 8" BUTTERFLY VALVE IN EACH SUPPLY AND RETURN LINE OF THE NSCW SYSTEM. IN ADDITION, A TEE CONNECTION WITH A BLIND FLANGE WAS ADDED TO EACH LINE FOR FUTURE USE. THE BUTTERFLY VALVES ARE USED TO ISOLATE THE NSCW SUPPLY AND RETURN LINES AND THE TEE CONNECTIONS ARE USED TO CONNECT THE NORMAL CHILLED WATER LINES. THE DESIGN OF THE NORMAL CHILLED WATER LINES IS PROVIDED IN SEQUENCE 2 OF THE DCP. SEQUENCE 3 WILL ADD INSULATION OF THE NSCW LINES INSIDE THE CONTAINMENT BUILDING, IF REQUIRED. THE SCOPE OF THIS SAFETY EVALUATION IS LIMITED TO SEQUENCE 1. ALL CHANGES ARE PROJECT CLASS 313.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THESE VALVES ARE USED ONLY DURING REFUELING OUTAGES. THE CHANGE WAS PERFORMED USING THE SAME DESIGN STANDARDS, CONSTRUCTION PRACTICES AND SITE PROCEDURES AS ORIGINALLY USED FOR THE SYSTEM. THE VALVES AND FITTINGS HAVE THE SAME PROJECT CLASS, PRESSURE AND

TEMPERATURE RATING AS USED FOR THE EXISTING SYSTEM. IF A NON-SAFETY RELATED SPOOL PIECE WERE TO FAIL, THE AFFECTED LINE CAN BE ISOLATED USING ISOLATION VALVES 1-HV-11689 AND 1-HV-11690 AND THE REMAINDER OF THE NSCW SYSTEM TRAIN B STILL FUNCTIONAL. CLOSING THESE ISOLATION VALVES ISOLATES COOLING WATER TO THE TRAIN B CONTAINMENT COOLERS WHICH ARE NOT REQUIRED TO BE FUNCTIONAL DURING MODES 5 AND 6, WHILE ALLOWING FLOW TO CONTINUE THROUGHOUT THE REMAINDER OF THE NSCW SYSTEM. THE INSTALLATION OF TEMPORARY SPOOL PIECES AS DESCRIBED ABOVE DURING MODES 5 AND 6 DID NOT IMPACT THE FUNCTIONALITY OF THE REQUIRED PORTIONS OF THE NSCW TRAIN B. THE BUTTERFLY VALVES BEING ADDED PER THIS DESIGN PACKAGE MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF ASME SECTION III CLASS 3. THE VALVES AND THE FITTINGS MEET THE DESIGN REQUIREMENTS OF THE NSCW SYSTEM. THE VALVES ARE LOCKED OPEN. THE ADDITIONAL WEIGHT AND CHANGE IN CENTER OF GRAVITY DUE TO THE NEW COMPONENTS HAS BEEN EVALUATED, AND DOES NOT REQUIRE ANY MODIFICATIONS TO THE EXISTING SUPPORTS. ALL STRESSES ARE WITHIN ACCEPTABLE LIMITS. THE DESIGN DID NOT AFFECT THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN THE BASES FOR ANY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BECAUSE THE CHANGE MEETS THE SAME DESIGN, INSTALLATION, INSPECTION AND TESTING REQUIREMENTS AS SET FORTH IN THE ORIGINAL DESIGN OF THE NUCLEAR SERVICE COOLING WATER (NSCW) SYSTEM. THE PERFORMANCE OF THE NSCW SYSTEM AND CONTAINMENT COOLING SYSTEM IS NOT BE AFFECTED BY THIS CHANGE. THIS CONCLUSION IS BASED UPON A REVIEW OF THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS AND THEIR BASES, INCLUDING SECTIONS 3/4.6.2, 3/4.6.3, AND 3/4.7.4

SUBJECT: DCP: 92-V1N0159, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THE DESIGN CHANGE AFFECTS THE FOUR AUXILIARY FEED WATER (AFW) 4" STOP CHECK VALVES, 1-1302-U4-113, 114, 115, AND 116. THESE VALVES ARE LOCATED IN LINE NUMBERS 1-1302-L4-030, 031, 032, AND 029, RESPECTIVELY. THE PROJECT CLASSIFICATION OF THE VALVES IS 212. THE PHYSICAL CHANGE CONSISTS OF REPLACING THE PREVIOUS VALVES OF SINGLE SEAT DESIGN WITH VALVES OF DUAL SEAT DESIGN. THE SUBJECT AFW CHECK VALVES HAVE EXPERIENCED LEAKAGE EVEN AFTER MAINTENANCE REWORK HAS BEEN PERFORMED. THESE VALVES ARE SINGLE SEAT, GLOBE LIFT-CHECK VALVES. THE NEW VALVES HAVE DUAL SEATS WHICH REDUCE THE LEAKAGE PROBLEM. THIS WILL ALSO REDUCE THE POSSIBILITY OF AFW PUMP STEAM BINDING DUE TO THE LEAKING CHECK VALVES.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE FUNCTION AND OPERATION OF THE AUXILIARY FEED WATER SYSTEM IS NOT BEING ADVERSELY AFFECTED. THE CHANGE WAS PERFORMED USING THE SAME STANDARDS AS ORIGINALLY USED FOR THE SYSTEM. THE NEW VALVES HAVE THE SAME PROJECT CLASS, PRESSURE AND TEMPERATURE RATING, AND MATERIALS AS THE PREVIOUS VALVES EXCEPT THEY ALSO HAVE ADDITIONAL SOFT SEATS. THE SOFT SEAT MATERIAL IS QUALIFIED FOR THIS APPLICATION, BUT REQUIRES PERIODIC REPLACEMENT. THE SOFT SEAT IS HELD IN PLACE BY A RETAINER THAT IS SCREWED TO THE DISC AND LOCK WELDED. THE NEW VALVES HAVE THE SAME SAFETY AND SEISMIC RATING AS THE ORIGINAL VALVES. THE MODIFICATION INCREASES THE RELIABILITY OF THE SYSTEM. THE FLOW RESISTANCE OF THE NEW VALVES IS THE SAME AS THE PREVIOUS VALVES, SO SYSTEM PERFORMANCE IS NOT AFFECTED. EPRI REPORT NP-5479 DESCRIBES THE USE OF DUAL SEAT DESIGN IN SECTION 2.4.2. THE NEW CHECK VALVES MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF ASME SECTION III CLASS 2. THE ACTIVITY DOES NOT INVOLVE ANY EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY THAT HAS NOT BEEN EVALUATED BEFORE. THE REPLACEMENT OF THE VALVES TO PROVIDE DUAL SEAT DESIGN DOES NOT AFFECT THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN THE BASES FOR ANY

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BECAUSE THE CHANGE MEETS THE SAME DESIGN, INSTALLATION, INSPECTION, AND TESTING REQUIREMENTS AS SET FORTH IN THE ORIGINAL DESIGN OF THE AUXILIARY FEED WATER SYSTEM. THE PERFORMANCE OF THE AFW SYSTEM IS NOT AFFECTED BY THIS CHANGE. THIS CONCLUSION IS BASED UPON A REVIEW OF THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS AND THEIR BASES, INCLUDING SECTIONS 3/4.6.3, 3/4.7.1.2, AND 3/4.9.4.

SUBJECT: DCP: 92-VIN0163, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THE SCOPE OF THIS DCP IS TO PROVIDE SAFETY CAGES FOR THE FOLLOWING LADDERS INSIDE THE UNIT 1 CONTAINMENT BUILDING: 1.) LADDER FROM EL. 220'-0" DOWN TO REACTOR COOL ANT PUMP (RCP) NO. 1. 2.) LADDER FROM EL. 220'-0" DOWN TO RCP NO. 3. 3.) LADDER FROM EL. 220'-0" DOWN TO RCP NO. 4. 4.) LADDER FROM EL. 193'-7 1/4" DOWN TO STEAM GENERATOR NO. 1. 5.) LADDER FROM EL. 193'-7 1/4" DOWN TO STEAM GENERATOR NO. 2. THE SAFETY CAGES FOR THE LADDERS LISTED UNDER ITEMS 3, 4, AND 5 REPLACED THE PREVIOUS SAFETY DEVICES INSTALLED ON THE LADDERS. THE PROJECT CLASS OF THE L ADDERS IS 62C. THE PROJECT CLASS OF THE NEW SAFETY CAGES IS 62C. SAFETY CAGES WERE DESIGNED AND MOUNTED TO SEISMIC CATEGORY 1 REQUIREMENTS. THE ADDITION OF SAFETY CAGES IMPROVED SAFETY CONDITIONS FOR PERSONNEL INSIDE THE CONTAINMENT BUILDING.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE SAFETY CAGES ARE OF A DESIGN THAT IS EQUIVALENT TO EXISTING ACCEPTABLE SAFETY CAGES INSTALLED IN THE CONTAINMENT BUILDING. ALSO, THE SAFETY CAGES HAVE BEEN EVALUATED TO SEISMIC CATEGORY 1 REQUIREMENTS TO INSURE NO ADVERSE EFFECTS ARE POSSIBLE.

SUBJECT: DCP: 92-VIN0165, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: CERTAIN VALVE MOTOR-OPERATORS DID NOT HAVE SUFFICIENT OUTPUT CAPACITY MARGIN WHEN THE REQUIREMENTS OF GENERIC LETTER 89-10 WERE CONSIDERED. THE CHANGES INCREASED THE MOTOR-OPERATORS' OUTPUT AND THEREFORE THE AVAILABLE MARGIN. THE INCREASED MARGIN ALLOWS FOR THE VALVES TO BE SET UP IN THE REQUIRED THRUST RANGE, ABOVE THE MINIMUM REQUIRED THRUST TO STROKE THE VALVE AND BELOW THE MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE THRUST TO PREVENT DAMAGE. PROVIDING THE INCREASED MARGIN AND UTILIZING DIAGNOSTIC TESTING EQUIPMENT SUCH AS MOVATS OR VOTES ALLOWS FOR ACCOUNTING, IN THE THRUST RANGE, FOR THE INHERENT INACCURACIES OF THE TESTING EQUIPMENT, TORQUE SWITCH REPEATABILITY, AND THE RATE-OF-LOADING (ROL) PHENOMENA. THIS PHENOMENA HAS BEEN SHOWN, IN SOME INSTANCES, TO RESULT IN LESS THRUST DELIVERED TO THE VALVE STEM UNDER DYNAMIC CONDITIONS THAN STATIC CONDITIONS, WITH THE MOST PRONOUNCED EFFECT ON GATE VALVES UNDER HIGH ENERGY BLOWDOWN CONDITIONS. SEVERAL THEORIES EXIST AS TO THE CAUSE OF THIS ROL EFFECT, BUT NONE HAVE BEEN DEFINITELY QUANTIFIED. WHEN INDUSTRY PROGRAMS AND THE DP TESTING PLANNED AT VEGP YIELD QUANTIFIABLE DATA ON THE ROL PHENOMENA, THIS INFORMATION WAS REVIEWED FOR ITS IMPACT ON THE MOV DESIGN CALCULATIONS. THE EFFECTED VALVES ARE IHV-8806, IHV-8801A & B, IHV-8807A & B, IHV-8821A & B, IHV-8923A & B, IHV-8924, IHV-8716A & B, IHV-8804A & B, IHV-8471A & B, ILV-0112D & E, IHV-19051, IHV-19053, IHV-19055, IHV-19057, IHV-2041, IHV-3009, IHV-3019, IHV-5106. BYPASSING THE OPEN TORQUE SWITCH ELIMINATED THE NEED TO DIAGNOSTICALLY SETUP THIS SWITCH. BYPASSING THIS SWITCH ENABLES THE MOTOR OPERATOR TO DEVELOP THE MAXIMUM AMOUNT OF TORQUE REQUIRED THROUGHOUT THE ENTIRE OPENING STROKE OF THE VALVE.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE VALVES CONTINUE TO PERFORM THEIR SAFETY-RELATED FUNCTIONS AS REQUIRED DURING ALL ACCIDENTS PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED IN THE FSAR. THE VALVES CONTINUE TO PERFORM THEIR SAFETY-RELATED FUNCTION AS REQUIRED DURING ALL ACCIDENTS PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED IN THE FSAR. THE MARGIN BEING PROVIDED BETWEEN THE REQUIRED AND THE ALLOWABLE THRUST ALLOWS DIAGNOSTIC TESTING EQUIPMENT TO BE USED TO SET-UP THE VALVES, VERIFYING THAT ADEQUATE THRUST, PER CALCULATION X4CLO00U02, IS AVAILABLE WHEN THE VALVES ARE REQUIRED AND THAT THE VALVES WAS NOT OVER STRESSED. THE CHANGE IN MOV STROKE TIMES DOES NOT ADVERSELY AFFECT THE ABILITY TO MITIGATE THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT PER THE EXISTING SAFETY ANALYSIS. THE NEW STROKE TIMES DID NOT EFFECT THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED IN THE FSAR. ALL OF THE SUBJECT MOV'S HAVE BEEN EVALUATED FOR STRESS, SEISMIC AND ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS AND THE APPROPRIATE TORQUE/THRUST LIMITS HAVE BEEN ESTABLISHED. THESE EVALUATIONS INCLUDED A VALVE STRESS AND SEISMIC REANALYSIS BASED ON THE MAXIMUM EXPECTED THRUST USING THE APPROPRIATE LOAD CONSIDERATIONS AS DOCUMENTED IN FSAR SECTION 3.9.B.3, AND AN ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION REVIEW TO VERIFY THAT THE NEW COMPONENTS WOULD BE SUITABLE FOR THE SPECIFIC POST-ACCIDENT LOCATIONS. PIPING STRESS PACKAGES WERE ANALYZED FOR THE INCREASED PIPING STRESS AND SUPPORT LOADS DUE TO THE NEW OPERATORS ADDITIONAL WEIGHT AND CHANGE IN CENTER OF GRAVITY. NO PIPING SUPPORTS WERE IDENTIFIED AS REQUIRING MODIFICATION BASED ON THE INCREASED LOADS DUE TO THE HIGHER WEIGHTS AND CHANGES IN CENTER OF GRAVITY OF THE NEW MOTOR OPERATORS. TWO CATEGORY 1 PIPING SUPPORTS REQUIRED MODIFICATION TO ACCOMMODATE THE INSTALLATION OF TWO NEW MOTOR OPERATORS. NO NEW PIPE BREAK LOCATIONS WERE CREATED NOR WERE EXISTING PIPE BREAK LOCATIONS CHANGED BY THESE MODIFICATIONS. THIS CHANGE DID NOT HAVE ANY ADVERSE IMPACT ON ANY OTHER PLANT SYSTEMS OR EQUIPMENT. NO NEW COMMON MODE FAILURE OF THESE VALVES IS INTRODUCED BY THE CHANGE IN THE THRUST VALUES. THIS DESIGN CHANGE DID NOT CREATE THE POSSIBILITY OF A MALFUNCTION OF EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY OF A DIFFERENT TYPE THAN THOSE PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED IN THE FSAR. THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS DEFINE THE LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION FOR THE DIFFERENT OPERATING MODES. THIS DESIGN CHANGE DID NOT CHANGE THE SAFETY-RELATED FUNCTION OF THE VALVES. DIAGNOSTIC TESTING OF THE VALVES VERIFIED THAT THE VALVES HAVE ADEQUATE THRUST, AS DOCUMENTED IN CALCULATION X4CLO00U02, TO PERFORM THEIR INTENDED FUNCTION WITHOUT OVER STRESSING THE VALVES OR THE OPERATORS.

SUBJECT: DCP: 92-VIN0167, REVISION 1, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THIS DCP ADDED A NEW GROUND TO THE AUXILIARY HOIST ON THE REFUELING MACHINE BY MOUNTING AN ADDITIONAL COLLECTOR BY THE EXISTING AUXILIARY HOIST POWER COLLECTORS. THE DIAGNOSTIC CAPABILITIES OF THE CONSOLE AND FREE WATER SPEED OF THE REFUELING MACHINE HAVE BEEN ENHANCED BY A SOFTWARE UPGRADE. THIS UPGRADE WAS PERFORMED BY REPLACING EPROMS AND EAROMS WITHIN THE SIGMA CONTROL CONSOLE. POWER RECEPTACLES WERE ADDED TO THE TROLLEY WITH AN ADDITIONAL TRANSFORMER MOUNTED ON THE TROLLEY PROVIDING THE ADDITIONAL POWER REQUIREMENTS. THE SOUND POWERED PHONE CABLE WERE REROUTED TO USE THE POWER CONDUIT AND CATRAC ASSEMBLY. A COMPUTER RESET SWITCH WAS MOUNTED ON THE CONSOLE TO PROVIDE A RESTART OF THE CONTROL PROGRAM WITHOUT CYCLING POWER ON THE BRIDGE. INSIDE THE CONSOLE, A SINGLE POINT GROUND WAS ADDED TO ELIMINATE GROUND POTENTIAL

DIFFERENCES WITHIN THE CONSOLE. A LOW IMPEDANCE, BRAIDED GROUND CABLE WAS ADDED TO A GROUND POINT WITHIN THE CONSOLE. THE BRIDGE AXLE WHICH DRIVES THE ENCODER WAS MODIFIED TO ELIMINATE SLIPPAGE BY PROVIDING FLATS ON THE AXLE SHAFT FOR SET SCREW SEATING PREVENTING THE MOVEMENT OF THE AXLE SHAFT OUT OF THE BEARING ASSEMBLY. THE SOFTWARE UPGRADE ALLOWS THE BRIDGE AND TROLLEY SPEED TO BE ADJUSTED SEPARATELY, INCREASING JOG AND AUTO POSITIONING CAPABILITY. IN ADDITION, THE FREE WATER SPEED HAS BEEN INCREASED BY INTRODUCING DRAG COMPENSATION FACTORS DURING HIGHER SPEED OPERATION. DIAGNOSTIC IMPROVEMENTS FOR FAULTY COMPONENTS AND ERRANT CONDITIONS, AND ADDITIONAL PARAMETERS FOR THE DIAGNOSTICS DISPLAY HAVE BEEN INCORPORATED BY THIS UPGRADE. THE COMPUTER RESET SWITCH ALLOWS RESTARTING OF THE CONTROL PROGRAM WITHOUT CYCLING THE POWER SUPPLY VIA THE DISCONNECT SWITCH. ENCODER PERFORMANCE WAS IMPROVED BY ELIMINATING SLIPPAGE OF THE BRIDGE AXLE THAT DRIVES THE ENCODER. THE NOISE PERFORMANCE OF THE SIGMA CONSOLE WAS IMPROVED WITH THE ADDITION OF THE SINGLE POINT GROUND.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE SOFTWARE CHANGES DO NOT IMPACT THE REFUELING MACHINE SAFETY FEATURES LISTED IN FSAR SECTION 9.1.4.3.1.1. SOFTWARE CHANGES DO NOT AFFECT THE REFUELING MACHINE'S ABILITY TO HOLD FUEL. ASSUMPTIONS AND RADIOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES OF A FUEL HANDLING ACCIDENT AS PRESENTED IN THE FSAR REMAIN UNCHANGED. THE CONTROL SOFTWARE CHANGES DO NOT AFFECT THE SEISMIC INTEGRITY OF THE REFUELING MACHINE. THE SIGMA REFUELING MACHINE IS NON-SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT. THE CONTROL SYSTEM DOES NOT INTERFACE WITH PLANT PROTECTION AND CONTROL SYSTEMS. FURTHER, SOFTWARE CHANGES DO NOT INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OF A REFUELING ACCIDENT. THE CONTROL SYSTEM SOFTWARE CHANGES ENHANCE MACHINE MOVEMENT AND DIAGNOSTICS. ALSO, SOFTWARE CHANGES ADHERING TO FUEL HANDLING INSTRUCTION REVISIONS HAVE BEEN IMPLEMENTED. THE FUNCTIONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE REFUELING MACHINE REMAIN UNCHANGED. THE MACHINE CONTINUES TO MEET ALL OPERATION AND SAFETY INTERLOCK REQUIREMENTS OF THE FSAR. THE SIGMA REFUELING MACHINE HAS NO DIRECT ELECTRICAL INTERFACE WITH PLANT PROTECTION AND CONTROL SYSTEMS. THE REFUELING MACHINE CONTINUES TO MEET ALL PROVISIONS TO ENSURE SAFE HANDLING OF FUEL ASSEMBLIES AS LISTED IN FSAR SECTION 9.1.4.3.1.1. THE WORKING LOAD CAPACITY OF THE FUEL ASSEMBLY GRIPPER REMAINS UNCHANGED FROM THAT DEFINED IN TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3/4.9.6. THIS DESIGN CHANGE IMPROVES RELIABILITY AND ENHANCE THE PERFORMANCE OF THE REFUELING MACHINE. CONSOLE MODIFICATIONS REDUCE NOISE AND PROVIDE FLEXIBILITY IN RESETTING THE CONTROL PROGRAM. PHYSICAL MODIFICATIONS TO THE REFUELING MACHINE PROVIDE A NEW GROUND FOR THE AUXILIARY HOIST, PROVIDE POWER RECEPTACLES FOR ADDITIONAL LIGHTING, REROUTE EXISTING SOUND POWERED PHONE CABLE, AND ELIMINATE BRIDGE AXLE SLIPPAGE TO IMPROVE ENCODER PERFORMANCE. THESE CHANGES DO NOT AFFECT THE FUNCTIONAL DESIGN OR OPERATION OF THE REFUELING MACHINE. ALL SAFETY FEATURES AND INTERLOCKS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR HAVE BEEN PRESERVED. ALL NEW EQUIPMENT HAVE BEEN MOUNTED TO 2 OVER 1 REQUIREMENTS. FURTHERMORE, THESE CHANGES DO NOT INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OF A DROPPED FUEL ASSEMBLY ACCIDENT SINCE THESE MODIFICATIONS DO NOT AFFECT THE REFUELING MACHINE'S ABILITY TO HOLD A FUEL ASSEMBLY. MODIFICATIONS MADE TO THE SOFTWARE DO NOT ALTER THE MAXIMUM VERTICAL POSITION REQUIRED TO ENSURE AN ADEQUATE WATER SHIELD DEPTH FOR RADIATION PROTECTION OF OPERATING PERSONNEL. IN ADDITION, CALCULATION MX6CHE.04.7 REV. J1 HAS BEEN PERFORMED TO ACCOUNT FOR THE ADDITION OF ZINC INSIDE CONTAINMENT. THE HYDROGEN GENERATION RESULTING FROM THE ZINC ADDITION REMAINS BELOW THE HYDROGEN DESIGN FLAMMABILITY LIMIT. NO NEW

INTERFACES WITH OTHER PLANT EQUIPMENT ARE INTRODUCED WITH THIS DESIGN CHANGE, THEREFORE, NO SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT OR FUNCTIONS ARE AFFECTED. THE REFUELING MACHINE'S SEISMIC ANALYSIS BOUNDS THE AFFECTS OF THE ADDITIONAL WEIGHT AND EQUIPMENT MOUNTING ASSOCIATED WITH THIS DESIGN CHANGE. THIS MODIFICATION TO THE REFUELING MACHINE DOES NOT REDUCE THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED BY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3/4.9 FOR REFUELING OPERATIONS.

SUBJECT: DCP: 92-VIN0171, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 2

DESCRIPTION: THE CHANGES ARE: 1) ADJUST THE PULSE WIDTH OF THE "TEST U/V" PUSHBUTTON LATCH TIMER TO REDUCE THE PULSE WIDTH BY 20 MILLISECONDS (MS). THE CURRENT NOMINAL TIMER SETTING IS 200MS. ALSO, THE RESET CIRCUITRY OF THE TEST SI, TEST U/V, TEST BLOCK D-G ENGINE, AND TEST D-G BREAKER CLOSE PUSHBUTTON LATCHES HAVE BEEN MODIFIED. THE CIRCUITRY IS MODIFIED TO ELIMINATE ONE OF TWO PATHS BY WHICH AN SI OR U/V SIGNAL CANCELS THE SEQUENCER TEST MODE. THE OTHER OF THE TWO PATHS HAVE BEEN LEFT UNCHANGED. THESE CHANGES WERE REQUIRED TO ELIMINATE LOGIC RACE CONDITIONS WHICH CAUSE THE SEQUENCER TO MALFUNCTION WHILE IN TEST MODE. THE NORMAL MODE OPERATION OF THE SEQUENCER HAS NOT BEEN AFFECTED BY THESE CHANGES. THE SEQUENCER'S TEST SWITCH INPUT MODULE (BOARD # 6N366) RECEIVED MINOR WIRING CHANGES TO EFFECT THE NECESSARY CHANGES. 2) REWIRE THE CONTROLLER A MODULE TO ELIMINATE A LOGIC RACE CONDITION. A RACE CONDITION EXISTS WHICH RESULTS IN THE BLOCK OUTPUT RELAYS BEING HELD IN FOR APPROXIMATELY TWICE THE EXPECTED TIME. THESE RELAYS PREVENT (BLOCK) CERTAIN LOADS FROM BEING LOADED ONTO THE DIESEL UNTIL A SPECIFIED TIME. THIS CHANGE WAS MADE BY REWIRING A GATE INPUT SUCH THAT IT RECEIVES A DELAYED SIGNAL. THESE CHANGES ARE PROJECT CLASS 11E AND AFFECT THE TRAIN A AND B SEQUENCERS, 1-1821-U3-001 AND -002. THESE CHANGES ARE NEEDED TO PROVIDE FOR EFFICIENTLY TESTING THE SEQUENCER. THE CHANGE ONLY AFFECTS THE MANUAL TEST PANEL PORTION OF THE SEQUENCER. THE SEQUENCER'S RESPONSE TO ACCIDENT SIGNALS REMAINS UNCHANGED. 2) THIS CHANGE IS NECESSARY FOR THE SEQUENCER TO PERFORM ITS DESIGNED SAFETY FUNCTION. CURRENTLY, THE DESIGNED RELAY BLOCK TIME IS APPROX. 36 SECONDS. DURING ESFAS TESTING (1R4), THE RELAY BLOCK TIME WAS FOUND TO BE APPROX. 67 SECONDS. THE DIESEL GENERATOR LOADING TABLES SHOW THE LOADS AND THEIR CORRESPONDING BLOCK TIMES. THE VENDOR ADDITION OF FILTERS UNDER THE ORIGINAL DCP RESULTED IN SHIFTING A GATE OUTPUT JUST ENOUGH TO CREATE THIS LOGIC RACE. THIS RACE DID NOT EXIST ON THE CONTROLLER A MODULES PRIOR TO VENDOR MODIFICATION.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THESE CHANGES DO NOT CHANGE THE SEQUENCER OPERATION FROM THAT DESCRIBED AND IMPLIED IN THE FSAR AND DESIGN CRITERIA, AND DO NOT AFFECT THE PROBABILITY OF ANY ACCIDENT EVALUATED IN THE FSAR. THE SEQUENCER CONTINUES TO RESPOND TO ACCIDENT SIGNALS AS DESCRIBED AND IMPLIED IN THE FSAR AND DESIGN CRITERIA. THE CHANGES ENSURE THAT THE SEQUENCER RESPONDS AS ORIGINALLY INTENDED; HENCE, THE OVERALL FUNCTION OF THE SEQUENCER REMAINS UNCHANGED. THESE CHANGES WERE MADE TO THE UNIT 1 EQUIPMENT BY QUALIFIED TECHNICIANS UNDER THE SUPERVISION AND DIRECTION OF THE SEQUENCER MANUFACTURER'S FIELD REPRESENTATIVE. THE ONLY MATERIAL REQUIRED TO EFFECT THE CHANGES WAS THE WIRE NECESSARY TO REWIRE THE BOARD. THE SEQUENCERS ARE LOCATED IN A MILD ENVIRONMENT. THE BOARDS WERE RE-WIRED USING QUALIFIED MATERIAL (WIRE) AND THE SAME METHOD (WIRE WRAPPING) AS WAS ORIGINALLY USED. THE REWIRING DOES NOT SIGNIFICANTLY

INCREASE THE WEIGHT OF THE BOARD, SO THE SEISMIC QUALIFICATION OF THE BOARD IS NOT IMPACTED. THESE BOARDS WERE TESTED IN A MANNER SIMILAR TO THAT USED FOR UNIT 1 MODIFICATION. THIS INCLUDES SEQUENCER AND SYSTEM LEVEL TESTS TO ENSURE THAT THE MODIFICATIONS FUNCTION AS DESIGNED. SIMILAR CHANGES WERE MADE TO THE UNIT 2 EQUIPMENT AND ARE EFFECTIVE IN ELIMINATING THE ANOMALIES AND RESTORING PROPER SEQUENCER OPERATION. THE MARGIN OF SAFETY DEFINED BY THE BASES OF THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS IS NOT REDUCED SINCE THE CHANGES ENHANCE OPERATION OF THE SEQUENCER. THE NET EFFECT OF THE CHANGES HAS BEEN TO CORRECT THE DESIGN OF THE SEQUENCER SO THAT IT OPERATES AS ORIGINALLY INTENDED.

SUBJECT: DCP: 92-V1N0174, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THE CHANGES REPRESENTED BY THIS DCP ARE THE ADDITION OF TIE-BACK SUPPORTS BETWEEN THE PROCESS LINES AND 1" DIAMETER DRAIN/VENT LINES FOR THE FOLLOWING VALVES :11201X4072, 11201X4084, 11204X4306, 11204X4307, 11204X4055, AND 11204X4056. THE SUPPORT HANGERS TIE THE DRAIN/VENT LINES TO THE PROCESS LINES FROM WHICH THEY ORIGINATE. THE TIE-BACK SUPPORTS DO NOT PERFORM ANY LOAD CARRYING FUNCTION BETWEEN THE PIPING AND THE BUILDING STRUCTURE, BUT SIMPLY IMPROVE THE LOCAL STRUCTURAL STABILITY OF THE DRAIN/VENT LINES. THE TIE-BACK SUPPORTS DO NOT CONSTITUTE A PRESSURE RETAINING BOUNDARY.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE DRAIN/VENT LINES AND THE PROCESS LINES FROM WHICH THEY ORIGINATE, HAVE BEEN REVIEWED FOR THE EFFECTS OF ADDITIONAL TIE-BACK SUPPORTS. THERE ARE NO ADVERSE EFFECTS ANTICIPATED BASED ON THIS REVIEW. THE SUPPORTS THEMSELVES HAVE BEEN DESIGNED IN ACCORDANCE WITH ASME SECTION III CLASS 1 CRITERIA TO INSURE SUPPORT INTEGRITY AND PERFORMANCE.

SUBJECT: DCP: 92-V1N0187, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THIS DCP CHANGED THE TURBINE DRIVEN AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP (TDAFWP) CONTROL POWER VOLTAGE DROPPING RESISTOR WITH ONE OF SIMILAR OPERATING CHARACTERISTICS AND SIGNIFICANTLY HIGHER RATINGS.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE OPERATION OF THE TDAFW PUMP WAS NOT ALTERED BY THE CHANGE. THE PANEL HAS BEEN MODIFIED WITH A VENT OPENING FOR HIGHER HEAT REMOVAL CAPABILITY. THE NEW VENT OPENING HAS BEEN COVERED WITH SCREEN WIRE TO PREVENT INSECT INTRUSION AND LOUVERED TO PREVENT FALLING WATER OR DEBRIS INTRUSION. ALL MODIFICATIONS MEET SEISMIC QUALIFICATIONS AS REQUIRED. THEREFORE THE CHANGE DOES NOT EFFECT SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT OPERATION, ACCIDENT ANALYSIS, OR TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION MARGIN TO SAFETY.

SUBJECT: DCP: 92-V1N0195, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THE DCP INVOLVED THE ADDITION OF A CHILLED WATER-TYPE COOLING COIL UNIT WITH FAN (UNIT EQUIPMENT NUMBER 1-1551-A7004) IN THE STEAM GENERATOR BLOWDOWN (SGBD) HEAT EXCHANGER ROOM (AUXILIARY BUILDING ROOM C125 ABOVE ELEVATION 153'6", AND ROOM C108 BELOW ELEVATION 153'6"). THESE AFFECTED COMPONENTS AND SYSTEMS ARE CONSIDERED NON-SAFETY RELATED, AND

SEISMIC CATEGORY 2. THE AUXILIARY BUILDING MISCELLANEOUS NON-RADIOACTIVE DRAIN SYSTEM IS CONSIDERED NON-SAFETY RELATED AND SEISMIC CATEGORY 1. SUPPORTS FOR COMPONENTS WITHIN THE SGBD HEAT EXCHANGER ROOM ARE DESIGNED TO MEET SEISMIC CATEGORY 2 OVER 1 CRITERIA.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE AFFECTED COMPONENTS ARE NOT ADDRESSED IN THE FSAR ACCIDENT ANALYSES, NOR ARE THEY RELATED TO ANY OF THE ACCIDENTS POSTULATED THERE. BASED ON REVIEW OF FSAR SECTIONS 9.2.9, 9.3.3, 9.4.3, AND 10.4.8, AND DESIGN CRITERIA SECTIONS DC-1215, DC-1551, DC-1561, DC-1591, AND DC-2401, THE ROOM COOLERS AND ASSOCIATED SYSTEMS DO NOT PERFORM SAFETY FUNCTIONS AND ARE NOT REQUIRED TO SAFELY SHUT DOWN THE PLANT. THE ADDITION OF A ROOM COOLER IN SGBD HEAT EXCHANGER ROOM C125 DOES NOT CHANGE, DEGRADE, OR PREVENT ACTIONS DESCRIBED OR ASSUMED IN THE ACCIDENTS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR. THIS ROOM COOLER PROVIDES ADDITIONAL COOLING CAPABILITY TO THE ROOM, DECREASING THE SPURIOUS ACTION OF THE SGBD ISOLATION SYSTEM. THIS DESIGN CHANGE DOES NOT ADVERSELY AFFECT ANY STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS, OR COMPONENTS USED TO MITIGATE THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR. IN ADDITION, THE OPENING OF VALVE 1-1215-U4-250 BY 3 TURNS DOES NOT ADVERSELY AFFECT THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT SINCE THIS ROOM IS STILL MAINTAINED AT NEGATIVE PRESSURE WITH RESPECT TO OUTSIDE ATMOSPHERE. THE EFFECT OF OPERATION OF THE SGBD HEAT EXCHANGER ROOM COOLERS ON THE HELB SENSORS IS TO ALLOW THE SENSORS TO FUNCTION AS INTENDED BY LOWERING ROOM TEMPERATURE SUCH THAT SPURIOUS SIGNALS DO NOT LEAD TO FALSE INDICATIONS OF HELB SITUATIONS. ASSUMING MALFUNCTION OF THE HELB SENSORS, ADDITION OF THE SGBD HEAT EXCHANGER ROOM COOLER WILL NOT RESULT IN INCREASED RADIOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES. BASED ON REVIEW OF TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 3/4.3.3.11, 3/4.7.7, AND 3/4.7.10, THE BLOWDOWN SYSTEM, PIPING PENETRATION AREA FILTRATION AND EXHAUST SYSTEM, AND AREA TEMPERATURE MONITORING ARE NOT ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY OPERATION OF THE SGBD HEAT EXCHANGER ROOM COOLERS. ACCORDINGLY, THE DESIGN CHANGE DID NOT REDUCE THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN THE BASIS FOR ANY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION.

SUBJECT: DCP: 92-VIN0197, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THIS DCP DID NOT MAKE ANY PHYSICAL CHANGES TO THE PLANT EQUIPMENT. THE K4 TERM IN THE OPDT SET POINT EQUATION AND THE TAU3 TERM IN THE OPDT AND OTDT SET POINT EQUATIONS WAS CHANGED. K4 WAS CHANGED FROM 1.08 TO 1.095 AND THE TAU3 TERMS WAS CHANGED FROM 0 TO 2 SECONDS BY ADJUSTING POTENTIOMETER SETTINGS ON THE 7300 PROCESS EQUIPMENT WHICH IS PROJECT CLASS 11J. WESTINGHOUSE HAS IDENTIFIED A POTENTIAL OPERATIONAL ISSUE RELATED TO A PHENOMENON DISCOVERED IN THE REACTOR VESSEL UPPER PLENUM WHICH IS CHARACTERIZED BY TEMPERATURE INCREASES IN ONE HOT LEG. THE LOOP REMAINS AT THE HIGHER TEMPERATURE FOR SEVERAL SECONDS THEN RETURNS TO THE ORIGINAL TEMPERATURE. SIMULTANEOUSLY, THE ADJACENT HOT LEG TEMPERATURE DECREASES BY ABOUT THE SAME AMOUNT FOR THE SAME TIME PERIOD. PREDICTIONS BASED ON CHARACTERIZATION OF THIS TEMPERATURE FLUCTUATION INDICATE THAT SUFFICIENT MARGIN BETWEEN THE OPERATING AND TURBINE RUN BACK AND REACTOR TRIP SET POINTS MAY NOT EXIST TO PERMIT PLANT OPERATION AT UP RATED POWER WITHOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF ACTUATING OPDT AND OTDT TRIPS AND TURBINE RUN BACK ALARMS IN A SINGLE CHANNEL. THE CHANGES IN THE K4 AND TAU3 TERMS PROVIDE

ADDITIONAL MARGIN BETWEEN OPERATING CONDITIONS AND REACTOR TRIP SET POINTS FOR THE OPDT AND OTDT EQUATIONS.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE OTDT AND OPDT REACTOR TRIP FUNCTIONS ARE PART OF THE ACCIDENT MITIGATION RESPONSE AND ARE NOT THEMSELVES INITIATORS FOR ANY TRANSIENT. THEREFORE, THE PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE OF AN ACCIDENT IS NOT AFFECTED. THE STRUCTURAL AND FUNCTIONAL INTEGRITY OF ANY PLANT SYSTEM IS UNAFFECTED BY THE CHANGES TO THE OTDT AND OPDT REACTOR TRIP SETPOINTS. THE CHANGES TO THE REACTOR TRIP FUNCTIONS DO NOT AFFECT THE INTEGRITY OF THE FISSION PRODUCT BARRIERS UTILIZED FOR MITIGATION OF RADIOLOGICAL DOSE CONSEQUENCES AS A RESULT OF AN ACCIDENT. BOTH THE MARGIN TO DNB AND FUEL LIMITS REMAIN PROTECTED WITH THE REVISED OTDT AND OPDT SETPOINTS, RESPECTIVELY. IN ADDITION, THE OFF SITE MASS RELEASES USED AS INPUT TO THE DO SO CALCULATIONS ARE UNCHANGED FROM THOSE PREVIOUSLY ASSUMED. THEREFORE, THE OFFSITE DOSE PREDICTIONS REMAIN WITHIN THE ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA FOR EACH OF THE TRANSIENTS AFFECTED. NO NEW OPERATING CONFIGURATION IS BEING IMPOSED BY THE SET POINT ADJUSTMENTS THAT WOULD CREATE A NEW FAILURE SCENARIO. IN ADDITION, NO NEW FAILURE MODES ARE BEING CREATED FOR ANY PLANT EQUIPMENT. THEREFORE, THE ACCIDENTS DEFINED IN THE FSAR CONTINUE TO REPRESENT THE CREDIBLE SPECTRUM OF EVENTS TO BE ANALYZED WHICH DETERMINE SAFE PLANT OPERATION. THE REVISED OTDT AND OPDT REACTOR TRIP SETPOINTS DO NOT EFFECT THE FUNCTION OF ANY EQUIPMENT OR SYSTEM EXPLICITLY OR IMPLICITLY ASSUMED TO OPERATE DURING A DESIGN BASIS ACCIDENT. THIS CHANGE DO A NOT DEGRADE THE DESIGN BASIS PERFORMANCE OF ANY SAFETY SYSTEM ASSUMED TO FUNCTION IN THE ACCIDENT ANALYSES. THE CHANGES RISES TO THE RECTOR TRIP FUNCTIONS DO NOT AFFECT THE INTEGRITY OF THE FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER UTILIZED FOR MITIGATION OF RADIOLOGICAL DOSE CONSEQUENCES AS A RESULT OF AN ACCIDENT. BOTH THE MARGIN TO DNB AND FUEL TEMPERATURE LIMITS REMAIN PROTECTED WITH THE REVISED OTDT AND OPDT SETPOINTS, RESPECTIVELY. IN ADDITION, THE OFF SITE MASS RELEASES USED AS INPUT TO THE DOSE CALCULATIONS ARE UNCHANGED FROM THOSE PREVIOUSLY ASSUMED. THEREFORE, THE OFF SITE DOSE PREDICTIONS REMAIN WITHIN THE ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA FOR EACH OF THE TRANSIENTS AFFECTED. THE OTDT AND OPDT REACTOR TRIP FUNCTIONS ARE PART OF THE ACCIDENT MITIGATION RESPONSE AND ARE NOT THEMSELVES INITIATORS FOR ANY EQUIPMENT FAILURE. THE EFFECT OF THE CHANGE ON THE MARGIN OF SAFETY ASSOCIATED WITH THE OTDT AND OPDT REACTOR TRIP FUNCTIONS IS DESCRIBED BY THE EVALUATIONS PERFORMED FOR TOE ACCIDENT ANALYSES DOCUMENTED IN SECTION 3.0. ANALYSES AND EVALUATIONS HAVE BEEN PERFORMED TO DETERMINED THE EFFECT ON PLANT RESPONSE TO AFFECTED TRANSIENTS DUE TO THE NEW REACTOR TRIP SETPOINTS. THIS EFFORT HAS CONFIRMED THAT THE ACCIDENT ANALYSIS CRITERIA ARE MET AND THE REQUIRED MARGIN OF SAFETY REGULATED FOR EACH AFFECTED SAFETY ANALYSIS IS MAINTAINED. THE ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA FOR THE ANALYZED EVENTS ARE UNCHANGED. THUS, THE REVISED OTDT AND OPDT SET POINTS DO NOT RESULT IN A REDUCTION IN A MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION.

SUBJECT: DCP: 92-V1N0199, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THIS DCP IMPLEMENTS THE WESTINGHOUSE REVISED T-HOT AVERAGE SCALING (RTAS) SCHEME. THE RCS HOT LEG TEMPERATURES ARE MEASURED USING FAST-RESPONSE RTDS LOCATED 120 DEGREES APART IN THE SAME PLANE. RTAS ASSIGNS DIFFERENT WEIGHTING FACTORS TO THE THREE HOT LEG RTDS TO MINIMIZE THE EFFECT OF THE TEMPERATURE FLUCTUATIONS FROM THE RTD WHICH HAS THE MOST

PROCESS NOISE. RTAS WILL BE IMPLEMENTED BY MODIFYING THE NSA CARDS, WHICH ARE LOCATED IN THE 7300 PROCESS EQUIPMENT, PROJECT CLASS 11J, FOR THE AFFECTED LOOPS. THE NSA CARDS, WHICH RECEIVE THE HOT LEG RTD SIGNALS, WILL HAVE THE INPUT AND BALANCING RESISTORS CHANGED.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE PLANT CHANGE IS NOT AN ACCIDENT INITIATOR. THE FSAR ACCIDENTS ANALYSES HAVE BEEN REVIEWED FOR THIS PLANT CHANGE AND IT HAS BEEN SHOWN THAT THE ANALYSES ARE NOT ADVERSELY AFFECTED NOR IS THE PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE INCREASED BY THE IMPLEMENTATION OF RTAS. IT HAS BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE ACCIDENT ANALYSES ARE NOT ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY THE IMPLEMENTATION OF RTAS. THUS, THERE IS NO CHANGE IN THE DOSES AS A RESULT OF RTAS. THE MODIFICATIONS REQUIRED TO IMPLEMENT RTAS DO NOT RESULT IN ANY NEW LIMITING SINGLE FAILURES WHICH COULD CREATE THE POSSIBILITY OF A CREDIBLE ACCIDENT. THE MODIFICATIONS DO NOT INVOLVE AN ACCIDENT INITIATOR. THUS, THERE IS NO POSSIBILITY OF CREATING AN ACCIDENT OF A DIFFERENT TYPE THAN PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED IN THE FSAR. VP04-92 THERE IS NO INCREASE IN THE PROBABILITY OF A PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED MALFUNCTION OF EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY. THERE IS NO ADDITIONAL HARDWARE INTRODUCED TO THE CONTROL OR PROTECTION SYSTEM AS A RESULT OF THIS MODIFICATION. THE INTRODUCTION OF THE PROCESS CALCULATION CHANGE DOES NOT AFFECT HARDWARE OPERATION, IT ONLY DIMINISHES THE MAGNITUDE OF THE EFFECT OF SHORT TERM PROCESS NOISE VARIATION ON A SINGLE, SPECIFIC RTD FOR THE DETERMINATION OF THE AVERAGE THE VALUE FOR A LOOP. FOR ACTUAL HEAT UP EVENTS, ALL THREE RTDS IN A HOT LEG WILL RESPOND THUS PROVIDING THE NEEDED PROTECTION FUNCTION ACTUATION. THE CONSEQUENCES OF A MALFUNCTION OF EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED WAS NOT INCREASED. THIS IS DUE TO THE CONCLUSION THAT THE CURRENT FAILURE MODES AS ANALYZED ARE UNCHANGED DUE TO THIS CALCULATION PROCESS MODIFICATION. WHEN A HOT LEG RTD IS DETERMINED TO BE INOPERABLE, RTAS IS NO LONGER APPLICABLE AND THE PROCEDURE FOR OPERATION WITH A HOT LEG RTD OUT OF SERVICE GIVEN IN REFERENCE 2 SHOULD BE FOLLOWED. THE PLANT MODIFICATION WILL NOT CREATE THE POSSIBILITY OF A MALFUNCTION OF EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY DIFFERENT FROM ANY ALREADY EVALUATED. THERE IS NO SIGNIFICANT CHANGE TO HARDWARE AS A RESULT OF THIS CALCULATION PROCESS MODIFICATION. THE DESIGN BASIS OF THE HARDWARE ASSOCIATED WITH THE OTDT AND OPDT PROTECTION SYSTEM IS NOT CHANGED. THE PLANT OPERATING STAFF WILL CONFIRM THAT THE INDICATED T-HOT IS GREATER THAN OR EQUAL TO ACTUAL T-HOT AND CONFIRM THAT THE ACTUAL TAVG STAYS WITH THE ALLOWABLE RANGE, TO MAINTAIN CONSERVATIVE OPERATION WITH RESPECT TO THE SAFETY ANALYSES ASSUMPTIONS. THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN THE BASES TO THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION WAS NOT REDUCED. ALL INITIAL CONDITIONS OF THE SAFETY ANALYSES WITH RESPECT TO TEMPERATURE WILL BE MAINTAINED. THE RESULTS OF SUCH ANALYSES AS NOTED IN THE FSAR ARE STILL VALID. THUS, THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN THE BASES OF THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS IS NOT REDUCED.

SUBJECT: DCP: 92-V2N0031, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THIS DCP INSTALLED TWO AIR HANDLING UNITS, 2-1556-A7-001 AND 2-1556-A7-002 ON THE ROOF OF THE UNIT 2 CONTROL BUILDING AT ELEVATION 260'-0", AND TWO AIR HANDLING UNITS, 2-1556-A7-003 AND 2-1556-A7-004 ON THE ROOF OF THE UNIT 2 AUXILIARY BUILDING AT ELEVATION 260'-0". EACH CAPABLE OF PROVIDING 100% OF THE CLEAN AIR REQUIRED TO MAINTAIN THE TEMPERATURE IN THE VICINITY OF MSIVS 2-HV-3016-A/B AND 2-HV-3026-A/B WITHIN THE DESIGN LIMITS. AUXILIARY

BUILDING AIR HANDLING UNITS 2-1556-A7-003 AND 2-1556-A7-004 ARE REDUNDANT UNITS, EACH CAPABLE OF PROVIDING 100% OF THE CLEAN AIR REQUIRED TO MAINTAIN THE TEMPERATURE IN THE VICINITY OF MSIVS 2-HV-3006-A/B AND 2-HV-3036-A/B WITHIN THE DESIGN LIMITS. AIR HANDLING UNITS SUPPLY OUTSIDE AIR AND DISTRIBUTE THE AIR TO REGISTERS LOCATED NEAR EACH MSIV BONNET AND ACTUATOR. A BACKDRAFT DAMPER SEPARATES THE OPERATING SYSTEM FROM THE NONOPERATING SYSTEM. FAILURE OF THE HEATER TO MAINTAIN THE SUPPLY AIR TEMPERATURE ABOVE 50 DEGREES F AUTOMATICALLY DE-ENERGIZES THE OPERATING FAN. THIS DCP ALSO REVERSES THE ORIENTATION OF THE EXISTING UNIT 2 CONTROL BUILDING 5-WAY RESTRAINT COOLING FANS FROM THE SUPPLY TO THE EXHAUST CONFIGURATION. THIS PREVENTS THE HEATED AIR, WHICH IS DISSIPATED BY THE RESTRAINTS, FROM IMPINGING ON THE MSIV ACTUATORS, AND FACILITATE THE REMOVAL OF HEATED AIR FROM THE BUILDING BY NATURAL CONVECTION. A "HIGH TEMP" SENSOR IS LOCATED IN EACH BUILDING IN THE VICINITY OF THE MSIVS; A "LOW TEMP" SENSOR IS LOCATED IN EACH BUILDING IN THE AIR HANDLER DISCHARGE AIR STREAM NEAR ONE OF THE MSIVS. THE HIGH AND LOW TEMPERATURE SENSORS ANNUNCIATE IN THE MAIN CONTROL ROOM TO INFORM AN OPERATOR IF A TEMPERATURE ANOMALY EXISTS. THIS DCP INVOLVED PENETRATIONS THROUGH PRESSURE, FIRE, AND FLOOD BOUNDARIES, WHICH WERE SUBJECT TO THE RESTRICTIONS OF VEGP PENETRATION SEAL CONTROL PROCEDURE 00432-C. PENETRATIONS WERE RESEALED IN ACCORDANCE WITH SPECIFICATION XIAG11 AFTER CONSTRUCTION.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE CHANGES IMPLEMENTED BY THIS DCP WERE DESIGNED TO REDUCE THE TEMPERATURE OF THE MSIV ACTUATOR, AND THEREFORE, DID NOT INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OF INADVERTENT CLOSURE. THE ADDITIONAL WEIGHT EXERTED ON THE ROOF BY THE AIR HANDLERS HAS BEEN EVALUATED, AS HAS THE DUCTWORK INSTALLED BY THIS DCP. THE DUCT SUPPORTS COMPLY WITH THE REQUIREMENTS SPECIFIED BY DESIGN CRITERIA DC-2167 FOR DUCTWORK IN SEISMIC CATEGORY 1 STRUCTURES, AND THEREFORE WILL NOT FALL ON SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT DURING A SAFE SHUTDOWN EARTHQUAKE (SSE). CIRCUITRY IS DESIGNED TO ENSURE THAT THE OPERATING FAN AUTOMATICALLY LOCKS OUT THE REDUNDANT UNIT, AND TO ENSURE THAT THE HEATER CANNOT OPERATE WITHOUT AIR FLOW. FAILURE OF THE HEATER TO MAINTAIN THE SUPPLY AIR TEMPERATURE ABOVE 50 DEGREES F AUTOMATICALLY DE-ENERGIZE THE OPERATING FAN. THERE WERE NO CREDIBLE COMMON-MODE FAILURES INTRODUCED BY THE DESIGN CHANGE WHICH AFFECTS SAFETY-RELATED EQUIPMENT. THE ROOFS OF THE CONTROL AND AUXILIARY BUILDING MSIV ENCLOSURES HAVE BEEN ANALYZED AND ARE CAPABLE OF SUPPORTING THE AIR HANDLERS AND MAINTAINING STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY DURING A SEISMIC EVENT. ELECTRICAL SEPARATION FROM CLASS 1E WIRING IS MAINTAINED. FAILURE OF AN AIR HANDLER FAN COULD CAUSE A HIGH TEMPERATURE EXCURSION IN THE VICINITY OF THE MSIVS, POTENTIALLY IMPACTING THEIR ENVIRONMENTALLY QUALIFIED LIFE. FAILURE OF THE HEATING COIL COULD RESULT IN LOW HYDRAULIC FLUID TEMPERATURE AND INCREASED VISCOSITY, RESULTING IN DEGRADED OPERABILITY OF THE MSIVS. NOTIFICATION OF A HIGH TEMPERATURE EXCURSION IS PROVIDED BY A "HIGH TEMP" ALARM, WHICH IS INSTALLED IN THE MAIN CONTROL ROOM QHVC PANEL AS PART OF THIS DCP. NOTIFICATION OF A LOW TEMPERATURE EXCURSION IS PROVIDED BY A "LOW TEMP" ALARM, WHICH IS INSTALLED ON THE CONTROL ROOM QHVC PANEL AS PART OF THIS DCP. ANNUNCIATION OF EITHER ALARM REQUIRE MITIGATING OPERATOR ACTION. AS AN ADDITIONAL PRECAUTION, THE AIR HANDLER FAN IS DESIGNED TO TRIP ON LOW TEMPERATURE. THE SAFETY RELATED PORTIONS OF THE MSIV SYSTEM ARE CAPABLE OF WITHSTANDING THE EFFECTS OF NATURAL PHENOMENA, AND OF PERFORMING THEIR INTENDED FUNCTION FOLLOWING POSTULATED HAZARDS OF FIRE, INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL MISSILES, AND PIPE BREAK. NEW PENETRATIONS THROUGH THE PENTHOUSE WALLS HAVE BEEN ANALYZED TO

DETERMINE THAT THERE ARE NO ADVERSE EFFECTS FROM MISSILES. MSLB VENT PATHS TO ATMOSPHERE, WHICH ARE PARTIALLY OBSTRUCTED BY THE INSTALLATION OF DUCT, HAVE BEEN ANALYZED. THE NET FREE AREA USED IN THE CALCULATION IS NOT AFFECTED, NOR HAS THE ABILITY TO RELIEVE PRESSURE BEEN REDUCED. THE ADDITION OF COOLING AIR INTO THE MSIV ENCLOSURES DOES NOT INCREASE THE AMOUNT OF RADIOACTIVITY RELEASED FOLLOWING AN MSLB. THERE IS NO ADVERSE IMPACT ON SAFETY RELATED STRUCTURES OR COMPONENTS AS SHOWN IN THE EVALUATIONS ABOVE. OPERABILITY AND BASIS FOR OPERABILITY DELINEATED IN TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 3/4.7.1.1 FOR SAFETY VALVES, AND 3/4.7.1.5 FOR THE MSIVS, HAS NOT BEEN REDUCED. THEREFORE, THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS IS NOT REDUCED AS A RESULT OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS DCP.

SUBJECT: DCP: 92-V2N0040, REVISION 1, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THIS DCP ADDED AN ENHANCEMENT TO THE AUTOMATIC RESET CIRCUITRY THAT RESETS THE SEQUENCER IF THE DIESEL GENERATOR BREAKER OPENS WHILE LOADS ARE BEING SEQUENCED ON TO THE BUS. THIS DCP ADDED AN ENHANCEMENT TO THE AUTOMATIC RESET CIRCUITRY, WHICH RESETS THE UNDER VOLTAGE (U/V) LATCH IN APPROXIMATELY 60 SECONDS. THIS SENDS A SECOND U/V SIGNAL, WHICH OPENS THE CLOSED FEEDER BREAKERS AND SEND A SIGNAL TO RE-CLOSE THE DIESEL GENERATOR BREAKER. IF THE DIESEL GENERATOR BREAKER RE-CLOSES, THE LOADS ARE AUTOMATICALLY SEQUENCED ON. ALL OF THESE MODIFICATIONS ARE SAFETY CLASS 1, SEISMIC CLASS 1, EXCEPT FOR THE CABLES AND INTERNAL WIRES THAT ARE SEISMIC CLASS 2. THE PURPOSE OF THE ADDITIONAL RESET FEATURES IS TO PREVENT AN INADVERTENT RE-CLOSURE OF THE DIESEL GENERATOR BREAKER ON A PARTIALLY LOADED BUS.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE DESIGN CHANGE FULLY MEETS THE DESIGN, MATERIAL AND CONSTRUCTION SPECIFICATIONS OF THE EQUIPMENT THAT IS BEING MODIFIED. THE DESIGN CHANGE DOES NOT AFFECT ANY OF THE SYSTEMS OR COMPONENTS POSTULATED TO CAUSE ACCIDENTS EVALUATED IN THE FSAR. THE DESIGN CHANGE DOES NOT AFFECT ANY SAFETY LIMITS OR SETTINGS. THIS IS BASED UPON A REVIEW OF THE FSAR THAT INCLUDED SECTIONS 1.9.9, 7.3, 8.3.1, 16.3 AND CHAPTER 15. THE ENHANCED AUTOMATIC SEQUENCER RESET FEATURE IS ONLY FUNCTIONAL IF THE DIESEL GENERATOR BREAKER OPENS DURING SEQUENCING. THUS, THIS NEW RESET FEATURE RESULTS IN AN IMPROVEMENT IN THE RELIABILITY OF THE EMERGENCY ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEM. THE DESIGN CHANGE DOES NOT ADVERSELY AFFECT THE ABILITY OF THE EMERGENCY STAND-BY POWER SYSTEM TO PERFORM ITS ROLE IN THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS EVALUATED IN THE FSAR. THE DESIGN CHANGE ENHANCED THE ABILITY TO RECOVER FROM A MALFUNCTION OF THE EMERGENCY STAND-BY POWER SYSTEM. THE RISK OF AN INADVERTENT FEEDER BREAKER CLOSING ONTO A DEAD, BUT PARTIALLY LOADED BUS, HAS BEEN REDUCED. THE ABILITY TO RE-INSTATE THE EMERGENCY LOADS AND RESTORE THE STAND-BY POWER SYSTEM HAS BEEN ENHANCED. THE DESIGN CHANGE FULLY MEETS THE DESIGN, MATERIAL AND CONSTRUCTION SPECIFICATIONS OF THE EQUIPMENT THAT IS BEING MODIFIED. THE DESIGN WAS EVALUATED AND IT WAS DETERMINED THAT ALL SEISMIC AND ENVIRONMENTAL SPECIFICATIONS, ELECTRICAL SEPARATION CRITERIA AND OTHER DESIGN CRITERIA HAVE BEEN MET. THE MODIFICATIONS ARE ELECTRICALLY ISOLATED FROM OTHER CIRCUITS BY COORDINATED FUSES AND ARE PHYSICALLY SEPARATED FROM CIRCUITS OF REDUNDANT TRAINS. THE NEW CIRCUITS ONLY BECOME ACTIVE IF AN U/V SIGNAL IS PRESENT AND THE DIESEL GENERATOR BREAKER TRIPS WHEN IT SHOULD BE CLOSED. THE DESIGN CHANGE DOES NOT AFFECT THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN THE

BASES OF THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS FOR ANY SAFETY LIMIT OR ANY SAFETY LIMIT SETTING. IT DOES NOT AFFECT THE LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION OR THE SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS FOR ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS - AC SOURCES, SECTION 3/4.8.1. THE CHANGE MEETS THE APPROPRIATE DESIGN CRITERIA AND DOES NOT AFFECT THE TIMING OR SEQUENCE THAT LOADS WOULD BE STARTED IN THE EVENT OF A LOSS-OF-OFFSITE POWER EVENT. THIS IS BASED ON A REVIEW OF THE FSAR AND THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS, INCLUDING SECTION 3/4.8.1.

SUBJECT: DCP: 92-V2N0044, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THIS DCP CHANGED THE NON-1E TRANSFORMER IN THE FOLLOWING GENERAL ELECTRIC (G.E.) DRY TYPE TRANSFORMERS: 2NB03X, 2NB10X, AND 2NB11X. THEY WERE REPLACED WITH ABB SUPPLIED DRY TYPE CORE AND CORE ASSEMBLIES DESIGNED TO BE INSTALLED IN THE OLD G.E. TRANSFORMER CASES. ALSO A TEMPERATURE MONITOR WAS ADDED TO EACH TRANSFORMER WHICH CAN MONITOR ALL THREE CORE WINDING TEMPERATURES.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE CRITICAL TRANSFORMERS AND THE LOADS SUPPLIED FROM THESE TRANSFORMERS ARE NOT REQUIRED TO FUNCTION FOR ACCIDENT MITIGATION OR FOR SAFE SHUTDOWN. THE LOSS OF ANY NON-1E TRANSFORMER IS BOUNDED BY THE LOSS OF NON EMERGENCY AC POWER TO THE PLANT AUXILIARIES ANALYSES. THE REPLACEMENT CORE AND COIL ASSEMBLY IS ELECTRICALLY EQUIVALENT TO THE PREVIOUS CORE AND COIL ASSEMBLY. THE NEW TRANSFORMERS CANNOT FAIL IN A DIFFERENT WAY FROM THE PREVIOUS TRANSFORMERS. THE NEW TRANSFORMERS GIVE OFF LESS HEAT AND HAVE HEAVIER WINDINGS AND ARE EXPECTED TO BE MORE RELIABLE. THEREFORE THIS DCP DOES NOT INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE OF A MALFUNCTION OF EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY; IT DOES NOT INCREASE THE CONSEQUENCES OF A MALFUNCTION OF EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED IN THE FSAR. THIS DCP DOES NOT CREATE THE POSSIBILITY OF A DIFFERENT TYPE OF ACCIDENT. THIS DCP DOES NOT EFFECT SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT AND IT DOES NOT DECREASE THE MARGIN OF SAFETY DEFINED BY THE BASES OF ANY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION.

SUBJECT: DCP: 92-V2N0046, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THIS DESIGN CHANGE PROVIDED NEW COVERS FOR THE "BANANA" REACTOR SUPPORT VENTS, NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION (NI) PORTS AND EMERGENCY REFUELING CANAL DRAINS (ERCDS) FOR THE REFUELING CANAL, SYSTEM 2148. ALSO INCLUDED IN THE DESIGN CHANGE WERE THE NEW FASTENING BOLTS AND REQUIRED NUTS AND WASHERS FOR THE COVERS. THE NEW SEALS PROVIDED, WHICH IN COMBINATION WITH THE NEW BOLTS, NUTS AND WASHERS ALLEVIATE THE NEED FOR USING RTV TYPE ADHESIVE IN SEALING THESE COVERS DURING REFUELING OUTAGES. THE PROJECT CLASS OF THE REFUELING CANAL LINER AND ALL COVERS AND RELATED MATERIALS IS 01C. THE OLD BANANA SHAPED REACTOR SUPPORT VENT COVERS, NI COVERS AND EMERGENCY REFUELING CANAL DRAIN (ERCD) COVERS WERE SEALED AGAINST WATER LEAKAGE USING RTV TYPE ADHESIVE. THE CURE TIME FOR APPLICATION OF THE RTV WAS 24 HOURS AND THE TIME TO REMOVE THE ADHESIVE IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE GASKET AFTER THE REFUELING OPERATION IS COMPLETED WAS 8 HOURS. THIS TIME FOR APPLICATION AND REMOVAL DOES NOT INCLUDE THE TIME REQUIRED TO TORQUE THE FASTENING BOLTS AND THEN TO UNFASTEN THEM AFTER THE REFUELING OPERATION IS COMPLETED.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE COVERS, SEALS AND BOLTING MATERIALS USED EITHER MEET OR EXCEED THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE SPECIFICATIONS FOR THE COVERS, SEALS AND BOLTING, AND THE DIMENSIONS OF THE BOLTING AND COVERS ARE ESSENTIALLY THE SAME AS THE PREVIOUS ONES. A COMPRESSED HEIGHT GAGE WAS PROVIDED BY THE VENDOR TO TEST WHETHER THE SEALS HAVE BEEN ADEQUATELY COMPRESSED BEFORE FLOODING THE REFUELING CANAL. THEREFORE, APPLYING A SPECIFIED TORQUE VALUE TO EACH BOLT OR STUD IS NO LONGER REQUIRED. THE NEW COMPONENTS HAVE BEEN EVALUATED UNDER THE MOST SEVERE LOADS (SEISMIC, HYDRAULIC, THERMAL, ETC.) EXPECTED DURING A REFUELING OUTAGE AND FOUND TO BE ACCEPTABLE. ALSO, THE SEALS ARE INSPECTED BEFORE AND AFTER EACH USE TO ASSURE THEIR CONDITION IS APPROPRIATE FOR USE IN THE REFUELING CANAL. DAMAGED COMPONENTS ARE REPLACED. THERE IS NO JUSTIFICATION FOR EXPECTING ANY ACCIDENTAL IMPACTS ON THE COVERS AND SEALS FROM BENEATH. THE SEALS ARE PROTECTED FROM IMPACTS FROM ABOVE BY THE COVER EXCEPT AT THE EDGES. NO ANALYZED IMPACTS TO THE COVER OR SEAL ARE EXPECTED TO BE SEVERE ENOUGH TO DISLodge THE SEALS. THE SEALS ARE REPLACED AFTER SEVEN YEARS, ACCORDING TO THE MANUFACTURER'S RECOMMENDATIONS. THIS REPLACEMENT SCHEDULE ASSURES THAT A QUALIFIED SEAL IS ALWAYS USED. NO EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY IS AFFECTED BY THE DESIGN CHANGE. THIS DESIGN CHANGE DOES NOT REDUCE THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN THE BASIS FOR ANY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION.

SUBJECT: DCP: 92-V2N0051, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: BEGIN IMPLEMENTATION OF THE UPGRADE OF THE UNIT 2 FUEL TO VANTAGE 5 LOPAR FUEL ASSEMBLIES. IT ALSO INCORPORATES THE CHANGES TO THE FOLLOWING: 1) REACTOR CORE SAFETY LIMITS AND DNB PARAMETERS. 2) INCREASE IN SHUTDOWN AND CONTROL ROD DROP TIME 3) AXIAL FLUX DIFFERENCE AND PEAKING FACTOR SURVEILLANCE 4) WIDENED ACCUMULATOR WATER LEVEL RANGE 5) MINIMUM RWST SOLUTION TEMPERATURE. THE LAST TWO OF THESE CHANGES ARE NOT DIRECTLY RELATED TO THE VANTAGE 5 SAFETY ANALYSES.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THIS DCP REQUIRES CHANGES TO THE FOLLOWING FSAR SECTIONS: 4.1, 4.2.1, 4.2.2, 4.2.3, 4.2.4, 4.3.1, 4.3.2, 4.3.3, 4.4.1, 4.4.2, 4.4.3, 4.4.4, CHAPTER 4 REFERENCES, 5.3, 6.2.1, 9.1.1, 15.0.3, 15.0.4, 15.0.5, 15.0.6, 15.0.9, 15.0.11, 15.1, 15.1.1, 15.1.2, 15.1.3, 15.2, 15.2.2, 15.2.3, 15.2.4, 15.3, 15.3.1, 15.3.2, 15.3.3, 15.3.4, 15.4, 15.4.1, 15.4.2, 15.4.3, 15.4.4, 15.4.6, 15.4.8, 15.4.9, 15.5, 15.5.1, 15.6.1, 15.6.3, 15.6.5, 15.7.4, 15A.1, 15A.2, 15A.3, 15A.4, CHAPTER 15 REFERENCES AND FSAR FIGURES 4.2-1 THROUGH 4.2-11, 4.2-14, 4.2-15, 4.3-1, 4.3-3 THROUGH 4.3-17, 4.3-21, 4.3-22, 4.3-23, 4.3-27 THROUGH 4.3-35, 4.3-38, 4.3-39, 4.4-1, 4.4-8, 4.4-9, 6.2.1-35 THROUGH 6.2.1-37, 15.0.3-1, 15.0.3-2, 15.0.4-1, 15.0.4-2, 15.0.5-1 THROUGH 15.0.5-3, 15.0.6-1, 15.1.2-1, 15.1.2-2, 15.1.3-1 THROUGH 15.1.3-8, 15.2.3-1 THROUGH 15.2.3-8, 15.3.1-1 THROUGH 15.3.1-4, 15.3.2-1 THROUGH 15.3.2-4, 15.3.3-1 THROUGH 15.3.3-4B, 15.4.1-1 THROUGH 15.4.1-3, 15.4.2-1 THROUGH 15.4.2-9, 15.4.3-2, 15.4.3-3, 15.4.4-1 THROUGH 15.4.4-5, 15.4.8-1 THROUGH 15.4.8-4, 15.4.9-1 THROUGH 15.4.9-3, 15.5.1-1, 15.5.1-2, 15.5.1-3, 15.6.1-1, 15.6.1-2, 15.6.3-1 THROUGH 15.6.3-11, 15.6.3-13 THROUGH 15.6.3-15, 15.6.5-2 THROUGH 15.6.5-48, AND ASSOCIATED TABLES. THIS CHANGE DOES NOT RESULT IN A CHANGE TO THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION PLAN. THIS DCP DOES NOT CREATE A CHANGE TO ANY PROCEDURE AS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR. IT DOES NOT AFFECT SYSTEM OPERATION, ACCIDENT ANALYSIS, PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE OF AN ACCIDENT OR INCREASE THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT AS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR NOR DOES IT CREATE AN UNPOSTULATED ACCIDENT NOT DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR.

SUBJECT: DCP: 92-V2N0054, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THIS DCP DELETED THE RHR SUCTION ISOLATION VALVE AUTO CLOSURE INTERLOCK (ACI) AND REPLACED IT WITH A CONTROL ROOM ALARM. IN ADDITION THE RHR SUCTION ISOLATION VALVE OPEN PERMISSIVE INTERLOCK (OPI) PRESSURE SETPOINT WAS REDUCED FROM 377 PSIG TO 365 PSIG.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE RHR ACI FEATURE ENSURES THAT THE RHR SUCTION ISOLATION VALVES ARE FULLY CLOSED WHEN THE RCS PRESSURE RISES ABOVE THE INTERLOCK SET POINT. WESTINGHOUSE ANALYSES INDICATE THAT THE REPLACEMENT OF THE ACI FEATURE WITH THE COMBINATION OF THE CONTROL ROOM ALARM AND REVISED ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES ENSURES THAT THE APPROPRIATE ACTIONS BE TAKEN BY THE OPERATORS SO THAT THE RHR IS ISOLATED FROM THE RCS WHEN THE RCS PRESSURE RISES ABOVE THE ALARM SET POINT. (THE INTERLOCK PROVIDES AN AUTOMATIC CLOSURE OF THE RHR SUCTION ISOLATION VALVES ON HIGH RCS PRESSURE, HOWEVER, RAPID OVER PRESSURE PROTECTION OF THE RHR SYSTEM IS AND IS PROVIDED BY THE RHR SYSTEM RELIEF VALVES AND NOT BY THE SLOW ACTING SUCTION ISOLATION VALVES.) THIS COMBINATION RESULTS IN A REDUCED PROBABILITY OF AN ACCIDENT OCCURRENCE (WCAP-12927). THE OPI SET POINT PREVENTS THE RHR SUCTION ISOLATION VALVES FROM BEING OPENED WHILE THE RCS PRESSURE IS POTENTIALLY ABOVE THE DESIGN PRESSURE OF THE RHR SYSTEM. THE REDUCED OPI SET POINT FURTHER MINIMIZES THE POTENTIAL OF OPENING THE RHR SUCTION ISOLATION VALVES WHILE THE RCS PRESSURE IS ABOVE THE DESIGN PRESSURE OF THE RHR SYSTEM. THE REMOVAL OF THE RHR ACI FEATURE AND THE REDUCTION IN THE OPI SET POINT W NOT RESULT IN A CONDITION WHERE THE DESIGN, MATERIAL, AND CONSTRUCTION STANDARDS THAT WERE APPLICABLE PRIOR TO THE CHANGE ARE ALTERED. IN ADDITION, THE SAFETY FUNCTIONS OF THE RHR SYSTEM HAVE NOT BEEN ALTERED AND NO NEW SINGLE FAILURES HAVE BEEN CREATED BY THIS MODIFICATION.

SUBJECT: DCP: 92-V2N0059, REVISION 1, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THIS DCP REVISES THE AUTOMATIC OPERATION OF THE NORTHEAST (NE) CELL FAN AND SPRAY VALVE IN THE TRAIN A AND B NUCLEAR SERVICE COOLING TOWERS (NSCT). ADDITIONALLY, THE START AND STOP SET POINTS OF THE NORTHWEST (NW) CELL FAN OF EACH TRAIN WERE REVISED. THE EQUIPMENT AFFECTED IS: TRAIN A: 2-HV-1668A, 2-HV-1668B, 2-1202-W4-001-F01, 2-1202-W4-001-F03, 2-TE-11641, 2-TE-11643, TRAIN B: 2-HV-1669A, 2-HV-1669B, 2-1202-W4-002-F01, 2-1202-W4-002-F03, 2-TE-11648. AN AX5 RELAY WAS ADDED TO THE AUTOMATIC START AND STOP CIRCUIT OF EACH NE CELL FAN (MOTORS 2-1202-W4-001-M03 AND 2-1202-W4-002-M03). THIS RELAY HAS A NORMALLY CLOSED CONTACT WIRED TO THE START CIRCUIT AND A NORMALLY OPEN CONTACT WIRED TO THE STOP CIRCUIT OF THE FAN. ONE AX5 RELAY WAS INSTALLED INSIDE MCC 2ABB AND THE OTHER RELAY WAS INSTALLED INSIDE MCC 2BBB. THESE RELAYS ARE ENERGIZED WHEN THE RESPECTIVE SPRAY VALVE FOR EACH NSCT REACHES THE FULLY CLOSED POSITION. NEW CABLES WERE PULLED FROM THE 480V SWITCH GEAR 2AB15 (AUX. BIDS. LEVEL D) TO THE 480V MCC 2ABB (AUX. BIDS. LEVEL 1) AND FROM THE 480V SWITCH GEAR 2BB16 (AUX. BIDS. LEVEL 2) TO THE 480V MCC 2BBB (AUX. BIDS. LEVEL 1). NEW CABLES WERE ALSO PULLED FROM VALVES 2BRHV-1668A AND 2BRHV-1669A TO THE MCC'S 2ABB AND 2BBB, RESPECTIVELY. THE NEW AX5 RELAYS ARE PROJECT CLASS 11E, AND THE CONTROL CABLES FOR THESE RELAYS ARE PROJECT CLASS 12E. TEMPERATURE SENSORS 2-TE-11643 AND 2-TE-11648, PREVIOUSLY USED IN THE AUTOMATIC START AND STOP CIRCUITRY OF THE NE CELL FANS, ARE NO LONGER NEEDED AND WERE ABANDONED IN PLACE ALONG WITH THEIR ASSOCIATED CABLING. THE SET POINTS FOR THE TEMPERATURE SENSORS 2-TE-11641

AND 2-TE-11646 FOR THE NW CELL FANS WERE REVISED FROM 75°F TO 83°F FOR STARTING AND 68°F TO 74°F FOR STOPPING OF THE FANS. THE SET POINT FOR AUTOMATIC OPENING OF EACH SPRAY VALVE WAS CHANGED FROM 70°F TO 75°F. THE RESET POINT OF 65°F REMAINS UNCHANGED FOR EACH SPRAY VALVE. THIS DCP ALSO REVISES THE AMBER LIGHT AND THE SWITCH GEAR TROUBLE ALARM CIRCUITRY ASSOCIATED WITH EACH NSCT FAN. EQUIPMENT AFFECTED IS LISTED AS FOLLOWS: TRAIN A: 480V SWGR BREAKER, 2AB1505, 2AB1506, 2AB1513, 2AB1508. TRAIN B: 480V SWGR BREAKER: 2BB1605, 2BB1606, 2BB1613, 2BB1608. FOUR NEW 74-1 RELAYS, ONE PER AFFECTED BREAKER, WERE INSTALLED IN THE INSTRUMENT PANELS OF THE ASSOCIATED 480V SWITCH GEAR BUSES. SPARE BELL ALARM CONTACTS (52BA) WERE WIRED TO ACTUATE THE 74-1 RELAYS. EACH RELAY HAS A NORMALLY CLOSED (NC) CONTACT WIRED TO THE AMBER LIGHT CIRCUIT AND A SECOND NC CONTACT WIRED TO THE SWITCH GEAR TROUBLE ALARM CIRCUIT. A SPARE BREAKER POSITION CONTACT IS ALSO WIRED INTO THE TROUBLE ALARM CIRCUIT TO PREVENT NUISANCE ALARMS. THE NSCT'S NE CELL FAN IS STARTED WHEN THE SPRAY VALVE OPENS, TO HELP ALLEVIATE THE ACCUMULATION OF MOISTURE ON ELECTRICAL AND MECHANICAL COMPONENTS LOCATED IN THE NSCT PUMP ROOMS. OUTSIDE AIR IS PULLED THROUGH THE PUMP ROOMS BY THE FAN WHEN THE SPRAY VALVE OPENS. THE FAN CONTINUES TO OPERATE UNTIL THE SPRAY VALVE CLOSES. MOISTURE ACCUMULATION IN THE PUMP ROOMS OF THE NSCT'S HAS CAUSED CORROSION, COMPONENT MALFUNCTION, AND INCREASED MAINTENANCE TO THE EQUIPMENT IN THE PUMP ROOMS. BY TYING THE OPERATION OF THE NE CELL FAN TO THE OPERATION OF THE SPRAY VALVE, A GREATER STEP CHANGE IN THE TOWER'S COOLING RESPONSE WILL OCCUR WHEN THE SET POINT OF THE SPRAY VALVE IS REACHED. THEREFORE, THE SET POINT OF THE SPRAY VALVE AND BYPASS VALVE IS INCREASED TO 75°F ON RISING NSCW RETURN HEADER TEMPERATURE TO PROVIDE AN INCREASED DEAD BAND BETWEEN THE SPRAY AND BYPASS MODES OF THE TOWER'S OPERATION; THIS IS DONE TO MINIMIZE THE CYCLING OF THESE MOTOR OPERATED VALVES. THE TEMPERATURE SET POINT CHANGE FOR THE AUTOMATIC OPERATION OF THE NSCT'S NW QUADRANT CELL FAN WILL ALLOW THE SEQUENCING OF THE FANS TO BE PROPERLY MAINTAINED. PRESENTLY, THE FAN CONTROLS OPERATE SO A SWITCH GEAR BREAKER TRIP INDICATION IS DEACTIVATED WHENEVER THE NSCW RETURN TEMPERATURE IS BELOW THE LOW TEMPERATURE SET POINT. THIS MAY ALLOW A BREAKER TRIP TO GO UNNOTICED UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS. THIS CONDITION IS APPLICABLE TO ANY NSCT FAN NOT IN OPERATION. MODIFICATION OF THE FAN AMBER LIGHT AND TROUBLE ALARM CIRCUITRY WILL ENSURE A FAN AMBER LIGHT IS NOT DEFEATED BY A LOW TEMPERATURE CONDITION IN THE NSCW RETURN HEADER. THE DESIGN CHANGES TO BE IMPLEMENTED TO THE AMBER LIGHT CIRCUITRY WILL ALLOW IT TO BE FUNCTIONAL AND INDEPENDENT OF THE NSCW RETURN TEMPERATURE.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE CHANGES TO THE NSCT SPRAY VALVE AND FAN CIRCUITRY IN EACH TRAIN HAVE NO IMPACT ON THE ABILITY OF THE NSCT TO PERFORM ITS FUNCTION DURING THE MITIGATION OF DESIGN BASIS ACCIDENTS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR. ALL CHANGES MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF DESIGN, MATERIAL, AND CONSTRUCTION STANDARDS SPECIFIED IN THE APPROPRIATE DESIGN CRITERIA. THE EXISTING SAFETY DESIGN FEATURES NECESSARY TO PRESERVE THE INTEGRITY OF THE NSCW SYSTEM ARE UNAFFECTED, ENSURING SYSTEM INTERFACES REMAIN FUNCTIONAL. THE ELECTRICAL LOADING IMPOSED ON THE DIESEL, AS DOCUMENTED IN CALCULATION X3CEOL, HAS NOT INCREASE. THIS CALCULATION ASSUMED THE ELECTRICAL LOAD FROM THE SPRAY VALVE WOULD BE LOADED ONTO THE DIESEL GENERATOR IN 0.5 SECONDS, AND THE FANS WOULD BE STARTED SIMULTANEOUSLY AFTER THE SEQUENCER BLOCK SIGNAL IS REMOVED DURING ANY DESIGN BASIS ACCIDENTS ACCOMPANIED BY A LOSS OF AC POWER. THE THERMAL RESPONSE OF THE NSCT FOR CONDITIONS ASSUMED IN DESIGN BASIS ACCIDENT ANALYSES IS UNCHANGED. THE RESULTS OF THE FAILURE MODES AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS FOR THE

NSCW EQUIPMENT CREDITED FOR ACCIDENT MITIGATION ARE UNCHANGED. THE VEGP RADIOLOGICAL RELEASE IS UNALTERED AND REMAINS IN COMPLIANCE WITHIN 10 CFR 100 LIMITS. THE OPERABILITY AND BASIS FOR OPERABILITY DELINEATED IN TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 3/4.7.4 AND 3/4.7.5 FOR THE NSCW EQUIPMENT ARE NOT IMPACTED.

SUBJECT: DCP: 92-V2N0064, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: EACH OF THE EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR'S CONNECTING ROD BOLTS THAT SECURE THE CONNECTING RODS AROUND THE CRANKSHAFT ARE REQUIRED TO BE PRELOADED AND THE PRELOAD VERIFIED. THE PREVIOUS DIESEL ENGINE CONNECTING ROD BOLTS ARE TO BE REPLACED WITH NEW STUD/NUT ASSEMBLIES. THE NEW ASSEMBLY UTILIZES A HYDRAULIC PRESTRESSER, IN LIEU OF TORQUEING THE BOLTS, TO ACHIEVE A MORE ACCURATE PRELOAD. THIS CHANGE IS PROJECT CLASS 015.

SAFETY EVALUATION: FAILURE OF THE EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR IS NOT AN INITIATING EVENT OF AN ACCIDENT NOR IS IT ANALYZED IN THE FSAR ACCIDENT ANALYSIS. THIS DESIGN CHANGE DID NOT AFFECT THE RELIABILITY OF THE DIESEL ENGINE IN THAT THE CONNECTING RODS WILL STILL BE SECURED TO THE CRANKSHAFT WITH THE SAME PRELOAD. THIS DESIGN CHANGE DID NOT INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE OF AN ACCIDENT DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR. THE CHANGE IN THE EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR CONNECTING ROD BOLTS AND THE CHANGE IN THE METHOD FOR MEASUREMENT OF THE BOLT PRELOADING REDUCED THE PROBABILITY OF GALLING THE THREADS AND DID NOT DECREASE THE ENGINE RELIABILITY. THE NEW STUDS ARE MADE OF THE SAME MATERIAL AS THE PREVIOUS BOLTS, AND THE PRELOAD REMAINS THE SAME ALSO. THE METHOD OF APPLYING AND MEASURING THE PRELOAD HAS BEEN IMPROVED. THIS DESIGN CHANGE DOES NOT ALTER THE OPERATION OF THE DIESEL ENGINE NOR DOES IT CREATE OR INCREASE THE POSSIBILITY OF ANY TYPE OF FAILURE THAT DOES NOT CURRENTLY EXIST. NEITHER THE RELIABILITY OF THE DIESEL GENERATOR NOR THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS AND BASES WERE DECREASED AS A RESULT OF THE CHANGE IN THE EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR CONNECTING ROD BOLTS.

SUBJECT: DCP: 92-V2N0070, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THIS DCP REPLACED THE PREVIOUS GEAR TYPE COUPLINGS WHICH CONNECTED THE PUMP SHAFTS WITH THE TURBINE DRIVERS OF THE STEAM GENERATOR FEED PUMPS WITH DRY DIAPHRAGM COUPLING.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THIS CHANGE DOES NOT AFFECT ANY SYSTEM, EQUIPMENT, OR COMPONENTS FUNCTION OR OPERATION AND DOES NOT AFFECT ANY FSAR ACCIDENT ANALYSIS OR CREATE A CONDITION WHICH HAS NOT BEEN POSTULATED, THEREFORE THIS CHANGE DOES NOT RESULT IN AN UNRESOLVED SAFETY QUESTION.

SUBJECT: DCP: 92-V2N0072, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: IN ROOM R147 OF THE UNIT 2 AUXILIARY BUILDING, A 120 VAC INVERTER UNIT (TAG NO. 2-1807-Y3-IB12) NEEDED TO BE PROTECTED FROM WATER ENTRY THROUGH THE OPEN (SCREEN) TOP OF THE INVERTER. FOR THIS PROTECTION, A DRIP SHIELD WAS INSTALLED ABOVE THE INVERTER AND SUPPORTED BY THE CONCRETE WALL BEHIND THE UNIT; THE SHIELD IS NOT ATTACHED TO THE INVERTER. THE DRIP

SHIELD STRUCTURE CONSISTS OF TWO P1001 UNISTRUT SECTIONS; EACH IS WELDED TO A BASE PLATE THAT IS BOLTED TO THE CONCRETE WALL ABOVE AND BEHIND THE INVERTER UNIT. THE UNISTRUT MEMBERS ARE CANTILEVERED OVER THE INVERTER UNIT, AND SUPPORT A SPAN OF METAL DECKING. THE DECKING VEILS THE ENTIRE UNIT, THUS SHIELDING IT FROM ANY OVERHEAD DRIPPING. A SHEET METAL GUTTER IS ATTACHED TO THE DECKING ON ONE SIDE. THE SHIELD STRUCTURE IS SLOPED SLIGHTLY TO FACILITATE WATER RUN-OFF FROM DECKING TO THE FLOOR THROUGH THE GUTTER. THE 120 VAC INVERTER (TAG NO. 2-1807-Y3-IB12) HAS CHILLED WATER AND FIRE WATER LINES RUNNING OVERHEAD. WATER AND CONDENSATION FROM THESE LINES DRIPS ONTO THE INVERTER AND CAN ENTER THE UNIT THROUGH ITS OPEN (SCREEN) TOP. THE SLOPED DRIP SHIELD DEFLECTS ANY DRIPPING WATER AWAY FROM THE INVERTER.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE DRIP SHIELD IS A SEISMIC CATEGORY 2 STRUCTURE THAT HAS BEEN DESIGNED TO WITHSTAND SSE LOADS; THEREFORE, THE DRIP SHIELD STRUCTURE SATISFIES SEISMIC 2 OVER 1 DESIGN CRITERIA. THE ADDITION OF SPARE CABLES, PULLED BACK FROM CONDUITS 2BE445RL368 AND 2BE445RQ367, TO CABLE TRAYS 2BE445TLCP AND 2BE445TQCP DOES NOT OVERLOAD OR OVERFILL THESE TRAYS. THE ADDITION OF THE DRIP SHIELD AND REMOVAL OF TWO SPARE CONDUITS FROM THE TOP THE INVERTER 2-1807-Y3-IB12 DID NOT HAVE AN IMPACT ON EXISTING PLANT SYSTEMS, COMPONENTS, AND STRUCTURES. THE SHIELD DOES NOT HAMPER AIR FLOW INTO OR OUT OF THE INVERTER SINCE THERE IS A MINIMUM CLEARANCE OF 12 INCHES BETWEEN THE TOP OF THE INVERTER AND DRIP SHIELD. THIS IS MORE THAN THE 6" MINIMUM CLEARANCE SPECIFIED ON VENDOR DRAWING (REF.: BECHTEL DWG. LOG NO. 2X3AQ03-43-5) FOR THE NATURAL CONVECTION VENT IN THE TOP OF THE UNIT. THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS DO NOT ADDRESS A PASSIVE SHIELD STRUCTURE SUCH AS THIS. THE MODIFICATIONS REQUIRED BY THIS DCP DO NOT DECREASE THE MARGIN OF SAFETY DEFINED IN THE BASIS OF ANY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS.

SUBJECT: DCP: 92-V2N0084, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THIS DCP PERFORMED SEVERAL MODIFICATIONS TO INTERNAL COMPONENTS OF THE STEAM GENERATOR FEED PUMPS, TAG NUMBERS 2-1305-P4-004 AND 005. THE MAJOR MODIFICATION WAS A CHANGE TO THE "A" AND "B" GAP DIMENSIONS. THE "A" GAP WAS MODIFIED BY DECREASING THE INNER DIAMETER OF THE DIFFUSER SIDE PLATES AND BY TRIMMING THE OUTER DIAMETER OF THE IMPELLER. THE "B" GAP IS MODIFIED BY TRIMMING BACK THE VANES OF THE DIFFUSER IN CONJUNCTION WITH TRIMMING THE IMPELLER OD. THE "B" GAP IS THE RADIAL DIMENSION BETWEEN THE OD OF THE IMPELLER VANE AND THE ID OF THE DIFFUSER VANE INLET. THE "A" GAP IS THE RADIAL DIMENSION BETWEEN THE OD OF THE IMPELLER VANE AND THE ID OF THE DIFFUSER SIDE PLATES.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THIS DESIGN CHANGE PERFORMED MODIFICATIONS TO THE STEAM GENERATOR FEED PUMPS THAT LESSEN THE LIKELIHOOD OF DEGRADATION OF COMPONENTS OF THE PUMP DUE TO HIGH VIBRATION AT LOW FLOW CONDITIONS, AND THUS IMPROVED THE PUMPS' RELIABILITY. AS DESCRIBED IN FSAR TABLE 10.4.7-1, LOSS OF A SINGLE FEEDPUMP MAY RESULT IN PLANT OPERATION AT REDUCED CAPACITY OR MAY RESULT IN A REACTOR TRIP. LOSS OF NORMAL FEEDWATER FLOW IS DESCRIBED IN FSAR SECTIONS 15.2.7 AND 15.1.2. BECAUSE THE DESIGN CHANGE MEETS ORIGINAL EQUIPMENT REQUIREMENTS AND INCORPORATES DESIGN FEATURES THAT SHOULD IMPROVE THE RELIABILITY OF PUMP COMPONENTS, THE PROBABILITY OF A LOSS OF FEEDWATER IS NOT INCREASED. THE STEAM GENERATOR FEED PUMPS ARE NOT SAFETY RELATED. BECAUSE THE ANALYSIS OF A LOSS OF FEEDWATER FLOW IS UNCHANGED, THE CONSEQUENCES OF A LOSS OF FEEDWATER FLOW ARE ALSO UNCHANGED. THIS

ASSESSMENT IS BASED ON A REVIEW OF THE FSAR INCLUDING SECTIONS 10.1, 10.2, 10.4, 15.2.7, AND CHAPTER 3. SHOULD THE PUMPS FAIL TO DELIVER FEEDWATER, THE SAFETY FUNCTIONS OF THE PLANT ARE NOT COMPROMISED. THIS ASSESSMENT WAS BASED ON A REVIEW OF THE FSAR INCLUDING SECTIONS 10.1, 10.2, 10.4, 15.2.7, AND CHAPTER 3. THE FEEDWATER PUMPS ARE LOCATED IN THE TURBINE BUILDING AND THEIR FAILURE WILL NOT IMPACT SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT, STRUCTURES OR SYSTEMS BEYOND THAT ALREADY ANALYZED IN THE FSAR. BECAUSE THE MAIN FEEDWATER SYSTEM IS NOT DISCUSSED IN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS, AND THE PROBABILITY OF A FAILURE OF THE MAIN FEEDWATER PUMPS WAS NOT INCREASED BY THIS CHANGE TO THE PUMP'S INTERNALS, THE TECH SPECS SAFETY MARGINS DEFINED BY THE BASIS OF THE TECH SPECS HAVE NOT BEEN DECREASED. THIS IS BASED ON A REVIEW OF THE TECH SPECS AND BASES INCLUDING SECTION B3/4.7.

SUBJECT: DCP: 92-V2N0091, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THIS DESIGN CHANGE PACKAGE (DCP) IMPLEMENTED BYPASS TEST INSTRUMENTATION (BTI) FOR NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION SYSTEM (NIS) REACTOR TRIP FUNCTIONS, 7300 PROCESS PROTECTION BOP SYSTEM REACTOR TRIP FUNCTIONS, 7300 PROCESS PROTECTION NSSS SYSTEM REACTOR TRIP (RT) FUNCTIONS AND ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM (ESFAS) FUNCTIONS. HARDWARE MODIFICATIONS WERE MADE PER WESTINGHOUSE FCN'S FOR INSTALLING BTI PANELS IN THE FOLLOWING EQUIPMENT: A) NIS CABINET (2-1602-Q5-NIR) B) 7300 PROCESS PROTECTION NSSS CABINETS (2-1604-Q5-PS1/PS2/PS3/PS4) C) 7300 PROCESS PROTECTION BOP CABINETS (2-1604-Q5-PP1/PP2/PP3) VISUAL INDICATION ON THE MAIN CONTROL BOARD IS PROVIDED BY THE ADDITION OF 11 NEW ANNUNCIATOR WINDOWS FOR BTI TEST PANELS STATUS. ADDITIONALLY, LOCAL INDICATION IS PROVIDED ON EACH BTI TEST PANEL FOR CHANNEL STATUS. THE REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM (RTS) AND ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM (ESFAS) UTILIZE 1-OUT-OF-2, 2-OUT-OF-3, AND 2-OUT-OF-4 COINCIDENCE LOGIC FROM REDUNDANT CHANNELS TO INITIATE PROTECTIVE ACTIONS. WITHIN THESE SYSTEMS, ANALOG CHANNEL COMPARATORS, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION SYSTEM (NIS) 1-OUT-OF-2 FUNCTIONS, ARE CURRENTLY PLACED IN THE TRIPPED STATE FOR CHANNEL TESTING OR IN RESPONSE TO A CHANNEL BEING OUT OF SERVICE. WITH AN INOPERABLE CHANNEL IN THE TRIPPED STATE, A REDUNDANT CHANNEL CANNOT BE MAINTAINED OR TESTED WITHOUT CAUSING A REACTOR TRIP OR SAFEGUARDS ACTUATION. WITH IMPLEMENTATION OF THE BYPASS TEST INSTRUMENTATION (BTI), A SPURIOUS REACTOR TRIP OR SAFEGUARDS ACTUATION IS AVOIDED SINCE THE PARTIAL TRIP CONDITION THAT WOULD HAVE BEEN PRESENT IS ELIMINATED AND THE COINCIDENCE LOGIC IS MAINTAINED BY REQUIRING SIGNALS FROM ADDITIONAL CHANNELS TO ACTUATE THE PROTECTIVE FUNCTIONS.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE INSTALLATION OF THE BTI DOES NOT ADVERSELY AFFECT THE OPERABILITY OF THE 7300 PROCESS PROTECTION SYSTEMS (NSSS & BOP) OR THE NIS. THE ACTIVITY DID NOT CHANGE THE CHANNEL REDUNDANCY OR SEPARATION REQUIREMENT PROVIDED BY THE 7300 PROCESS PROTECTION SYSTEM OR THE NIS. WITH IMPLEMENTATION OF THE BTI, A SPURIOUS REACTOR TRIP OR SAFEGUARDS ACTUATION, DURING TESTING, IS LESS LIKELY SINCE THE PARTIAL TRIP CONDITION THAT WOULD HAVE BEEN PRESENT IS ELIMINATED WHILE THE COINCIDENCE LOGIC IS MAINTAINED. FURTHERMORE, THERE ARE NO CREDIBLE FAILURE MODES OF THE BTI TOGGLE SWITCHES THAT CAN CAUSE A PLANT TRIP. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE BTI DOES NOT AFFECT THE INTEGRITY OF ANY FISSION PRODUCT BARRIERS UTILIZED IN THE MITIGATION OF THE RADIOLOGICAL DOSE CONSEQUENCES OF AN

ACCIDENT. THE INSTALLATION OF THE BYPASS PANELS DOES NOT ADVERSELY AFFECT THE SEISMIC QUALIFICATION OF THE NIS OR 7300 PROCESS PROTECTION NSSS AND BOP RACKS (REFERENCES 2, 3 & 4). FAULT TEST/EVALUATIONS HAVE BEEN PERFORMED FOR THE BTI SYSTEM TO DETERMINE THAT A CREDIBLE FAULT DID NOT PROPAGATE TO OR FROM THE BTI AS IT INTERFACES WITH ASSOCIATED PROTECTION SYSTEM FUNCTIONS (REFERENCE 1). THE BTI SYSTEM IS NOT SUBJECT TO COMMON MODE FAILURES. THE BTI SYSTEM IS DESIGNED TO PERFORM ITS ASSOCIATED PROTECTIVE FUNCTION (I.E., TESTING/TROUBLESHOOTING IN THE BYPASSED CONDITION) AND NOT ADVERSELY AFFECT EQUIPMENT UTILIZED IN THE MITIGATION OF RADIOLOGICAL DOSE CONSEQUENCES. INSTALLATION OF THE BTI SYSTEM DOES NOT AFFECT ACCIDENT INITIATION SEQUENCES OR RESPONSE SCENARIOS. NO NEW FAILURE MODES ARE BEING CREATED FOR ANY PLANT EQUIPMENT. ALTHOUGH THE FSAR DOES NOT EVALUATE ACCIDENTS WHICH ARE THE RESULT OF THE PROCESS PROTECTION SYSTEM FAILING TO PERFORM ITS INTENDED FUNCTION, A COMMON MODE FAILURE OF MORE THAN ONE PROCESS PROTECTION CHANNEL COULD LEAD TO THE POSSIBILITY OF AN ACCIDENT BEING CREATED THAT IS DIFFERENT FROM ANY PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED IN THE FSAR. MEASURES TO ENSURE SYSTEM RELIABILITY, HAVE BEEN TAKEN TO ENSURE THAT THE POSSIBILITY OF A MALFUNCTION OF EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY DIFFERENT FROM ANY ALREADY EVALUATED IN THE FSAR WAS NOT CREATED BY THE INSTALLATION OF THE BTI SYSTEM (REFERENCE 1). THESE MEASURES INCLUDE: RELIABILITY EVALUATION, ISOLATION CAPABILITY EVALUATION, SEISMIC, AND ENVIRONMENTAL EQUIPMENT QUALIFICATION EVALUATIONS AND TESTING, AND DESIGN CONSTRAINTS GOVERNED BY WCAP-11368 AND SERS FOR APPLICATION OF ROUTINE TEST IN BYPASS. NO FUNCTIONS CREDITED IN SAFETY ANALYSES ARE ALTERED OR AFFECTED BY THE INSTALLATION OF THE BTI. THIS DCP DOES NOT REDUCE THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN THE BASIS FOR ANY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION.

SUBJECT: DCP: 92-V2N0092, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: TWO (2) TIME DELAY PRINTED CIRCUIT BOARDS WERE INSTALLED IN SPARE SLOTS OF THE NIS CABINET N50 DRAWER. THESE BOARDS PROVIDE AN ADJUSTABLE INHIBIT CONTROL OVER THE FLUX DEVIATION DRAWER QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO-(QPTR) DEVIATION RELAY ALARM OUTPUTS. THIS CHANGE WAS MADE TO PREVENT QPTR NUISANCE ALARMS WHICH ARE GENERATED FROM THE NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION SYSTEM (NIS) FLUX DEVIATION DRAWER. THESE ALARMS WERE ACTIVATED WHEN THE INSTANTANEOUS QPTR WAS CALCULATED BY THE NIS EXCORE DETECTORS AND EXCEEDS 2% OF THE STEADY STATE CONDITION. AT PLANT VOGTLE THERE IS A REACTOR VESSEL LOWER PLENUM VORTEX FLOW ANOMALY, THAT IN CONJUNCTION WITH NORMAL NIS CALIBRATION TOLERANCES, CAUSES A QPTR NUISANCE ALARM.

SAFETY EVALUATION: ONLY ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS WERE ADDED TO THE NON-SAFETY RELATED FLUX DEVIATION AND MISCELLANEOUS CONTROL DRAWER. THIS DRAWER DOES NOT PROVIDE A PRIMARY OR DIVERSE PROTECTIVE FUNCTION. THERE WERE NO FUNCTIONAL CHANGES MADE TO THE SAFETY-RELATED PORTION OF THE NIS. THIS ACTIVITY DID NOT MOVE OR CHANGE THE PHYSICAL SEPARATION BARRIER BETWEEN THE NON-SAFETY RELATED FLUX DEVIATION AND MISCELLANEOUS CONTROL DRAWER AND THE SAFETY-RELATED POWER RANGE DRAWERS. WESTINGHOUSE SUPPORTS THE USE OF QPTR VALUES GENERATED BY PROTEUS TO SOUND AN ALARM BASED ON ONE MINUTE AVERAGED NIS SIGNALS. THE FUNCTION PROVIDED BY THE

DELAY CARDS CAN PERFORM A TIME DELAY ALARM INDEPENDENTLY OF THE AVERAGING FUNCTION CURRENTLY BEING GENERATED BY THE PROTEUS. ACCORDING TO TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION SECTION 4.2.4.1.B WHEN THE QPTR ALARM IS INOPERABLE, PRIOR TO USING THE PROTEUS PLANT COMPUTER, THE QPTR WAS DETERMINED TO BE WITHIN ITS LIMITS BY "CALCULATING THE RATIO AT LEAST ONCE PER 12 HOURS DURING STEADY STATE OPERATION." THIS STATEMENT ALLOWS THE USE OF UP TO A SIX MINUTE DELAY IN THE INSTANTANEOUS NIS GENERATED QPTR ALARM. REAL EVENTS, SUCH AS DROPPED RODS OR LOCAL FUEL ASSEMBLY FLOW BLOCKAGE, LAST LONGER THAN THE TIME DELAY AND WOULD PRODUCE AN ALARM SOONER THAN THE ACCEPTABLE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CALCULATION METHOD. THIS DRAWER DOES NOT PROVIDE A PRIMARY OR DIVERSE PROTECTIVE FUNCTION WHICH IS RELIED UPON TO BRING THE PLANT TO A SAFE SHUTDOWN CONDITION OR TO MITIGATE THE RELEASE OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL TO THE ATMOSPHERE. THE STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY OF THE NIS IS MAINTAINED. NONE OF THE LIMITS OR ACTION STATEMENTS IDENTIFIED IN TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3/4.2.4 ARE AFFECTED BY THIS DCP. THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN THE BASES TO ANY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS HAVE NOT BEEN REDUCED.

SUBJECT: DCP: 92-V2N0101, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THIS DCP ADDED MANUAL-RESET PROTECTIVE RELAY TRIP LOCKOUT RELAYS TO THE 4160 VOLT SWITCH GEAR COMPARTMENTS OF THE FOLLOWING MOTOR LOADS: CLASS 1E LOADS: NSCW PUMP MOTORS, CCW PUMP MOTORS, ACCW PUMP MOTORS, AFW PUMP MOTORS, ESF CHILLER COMP MOTORS NON-CLASS 1E LOADS: TPCW PUMP MOTORS, NORM CHILLER MOTORS, COND PUMP MOTORS, MPL TAG NUMBERS ARE: 2-1202-P4-001-M01, 2-1202-P4-002-M01, 2-1202-P4-003-M01, 2-1202-P4-004-M01, 2-1202-P4-005-M01, 2-1202-P4-006-M01, 2-1203-P4-001-M01 2-1203-P4-002-M01, 2-1203-P4-003-M01, 2-1203-P4-004-M01, 2-1203-P4-005-M01, 2-1203-P4-006-M01, 2-1217-P4-001-M01, 2-1217-P4-002-M01, 2-1302-P4-003-M01, 2-1302-P4-002-M01, 2-1592-C7-001-M01, 2-1592-C7-002-M01, 2-1405-P5-501-M01, 2-1405-P5-502-M01, A-1591-C7-003-M01, . EXISTING LOCK-OUT RELAYS WERE USED ON 2-1305-P4-001-M01, 2-1305-P4-002-M01, AND 2-1305-P4-003-M01. THE ADDED WIRING MODIFICATIONS EFFECT THE NECESSARY CONTROL CIRCUITRY TO TRIP THE CIRCUIT BREAKER, PREVENT RECLOSING OF THE BREAKER, AND (FOR CLASS 1E LOADS ONLY) MAINTAIN "BYPASSED" STATUS ON THE SYSTEM STATUS MONITOR PANEL UNTIL DELIBERATE ACTION IS TAKEN TO RESET THE LOCKOUT RELAY AFTER THE CIRCUIT BREAKER IS OPENED DUE TO A PROTECTIVE RELAY TRIP. A RED MONITOR LIGHT WAS ADDED TO THE FRONT OF THE SWITCH GEAR TO INDICATE CIRCUIT CONTINUITY THROUGH THE LOCKOUT RELAY COIL WHEN NOT ENERGIZED. THIS NEON LIGHT ADDED A NEGLIGIBLE LOAD TO THE BATTERY. REVISION OF CALCULATIONS X3CF01 AND X3CF02 WAS NOT BE REQUIRED. A THERMISTOR IS INSTALLED ACROSS THE LOCKOUT RELAY COIL TO ENSURE PROPER OPERATION OF THE PROTECTIVE RELAY TARGET COIL. ALL WIRING CHANGES ARE INTERNAL TO THE SWITCH GEAR. THE FRONT OF THE SWITCH GEAR COMPARTMENT WAS DRILLED FOR MOUNTING THE LOCKOUT RELAY AND MONITOR LIGHT, AS REQUIRED. THE EXISTING PROTECTIVE BAR ACROSS THE BACK OF THE LOCAL BREAKER CONTROL SWITCH WAS REPLACED WITH A LONGER BAR TO PROTECT BOTH THE CONTROL SWITCH AND THE LOCKOUT RELAY ASSEMBLY. THE LOADS SELECTED FOR ADDITION OF TRIP LOCKOUT CAN BE STARTED BY AN AUTOMATIC START SIGNAL WHEN THE CONTROLS ARE SET TO THE "AUTO" POSITION. UNDER THIS CONDITION, IF AN AUTOMATIC START SIGNAL IS

PRESENT COINCIDENTAL WITH A PROTECTIVE RELAY TRIP, THE BREAKER WAS NOT PREVIOUSLY PREVENTED FROM RECLOSING AND COULD RECLOSE ONTO A FAULT. RECLOSING COULD OCCUR SEVERAL TIMES BEFORE THE OPERATOR COULD RESPOND TO LOCK THE BREAKER CIRCUIT OUT MANUALLY. REPEATED RECLOSING ONTO A FAULT CAN RESULT IN DAMAGE TO THE MOTOR, DAMAGE TO THE BREAKER AND ITS POWER CIRCUITRY, AND COULD JEOPARDIZE THE INTEGRITY OF THE POWER DELIVERY SYSTEM UPSTREAM OF THE BREAKER INVOLVED, INCLUDING LOSS OF THE BUS SUPPLYING THE BREAKER. THE PLANT HAS EXPERIENCED MOTOR DAMAGE AS A RESULT OF SUCH RECLOSING. THE ADDITION OF THE LOCKOUT RELAY PREVENTS RECLOSING THE BREAKER AFTER A PROTECTIVE RELAY TRIP UNTIL THE LOCKOUT RELAY IS RESET. THIS ALLOWS THE OPERATOR TO INVESTIGATE THE CAUSE OF THE TRIP AND TAKE APPROPRIATE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS BEFORE RE-ENERGIZING THE LOAD.

SAFETY EVALUATION: NORMAL OPERATION OF THE RELAYS PROVIDES THE SAME TRIPPING ACTION AS THE PREVIOUS CONFIGURATION. FAILURE OF THE LOCKOUT RELAY COULD PREVENT BREAKER TRIPPING ON OVER CURRENT CONDITION. HOWEVER, THE SWITCH GEAR BUS FEEDER OVER CURRENT PROTECTION IS DESIGNED TO PROVIDE BACKUP TRIPPING OF THE ENTIRE BUS IN THE EVENT THAT THE MOTOR FEEDER BREAKER FAILS TO CLEAR A FAULT CONDITION. IN THIS CASE THE BACKUP TRAIN IS AVAILABLE FOR THE CLASS 1E LOADS. THE THERMISTOR, WHICH WAS ADDED IN SERIES WITH THE PROTECTIVE RELAY TO ENHANCE THE OPERATION OF ITS TARGET COIL AND IS ACTIVE ONLY AFTER THE LOCKOUT RELAY TRIPS, COULD FAIL EITHER OPEN CIRCUIT OR SHORT CIRCUIT. NEITHER FAILURE PREVENTS TRIPPING OF THE BREAKER OR INTERFERE WITH THE NORMAL OPERATION OF THE BREAKER. IN ALL CASES, AN ALTERNATE SYSTEM IS AVAILABLE AND THE CONDITIONS APPLICABLE TO THE NEW LOGIC ARE COVERED BY THE CURRENT EVALUATIONS IN THE FSAR. PROPER OPERATOR RESPONSE TO AN OVER CURRENT TRIP INCLUDES RESETTING THE LOCKOUT RELAY AFTER EVALUATION OF THE CAUSE OF THE TRIP AND DETERMINATION THAT THE MOTOR MAY BE RETURNED TO SERVICE. PLANT OPERATIONS PROCEDURES HAVE BEEN REVISED TO INCLUDE THIS RESPONSE. ALSO, IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT THE COIL MONITOR LIGHT MAY REMAIN DIMLY LIT AFTER A LOCKOUT RELAY TRIP DUE TO THE PRESENCE OF A THERMISTOR IN THE CIRCUIT. THIS DOES NOT AFFECT OPERATION OF THE BREAKER OR OPERATOR RESPONSE, SINCE THE MONITOR LIGHT IS USED ONLY WHEN THE LOCKOUT RELAY IS RESET. A REVIEW OF NUCLEAR PLANT RELIABILITY DATA SYSTEM RECORDS REVEALS NO REPORTED FAILURES OF THE SPECIFIC ELECTRO SWITCH LOCKOUT RELAY USED. DOCUMENTED FAILURES OF SIMILAR ELECTRO SWITCH RELAYS AND SWITCHES INCLUDE COIL AND CONTACT MALFUNCTIONS WHICH WOULD CAUSE THE RELAY TO FAIL TO PROVIDE PROPER CONTACT OPERATION WHEN REQUIRED. SIMILAR FAILURES, WHEN APPLIED TO THE SPECIFIC LOCKOUT RELAY USED, WOULD CAUSE THE LOCKOUT RELAY TO FAIL TO TRIP THE MOTOR FEEDER BREAKER ON OVERLOAD CONDITION. THE SWITCH GEAR BUS FEEDER OVER CURRENT PROTECTION IS DESIGNED TO PROVIDE BACKUP TRIPPING OF THE ENTIRE BUS IN THE EVENT THAT THE MOTOR FEEDER BREAKER FAILS TO CLEAR A FAULT CONDITION. CERTAIN LOW-LEVEL FAULT (OR OVERLOAD) CONDITIONS MAY NOT BE SENSED BY THE BACKUP PROTECTION. IN THIS EVENT, LOCALIZED DAMAGE TO THE MOTOR AND/OR ITS POWER CIRCUITRY MAY BE EXPECTED BEFORE THE FAULT REACHES A LEVEL AT WHICH THE BACKUP PROTECTION OPERATES. IN THIS EVENT HOWEVER, THE BACKUP PROTECTION WILL OPERATE BEFORE METASTATIC DAMAGE OCCURS. OTHER FAILURES, I.E., FAILURE TO RESET OR FAILURE OF THE THERMISTOR, WILL NOT AFFECT THE CIRCUITRY UNLESS A TRIP HAS OCCURRED AND THE EQUIPMENT IS ALREADY REMOVED FROM SERVICE. THEREFORE, THESE FAILURES ARE OF NO SAFETY CONCERN. IN ANY CASE, A BACKUP TRAIN IS AVAILABLE TO PROVIDE PROPER EQUIPMENT OPERATION. ALL CHANGES MEET

THE REQUIREMENTS FOR SEISMIC CATEGORY I AND CLASS 1E CIRCUITRY INSTALLATION. OTHER FAILURES, I.E., FAILURE TO RESET OR FAILURE OF THE THERMISTOR, WILL NOT AFFECT THE CIRCUITRY UNLESS A TRIP HAS OCCURRED AND THE EQUIPMENT IS ALREADY REMOVED FROM SERVICE. THEREFORE, THESE FAILURES ARE OF NO SAFETY CONCERN. THE MARGIN OF SAFETY IS NOT REDUCED BY THIS CHANGE.

SUBJECT: DCP: 92-V2N0105, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THE HIGH VOLTAGE TAP SETTING ON RESERVE AUXILIARY TRANSFORMERS (RATS) 2NXRA AND 2NXRB WAS CHANGED FROM 98.75% TO 100% AS EVALUATED IN CALCULATION X3CA22 (UNIT 2 LOAD STUDY). THIS CALCULATION WAS PERFORMED UNDER REA VG-1071. THE CHANGE IN TRANSFORMER TAP POSITION FROM 98.75% TO 100% CAUSES LOWER VOLTAGE ON THE SECONDARY SIDE OF THE TRANSFORMER FOR A GIVEN VOLTAGE ON THE PRIMARY SIDE OF THE TRANSFORMER. THIS REDUCES THE POTENTIAL OVERVOLTAGE CONDITION IN THE STATION AUXILIARY SYSTEM.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE NET EFFECT OF THIS DCP WAS TO REDUCE A POTENTIAL OVERVOLTAGE SITUATION. THE LOSS-OF-OFFSITE POWER (LOSP) ACCIDENT DESCRIBED IN SECTION 15.6 AND ASSUMED IN OTHER ACCIDENTS IS BASED ON ACCEPTABLE DEGRADED GRID RELAY SETPOINTS. THIS DCP DID NOT AFFECT THE DEGRADED GRID VOLTAGE RELAY SETPOINTS. THE RELAYS CONTINUE TO SENSE VOLTAGE LEVEL ON THE 4160 VOLT AC, CLASS 1E BUSES AND OPERATE IF THE BUS VOLTAGE FALLS BELOW THE RELAY SETPOINT. CALCULATION X3CA22 ANALYZED THE VOLTAGE CONDITIONS AT CLASS 1E 4160 VOLT, 480 VOLT AND 120 VOLT SYSTEMS ASSUMING THE 4160 VOLT AC BUS VOLTAGE TO BE JUST ABOVE THE DEGRADED GRID VOLTAGE RELAY SETPOINTS (88.53% OF 4160 VOLTS). THE ANALYSIS CONCLUDED THAT VOLTAGE AT THE SAFETY-RELATED EQUIPMENT TERMINALS WAS ADEQUATE TO START THE EQUIPMENT. CHANGING THE HIGH VOLTAGE TAP ON 2NXRA AND 2NXRB FROM 98.75% TO 100% WILL NOT PREVENT SAFETY-RELATED MOTORS FROM PERFORMING AS EXPECTED DURING AN ; ACCIDENT . THE DCP DOES NOT AFFECT THE DIESEL GENERATOR (DG) OUTPUT DURING A LOSS-OF-OFFSITE POWER EVENT. DURING A LOSP EVENT, ELECTRICAL INTERLOCKS ON THE CLASS 1E BUS CIRCUIT BREAKERS PREVENT THE DG AND THE RATS FROM BEING SIMULTANEOUSLY CONNECTED TO THE BUSES. TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION SECTIONS 3/4.8.1 AND 3/4.8.3 AND THEIR BASES ARE NOT IMPACTED BY THE RAT TAP SETTING CHANGE.

SUBJECT: DCP: 92-V2N0106, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: PREVIOUS FEEDWATER FLOW ELEMENTS 2FE-0510, 0520, 0530, & 0540 WERE REMOVED AND REPLACED WITH FLOW ELEMENTS EQUIPPED WITH INSPECTION/CLEANOUT PORTS. THE INSPECTION/CLEANOUT PORTS ARE 5" IN DIAMETER, AND DURING NORMAL OPERATION ARE PLUGGED WITH A CARBON STEEL PLUG SECURED WITH A 900 LB BLIND FLANGE CONNECTION. THIS INSPECTION/ CLEANOUT PORT DESIGN MEETS THE REQUIREMENTS OF ASME PTC 6.1-1984. TWO PIPE SUPPORTS WERE MODIFIED SLIGHTLY. THE ALIGNMENT ANGLE OF THE STRUTS ON ONE SUPPORT WERE ADJUSTED. A SPRING COLD SET POSITION ADJUSTMENT WAS MADE ON ONE OTHER SUPPORT. THIS DESIGN CHANGE APPLIES TO THE PORTION OF THE CONDENSATE AND FEEDWATER SYSTEM (1305) THAT IS PROJECT CLASS 424. HOWEVER, THIS REGION IS ANALYZED AS PROJECT CLASS 212 TO ENSURE THAT THE PRESSURE BOUNDARY INTEGRITY IS

MAINTAINED FOR THE SAFETY RELATED REGION. RE-ANALYSIS OF PIPE STRESS VERIFIED THAT PROJECT CLASS 212 PIPE STRESS LIMITS ARE NOT EXCEEDED.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE FLOW ELEMENTS WITH THE INSPECTION/CLEANOUT PORT WERE DESIGNED TO MEET THE ORIGINAL DESIGN REQUIREMENTS OF THE PREVIOUS FLOW ELEMENTS AND WERE HYDROSTATICALLY TESTED AND QUALIFIED PER ANSI B31.1 SECTION 137.4. THE TAP SETS ON EACH FLOW ELEMENT WERE CALIBRATED. THE CORRESPONDING FLOW TRANSMITTERS WERE RECALIBRATED TO ENSURE FEEDWATER FLOW IS MEASURED ACCURATELY. NEITHER THE FUNCTION NOR THE RELIABILITY OF THE FLOW ELEMENTS WAS CHANGED. THE PLUG IN THE INSPECTION/CLEANOUT PORT WAS DESIGNED SO THAT IT DOES NOT DISRUPT THE FLOW PATTERN IN THE FLOW ELEMENT. THE FLANGE/PLUG ASSEMBLY IS KEYS TO INSURE PROPER REINSTALLATION OF THE PLUG WHENEVER IT IS REMOVED. SINCE THE OPERATION OF THE FEEDWATER FLOW ELEMENT IS NOT CHANGING, THE CONSEQUENCES OF A FAILURE OF THE FLOW ELEMENT WAS NOT CHANGED. THE ADDED INSPECTION/CLEANOUT PORT IS ONLY USED TO FACILITATE CLEANING AND INSPECTION OF THE FLOW ELEMENT DURING OUTAGES OR WHEN A PROBLEM IS SUSPECTED. THE NEW FLOW ELEMENT IS DESIGNED TO THE SAME DESIGN PARAMETERS AS THE PREVIOUS FLOW ELEMENT. THE DESIGN CHANGE WAS A DIRECT EXCHANGE OF THE TWO FLOW ELEMENTS. THIS DID NOT AFFECT THE OPERATION OF THE CONDENSATE AND FEEDWATER SYSTEM. THE DESIGN CHANGE DID NOT DECREASE THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED BY THE BASIS OF THE TECH SPECS, INCLUDING THE BASES FOR 3/4.7.1 AND 3/4.7.2.

SUBJECT: DCP: 92-V2N0125, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THIS DCP ELIMINATED VALVE 2-1301-U4-405 AND A PORTION OF LINE 2-1301-L4-010-2" IN THE MAIN STEAM SYSTEM (1301). THE VALVE AND LINE WERE LOCATED IN THE AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP HOUSE. THE VALVE AND 2" LINE FORMED A BYPASS AROUND 4" CHECK VALVE 2-1301-U4-404. THE PROJECT CLASS OF THE VALVE AND 2" PIPE WAS 313. THE PORTION OF THE 2" PIPE THAT REMAINED WAS CAPPED. VALVES 2-1301-U4-405 AND 2-1301-U4-404 WERE IN A PORTION OF THE MAIN STEAM SYSTEM WHICH SUPPLIED STEAM TO THE AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP (AFWP) TURBINE 2-1302-P4-001-K01. THE TAKE-OFFS FOR THE STEAM SUPPLY LINE TO THE AFWP TURBINE LIE UPSTREAM OF THE MSIV'S IN THE MAIN STEAM LINES FROM STEAM GENERATORS 2-1201-B6-001 (SG-1) AND 2-1201-B6-002 (SG-2). THE TWO LINES THEN COMBINE INTO ONE HEADER WHICH CARRIES THE STEAM TO THE AFWP TURBINE. SINCE THE BYPASS VALVE HAS BEEN A SOURCE OF STEAM LEAKAGE AND NO LONGER PERFORMS A USEFUL FUNCTION IT WAS ELIMINATED AND THE PORTION OF THE BYPASS LINE WHICH REMAINED WAS CAPPED.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE DESIGN CHANGE ELIMINATED VALVE 2-1301-U4-405 AND A PORTION OF THE 2" BYPASS LINE WHICH CONTAINED THE VALVE. THE VALVE HAD INSTANCES OF STEAM LEAKAGE. ELIMINATION OF THE VALVE REDUCED THE PROBABILITY OF STEAM LEAKS. THE VALVE AND 2" BYPASS LINE WERE REPLACED BY 2" PIPE CAPS WELDED TO THE TWO ENDS WHERE THE BYPASS LINE WAS CONNECTED TO THE 4" MAIN STEAM LINE. THEREFORE, BASED ON A REVIEW THE FSAR, INCLUDING SECTIONS 15.2, 10.4.9, 10.3 AND 7.3. THE PIPE CAPS HAS THE SAME SAFETY AND SEISMIC RATINGS THAT THE VALVE AND PIPE HAD. BASED ON A REVIEW OF THE FSAR INCLUDING SECTIONS 15.2, 10.4.9, 10.3, AND 7.3 THERE WAS NO INCREASE IN THE CONSEQUENCES OF ANY ACCIDENT PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED IN THE FSAR. THE PROPOSED CHANGE REDUCED THE PROBABILITY OF A MALFUNCTION OF THE TURBINE DRIVEN AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP DUE TO INADEQUATE STEAM FLOW, THUS IMPROVING RELIABILITY.

NO CREDIT IS TAKEN FOR A BYPASS LINE AROUND ANY CHECK VALVE IN THE STEAM SUPPLY LINE TO THE AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP TURBINE IN ANY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION OR BASIS. ADDITIONALLY, THE VALVE AND LINE CONTAINING THE VALVE WAS REPLACED BY PIPE CAPS WHICH MEET THE SAME SEISMIC AND SAFETY CRITERIA. THESE CONCLUSIONS WERE BASED UPON A REVIEW OF THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS AND THEIR BASES INCLUDING SECTION 3/4.7.1.2.

SUBJECT: DCP: 92-V2N0135, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THE CONDENSATE CHEMICAL INJECTION SYSTEM, SYSTEM 1411, PROVIDES HYDRAZINE AND AMMONIA TO THE CONDENSATE AND FEED WATER SYSTEMS FOR CORROSION CONTROL. THIS SYSTEM IS OPERATED DURING MODES 5 AND 6 WHILE THE STEAM GENERATORS (S/G) ARE IN WET LAY UP. CHECK VALVES 2-1411-U4-029, 031, 043 AND 044 ARE LOCATED INSIDE REACTOR CONTAINMENT, IN THE CHEMICAL INJECTION LINES (2-1411-L4-046, 045, 027, AND 028) TO THE ASSOCIATED S/G WET LAY UP RECIRCULATION PUMP DISCHARGE LINES (2-1301-L4-148, 149, 146, AND 147). THESE VALVES SERVE AS THE CONTAINMENT ISOLATION BOUNDARY TO CONTAINMENT PENETRATIONS 12A, 11A, 69A, AND 69B AND ALSO SERVE TO LIMIT ANY POSSIBLE BACK FLOW OF S/G WET LAY UP RECIRCULATION PUMP DISCHARGE WATER THROUGH THE S/G LAY UP PUMPS (2-1411-P4-508-P01 AND P02). THE CHECK VALVES WERE REPLACED BY NEW LOCKED CLOSED GLOBE VALVES (2-1411-U4-676, 677, 678, 679) AS THE CONTAINMENT ISOLATION BOUNDARY AND WERE MOVED FURTHER DOWNSTREAM IN THE CHEMICAL INJECTION LINES TO LIMIT POSSIBLE BACK FLOW. THE CHECK VALVES WERE RETAGGED AS 2-1301-U4-029, 031, 043, & 044. THE NEW GLOBE VALVES ARE IDENTICAL TO GLOBE VALVES 2-1411-U4-081, 084, 087, AND 090, EXCEPT THAT THEY INCLUDE A LOCK AND CHAIN. THE NEW VALVES ARE PROJECT CLASS 212 AND THE PREVIOUS CHECK VALVES WERE DOWNGRADED TO PROJECT CLASS 424.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE CONTAINMENT ISOLATION FUNCTION WAS IMPROVED AND THE OPERATIONAL FUNCTION OF THE CONDENSATE CHEMICAL INJECTION SYSTEM WAS NOT ADVERSELY AFFECTED. THE NEW VALVES HAVE THE SAME PROJECT CLASS, MATERIALS AND ARE DESIGNED TO THE SAME STANDARDS AS ORIGINALLY USED FOR THE CHECK VALVES. THEREFORE, THIS DESIGN CHANGE IS CONSIDERED TO BE A DESIGN IMPROVEMENT WHICH INCREASES THE RELIABILITY OF THE SYSTEM BY UTILIZING A GLOBE VALVE RATHER THAN A CHECK VALVE FOR CONTAINMENT ISOLATION. THE LOCKED CLOSED GLOBE VALVE STILL PROVIDES CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY. IT WOULD TAKE A SECOND FAILURE - THAT OF THE GLOBE VALVE - FOR INSIDE CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY TO BE BREACHED. THEREFORE, THIS DESIGN CHANGE MEETS THE SINGLE FAILURE CRITERION. PIPE STRESS CALCULATIONS HAVE VERIFIED THAT THE EXISTING PIPING SYSTEM AND SUPPORTS ARE ACCEPTABLE WITHOUT MODIFICATION. BY ADDING THE GLOBE VALVE, THE STRUCTURE IS NOT DEGRADED, REDUNDANCY IS MAINTAINED, AND RELIABILITY IS INCREASED, AS PER PLANT EXPERIENCE, GLOBE VALVES PROVIDE RELIABLE ISOLATION WITHOUT THE NEED FOR EXTENSIVE REWORKING. THE PROJECT CLASS 424 SECTION OF PIPING THAT THE CHECK VALVE WAS RELOCATED TO HAS ALSO BEEN EVALUATED PER THE APPROPRIATE CRITERIA AND IS ACCEPTABLE. IF IT IS ASSUMED THAT A MALFUNCTION OF THE CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVE OCCURS, THIS DESIGN WILL NOT INCREASE THE RADIOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES. SINCE THE FAILURE MODE FOR EITHER VALVE IS IN THE OPEN POSITION, THE RADIOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES OF EITHER VALVE FAILING WOULD BE EQUIVALENT. THE REPLACEMENT OF CONTAINMENT ISOLATION CHECK VALVES WITH MANUAL GLOBE VALVES DID NOT REDUCE THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN THE BASIS FOR ANY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS.

CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES ARE REQUIRED TO REMAIN OPERABLE, AND TO PERFORM A CONTAINMENT ISOLATION FUNCTION PER 10 CFR PART 50, APPENDIX J. THE GLOBE VALVES ARE DESIGNED TO REMAIN OPERABLE AND TO AID IN KEEPING LEAKAGE BELOW THE LEVELS SPECIFIED IN 10 CFR PART 50, APPENDIX J.

SUBJECT: DCP: 92-V2N0136, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: REDUCE REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) AVERAGE TEMPERATURE (TAVG) FROM 588.4 °F TO 586.4 °F. THE REDUCTION IN TAVG WAS ACCOMPLISHED BY ADJUSTING THE REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM BORON CONCENTRATION. THIS DESIGN CHANGE PACKAGE DID NOT REQUIRE PHYSICAL PLANT MODIFICATIONS BUT REQUIRED SET POINT ADJUSTMENTS WITHIN THE 7300 CONTROL SYSTEM CABINETS. THIS CHANGE WAS MADE TO ENSURE THAT UNIT 2 COULD REACH 100% POWER AFTER IMPLEMENTATION OF THE VANTAGE 5 FUEL TRANSITION. BASED ON UNIT 1 EXPERIENCE RECURRING OTDT/OPDT TURBINE RUN BACK ALARMS HAVE RESULTED AT VOGTLE UNIT 1, AFTER LOADING OF VANTAGE 5 TRANSITION CORE AND REMOVAL OF THE RTD BYPASS SYSTEM, COMPLETED DURING THE THIRD REFUELING OUTAGE.

SAFETY EVALUATION: SET POINT VALUES OR CHANGES TO SET POINTS TO ACCOMMODATE THE CHANGE TO TAVG DO NOT INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OF AN ACCIDENT PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED IN THE FSAR. NO NEW PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS ARE BEING IMPOSED ON ANY SYSTEM OR COMPONENTS SUCH THAT THE DESIGN CRITERIA WAS EXCEEDED. THE TEMPERATURE REDUCTION DOES NOT CREATE A CONDITION WHERE THE DESIGN, MATERIAL OR CONSTRUCTION STANDARDS THAT WERE APPLICABLE TO THE ORIGINAL DESIGN ARE ALTERED. THE REVISED VALUE FOR TAVG IS BOUNDED BY THE ACCIDENT ANALYSES PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED IN THE FSAR. THE RADIOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES OF A STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE HAVE BEEN ADDRESSED (REFERENCE SECL 91-448) FOR A BOUNDING TEMPERATURE REDUCTION WHICH DEMONSTRATES THAT DOSE CRITERIA ARE NOT EXCEEDED. RADIOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES OF OTHER TRANSIENTS ARE NOT DEPENDENT ON INITIAL RCS TEMPERATURES AND THE CURRENT ANALYSES OF RECORD REMAIN VALID. NO ADVERSE EFFECT ON THE REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM HAS BEEN CREATED AS A RESULT OF THIS MODIFICATION. COMPONENT AND SYSTEM INTEGRITY ARE MAINTAINED AND PERFORMANCE WAS NOT ADVERSELY AFFECTED. IN ADDITION, AS SPECIFIED IN SECL 91-448, THE TAVG REDUCTION DOES NOT EXPOSE EQUIPMENT USED IN ACCIDENT MITIGATION TO AN ADVERSE ENVIRONMENT FOR WHICH IT HAS NOT BEEN PREVIOUSLY QUALIFIED. EVALUATIONS OF EQUIPMENT PERFORMANCE AND INTEGRITY PRESENTED IN SECL 91-448 HAVE CONCLUDED THAT THEIR ROLE IN THE CONTROL OF RADIOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES IS NOT ALTERED. NO NEW EQUIPMENT MALFUNCTIONS HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED THAT EFFECT FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER INTEGRITY. THE TEMPERATURE REDUCTION DOES NOT AFFECT THE ABILITY OF EQUIPMENT TO PERFORM ITS INTENDED SAFETY FUNCTION NOR DOES IT CREATE FAILURE MODES THAT COULD ADVERSELY AFFECT SAFETY-RELATED EQUIPMENT. CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORT CHANGES ARE REQUIRED AS A RESULT OF THIS TEMPERATURE REDUCTION AND WAS PERFORMED IN ACCORDANCE WITH TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION SECTION 6.8.1.6. THEREFORE, THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN THE BASIS OF THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION HAS NOT BEEN REDUCED.

SUBJECT: DCP: 92-V2N0137, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THIS DCP RAISED THE OTDT ROD STOP AND AUTO TURBINE RUNBACK SETPOINT TO 1 PERCENT BELOW THE OTDT REACTOR TRIP SETPOINT. THIS CHANGE WAS

MADE TO ENSURE THAT UNIT 2 COULD REACH 100% POWER AFTER IMPLEMENTATION OF THE VANTAGE 5 FUEL TRANSITION. BASED ON UNIT 1 EXPERIENCE RECURRING OTDT/OPDT TURBINE RUN BACK ALARMS HAVE RESULTED AT VOGTLE UNIT 1, AFTER LOADING OF VANTAGE 5 TRANSITION CORE AND REMOVAL OF THE RTD BYPASS SYSTEM, COMPLETED DURING THE THIRD REFUELING OUTAGE.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE FUNCTION OF THE TURBINE RUNBACK ON OTDT IS TO IMPROVE PLANT AVAILABILITY BY ASSISTING THE OPERATORS IN MITIGATING TRANSIENTS WHICH CAUSE UNNECESSARY REACTOR TRIPS. SETPOINT VALUES OR CHANGES TO THE SETPOINT DID NOT INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OF AN ACCIDENT PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED IN THE FSAR. THEREFORE THIS CHANGE DOES NOT AFFECT SYSTEM OPERATION, ACCIDENT ANALYSIS, PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE OF AN ACCIDENT OR INCREASE THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT AS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR NOR DOES IT CREATE AN UNPOSTULATED ACCIDENT NOT DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR.

SUBJECT: DCP: 92-V2N0145, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 2

DESCRIPTION: THIS DESIGN CHANGE REMOVED THE DOOR LEAF AND TRANSOM PANEL FROM DOOR V22111L1A65. THE DOOR PROVIDED ACCESS TO ROOM A63 FROM ROOM A32 IN THE CONTROL BUILDING. ROOM A63 HOUSES THE 30KVA SOLA TRANSFORMERS THAT WERE THE SUBJECT OF SEQUENCE 1 OF THIS DCP. THE FRAME OF THE DOOR REMAINS IN PLACE. THE PROJECT CLASS OF THE DOOR LEAF, TRANSOM PANEL AND FRAME IS 62C. BY REMOVING THE DOOR LEAF AND TRANSOM PANEL FROM DOOR A65, ROOM A63 BENEFITED FROM THE SURPLUS COOLING CAPACITY IN THE ADJACENT ROOM, ROOM A32, AND EXPERIENCES COOLER TEMPERATURES. A COOLER ENVIRONMENT IN ROOM A63 IMPROVES THE PERFORMANCE AND RELIABILITY OF THE SOLA TRANSFORMERS IN THE ROOM.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE SUBJECT DOOR IS NOT ASSOCIATED WITH ANY ACCIDENT DISCUSSED IN SECTION 15 OF THE FSAR NOR IS IT ASSOCIATED WITH ANY SYSTEM FOR WHICH AN ACCIDENT IS EVALUATED. THE SUBJECT DOOR IS NOT REQUIRED TO MITIGATE THE RADIOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES OF ANY ACCIDENT DISCUSSED IN THE FSAR NOR IS IT ASSOCIATED WITH ANY SYSTEM REQUIRED TO DO SO. THE DOOR IS NOT REQUIRED TO PROTECT THE EQUIPMENT IN ONE ROOM FROM HAZARDOUS CONDITIONS IN THE OTHER ROOM. SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT IN ONE ROOM WAS NOT ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY THE ENVIRONMENT OF THE OTHER ROOM WITH THE SUBJECT DOOR REMOVED. ALSO, FLOOD CALCULATIONS WERE REVIEWED AND CONFIRM THAT THE FLOOD CHARACTERISTICS OF THE TWO ROOMS ARE NOT ADVERSELY EFFECTED WITH THE DOOR REMOVED. THE SUBJECT DOOR IS NOT A PART OF THE NEGATIVE PRESSURE BOUNDARY. NOR IS IT REQUIRED TO PROTECT EQUIPMENT RESPONSIBLE FOR MITIGATING THE CONSEQUENCES OF A RADIOLOGICAL EVENT. THE SUBJECT DOOR IS NOT A PRESSURE RATED DOOR, AN AIRTIGHT DOOR, A WATERTIGHT DOOR, A MISSILE DOOR, OR A FIRE RATED DOOR. IT DID NOT PERFORM ANY FUNCTION IMPORTANT TO SAFETY AND WAS NOT DESIGNED TO PROTECT ANY EQUIPMENT OR SYSTEM IMPORTANT TO SAFETY. BASED ON THE DISCUSSIONS ABOVE, REMOVAL OF THE DOOR A65 OF THE CONTROL BUILDING DID NOT CREATE ANY ADVERSE EFFECTS.

SUBJECT: DCP: 92-V2N0155, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THIS DCP ADDRESSED THE REMOVAL OF THE RAISED FACES FROM THE UPPER FLANGES OF THE RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL (RHR) AND CONTAINMENT SPRAY (CS) ENCAPSULATION VESSELS. THE VESSELS ARE PROJECT CLASSIFICATION 01C, AND

THEIR TAG NUMBERS ARE THE FOLLOWING: 2-1205-V4-001, 2-1205-V4-002, 2-1206-V4001, AND 2-1206-V4-002. THE REMOVAL OF THE RAISED FACES CONVERTED THE UPPER FLANGES OF THE RHR AND CS ENCAPSULATION VESSELS INTO FLAT FACE FLANGES. THE PREVIOUS COMPRESSED ASBESTOS GASKETS WERE DISCARDED AND REPLACED WITH EPDM GASKETS. THE REMOVAL OF THE RAISED FACES FROM THE RHR AND CS ENCAPSULATION VESSELS IMPROVED THE LEAK TIGHTNESS FOR THE UPPER FLANGES OF THE ENCAPSULATION VESSELS. THIS CHANGE PROVIDES AN EFFECTIVE SEAL AND THEREBY ELIMINATED THE USE OF RTV SEALANT OR EXCESSIVE BOLT TORQUE WHEN TRYING TO OBTAIN AN ACCEPTABLE SEAL.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE CONVERSION OF THE FLANGES FROM RAISED FACE TO FLAT FACE, MEETS THE ORIGINAL DESIGN BASIS. THE RHR AND CS ENCAPSULATION VESSELS ARE PROVIDED TO CONTAIN POTENTIAL LEAKAGE FROM THE ISOLATION VALVES WITHIN THE VESSELS; THE VESSELS SERVE AS AN EXTENSION OF THE CONTAINMENT BOUNDARY AT PENETRATIONS 36, 37, 38, AND 39. THE ENCAPSULATION VESSELS ARE NOT INITIATORS OF ANY ACCIDENT PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED IN THE FSAR. THE RHR AND CS ENCAPSULATION VESSELS ARE DESIGNED TO CONTAIN LEAKAGE FROM A POTENTIAL FAILURE OF THE ISOLATION VALVES CONTAINED WITHIN THE VESSELS UNDER POSTULATED POST-LOCA CONDITIONS. THE CONVERSION OF THE RHR AND CS ENCAPSULATION VESSELS UPPER FLANGES FROM RAISED FACE TO FLAT FACE FLANGES PROVIDES A MORE EFFECTIVE SEAL AND THUS IMPROVED THE OVERALL LEAK TIGHTNESS OF THE VESSELS. REMOVAL OF THE RAISED FACES FROM THE UPPER FLANGES OF THE RHR AND CS ENCAPSULATION VESSELS MEETS THE ORIGINAL DESIGN, MATERIAL AND CONSTRUCTION STANDARDS UTILIZED FOR THE RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL AND CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEMS. THIS DESIGN MODIFICATION DID NOT AFFECT THE SEISMIC QUALIFICATION OF THE VESSEL. THE RELIABILITY OF THE RHR AND CS SYSTEMS HAVE NOT BEEN DEGRADED. THE RHR AND CS SYSTEM DID NOT ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY THIS CHANGE AND THE SYSTEMS CONTINUES TO FUNCTION AS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR. THE NEW GASKET MATERIAL, ETHYLENE PROPYLENE (EPDM) IS AN ACCEPTABLE SUBSTITUTE FOR THE EXISTING COMPRESSED ASBESTOS GASKET. THE MODIFIED VESSELS WAS LEAK TESTED TO ENSURE THAT THE PRESSURE INTEGRITY OF THE COMPONENT WAS MAINTAINED. THIS MODIFICATION HAS NO ADVERSE EFFECT ON THE CAPABILITY OF THE RHR AND CS SYSTEMS TO PERFORM THEIR INTENDED FUNCTION. AS A RESULT OF THIS CHANGE, THE DESIGN PRESSURE RATING OF THE RHR AND CS ENCAPSULATION VESSELS DID NOT CHANGE AND THEREFORE THE MARGIN OF SAFETY REMAINED THE SAME. SINCE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE UPPER GASKET SEAL IMPROVES AS A RESULT OF THIS DESIGN CHANGE, THEN THE OVERALL EFFECTIVENESS OF THE VESSELS ALSO IMPROVES. THEREFORE, THIS MODIFICATION DID NOT REDUCE THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN THE BASIS FOR ANY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION.

SUBJECT: DCP: 92-V2N0160, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THE DESIGN CHANGE AFFECTS THE FOUR AUXILIARY FEED WATER (AFW) 4" STOP CHECK VALVES, 2-1302-U4-113, 114, 115, AND 116. THESE VALVES ARE LOCATED IN LINE NUMBERS 2-1302-L4-030, 031, 032, AND 029, RESPECTIVELY. THE PROJECT CLASSIFICATION OF THE VALVES IS 212. THE PHYSICAL CHANGE CONSISTS OF REPLACING THE PREVIOUS VALVES OF SINGLE SEAT DESIGN WITH VALVES OF DUAL SEAT DESIGN. THE SUBJECT AFW CHECK VALVES HAVE EXPERIENCED LEAKAGE EVEN AFTER MAINTENANCE REWORK HAS BEEN PERFORMED. THESE VALVES ARE SINGLE SEAT, GLOBE LIFT-CHECK VALVES. THE NEW VALVES HAVE DUAL SEATS WHICH REDUCE THE LEAKAGE PROBLEM. THIS ALSO REDUCED THE POSSIBILITY OF AFW PUMP STEAM BINDING DUE TO THE LEAKING CHECK VALVES.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE FUNCTION AND OPERATION OF THE AUXILIARY FEED WATER SYSTEM IS NOT BEING ADVERSELY AFFECTED. THE CHANGE WAS PERFORMED USING THE SAME STANDARDS AS ORIGINALLY USED FOR THE SYSTEM. THE NEW VALVES HAVE THE SAME PROJECT CLASS, PRESSURE AND TEMPERATURE RATING, AND MATERIALS AS THE PREVIOUS VALVES EXCEPT THEY ALSO HAVE ADDITIONAL SOFT SEATS. THE SOFT SEAT MATERIAL IS QUALIFIED FOR THIS APPLICATION, BUT REQUIRES PERIODIC REPLACEMENT. THE SOFT SEAT IS HELD IN PLACE BY A RETAINER THAT IS SCREWED TO THE DISC AND LOCK WELDED. THE NEW VALVES HAVE THE SAME SAFETY AND SEISMIC RATING AS THE ORIGINAL VALVES. THE MODIFICATION INCREASES THE RELIABILITY OF THE SYSTEM. THE FLOW RESISTANCE OF THE NEW VALVES IS THE SAME AS THE PREVIOUS VALVES, SO SYSTEM PERFORMANCE IS NOT AFFECTED. EPRI REPORT NP-5479 DESCRIBES THE USE OF DUAL SEAT DESIGN IN SECTION 2.4.2. THE NEW CHECK VALVES MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF ASME SECTION III CLASS 2. THE ACTIVITY DOES NOT INVOLVE ANY EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY THAT HAS NOT BEEN EVALUATED BEFORE. THE REPLACEMENT OF THE VALVES TO PROVIDE DUAL SEAT DESIGN DOES NOT AFFECT THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN THE BASES FOR ANY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BECAUSE THE CHANGE MEETS THE SAME DESIGN, INSTALLATION, INSPECTION, AND TESTING REQUIREMENTS AS SET FORTH IN THE ORIGINAL DESIGN OF THE AUXILIARY FEED WATER SYSTEM. THE PERFORMANCE OF THE AFW SYSTEM IS NOT AFFECTED BY THIS CHANGE. THIS CONCLUSION IS BASED UPON A REVIEW OF THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS AND THEIR BASES, INCLUDING SECTIONS 3/4.6.3, 3/4.7.1.2, AND 3/4.9.4.

SUBJECT: DCP: 92-V2N0164, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THE SCOPE OF THIS DCP IS TO PROVIDE SAFETY CAGES FOR THE FOLLOWING LADDERS INSIDE THE UNIT 2 CONTAINMENT BUILDING: 1.) LADDER FROM EL. 220'-0" DOWN TO REACTOR COOL ANT PUMP (RCP) NO. 1. 2.) LADDER FROM EL. 220'-0" DOWN TO RCP NO. 3. 3.) LADDER FROM EL. 220'-0" DOWN TO RCP NO. 4. 4.) LADDER FROM EL. 193'-7 1/4" DOWN TO STEAM GENERATOR NO. 1. 5.) LADDER FROM EL. 193'-7 1/4" DOWN TO STEAM GENERATOR NO. 2. THE SAFETY CAGES FOR THE LADDERS LISTED UNDER ITEMS 3, 4, AND 5 REPLACED THE PREVIOUS SAFETY DEVICES INSTALLED ON THE LADDERS. THE PROJECT CLASS OF THE L ADDERS IS 62C. THE PROJECT CLASS--S OF THE NEW SAFETY CAGES ARE 62C. SAFETY CAGES ARE DESIGNED AND MOUNTED TO SEISMIC CATEGORY 1 REQUIREMENTS. THE ADDITION OF SAFETY CAGES IMPROVED SAFETY CONDITIONS FOR PERSONNEL INSIDE THE CONTAINMENT BUILDING.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE SAFETY CAGES ARE OF A DESIGN THAT IS EQUIVALENT TO EXISTING ACCEPTABLE SAFETY CAGES INSTALLED IN THE CONTAINMENT BUILDING. ALSO, THE SAFETY CAGES HAVE BEEN EVALUATED TO SEISMIC CATEGORY 1 REQUIREMENTS TO INSURE NO ADVERSE EFFECTS ARE POSSIBLE.

SUBJECT: DCP: 92-V2N0166, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: CERTAIN VALVE MOTOR-OPERATORS DID NOT HAVE SUFFICIENT OUTPUT CAPACITY MARGIN WHEN THE REQUIREMENTS OF GENERIC LETTER 89-10 WERE CONSIDERED. THE CHANGES INCREASED THE MOTOR-OPERATORS' OUTPUT AND THEREFORE THE AVAILABLE MARGIN. THE INCREASED MARGIN ALLOWS FOR THE VALVES TO BE SET UP IN THE REQUIRED THRUST RANGE, ABOVE THE MINIMUM REQUIRED THRUST TO STROKE THE VALVE AND BELOW THE MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE THRUST TO PREVENT DAMAGE. PROVIDING THE INCREASED MARGIN AND UTILIZING

DIAGNOSTIC TESTING EQUIPMENT SUCH AS MOVATS OR VOTES ALLOWS FOR ACCOUNTING, IN THE THRUST RANGE, FOR THE INHERENT INACCURACIES OF THE TESTING EQUIPMENT, TORQUE SWITCH REPEATABILITY, AND THE RATE-OF-LOADING (ROL) PHENOMENA. THIS PHENOMENA HAS BEEN SHOWN, IN SOME INSTANCES, TO RESULT IN LESS THRUST DELIVERED TO THE VALVE STEM UNDER DYNAMIC CONDITIONS THAN STATIC CONDITIONS, WITH THE MOST PRONOUNCED EFFECT ON GATE VALVES UNDER HIGH ENERGY BLOWDOWN CONDITIONS. SEVERAL THEORIES EXIST AS TO THE CAUSE OF THIS ROL EFFECT, BUT NONE HAVE BEEN DEFINITELY QUANTIFIED. WHEN INDUSTRY PROGRAMS AND THE DP TESTING PLANNED AT VEGP YIELD QUANTIFIABLE DATA ON THE ROL PHENOMENA, THIS INFORMATION WAS REVIEWED FOR ITS IMPACT ON THE MOV DESIGN CALCULATIONS. THE EFFECTED VALVES ARE 2HV-8806, 2HV-8801A & B, 2HV-8807A & B, 2HV-8821A & B, 2HV-8923A & B, 2HV-8924, 2HV-8716A & B, 2HV-8804A & B, 2HV-8111B, 2HV-8471A & B, 2LV-0112D & E, 2HV-19051, 2HV-19053, 2HV-19055, 2HV-19057, 2HV-2041, 2HV-3009, 2HV-3019, 2HV-5106. BYPASSING THE OPEN TORQUE SWITCH ELIMINATED THE NEED TO DIAGNOSTICALLY SETUP THIS SWITCH. BYPASSING THIS SWITCH ENABLES THE MOTOR OPERATOR TO DEVELOP THE MAXIMUM AMOUNT OF TORQUE REQUIRED THROUGHOUT THE ENTIRE OPENING STROKE OF THE VALVE.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE VALVES CONTINUE TO PERFORM THEIR SAFETY-RELATED FUNCTIONS AS REQUIRED DURING ALL ACCIDENTS PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED IN THE FSAR. THE VALVES CONTINUE TO PERFORM THEIR SAFETY-RELATED FUNCTION AS REQUIRED DURING ALL ACCIDENTS PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED IN THE FSAR. THE MARGIN BEING PROVIDED BETWEEN THE REQUIRED AND THE ALLOWABLE THRUST ALLOW DIAGNOSTIC TESTING EQUIPMENT TO BE USED TO SET-UP THE VALVES, VERIFYING THAT ADEQUATE THRUST, PER CALCULATION X4CLOOOU02, IS AVAILABLE WHEN THE VALVES ARE REQUIRED AND THAT THE VALVES WAS NOT OVER STRESSED. THE CHANGE IN MOV STROKE TIMES DOES NOT ADVERSELY AFFECT THE ABILITY TO MITIGATE THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT PER THE EXISTING SAFETY ANALYSIS. THE NEW STROKE TIMES NOT EFFECT THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED IN THE FSAR. ALL OF THE SUBJECT MOV'S HAVE BEEN EVALUATED FOR STRESS, SEISMIC AND ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS AND THE APPROPRIATE TORQUE/THRUST LIMITS HAVE BEEN ESTABLISHED. THESE EVALUATIONS INCLUDED A VALVE STRESS AND SEISMIC REANALYSIS BASED ON THE MAXIMUM EXPECTED THRUST USING THE APPROPRIATE LOAD CONSIDERATIONS AS DOCUMENTED IN FSAR SECTION 3.9.B.3, AND AN ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION REVIEW TO VERIFY THAT THE NEW COMPONENTS WOULD BE SUITABLE FOR THE SPECIFIC POST-ACCIDENT LOCATIONS. PIPING STRESS PACKAGES WERE ANALYZED FOR THE INCREASED PIPING STRESS AND SUPPORT LOADS DUE TO THE NEW OPERATORS ADDITIONAL WEIGHT AND CHANGE IN CENTER OF GRAVITY. NO PIPING SUPPORTS WERE IDENTIFIED AS REQUIRING MODIFICATION BASED ON THE INCREASED LOADS DUE TO THE HIGHER WEIGHTS AND CHANGES IN CENTER OF GRAVITY OF THE NEW MOTOR OPERATORS. TWO CATEGORY 1 PIPING SUPPORTS REQUIRED MODIFICATION TO ACCOMMODATE THE INSTALLATION OF TWO NEW MOTOR OPERATORS. NO NEW PIPE BREAK LOCATIONS WERE CREATED NOR WERE EXISTING PIPE BREAK LOCATIONS CHANGED BY THESE MODIFICATIONS. THIS CHANGE DID NOT HAVE ANY ADVERSE IMPACT ON ANY OTHER PLANT SYSTEMS OR EQUIPMENT. NO NEW COMMON MODE FAILURE OF THESE VALVES IS INTRODUCED BY THE CHANGE IN THE THRUST VALUES. THIS DESIGN CHANGE DID NOT CREATE THE POSSIBILITY OF A MALFUNCTION OF EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY OF A DIFFERENT TYPE THAN THOSE PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED IN THE FSAR. THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS DEFINE THE LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION FOR THE DIFFERENT OPERATING MODES. THIS DESIGN CHANGE DID NOT CHANGE THE SAFETY-RELATED FUNCTION OF THE VALVES. DIAGNOSTIC TESTING OF THE VALVES VERIFIED THAT THE VALVES HAVE ADEQUATE THRUST, AS DOCUMENTED IN

CALCULATION X4CLOOOU02, TO PERFORM THEIR INTENDED FUNCTION WITHOUT OVER STRESSING THE VALVES OR THE OPERATORS.

SUBJECT: DCP: 92-V2N0168, REVISION 1, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THIS DCP ADDED A NEW GROUND TO THE AUXILIARY HOIST ON THE REFUELING MACHINE BY MOUNTING AN ADDITIONAL COLLECTOR BY THE EXISTING AUXILIARY HOIST POWER COLLECTORS. THE DIAGNOSTIC CAPABILITIES OF THE CONSOLE AND FREE WATER SPEED OF THE REFUELING MACHINE HAVE BEEN ENHANCED BY A SOFTWARE UPGRADE. THIS UPGRADE WAS PERFORMED BY REPLACING EPROMS AND EAROMS WITHIN THE SIGMA CONTROL CONSOLE. POWER RECEPTACLES WERE ADDED TO THE TROLLEY WITH AN ADDITIONAL TRANSFORMER MOUNTED ON THE TROLLEY PROVIDING THE ADDITIONAL POWER REQUIREMENTS. THE SOUND POWERED PHONE CABLE WERE REROUTED TO USE THE POWER CONDUIT AND CATRAC ASSEMBLY. A COMPUTER RESET SWITCH WAS MOUNTED ON THE CONSOLE TO PROVIDE A RESTART OF THE CONTROL PROGRAM WITHOUT CYCLING POWER ON THE BRIDGE. INSIDE THE CONSOLE, A SINGLE POINT GROUND WAS ADDED TO ELIMINATE GROUND POTENTIAL DIFFERENCES WITHIN THE CONSOLE. A LOW IMPEDANCE, BRAIDED GROUND CABLE WAS ADDED TO A GROUND POINT WITHIN THE CONSOLE. THE BRIDGE AXLE WHICH DRIVES THE ENCODER WAS MODIFIED TO ELIMINATE SLIPPAGE BY PROVIDING FLATS ON THE AXLE SHAFT FOR SET SCREW SEATING PREVENTING THE MOVEMENT OF THE AXLE SHAFT OUT OF THE BEARING ASSEMBLY. THE SOFTWARE UPGRADE ALLOWS THE BRIDGE AND TROLLEY SPEED TO BE ADJUSTED SEPARATELY, INCREASING JOG AND AUTO POSITIONING CAPABILITY. IN ADDITION, THE FREE WATER SPEED HAS BEEN INCREASED BY INTRODUCING DRAG COMPENSATION FACTORS DURING HIGHER SPEED OPERATION. DIAGNOSTIC IMPROVEMENTS FOR FAULTY COMPONENTS AND ERRANT CONDITIONS, AND ADDITIONAL PARAMETERS FOR THE DIAGNOSTICS DISPLAY HAVE BEEN INCORPORATED BY THIS UPGRADE. THE COMPUTER RESET SWITCH ALLOWS RESTARTING OF THE CONTROL PROGRAM WITHOUT CYCLING THE POWER SUPPLY VIA THE DISCONNECT SWITCH. ENCODER PERFORMANCE WAS IMPROVED BY ELIMINATING SLIPPAGE OF THE BRIDGE AXLE THAT DRIVES THE ENCODER. THE NOISE PERFORMANCE OF THE SIGMA CONSOLE WAS IMPROVED WITH THE ADDITION OF THE SINGLE POINT GROUND.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE SOFTWARE CHANGES DO NOT IMPACT THE REFUELING MACHINE SAFETY FEATURES LISTED IN FSAR SECTION 9.1.4.3.1.1. SOFTWARE CHANGES DO NOT AFFECT THE REFUELING MACHINE'S ABILITY TO HOLD FUEL. ASSUMPTIONS AND RADIOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES OF A FUEL HANDLING ACCIDENT AS PRESENTED IN THE FSAR REMAIN UNCHANGED. THE CONTROL SOFTWARE CHANGES DO NOT AFFECT THE SEISMIC INTEGRITY OF THE REFUELING MACHINE. THE SIGMA REFUELING MACHINE IS NON-SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT. THE CONTROL SYSTEM DOES NOT INTERFACE WITH PLANT PROTECTION AND CONTROL SYSTEMS. FURTHER, SOFTWARE CHANGES DO NOT INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OF A REFUELING ACCIDENT. THE CONTROL SYSTEM SOFTWARE CHANGES ENHANCE MACHINE MOVEMENT AND DIAGNOSTICS. ALSO, SOFTWARE CHANGES ADHERING TO FUEL HANDLING INSTRUCTION REVISIONS HAVE BEEN IMPLEMENTED. THE FUNCTIONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE REFUELING MACHINE REMAIN UNCHANGED. THE MACHINE CONTINUES TO MEET ALL OPERATION AND SAFETY INTERLOCK REQUIREMENTS OF THE FSAR. THE SIGMA REFUELING MACHINE HAS NO DIRECT ELECTRICAL INTERFACE WITH PLANT PROTECTION AND CONTROL SYSTEMS. THE REFUELING MACHINE CONTINUES TO MEET ALL PROVISIONS TO ENSURE SAFE HANDLING OF FUEL ASSEMBLIES AS LISTED IN FSAR SECTION 9.1.4.3.1.1. THE WORKING LOAD CAPACITY OF THE FUEL ASSEMBLY GRIPPER REMAINS UNCHANGED FROM THAT DEFINED IN TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3/4.9.6. THIS

DESIGN CHANGE IMPROVES RELIABILITY AND ENHANCE THE PERFORMANCE OF THE REFUELING MACHINE. CONSOLE MODIFICATIONS REDUCE NOISE AND PROVIDE FLEXIBILITY IN RESETTING THE CONTROL PROGRAM. PHYSICAL MODIFICATIONS TO THE REFUELING MACHINE PROVIDE A NEW GROUND FOR THE AUXILIARY HOIST, PROVIDE POWER RECEPTACLES FOR ADDITIONAL LIGHTING, REROUTE EXISTING SECOND POWERED PHONE CABLE, AND ELIMINATE BRIDGE AXLE SLIPPAGE TO IMPROVE ENCODER PERFORMANCE. THESE CHANGES DO NOT AFFECT THE FUNCTIONAL DESIGN OR OPERATION OF THE REFUELING MACHINE. ALL SAFETY FEATURES AND INTERLOCKS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR HAVE BEEN PRESERVED. ALL NEW EQUIPMENT HAVE BEEN MOUNTED TO 2 OVER 1 REQUIREMENTS. FURTHERMORE, THESE CHANGES DID NOT INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OF A DROPPED FUEL ASSEMBLY ACCIDENT SINCE THESE MODIFICATIONS DID NOT AFFECT THE REFUELING MACHINE'S ABILITY TO HOLD A FUEL ASSEMBLY. MODIFICATIONS MADE TO THE SOFTWARE DO NOT ALTER THE MAXIMUM VERTICAL POSITION REQUIRED TO ENSURE AN ADEQUATE WATER SHIELD DEPTH FOR RADIATION PROTECTION OF OPERATING PERSONNEL. IN ADDITION, CALCULATION MX6CHE.04.7 REV. J1 HAS BEEN PERFORMED TO ACCOUNT FOR THE ADDITION OF ZINC INSIDE CONTAINMENT. THE HYDROGEN GENERATION RESULTING FROM THE ZINC ADDITION REMAINS BELOW THE HYDROGEN DESIGN FLAMMABILITY LIMIT. NO NEW INTERFACES WITH OTHER PLANT EQUIPMENT ARE INTRODUCED WITH THIS DESIGN CHANGE, THEREFORE, NO SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT OR FUNCTIONS ARE AFFECTED. THE REFUELING MACHINE'S SEISMIC ANALYSIS BOUNDS THE AFFECTS OF THE ADDITIONAL WEIGHT AND EQUIPMENT MOUNTING ASSOCIATED WITH THIS DESIGN CHANGE. THIS MODIFICATION TO THE REFUELING MACHINE DOES NOT REDUCE THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED BY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3/4.9 FOR REFUELING OPERATIONS.

SUBJECT: DCP: 92-V2N0172, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 2

DESCRIPTION: THE SCOPE OF THIS SAFETY EVALUATION INCLUDES FCR 92-V2N0172-0-2-F001. THE CHANGES ARE: 1) ADJUST THE PULSE WIDTH OF THE "TEST U/V" PUSHBUTTON LATCH TIMER TO REDUCE THE PULSE WIDTH BY 20 MILLISECONDS (MS). THE CURRENT NOMINAL TIMER SETTING IS 200MS. ALSO, THE RESET CIRCUITRY OF THE TEST SI, TEST U/V, TEST BLOCK D-G ENGINE, AND TEST D-G BREAKER CLOSE PUSHBUTTON LATCHES HAVE BEEN MODIFIED. THE CIRCUITRY IS MODIFIED TO ELIMINATE ONE OF TWO PATHS BY WHICH AN SI OR U/V SIGNAL CANCELS THE SEQUENCER TEST MODE. THE OTHER OF THE TWO PATHS HAVE BEEN LEFT UNCHANGED. THESE CHANGES WERE REQUIRED TO ELIMINATE LOGIC RACE CONDITIONS WHICH CAUSE THE SEQUENCER TO MALFUNCTION WHILE IN TEST MODE. THE NORMAL MODE OPERATION OF THE SEQUENCER HAS NOT BEEN AFFECTED BY THESE CHANGES. THE SEQUENCER'S TEST SWITCH INPUT MODULE (BOARD # 6N366) RECEIVED MINOR WIRING CHANGES TO EFFECT THE NECESSARY CHANGES. 2) REWIRE THE CONTROLLER A MODULE TO ELIMINATE A LOGIC RACE CONDITION. A RACE CONDITION EXISTS WHICH RESULTS IN THE BLOCK OUTPUT RELAYS BEING HELD IN FOR APPROXIMATELY TWICE THE EXPECTED TIME. THESE RELAYS PREVENT (BLOCK) CERTAIN LOADS FROM BEING LOADED ONTO THE DIESEL UNTIL A SPECIFIED TIME. THIS CHANGE WAS MADE BY REWIRING A GATE INPUT SUCH THAT IT RECEIVES A DELAYED SIGNAL. THESE CHANGES ARE PROJECT CLASS 11E AND AFFECT THE TRAIN A AND B SEQUENCERS, 2-1821-U3-001 AND -002. THEY ARE BEING MADE TO INCORPORATE FIELD CHANGES MADE TO THE UNIT 1 SEQUENCERS DURING THE 1R4 OUTAGE. 1) THESE CHANGES ARE NEEDED TO PROVIDE FOR EFFICIENTLY TESTING THE SEQUENCER. THE CHANGE ONLY AFFECTS THE MANUAL TEST PANEL PORTION OF THE SEQUENCER. THE SEQUENCER'S RESPONSE TO ACCIDENT SIGNALS REMAINS UNCHANGED. 2) THIS CHANGE IS NECESSARY FOR THE SEQUENCER TO PERFORM ITS DESIGNED SAFETY FUNCTION. CURRENTLY, THE DESIGNED RELAY BLOCK

TIME IS APPROX. 36 SECONDS. DURING ESFAS TESTING (1R4), THE RELAY BLOCK TIME WAS FOUND TO BE APPROX. 67 SECONDS. THE DIESEL GENERATOR LOADING TABLES SHOW THE LOADS AND THEIR CORRESPONDING BLOCK TIMES. THE VENDOR ADDITION OF FILTERS UNDER THE ORIGINAL DCP RESULTED IN SHIFTING A GATE OUTPUT JUST ENOUGH TO CREATE THIS LOGIC RACE. THIS RACE DID NOT EXIST ON THE CONTROLLER A MODULES PRIOR TO VENDOR MODIFICATION.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THESE CHANGES DID NOT CHANGE THE SEQUENCER OPERATION FROM THAT DESCRIBED AND IMPLIED IN THE FSAR AND DESIGN CRITERIA, AND DO NOT AFFECT THE PROBABILITY OF ANY ACCIDENT EVALUATED IN THE FSAR. THE SEQUENCER CONTINUES TO RESPOND TO ACCIDENT SIGNALS AS DESCRIBED AND IMPLIED IN THE FSAR AND DESIGN CRITERIA. THE CHANGES ENSURE THAT THE SEQUENCER RESPONDS AS ORIGINALLY INTENDED; HENCE, THE OVERALL FUNCTION OF THE SEQUENCER REMAINS UNCHANGED. THESE CHANGES WERE MADE TO THE UNIT 1 EQUIPMENT BY QUALIFIED TECHNICIANS UNDER THE SUPERVISION AND DIRECTION OF THE SEQUENCER MANUFACTURER'S FIELD REPRESENTATIVE. THE ONLY MATERIAL REQUIRED TO EFFECT THE CHANGES WAS THE WIRE NECESSARY TO REWIRE THE BOARD. THE SEQUENCERS ARE LOCATED IN A MILD ENVIRONMENT. THE BOARDS WERE RE-WIRED USING QUALIFIED MATERIAL (WIRE) AND THE SAME METHOD (WIRE WRAPPING) AS WAS ORIGINALLY USED. THE REWIRING DOES NOT SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASE THE WEIGHT OF THE BOARD, SO THE SEISMIC QUALIFICATION OF THE BOARD IS NOT IMPACTED. THESE BOARDS WERE TESTED IN A MANNER SIMILAR TO THAT USED FOR UNIT 1 MODIFICATION. THIS INCLUDES SEQUENCER AND SYSTEM LEVEL TESTS TO ENSURE THAT THE MODIFICATIONS FUNCTION AS DESIGNED. SIMILAR CHANGES MADE TO THE UNIT 1 EQUIPMENT WERE TESTED AND SHOWN TO BE EFFECTIVE IN ELIMINATING THE ANOMALIES AND RESTORING PROPER SEQUENCER OPERATION. THE MARGIN OF SAFETY DEFINED BY THE BASES OF THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS IS NOT REDUCED SINCE THE CHANGES ENHANCE OPERATION OF THE SEQUENCER. THE NET EFFECT OF THE CHANGES HAS BEEN TO CORRECT THE DESIGN OF THE SEQUENCER SO THAT IT OPERATES AS ORIGINALLY INTENDED.

SUBJECT: DCP: 92-V2N0188, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THE PREVIOUS DROPPING RESISTOR USED TO REDUCE THE 125VDC PANEL SUPPLY TO 48VDC FOR THE TURBINE SPEED CONTROL, WAS REPLACED WITH A RESISTOR OF THE SAME OHM VALUE BUT HAVING A HIGHER WATTAGE RATING (250 WATT). ALSO PANEL VENTILATION WAS INCREASED TO PROVIDE COOLING FOR THE HIGHER WATTAGE RESISTOR. THE PREVIOUS RESISTOR HAS A HISTORY OF FAILING AS REPORTED IN THE NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 90-51 (REF. 1)

SAFETY EVALUATION: THIS CHANGE DOES NOT ALTER THE OPERATION OF THE TDAFW PUMP AND THE NEW VENT IS SCREENED TO PREVENT INSECT INTRUSION. THE NEW RESISTOR WAS EVALUATED PRIOR TO INSTALLATION TO ENSURE PROPER TOLERANCES. THEREFORE THIS DCP DOES NOT CREATE OR INCREASE THE, CONSEQUENCES, EQUIPMENT MALFUNCTION PROBABILITY, OR PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE OF A ACCIDENT OR OCCURRENCE OF A ACCIDENT OF A DIFFERENT TYPE.

SUBJECT: DCP: 92-V2N0189, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THE CHANGES REPRESENTED BY THIS DCP ARE THE ADDITION OF TIE-BACK SUPPORTS BETWEEN THE PROCESS LINES AND 1" DIAMETER DRAIN/VENT LINES FOR THE FOLLOWING VALVES :21201U4220, 21201U4240, 21201U4114, 21201U4244,

21204X4055, 21204X4056, 21204X4306, 21204X4307. THE SUPPORT HANGERS TIE THE DRAIN/VENT LINES TO THE PROCESS LINES FROM WHICH THEY ORIGINATE. THE TIE-BACK SUPPORTS DO NOT PERFORM ANY LOAD CARRYING FUNCTION BETWEEN THE PIPING AND THE BUILDING STRUCTURE, BUT SIMPLY IMPROVE THE LOCAL STRUCTURAL STABILITY OF THE DRAIN/VENT LINES. THE TIE-BACK SUPPORTS DO NOT CONSTITUTE A PRESSURE RETAINING BOUNDARY.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE DRAIN/VENT LINES AND THE PROCESS LINES FROM WHICH THEY ORIGINATE, HAVE BEEN REVIEWED FOR THE EFFECTS OF ADDITIONAL TIE-BACK SUPPORTS. THERE ARE NO ADVERSE EFFECTS ANTICIPATED BASED ON THIS REVIEW. THE SUPPORTS THEMSELVES HAVE BEEN DESIGNED IN ACCORDANCE WITH ASME SECTION III CLASS 1 CRITERIA TO INSURE SUPPORT INTEGRITY AND PERFORMANCE.

SUBJECT: DCP: 92-V2N0191, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: A LOCAL LEAK RATE TEST (LLRT) ISOLATION VALVE, VALVE TAG NUMBER 2-1208-U4-504, A 2" 600-LB GATE VALVE WITH MK NO. 115L, WAS INSTALLED IN THE CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM (CVCS) SEAL WATER LEAK OFF LINE 2-1208-L4-020, BETWEEN THE TEST VENT CONTAINING VALVE 2-1208-U4-463 AND THE DRAIN LINE CONTAINING VALVE 2-1208-X4-544. ALSO, THE BLIND FLANGE AND PIPE NIPPLE AT THE END OF THE CVCS SEAL WATER LEAK OFF LINE TEST CONNECTION BRANCH, WHICH CONTAINS VALVE 2-1208-U4-462, WAS REMOVED AND WAS REPLACED BY A THREADED PIPE CAP AND PIPE NIPPLE. THE CVCS SEAL WATER LEAK OFF LINE IS A PART OF THE CVCS, SYSTEM 1208. THE ADDITION OF THE NEW LLRT ISOLATION VALVE REDUCE THE CHANCE OF A SPILLAGE OF WATER IN THE AUXILIARY BUILDING, SINCE THE LLRT IS CURRENTLY ISOLATED BY VALVE 2HV-41329A OR B, LOCATED AT THE INLET AND OUTLET, RESPECTIVELY, OF THE CVCS SEAL WATER LEAK OFF LINE BACK FLUSHABLE FILTER, WHICH FAILS OPEN ON A LOSS OF POWER. THE PROJECT CLASS IS 212. THE PORTION OF THE TEST CONNECTION WHERE THE NEW PIPE CAP AND PIPE NIPPLE WAS INSTALLED WAS PROJECT CLASS 424. THIS IS IN CONFORMANCE WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF DRAWING AX4DR001, REV. 19.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE IN-LINE LLRT VALVE BEING ADDED BY THIS DESIGN MODIFICATION CONFORM TO THE SAME DESIGN REQUIREMENTS AS THE SYSTEM WHERE IT IS BEING ADDED. THE VALVE IS LOCKED OPEN DURING NORMAL SYSTEM OPERATIONS. THE NEW THREADED PIPE CAP AND PIPE NIPPLE ADDED DOWNSTREAM OF VALVE 2-1208-U4-462 ALLOWS MAINTAINING THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE SINGLE ISOLATION CRITERIA FOR TEST CONNECTIONS PER DRAWING AX4DR001, REV. 19. ADDITIONALLY, THE GATE VALVE BEING ADDED IS THE FULL BORE SOLID WEDGE DESIGN WHICH ALLOWS MAXIMUM FLOW WHEN FULLY OPEN, AND THEREFORE, CREATES AN INSIGNIFICANT INCREASE IN PRESSURE DIFFERENTIAL IN THE LINE. THE ADDITION OF THE LLRT ISOLATION GATE VALVE OR REPLACEMENT OF THE BLIND FLANGE AND PIPE NIPPLE WITH A NEW THREADED PIPE CAP AND PIPE NIPPLE DOES NOT AFFECT THE ACCIDENTS EVALUATED IN CHAPTERS 6 AND 15 OF THE FSAR. THE PIPE STRESSES AND PIPE SUPPORT STRESSES, RESULTING FROM THE ADDITION OF THE LLRT ISOLATION VALVE AND REPLACEMENT OF THE BLIND FLANGE AND PIPE NIPPLE WITH A THREADED PIPE CAP AND PIPE NIPPLE HAVE BEEN EVALUATED AND HAVE BEEN FOUND TO BE WITHIN THE APPROPRIATE DESIGN CODE ALLOWABLE STRESSES. THIS DESIGN CHANGE REDUCES THE POSSIBILITY OF A FLOODING ACCIDENT. THE DESIGN CHANGE DOES NOT REDUCE THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN THE BASFS FOR ANY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS.

SUBJECT: DCP. 92-V2N0198, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THIS DCP DID NOT MAKE ANY PHYSICAL CHANGES TO THE PLANT EQUIPMENT. THE K4 TERM IN THE OPDT SET POINT EQUATION AND THE TAU3 TERM IN THE OPDT AND OTDT SET POINT EQUATIONS WAS CHANGED. K4 WAS CHANGED FROM 1.08 TO 1.095 AND THE TAU3 TERMS WAS CHANGED FROM 0 TO 2 SECONDS BY ADJUSTING POTENTIOMETER SETTINGS IN THE 7300 PROCESS EQUIPMENT WHICH IS PROJECT CLASS 11J. WESTINGHOUSE HAS IDENTIFIED A POTENTIAL OPERATIONAL ISSUE RELATED TO A PHENOMENON DISCOVERED IN THE REACTOR VESSEL UPPER PLENUM WHICH IS CHARACTERIZED BY TEMPERATURE INCREASES IN ONE HOT LEG. THE LOOP REMAINS AT THE HIGHER TEMPERATURE FOR SEVERAL SECONDS THEN RETURNS TO THE ORIGINAL TEMPERATURE. SIMULTANEOUSLY, THE ADJACENT HOT LEG TEMPERATURE DECREASES BY ABOUT THE SAME AMOUNT FOR THE SAME TIME PERIOD. PREDICTIONS BASED ON CHARACTERIZATION OF THIS TEMPERATURE FLUCTUATION INDICATE THAT SUFFICIENT MARGIN BETWEEN THE OPERATING AND TURBINE RUN BACK AND REACTOR TRIP SET POINTS MAY NOT EXIST TO PERMIT PLANT OPERATION AT UP RATED POWER WITHOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF ACTUATING OPDT AND OTDT TRIPS AND TURBINE RUN BACK ALARMS IN A SINGLE CHANNEL. THE CHANGES IN THE K4 AND TAU3 TERMS PROVIDE ADDITIONAL MARGIN BETWEEN OPERATING CONDITIONS AND REACTOR TRIP SET POINTS FOR THE OPDT AND OTDT EQUATIONS.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE OTDT AND OPDT REACTOR TRIP FUNCTIONS ARE PART OF THE ACCIDENT MITIGATION RESPONSE AND ARE NOT THEMSELVES INITIATORS FOR ANY TRANSIENT. THEREFORE, THE PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE OF AN ACCIDENT IS NOT AFFECTED. THE STRUCTURAL AND FUNCTIONAL INTEGRITY OF ANY PLANT SYSTEM IS UNAFFECTED BY THE CHANGES TO THE OTDT AND OPDT REACTOR TRIP SETPOINTS. THE CHANGES TO THE REACTOR TRIP FUNCTIONS DO NOT AFFECT THE INTEGRITY OF THE FISSION PRODUCT BARRIERS UTILIZED FOR MITIGATION OF RADIOLOGICAL DOSE CONSEQUENCES AS A RESULT OF AN ACCIDENT. BOTH THE MARGIN TO DNB AND FUEL LIMITS REMAIN PROTECTED WITH THE REVISED OTDT AND OPDT SETPOINTS, RESPECTIVELY. IN ADDITION, THE OFF SITE MASS RELEASES USED AS INPUT TO THE DO SO CALCULATIONS ARE UNCHANGED FROM THOSE PREVIOUSLY ASSUMED. THEREFORE, THE OFFSITE DOSE PREDICTIONS REMAIN WITHIN THE ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA FOR EACH OF THE TRANSIENTS AFFECTED. NO NEW OPERATING CONFIGURATION IS BEING IMPOSED BY THE SET POINT ADJUSTMENTS THAT WOULD CREATE A NEW FAILURE SCENARIO. IN ADDITION, NO NEW FAILURE MODES ARE BEING CREATED FOR ANY PLANT EQUIPMENT. THEREFORE, THE ACCIDENTS DEFINED IN THE FSAR CONTINUE TO REPRESENT THE CREDIBLE SPECTRUM OF EVENTS TO BE ANALYZED WHICH DETERMINE SAFE PLANT OPERATION. THE REVISED OTDT AND OPDT REACTOR TRIP SETPOINTS DO NOT EFFECT THE FUNCTION OF ANY EQUIPMENT OR SYSTEM EXPLICITLY OR IMPLICITLY ASSUMED TO OPERATE DURING A DESIGN BASIS ACCIDENT. THIS CHANGE DO A NOT DEGRADE THE DESIGN BASIS PERFORMANCE OF ANY SAFETY SYSTEM ASSUMED TO FUNCTION IN THE ACCIDENT ANALYSES. THE CHANGES RISES TO THE RECTOR TRIP FUNCTIONS DO NOT AFFECT THE INTEGRITY OF THE FISSION PRODUCT BARRIER UTILIZED FOR MITIGATION OF RADIOLOGICAL DOSE CONSEQUENCES AS A RESULT OF AN ACCIDENT. BOTH THE MARGIN TO DNB AND FUEL TEMPERATURE LIMITS REMAIN PROTECTED WITH THE REVISED OTDT AND OPDT SETPOINTS, RESPECTIVELY. IN ADDITION, THE OFF SITE MASS RELEASES USED AS INPUT TO THE DOSE CALCULATIONS ARE UNCHANGED FROM THOSE PREVIOUSLY ASSUMED. THEREFORE, THE OFF SITE DOSE PREDICTIONS REMAIN WITHIN THE ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA FOR EACH OF THE TRANSIENTS AFFECTED. THE OTDT AND OPDT REACTOR TRIP FUNCTIONS ARE PART OF THE ACCIDENT MITIGATION RESPONSE AND ARE NOT THEMSELVES INITIATORS FOR ANY EQUIPMENT FAILURE. THE EFFECT OF THE CHANGE ON THE MARGIN OF SAFETY

ASSOCIATED WITH THE OTDT AND OPDT REACTOR TRIP FUNCTIONS IS DESCRIBED BY THE EVALUATIONS PERFORMED FOR TOE ACCIDENT ANALYSES DOCUMENTED IN SECTION 3.0. ANALYSES AND EVALUATIONS HAVE BEEN PERFORMED TO DETERMINE THE EFFECT ON PLANT RESPONSE TO AFFECTED TRANSIENTS DUE TO THE NEW REACTOR TRIP SETPOINTS. THIS EFFORT HAS CONFIRMED THAT THE ACCIDENT ANALYSIS CRITERIA ARE MET AND THE REQUIRED MARGIN OF SAFETY REGULATED FOR EACH AFFECTED SAFETY ANALYSIS IS MAINTAINED. THE ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA FOR THE ANALYZED EVENTS ARE UNCHANGED. THUS, THE REVISED OTDT AND OPDT SET POINTS DO NOT RESULT IN A REDUCTION IN A MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION.

SUBJECT: DCP: 92-V2N0200, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THIS DCP IMPLEMENTS THE WESTINGHOUSE REVISED T-HOT AVERAGE SCALING (RTAS) SCHEME. THE RCS HOT LEG TEMPERATURES ARE MEASURED USING FAST-RESPONSE RTDS LOCATED 120 DEGREES APART IN THE SAME PLANE. RTAS ASSIGNS DIFFERENT WEIGHTING FACTORS TO THE THREE HOT LEG RTDS TO MINIMIZE THE EFFECT OF THE TEMPERATURE FLUCTUATIONS FROM THE RTD WHICH HAS THE MOST PROCESS NOISE. RTAS IS IMPLEMENTED BY MODIFYING THE NSA CARDS, WHICH ARE LOCATED IN THE 7300 PROCESS EQUIPMENT, PROJECT CLASS 11J, FOR THE AFFECTED LOOPS. THE NSA CARDS, WHICH RECEIVE THE HOT LEG RTD SIGNALS, WILL HAVE THE INPUT AND BALANCING RESISTORS CHANGED.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE PLANT CHANGE IS NOT AN ACCIDENT INITIATOR. THE FSAR ACCIDENTS ANALYSES HAVE BEEN REVIEWED FOR THIS PLANT CHANGE AND IT HAS BEEN SHOWN THAT THE ANALYSES ARE NOT ADVERSELY AFFECTED NOR IS THE PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE INCREASED BY THE IMPLEMENTATION OF RTAS. IT HAS BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE ACCIDENT ANALYSES ARE NOT ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY THE IMPLEMENTATION OF RTAS. THUS, THERE IS NO CHANGE IN THE DOSES AS A RESULT OF RTAS. THE MODIFICATIONS REQUIRED TO IMPLEMENT RTAS DO NOT RESULT IN ANY NEW LIMITING SINGLE FAILURES WHICH COULD CREATE THE POSSIBILITY OF A CREDIBLE ACCIDENT. THE MODIFICATIONS DO NOT INVOLVE AN ACCIDENT INITIATOR. THUS, THERE IS NO POSSIBILITY OF CREATING AN ACCIDENT OF A DIFFERENT TYPE THAN PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED IN THE FSAR. VP04-92 THERE IS NO INCREASE IN THE PROBABILITY OF A PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED MALFUNCTION OF EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY. THERE IS NO ADDITIONAL HARDWARE INTRODUCED TO THE CONTROL OR PROTECTION SYSTEM AS A RESULT OF THIS MODIFICATION. THE INTRODUCTION OF THE PROCESS CALCULATION CHANGE DOES NOT AFFECT HARDWARE OPERATION, IT ONLY DIMINISHES THE MAGNITUDE OF THE EFFECT OF SHORT TERM PROCESS NOISE VARIATION ON A SINGLE, SPECIFIC RTD FOR THE DETERMINATION OF THE AVERAGE THE VALUE FOR A LOOP. FOR ACTUAL HEAT UP EVENTS, ALL THREE RTDS IN A HOT LEG WILL RESPOND THUS PROVIDING THE NEEDED PROTECTION FUNCTION ACTUATION. THE CONSEQUENCES OF A MALFUNCTION OF EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED WAS NOT INCREASED. THIS IS DUE TO THE CONCLUSION THAT THE CURRENT FAILURE MODES AS ANALYZED ARE UNCHANGED DUE TO THIS CALCULATION PROCESS MODIFICATION. WHEN A HOT LEG RTD IS DETERMINED TO BE INOPERABLE, RTAS IS NO LONGER APPLICABLE AND THE PROCEDURE FOR OPERATION WITH A HOT LEG RTD OUT OF SERVICE GIVEN IN REFERENCE 2 SHOULD BE FOLLOWED. THE PLANT MODIFICATION DO NOT CREATE THE POSSIBILITY OF A MALFUNCTION OF EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY DIFFERENT FROM ANY ALREADY EVALUATED. THERE IS NO SIGNIFICANT CHANGE TO HARDWARE AS A RESULT OF THIS CALCULATION PROCESS MODIFICATION. THE DESIGN BASIS OF THE HARDWARE ASSOCIATED WITH THE OTDT AND OPDT PROTECTION SYSTEM IS NOT CHANGED. THE PLANT OPERATING STAFF

WILL CONFIRM THAT THE INDICATED T-HOT IS GREATER THAN OR EQUAL TO ACTUAL T-HOT AND CONFIRM THAT THE ACTUAL TAVG STAYS WITH THE ALLOWABLE RANGE, TO MAINTAIN CONSERVATIVE OPERATION WITH RESPECT TO THE SAFETY ANALYSES ASSUMPTIONS. THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN THE BASES TO THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION WAS NOT REDUCED. ALL INITIAL CONDITIONS OF THE SAFETY ANALYSES WITH RESPECT TO TEMPERATURE WERE MAINTAINED. THE RESULTS OF SUCH ANALYSES AS NOTED IN THE FSAR ARE STILL VALID. THUS, THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN THE BASES OF THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS IS NOT REDUCED.

SUBJECT: DCP: 92-VAN0071, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THIS DESIGN CHANGE PACKAGE PERMANENTLY INSTALLED THE PORTABLE WASHER/DRYER USED BY HEALTH PHYSICS FOR CONTAMINATED PERSONAL CLOTHING. THE WASHER/DRYER IS LOCATED IN ROOM R-106 OF THE CONTROL BUILDING. ELECTRICAL, WATER SUPPLY, DRAIN, AND DRYER EXHAUST CONNECTIONS WERE ADDED TO ALLOW THE WASHER/DRYER TO BE USED ON A PERMANENT BASIS. ROOM R-106 IS LOCATED IN A SEISMIC CATEGORY 2 AREA WITHIN A SEISMIC CATEGORY 1 STRUCTURE. THE ELECTRICAL FEED IS PROVIDED FROM PANEL ANY06 TO A RECEPTACLE LOCATED NEAR THE WASHER/DRYER. THE ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS ARE PROJECT CLASS 62E. THE MECHANICAL COMPONENTS, WHICH CONSIST OF THE DRYER EXHAUST, WATER SUPPLY LINES, DRAIN LINE, AND THE WASHER/DRYER, ARE PROJECT CLASS 626. THIS IS A DEVIATION FROM REGULATORY GUIDE 1.143. THIS IS JUSTIFIED FOR SEVERAL REASONS: 1. THERE IS NO UNMONITORED RELEASE OF RADIOACTIVE WASTES FROM THE WASHER/DRYER. 2. THE EXHAUST FROM THE DRYER PASSES THROUGH THE HEPA FILTER. THE FILTER PROVIDES A MINIMUM OF 99.97% OVERALL EFFICIENCY ON 0.3 MICRON PARTICLES. BY MEANS OF THE CONTROL BUILDING HVAC SYSTEM, THE EXHAUST WILL PASS THROUGH TWO MORE HEPA FILTERS BEFORE IT IS RELEASED THROUGH THE VENT STACK. 3. THIS ROOM IS LOCATED IN A RADIOLOGICALLY CONTROLLED AREA (RCA). ACCESS TO AN RCA IS CONTROLLED BY THE USE OF A RADIATION WORK PERMIT (RWP). ANY WORKER ENTERING AN RCA MUST HAVE A TLD AND A POCKET DOSIMETER, AND MUST LOG IN ON HIS RWP. THE ACCESSIBILITY ZONE FOR ROOM R-106 IS LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO 2.5 MREM/HR DURING OPERATIONS. 4. ADEQUATE DRAIN PROVISIONS HAVE BEEN MADE TO PROTECT THE ROOM AGAINST FLOODING FROM FAILURE OF THE WASHER/DRYER DRAIN. (PER DOCUMENTATION OF ENGINEERING JUDGMENT.) POTENTIALLY CONTAMINATED WATER FROM THE RUPTURED WASHER/DRYER DRAIN ARE COLLECTED IN THE FLOOR DRAIN AND FLOW BY GRAVITY TO THE LAUNDRY AND HOT SHOWER TANK. THE FLOOR DRAIN HAS BEEN INSTALLED WITH RIMS WHICH ARE FLUSH WITH THE LOW POINT ELEVATION OF THE FINISHED FLOOR.

SAFETY EVALUATION: DURING NORMAL OPERATION, THE CONTAMINATED WATER FROM THE WASHER IS ROUTED FROM THE WASHER DRAIN TO THE LAUNDRY AND HOT SHOWER TANKS. IF THERE WERE A FAILURE OF THE DRAIN LINE, THE WATER WOULD BE COLLECTED BY THE FLOOR DRAIN WHERE IT WOULD THEN BE ROUTED TO THE LAUNDRY AND HOT SHOWER TANKS. THERE ARE NO POSSIBLE ADVERSE EFFECTS OF PERMANENTLY INSTALLING THE PORTABLE WASHER/DRYER. THE PERMANENT INSTALLATION OF THE WASHER/DRYER IN THE HEALTH PHYSICS LAUNDRY ROOM INVOLVES NON-SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT LOCATED IN A SEISMIC CATEGORY 2 AREA.

SUBJECT: DCP: 93-V1N0003, REVISION 1, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THIS DCP ADDED AN ENHANCEMENT TO THE AUTOMATIC RESET CIRCUITRY THAT RESETS THE SEQUENCER IF THE DIESEL GENERATOR BREAKER OPENS WHILE LOADS ARE BEING SEQUENCED ONTO THE BUS. THIS DCP ADDED AN ENHANCEMENT TO THE AUTOMATIC RESET CIRCUITRY, WHICH RESETS THE UNDER VOLTAGE (U/V) LATCH IN APPROXIMATELY 60 SECONDS. THIS SENDS A SECOND U/V SIGNAL, WHICH OPENS THE CLOSED FEEDER BREAKERS AND SEND A SIGNAL TO RE-CLOSE THE DIESEL GENERATOR BREAKER. IF THE DIESEL GENERATOR BREAKER RE-CLOSES, THE LOADS ARE AUTOMATICALLY SEQUENCED ON. ALL OF THESE MODIFICATIONS ARE SAFETY CLASS 1, SEISMIC CLASS 1, EXCEPT FOR THE CABLES AND INTERNAL WIRES THAT ARE SEISMIC CLASS 2. THE PURPOSE OF THE ADDITIONAL RESET FEATURES IS TO PREVENT AN INADVERTENT RE-CLOSURE OF THE DIESEL GENERATOR BREAKER ON A PARTIALLY LOADED BUS.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE DESIGN CHANGE FULLY MEETS THE DESIGN, MATERIAL AND CONSTRUCTION SPECIFICATIONS OF THE EQUIPMENT THAT IS BEING MODIFIED. THE DESIGN CHANGE DOES NOT AFFECT ANY OF THE SYSTEMS OR COMPONENTS POSTULATED TO CAUSE ACCIDENTS EVALUATED IN THE FSAR. THE DESIGN CHANGE DOES NOT AFFECT ANY SAFETY LIMITS OR SETTINGS. THIS IS BASED UPON A REVIEW OF THE FSAR THAT INCLUDED SECTIONS 1.9.9, 7.3, 8.3.1, 16.3 AND CHAPTER 15. THE ENHANCED AUTOMATIC SEQUENCER RESET FEATURE IS ONLY FUNCTIONAL IF THE DIESEL GENERATOR BREAKER OPENS DURING SEQUENCING. THUS, THIS NEW RESET FEATURE RESULTS IN AN IMPROVEMENT IN THE RELIABILITY OF THE EMERGENCY ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEM. THE DESIGN CHANGE DOES NOT ADVERSELY AFFECT THE ABILITY OF THE EMERGENCY STAND-BY POWER SYSTEM TO PERFORM ITS ROLE IN THE MITIGATION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF ACCIDENTS EVALUATED IN THE FSAR. THE DESIGN CHANGE ENHANCED THE ABILITY TO RECOVER FROM A MALFUNCTION OF THE EMERGENCY STAND-BY POWER SYSTEM. THE RISK OF AN INADVERTENT FEEDER BREAKER CLOSING ONTO A DEAD, BUT PARTIALLY LOADED BUS, HAS BEEN REDUCED. THE ABILITY TO RE-INSTATE THE EMERGENCY LOADS AND RESTORE THE STAND-BY POWER SYSTEM HAS BEEN ENHANCED. THE DESIGN CHANGE FULLY MEETS THE DESIGN, MATERIAL AND CONSTRUCTION SPECIFICATIONS OF THE EQUIPMENT THAT IS BEING MODIFIED. THE DESIGN WAS EVALUATED AND IT WAS DETERMINED THAT ALL SEISMIC AND ENVIRONMENTAL SPECIFICATIONS, ELECTRICAL SEPARATION CRITERIA AND OTHER DESIGN CRITERIA HAVE BEEN MET. THE MODIFICATIONS ARE ELECTRICALLY ISOLATED FROM OTHER CIRCUITS BY COORDINATED FUSES AND ARE PHYSICALLY SEPARATED FROM CIRCUITS OF REDUNDANT TRAINS. THE NEW CIRCUITS ONLY BECOME ACTIVE IF AN U/V SIGNAL IS PRESENT AND THE DIESEL GENERATOR BREAKER TRIPS WHEN IT SHOULD BE CLOSED. THE DESIGN CHANGE DOES NOT AFFECT THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN THE BASES OF THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS FOR ANY SAFETY LIMIT OR ANY SAFETY LIMIT SETTING. IT DOES NOT AFFECT THE LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION OR THE SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS FOR ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS - AC SOURCES, SECTION 3/4.8.1. THE CHANGE MEETS THE APPROPRIATE DESIGN CRITERIA AND DOES NOT AFFECT THE TIMING OR SEQUENCE THAT LOADS WOULD BE STARTED IN THE EVENT OF A LOSS-OF-OFFSITE POWER EVENT. THIS IS BASED ON A REVIEW OF THE FSAR AND THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS, INCLUDING SECTION 3/4.8.1.

SUBJECT: DCP: 93-V1N0004, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THIS DCP REPLACED THE DIESEL GENERATOR AIR START SYSTEM AIR RECEIVE RELIEF VALVES WITH AN ANDERSON, GREENWOOD & CO. (AGCO) RELIEF VALVE WHICH MEETS ALL ORIGINAL FUNCTION AND SAFETY REQUIREMENTS.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE REPLACEMENT RELIEF VALVE SATISFIES ALL ORIGINAL DESIGN AND FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS AND ARE SIZED TO MEET THE EXISTING DESIGN CRITERIA AS SPECIFIED IN FSAR SECTION 9.5.6. ALL SEISMIC QUALIFICATIONS HAVE BEEN MET. THE REPLACEMENT RELIEF VALVE WAS SIZED TO HAVE A BLOWDOWN OF LESS THAN 10%, THIS PREVENTS THE AIR RECEIVER PRESSURE FROM DROPPING BELOW THE TECH SPEC LIMIT OF 210 PSIG. THEREFORE THIS CHANGE HAS NO EFFECT ON SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT MALFUNCTION, ACCIDENT ANALYSIS, OR THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS SPECIFIED BY TECH SPEC 3/4.8.1.1.2.

SUBJECT: DCP: 93-V1N0016, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THIS DESIGN CHANGE PACKAGE (DCP) IMPLEMENTED BYPASS TEST INSTRUMENTATION (BTI) FOR NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION SYSTEM (NIS) REACTOR TRIP FUNCTIONS, 7300 PROCESS PROTECTION BOP SYSTEM REACTOR TRIP FUNCTIONS, 7300 PROCESS PROTECTION NSSS SYSTEM REACTOR TRIP (RT) FUNCTIONS AND ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM (ESFAS) FUNCTIONS. HARDWARE MODIFICATIONS WERE MADE PER WESTINGHOUSE FCN'S FOR INSTALLING BTI PANELS IN THE FOLLOWING EQUIPMENT: A) NIS CABINET (1-1602-Q5-NIR) B) 7300 PROCESS PROTECTION NSSS CABINETS (1-1604-Q5-PS1/PS2/PS3/PS4) C) 7300 PROCESS PROTECTION BOP CABINETS (1-1604-Q5-PP1/PP2/PP3) VISUAL INDICATION ON THE MAIN CONTROL BOARD IS PROVIDED BY THE ADDITION OF 11 NEW ANNUNCIATOR WINDOWS FOR BTI TEST PANELS STATUS. ADDITIONALLY, LOCAL INDICATION IS PROVIDED ON EACH BTI TEST PANEL FOR CHANNEL STATUS. THE REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM (RTS) AND ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM (ESFAS) UTILIZE 1-OUT-OF-2, 2-OUT-OF-3, AND 2-OUT-OF-4 COINCIDENCE LOGIC FROM REDUNDANT CHANNELS TO INITIATE PROTECTIVE ACTIONS. WITHIN THESE SYSTEMS, ANALOG CHANNEL COMPARATORS, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION SYSTEM (NIS) 1-OUT-OF-2 FUNCTIONS, ARE CURRENTLY PLACED IN THE TRIPPED STATE FOR CHANNEL TESTING OR IN RESPONSE TO A CHANNEL BEING OUT OF SERVICE. WITH AN INOPERABLE CHANNEL IN THE TRIPPED STATE, A REDUNDANT CHANNEL CANNOT BE MAINTAINED OR TESTED WITHOUT CAUSING A REACTOR TRIP OR SAFEGUARDS ACTUATION. WITH IMPLEMENTATION OF THE BYPASS TEST INSTRUMENTATION (BTI), A SPURIOUS REACTOR TRIP OR SAFEGUARDS ACTUATION IS AVOIDED SINCE THE PARTIAL TRIP CONDITION THAT WOULD HAVE BEEN PRESENT IS ELIMINATED AND THE COINCIDENCE LOGIC IS MAINTAINED BY REQUIRING SIGNALS FROM ADDITIONAL CHANNELS TO ACTUATE THE PROTECTIVE FUNCTIONS.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE INSTALLATION OF THE BTI DOES NOT ADVERSELY AFFECT THE OPERABILITY OF THE 7300 PROCESS PROTECTION SYSTEMS (NSSS & BOP) OR THE NIS. THE ACTIVITY DID NOT CHANGE THE CHANNEL REDUNDANCY OR SEPARATION REQUIREMENT PROVIDED BY THE 7300 PROCESS PROTECTION SYSTEM OR THE NIS. WITH IMPLEMENTATION OF THE BTI, A SPURIOUS REACTOR TRIP OR SAFEGUARDS ACTUATION, DURING TESTING, IS LESS LIKELY SINCE THE PARTIAL TRIP CONDITION THAT WOULD HAVE BEEN PRESENT IS ELIMINATED WHILE THE COINCIDENCE LOGIC IS MAINTAINED. FURTHERMORE, THERE ARE NO CREDIBLE FAILURE MODES OF THE BTI TOGGLE SWITCHES THAT CAN CAUSE A PLANT TRIP. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE BTI DOES

NOT AFFECT THE INTEGRITY OF ANY FISSION PRODUCT BARRIERS UTILIZED IN THE MITIGATION OF THE RADIOLOGICAL DOSE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT. THE INSTALLATION OF THE BYPASS PANELS DOES NOT ADVERSELY AFFECT THE SEISMIC QUALIFICATION OF THE NIS OR 7300 PROCESS PROTECTION NSSS AND BOP RACKS (REFERENCES 2, 3 & 4). FAULT TEST/EVALUATIONS HAVE BEEN PERFORMED FOR THE BTI SYSTEM TO DETERMINE THAT A CREDIBLE FAULT DID NOT PROPAGATE TO OR FROM THE BTI AS IT INTERFACES WITH ASSOCIATED PROTECTION SYSTEM FUNCTIONS (REFERENCE 1). THE BTI SYSTEM IS NOT SUBJECT TO COMMON MODE FAILURES. THE BTI SYSTEM IS DESIGNED TO PERFORM ITS ASSOCIATED PROTECTIVE FUNCTION (I.E., TESTING/TROUBLESHOOTING IN THE BYPASSED CONDITION) AND NOT ADVERSELY AFFECT EQUIPMENT UTILIZED IN THE MITIGATION OF RADIOLOGICAL DOSE CONSEQUENCES. INSTALLATION OF THE BTI SYSTEM DOES NOT AFFECT ACCIDENT INITIATION SEQUENCES OR RESPONSE SCENARIOS. NO NEW FAILURE MODES ARE BEING CREATED FOR ANY PLANT EQUIPMENT. ALTHOUGH THE FSAR DOES NOT EVALUATE ACCIDENTS WHICH ARE THE RESULT OF THE PROCESS PROTECTION SYSTEM FAILING TO PERFORM ITS INTENDED FUNCTION, A COMMON MODE FAILURE OF MORE THAN ONE PROCESS PROTECTION CHANNEL COULD LEAD TO THE POSSIBILITY OF AN ACCIDENT BEING CREATED THAT IS DIFFERENT FROM ANY PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED IN THE FSAR. MEASURES TO ENSURE SYSTEM RELIABILITY, HAVE BEEN TAKEN TO ENSURE THAT THE POSSIBILITY OF A MALFUNCTION OF EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY DIFFERENT FROM ANY ALREADY EVALUATED IN THE FSAR WAS NOT CREATED BY THE INSTALLATION OF THE BTI SYSTEM (REFERENCE 1). THESE MEASURES INCLUDE: RELIABILITY EVALUATION, ISOLATION CAPABILITY EVALUATION, SEISMIC, AND ENVIRONMENTAL EQUIPMENT QUALIFICATION EVALUATIONS AND TESTING, AND DESIGN CONSTRAINTS GOVERNED BY WCAP-11368 AND SERS FOR APPLICATION OF ROUTINE TEST IN BYPASS. NO FUNCTIONS CREDITED IN SAFETY ANALYSES ARE ALTERED OR AFFECTED BY THE INSTALLATION OF THE BTI. THIS DCP DOES NOT REDUCE THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN THE BASIS FOR ANY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION.

SUBJECT: DCP: 93-V1N0020, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THIS DCP ADDED FOUR "NORMAL-DISABLE" HANDSWITCHES TO THE CONTROL POWER CIRCUITS ASSOCIATED WITH THE AUXILIARY FEEDWATER ACTUATION SYSTEM (AFWAS) AND STEAM GENERATOR BLOWDOWN (SGBD) ISOLATION SYSTEM. THESE HANDSWITCHES ARE LOCATED IN VARIOUS LOCAL AUXILIARY RELAY PANELS.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THIS DCP ALTERED THE AFWAS AND SGBD ISOLATION LOGIC BUT THE HAND SWITCH POSITION, LIKE REMOVAL OF THE CONTROL POWER FUSES, IS ADMINISTRATIVELY CONTROLLED THROUGH SOPS. THIS CHANGE DID NOT AFFECT THE SYSTEM OPERATION IN ANY WAY WHEN THE HAND SWITCHES ARE IN THE "NORMAL" POSITION, AND DID NOT ADD ANY NEW ACCIDENT SOURCES. WHEN PLACED IN THE DISABLE POSITION, THE HAND SWITCHES ADDED BY THIS DCP, BLOCK SIGNALS FROM CAUSING AUTOMATIC POSITIONING OF THESE VALVES. AUTOMATIC START OF THE MDAFP ON A TWO-OF-TWO MFPT TRIP SIGNAL IS ALSO BLOCKED. THE CAPABILITY OF THE AFWAS TO PROVIDE SUFFICIENT FLOW TO THE STEAM GENERATORS DURING SOME ACCIDENTS IS PREDICATED ON THESE SGBD VALVES BEING CLOSED. PLACING THE HAND SWITCHES INTO THE DISABLE POSITION IS NO DIFFERENT THAN REMOVING THE CONTROL POWER FUSES, WHICH IS ALLOWED BY CURRENT SOPS. ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL OF THE HAND SWITCHES LIKEWISE PREVENT AN INCREASE IN THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED IN THE FSAR. THE HAND

SWITCHES ARE MOUNTED INTERNAL TO EXISTING PANELS AND ARE DESIGNED TO MEET THE APPROPRIATE EQUIPMENT QUALIFICATION AND ELECTRICAL SEPARATION CRITERIA. ADDITION OF THESE HAND SWITCHES DID NOT CREATE THE POSSIBILITY OF AN ACCIDENT OF A DIFFERENT TYPE THAN ANY PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED IN THE FSAR. THE ADDITION OF THESE HAND SWITCHES DID NOT AFFECT THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES OR SAFETY MARGINS.

SUBJECT: DCP: 93-V1N0024, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THIS DCP ADDRESSED THE MODIFICATION OF TWO REACTOR VESSEL HEAD VENT SYSTEM (RVHVS) PIPE SUPPORTS: V1-1201-055-H604 AND V1-1208-487-H608. SUPPORT V1-1201-055-H604 WAS MODIFIED FROM A TWO DIRECTIONAL RESTRAINT TO A ONE DIRECTIONAL VERTICAL RESTRAINT. SUPPORT V1-1208-487-H608 WAS REINFORCED BY ADDING A PLATE TO THE STRAP OF THE SUPPORT. THE RVHVS IS A TWO TRAIN SYSTEM WHOSE MAIN FUNCTION IS TO REMOVE, VIA REMOTE MANUAL OPERATION FROM THE CONTROL ROOM, NONCONDENSIBLE GASES, STEAM AND WATER, OR FLASHING WATER FROM THE REACTOR VESSEL FOLLOWING A POSTULATED LOCA OR A BEYOND DESIGN BASIS EVENT. THE RVHVS MAY ALSO BE USED AS A LETDOWN SYSTEM TO ACHIEVE A COLD SHUTDOWN CONDITION USING ONLY SAFETY GRADE EQUIPMENT. THE ORIGINAL RVHVS DESIGN ANALYSIS CONSIDERED SIMULTANEOUS OPERATION OF BOTH RVHVS TRAINS. HOWEVER, THE SINGLE ACTIVE FAILURE CRITERION DICTATES THAT ONLY ONE RVHVS FLOW PATH (TRAIN) MAY BE OPERABLE. AS A RESULT, THERMAL EXPANSION RE-ANALYSIS OF THE RVHVS CONSIDERING BOTH ONE AND TWO TRAIN OPERATION WAS CARRIED OUT. ALSO INVESTIGATED WAS THE LOADING CONDITION OF A WATER SLUG DISCHARGE FOLLOWED BY HYDROGEN DISCHARGES THAT COULD OCCUR DURING ACCIDENT CONDITIONS. THIS RE-ANALYSIS REVEALED THAT SUPPORT V1-1201-055-H604, IN THE VICINITY OF ISOLATION VALVES 1HV-8095A AND 1HV-8096A, AND SUPPORT V1-1208-487-H608, IN THE VICINITY OF THROTTLE VALVES 1HV-0442A AND 1HV-0442B, NEED TO BE MODIFIED IN ORDER FOR THE PIPE STRESSES TO SATISFY THE ASME CODE SECTION III ALLOWABLES FOR THE SAFETY RELATED PORTION OF THE SYSTEM AND ANSI B31.1 ALLOWABLES FOR THE NON-NUCLEAR SAFETY RELATED PORTION OF THE RVHVS.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE SUPPORT MODIFICATIONS ENSURES THAT THE RVHVS PIPING STRESSES ARE WITHIN CODE DESIGN LIMITS FOR EITHER ONE OR TWO TRAIN OPERATION, THUS SATISFYING THE SINGLE FAILURE CRITERION. THE RVHVS PIPING IS 1" NPS AND IS EXEMPTED FROM HIGH ENERGY PIPE BREAK POSTULATION PER DC-1018, REV. 3. THE RE-ANALYSIS AND SUPPORT MODIFICATIONS DO NOT AFFECT THE EXISTING HELB ANALYSIS. THE SUPPORT MODIFICATIONS DO NOT ADVERSELY AFFECT THE PRESSURE INTEGRITY OF THE REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM. THE MODIFICATIONS MEET THE DESIGN, MATERIAL, INSTALLATION, TESTING AND QUALITY REQUIREMENTS APPLICABLE TO THE RVHVS. THE MODIFICATIONS DID NOT CHANGE, DEGRADE, OR PREVENT ACTIONS DESCRIBED OR ASSUMED IN THE FSAR FOR AN ACCIDENT, NOR DO THEY ALTER ANY ASSUMPTIONS PREVIOUSLY MADE IN EVALUATING RADIOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES. THE MODIFICATIONS ADDRESSED IN THIS DCP DID NOT AFFECT ANY ACTIVE COMPONENTS OF THE RVHVS. THE MODIFICATIONS THE OPERATION AND RESPONSE OF THE RVHVS HAS BEEN IMPROVED SINCE THE RVHVS STRESSES REMAIN WITHIN ASME CODE ALLOWABLES FOR EITHER ONE OR TWO TRAIN

OPERATION. THE MODIFICATION DID NOT INTRODUCE ANY ADDITIONAL EQUIPMENT TO THE RVHVS NOR ANY NEW FAILURE MODES.

SUBJECT: DCP: 93-VIN0044 REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: GEORGIA POWER COMPANY HAS UNDERTAKEN A PROGRAM TO UPRATE VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT (VEGP), UNITS 1 AND 2 TO A MAXIMUM NSSS POWER LEVEL OF 3579 MWT WHICH RESULTED IN AN ADDITIONAL OUTPUT OF APPROXIMATELY 50 MWE FOR EACH UNIT. IN ADDITION TO THE POWER UPRATE, A REDUCTION IN THE DESIGN REACTOR VESSEL OUTLET TEMPERATURE (T-HOT) WITH UP TO 10% STEAM GENERATOR TUBE PLUGGING WAS IMPLEMENTED. THIS DESIGN CHANGE PACKAGE IMPLEMENTED THE T-HOT REDUCTION WHICH CORRESPONDS TO A REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM AVERAGE TEMPERATURE (T-AVG) RANGE OF 588.4 °F TO 570.7 °F (T-HOT REDUCTION OF 16.8 °F). GEORGIA POWER COMPANY HAS ESTABLISHED A TARGET T-AVG TEMPERATURE OF 583.4 °F TO ACHIEVE THE DESIRED PLANT ELECTRICAL POWER OUTPUT FOR PLANT OPERATION.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THIS DESIGN CHANGE DID NOT CAUSE SYSTEMS TO BE OPERATED OUTSIDE OF THEIR DESIGN LIMITS. THERE WERE NO PHYSICAL PLANT CHANGES NOR ANY REDUCTIONS IN SYSTEM OR COMPONENT REDUNDANCY. SYSTEMS ARE PROVIDING THEIR SAME FUNCTIONS. THE EXISTING DESIGN BASIS FOR FLOODING LEVELS INSIDE CONTAINMENT, WHICH CONSIDERS A POSTULATED MAIN STEAM LINE BREAK OR MAIN FEED WATER LINE BREAK AS THE MOST SEVERE FLUID RELEASE CONDITION, WAS NOT AFFECTED BY THE T-HOT REDUCTION SINCE THE FLUID RELEASE IS BASED ON A STEAM GENERATOR PRESSURE CORRESPONDING TO A ZERO LOAD CONDITION WHICH BOUNDS THE STEAM GENERATOR PRESSURE FOR THE RANGE OF T-HOT VALUES ASSOCIATED WITH T-HOT REDUCTION. STEAM GENERATOR INVENTORY WAS NOT AFFECTED BY THE T-HOT REDUCTION. NO ADVERSE EFFECT ON SYSTEMS OR EQUIPMENT HAS BEEN CREATED AS A RESULT OF THIS MODIFICATION. COMPONENT AND SYSTEM INTEGRITY IS MAINTAINED AND PERFORMANCE IS NOT ADVERSELY AFFECTED. THE T-HOT REDUCTION DOES NOT EXPOSE EQUIPMENT USED IN ACCIDENT MITIGATION TO AN ADVERSE ENVIRONMENT FOR WHICH IT HAD NOT BEEN PREVIOUSLY QUALIFIED SINCE THE EQUIPMENT QUALIFICATION ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS (E.G., PRESSURE (REFERENCE 5), TEMPERATURE, DOSE) INSIDE AND OUTSIDE THE CONTAINMENT BUILDING ARE BOUNDED BY THE EXISTING EQUIPMENT QUALIFICATION ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS. SYSTEMS WITH DOSE CONTROL FUNCTIONS CONTINUE TO FUNCTION AS INTENDED AND WERE NOT ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY THIS MODIFICATION. EQUIPMENT PERFORMANCE AND INTEGRITY WERE NOT ALTERED BY THE DCP. THE DCP HAD NO ADVERSE EFFECT ON THE CAPABILITY OF SYSTEMS TO PERFORM THEIR SAFETY FUNCTION. NO NEW LIMITING SINGLE FAILURES HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED NOR HAVE ANY NEW FAILURE MODES BEEN DEFINED FOR ANY SYSTEM OR COMPONENT AS A RESULT OF THIS MODIFICATION. OPERATION WITHIN THE ORIGINAL DESIGN AND CRITERIA LIMITS FOR ALL SYSTEMS AND COMPONENTS PROVIDES FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY AND FUNCTIONAL CAPABILITIES UNDER THE REDUCED TEMPERATURE CONDITIONS. NO NEW ACCIDENT SCENARIOS, OR FAILURE MECHANISMS WERE INTRODUCED AS A RESULT OF THE T-HOT REDUCTION. CHANGES TO COMPONENTS, OR ADDITIONS OF NEW COMPONENTS WERE NOT REQUIRED FOR THE DCP. THIS DESIGN CHANGE DID NOT ADD OR DELETE INTERFACES WITH ANY SYSTEMS OR COMPONENTS NOR WERE ANY NEW OR DIFFERENT RADIOACTIVE RELEASE EVENTS CREATED. ANALYSES HAVE BEEN PERFORMED (REFERENCE 1) WHICH DEMONSTRATES THAT THE T-HOT REDUCTION DID NOT ADVERSELY AFFECT THE FUNCTION OF SYSTEMS AND COMPONENTS IMPORTANT TO SAFETY. THE TEMPERATURE REDUCTION DID NOT CREATE FAILURE MODES THAT COULD ADVERSELY AFFECT SAFETY-RELATED

EQUIPMENT. NO NEW COMPONENTS WERE ADDED, NO EXISTING COMPONENTS WERE CHANGED, NOR WERE ANY INTERFACES ADDED OR DELETED FOR THE DCP. THERE WERE NO PHYSICAL PLANT CHANGES WHICH CREATE THE POSSIBILITY OF A NEW TYPE OF MALFUNCTION. THE DCP HAD NO ADVERSE EFFECT ON THE AVAILABILITY, OPERABILITY, OR PERFORMANCE OF PLANT EQUIPMENT (REFERENCE 1). THE PLANT RESPONSE TO ANTICIPATED TRANSIENTS HAS BEEN SHOWN TO REMAIN WITHIN ANALYZED CONDITIONS FOR TRANSIENT RESPONSE AND EQUIPMENT DESIGN.

SUBJECT: DCP: 93-V1N0048, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THIS DESIGN CHANGE PACKAGE IMPLEMENTED THE POWER UP RATE FOR VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT, UNIT 1 FROM A NUCLEAR STEAM SUPPLY SYSTEM (NSSS) POWER LEVEL OF 3425 MWT TO A MAXIMUM NSSS POWER LEVEL OF 3579 MWT.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT CAUSE SYSTEMS TO BE OPERATED OUTSIDE OF THEIR DESIGN LIMITS. THERE ARE NO PHYSICAL PLANT CHANGES NOR ANY REDUCTIONS IN SYSTEM OR COMPONENT REDUNDANCY. ADDITIONALLY, SYSTEMS ARE PROVIDING THEIR SAME FUNCTIONS. FURTHERMORE, THOSE SYSTEMS AND COMPONENTS FOR WHICH POWER UP RATE HAS AN EFFECT HAVE BEEN EVALUATED (REFERENCE 1) AND IT HAS BEEN DETERMINED THAT THESE EVALUATIONS ARE BOUNDED BY THE NEW AND EXISTING DESIGN CRITERIA. ACCEPTABILITY OF THE NEW DESIGN CRITERIA HAS BEEN EVALUATED IT WAS DETERMINED THAT FOR THE BECHTEL SCOPE OF THE ACTIVITY, NSCW IS THE ONLY SYSTEM WHICH COULD HAVE THE POTENTIAL OF AFFECTING ANY FISSION PRODUCT BARRIERS. THE NSCW SYSTEM PROVIDES COOLING TO PLANT COMPONENTS DURING NORMAL PLANT OPERATION AND FOR ACCIDENT CONDITIONS, AND TRANSFERS THE HEAT REMOVED FROM THESE SYSTEMS TO THE ULTIMATE HEAT SINK. CALCULATIONS WERE PERFORMED (REFERENCES 8 AND 9) TO CONFIRM THAT THE MAXIMUM NSCW TOWER BASIN WATER TEMPERATURE REMAINS BELOW THE DESIGN BASIS BASIN WATER TEMPERATURE, AND THE NSCW TOWER BASIN INVENTORY AVAILABILITY MEETS THE REQUIREMENTS OF REGULATORY GUIDE 1.27 FOR THE INCREASED POWER LEVEL. NO ADVERSE EFFECT ON SYSTEMS HAS BEEN CREATED AS A RESULT OF THIS MODIFICATION. COMPONENT AND SYSTEM INTEGRITY IS MAINTAINED AND PERFORMANCE WAS NOT ADVERSELY AFFECTED. SYSTEMS WITH DOSE CONTROL FUNCTIONS POST-ACCIDENT CONTINUE TO FUNCTION AS INTENDED AND ARE NOT ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY THIS MODIFICATION. ADDITIONALLY, EQUIPMENT PERFORMANCE AND INTEGRITY ARE NOT ALTERED BY THE ACTIVITY. THE DESIGN BASES FOR THE LIQUID, SOLID, AND GASEOUS WASTE SYSTEMS AND THE PROCESS AND EFFLUENT RADIOLOGICAL MONITORING AND SAMPLING SYSTEMS ARE BASED ON SOURCE TERMS AND WASTE VOLUMES ASSOCIATED WITH A REACTOR CORE THERMAL POWER LEVEL OF 3565 MWT, WHICH IS THE UP RATED POWER LEVEL. ADDITIONALLY, NO CHANGES ARE MADE TO THE NSCW SYSTEM DESIGN WHICH DETECTS AND PREVENTS LEAKAGE TO THE ENVIRONMENT OF RADIOACTIVE CONTAMINATION THAT MAY ENTER THE NSCW SYSTEM FROM THE CCW SYSTEM, ACCW SYSTEM, OR THE CONTAINMENT COOLERS. NO NEW ACCIDENT SCENARIOS, FAILURE MECHANISMS, OR LIMITING SINGLE FAILURES ARE INTRODUCED AS A RESULT OF THE POWER UP RATE. CHANGES TO COMPONENTS, OR ADDITIONS OF NEW COMPONENTS ARE NOT REQUIRED FOR THIS ACTIVITY. ADDITIONALLY, THIS DESIGN CHANGE DOES NOT ADD OR DELETE INTERFACES WITH ANY SYSTEMS OR COMPONENTS NOR ARE ANY NEW OR DIFFERENT RADIOACTIVE RELEASE EVENTS CREATED. IN ADDITION, CONSIDERATION WAS GIVEN, AFTER RERATE, TO THE SPENT FUEL POOL (SFP) COOLING SYSTEM DUE TO THE POTENTIAL INCREASE IN HEAT LOAD. THE SFP COOLING SYSTEM WAS EVALUATED

(REFERENCES 4 AND 5) TO DETERMINE THE SYSTEM CAPABILITY TO MAINTAIN DESIGN FUEL POOL TEMPERATURE WITH ONE TRAIN IN OPERATION. THE SFP COOLING SYSTEMS FOR UNITS 1 AND 2 ARE THE SAME DESIGN, HOWEVER, HIGH DENSITY FUEL STORAGE RACKS HAVE BEEN INSTALLED IN THE UNIT 2 SFP. THE UNIT 2 SFP IS DESIGNED TO CONTAIN 2098 FUEL ASSEMBLIES, WHICH IS GREATER THAN THE ORIGINAL UNIT 1 DESIGN STORAGE CAPACITY OF 936 FUEL ASSEMBLIES. SINCE THE STORAGE CAPACITY FOR FUEL ASSEMBLIES IS GREATER FOR THE UNIT 2 SFP, THE HEAT REMOVAL REQUIREMENTS WILL ALSO BE GREATER THAN THOSE FOR THE UNIT 1 SFP. THEREFORE, THE UNIT 2 SFP COOLING SYSTEM ANALYSIS BOUND THE UNIT 1 DESIGN. FOR NORMAL REFUELING, THE UNIT 2 SFP TEMPERATURE REMAINS BELOW 140°F. IN ADDITION, FOR MAXIMUM NORMAL REFUELING AND MAXIMUM EMERGENCY CORE UNLOADING, THE POOL TEMPERATURE REMAINS BELOW BOILING AND THE MAXIMUM DESIGN TEMPERATURE FOR THE SFP. (FOR THE DEFINITIONS OF THESE REFUELING CONDITIONS, SEE FSAR SECTION 9.1.3.1.) THEREFORE, REFERENCES 4 AND 5 ARE IN ACCORDANCE WITH SRP 9.1.3. ANALYSES HAVE BEEN PERFORMED (REFERENCE 1) WHICH DEMONSTRATE THAT THE ACTIVITY WILL NOT ADVERSELY AFFECT THE FUNCTION OF ANY EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY. NO NEW COMPONENTS ARE ADDED, NO EXISTING COMPONENTS ARE CHANGED, NOR ARE ANY INTERFACES ADDED OR DELETED FOR THE ACTIVITY. FURTHER, THERE ARE NO PHYSICAL PLANT CHANGES WHICH INCREASE THE LIKELIHOOD OF A MALFUNCTION. WESTINGHOUSE EVALUATIONS (WCAP-13001) HAVE DETERMINED THAT THE BOUNDING ACCIDENT FOR THE MAXIMUM PEAK CONTAINMENT PRESSURE IS THE LARGE BREAK LOCA INSTEAD OF THE STEAM LINE BREAK. THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS IS NOT REDUCED SINCE THE CALCULATED CONTAINMENT PEAK PRESSURE (REFERENCE 1) DOES NOT EXCEED THE EXISTING DESIGN PRESSURE OF 52 PSIG FOR THE LOCA.

SUBJECT: DCP: 93-V1N0063, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THIS DCP ALLOWS THE USE OF A FIVE RING GRAPHITE PACKING SET, AND THE REMOVAL AND CAPPING OF THE VALVE STEM LEAK OFF LINE ON VALVES 1HV-8701A & B AND 1HV-8702A & B. THE EXISTING PACKING CONFIGURATION IS ALSO AN APPROVED METHOD; HOWEVER, IF IT IS USED THE VALVE STEM LEAK OFF LINE MUST BE RECONNECTED. IN EITHER CASE LIVE-LOAD PACKING MAY BE APPLIED. THE AFFECTED VALVES ARE SAFETY RELATED SEISMIC CATEGORY 1 VALVES. THE LEAK OFF LINE IS NON SAFETY SEISMIC CATEGORY 2.

SAFETY EVALUATION: BASED ON INDUSTRY EXPERIENCE AND EPRI STUDY REPORT NUMBER NP-5697, AN IMPROVED PACKING CONFIGURATION IS A FIVE RING GRAPHITE PACKING SET. WHEN THE FIVE RING PACKING SET IS INSTALLED PER THIS DESIGN CHANGE, NO STEM SEALING WILL BE PRESENT ABOVE THE VALVE STEM LEAK OFF LINE. A SECTION OF THE LEAK OFF LINE WILL BE REMOVED AND CAPPED TO PREVENT RADIOACTIVE FLUID FROM LEAKING INTO THE AREA DUE TO THIS OPENING. TO REDUCE THE POSSIBILITY OF VALVE STEM LEAKAGE AS THE PACKING CONSOLIDATES THE VALVE PACKING CAN BE LIVE-LOADED. THE SEISMIC QUALIFICATION OF THE VALVE, VALVE OPERATOR, AND RHR SYSTEM WILL BE MAINTAINED. NEITHER THE GLAND NUT TORQUE VALUE NOR THE VALVE STEM FRICTION WILL BE INCREASED ABOVE THE DESIGN APPROVED VALUES GIVEN IN REFERENCE 5.

SUBJECT: DCP: 93-V1N0064, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THIS DCP INSTALLED A FLOW ORIFICE PLATE BETWEEN AN EXISTING SET OF FLANGES ON THE DISCHARGE LINE OF THE (B CCP) B TRAIN CENTRIFUGAL CHARGING

PUMP. THIS ORIFICE WILL MAINTAIN THE PUMP DISCHARGE FLOW RATE DURING NEAR PUMP RUNOUT CONDITIONS WITHIN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION LIMITS. THIS DCP WAS REQUIRED AS A RESULT OF THE INSTALLATION OF A NEW IMPELLER IN THE B CCP WHEN THE OLD IMPELLER WAS DISCOVERED TO HAVE BEEN DAMAGED. THE NEW IMPELLER IS A DIFFERENT TYPE OF CASTING WHICH HAS IMPROVED PERFORMANCE CHARACTERISTICS.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE INSTALLATION OF THE ORIFICE PLATE DID NOT CHANGE THE OPERABILITY, AVAILABILITY, OR QUALIFICATION OF THE B CCP AS REQUIRED BY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS. USE OF THE ORIFICE PLATE ENSURES THAT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REQUIREMENTS/LIMITS ARE MAINTAINED AND THAT ANY ASSUMPTIONS PREVIOUSLY MADE IN THE RADIOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCE EVALUATION DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR ARE NOT AFFECTED.

SUBJECT: DCP: 93-V2N0025, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THIS DCP MODIFIED REACTOR VESSEL HEAD VENT SYSTEM (RVHVS) PIPE SUPPORT V2-1208-055-H610. THIS SUPPORT WAS MODIFIED FROM A TWO DIRECTIONAL RESTRAINT TO A ONE DIRECTIONAL VERTICAL RESTRAINT. THE RVHVS IS A TWO TRAIN SYSTEM WHOSE MAIN FUNCTION IS TO REMOVE, VIA REMOTE MANUAL OPERATION FROM THE CONTROL ROOM, NONCONDENSIBLE GASES, STEAM AND WATER, OR FLASHING WATER FROM THE REACTOR VESSEL FOLLOWING A POSTULATED LOCA OR A BEYOND DESIGN BASIS EVENT. THE SINGLE ACTIVE FAILURE CRITERION DICTATES THAT ONLY ONE RVHVS FLOW PATH (TRAIN) MAY BE OPERABLE. AS A RESULT, THERMAL EXPANSION RE-ANALYSIS OF THE RVHVS CONSIDERING BOTH ONE AND TWO TRAIN OPERATION WAS CARRIED OUT. ALSO INVESTIGATED WAS THE DESIGN CONDITION OF A WATER SLUG DISCHARGE FOLLOWED BY HYDROGEN DISCHARGES WHICH COULD OCCUR DURING ACCIDENT CONDITIONS. THIS RE-ANALYSIS REVEALED THAT SUPPORT V2-1208-055-H610, IN THE VICINITY OF ISOLATION VALVES 2HV-8095A AND 2HV-8096A NEEDED TO BE MODIFIED IN ORDER FOR THE PIPE STRESSES TO SATISFY THE ASME CODE SECTION III ALLOWABLES FOR THE SAFETY RELATED PORTION OF THE SYSTEM AND ANSI B31.1 ALLOWABLES FOR THE NON-NUCLEAR SAFETY RELATED PORTION OF THE RVHVS.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE SUPPORT MODIFICATION ENSURES THAT THE RVHVS PIPING STRESSES ARE MAINTAINED WITHIN CODE DESIGN LIMITS FOR EITHER ONE OR TWO TRAIN OPERATION, THUS SATISFYING THE SINGLE FAILURE CRITERION. THE RVHVS PIPING IS 1" NPS AND IS EXEMPTED FROM HIGH ENERGY PIPE BREAK POSTULATION PER DC-1018, REV. 3. THEREFORE, THE RE-ANALYSIS AND SUPPORT MODIFICATION DID NOT AFFECT THE EXISTING HELB ANALYSIS. THE SUPPORT MODIFICATION DOES NOT ADVERSELY AFFECT THE PRESSURE INTEGRITY OF THE REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM. THE MODIFICATION MEETS THE DESIGN, MATERIAL, INSTALLATION, TESTING AND QUALITY REQUIREMENTS APPLICABLE TO THE RVHVS. THE MODIFICATION DOES NOT CHANGE, DEGRADE, OR PREVENT ACTIONS DESCRIBED OR ASSUMED IN THE FSAR FOR AN ACCIDENT, NOR DOES IT ALTER ANY ASSUMPTIONS PREVIOUSLY MADE IN EVALUATING RADIOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES. THE RELIABILITY OF THE RVHVS IS IMPROVED. THE MODIFICATION ADDRESSED IN THIS DCP DOES NOT AFFECT ANY ACTIVE COMPONENTS OF THE RVHVS NOR DOES IT AFFECT THE FUNCTION OF THE RVHVS. THIS MODIFICATION DOES NOT AFFECT THE ABILITY OF EQUIPMENT TO PERFORM INTENDED SAFETY

FUNCTIONS NOR DOES IT CREATE FAILURE MODES THAT COULD ADVERSELY AFFECT SAFETY-RELATED EQUIPMENT. INHERENT TO THIS DESIGN BASES IS THE SAME MARGIN OF SAFETY AS THE ORIGINAL DESIGN.

SUBJECT: DCP: 93-V2N0026, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THIS CHANGE ADDED PIPING (2-1208-241-1") AND A VALVE (2-1208-X4-902) TO AN EXISTING VENT (VALVE 2-1208-X4-468) OF THE BORIC ACID TRANSFER PORTION OF THE CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM (CVCS). THE NEW PIPING IS CLASSIFIED SEISMIC CATEGORY 1 AND IS HEAT TRACED AND INSULATED. THE CHANGE EXTENDED THE PRESSURE BOUNDARY OF THE SYSTEM UP TO THE NEW VALVE 2-1208-X4-902. FOLLOWING THE MODIFICATION, VALVE 2-1208-X4-468 WAS LEFT OPEN. VENTING OF THIS PORTION OF BORIC ACID TRANSFER LINE 2-1208-241-3" IS NOW ACCOMPLISHED BY OPENING VALVE 2-1208-X4-902. VENTING OF A PORTION OF LINE 2-1208-241-3" IS REQUIRED AS PART OF BORIC ACID TRANSFER OPERATIONS. THE LOCATION OF THE EXISTING VALVE (2-1208-X4-468) USED IN THIS OPERATION IS SUCH THAT PERSONNEL CANNOT USE NORMAL ACCESS MEANS TO GET IN POSITION TO OPERATE IT. THIS IS CONSIDERED AN UNACCEPTABLE SAFETY HAZARD. EXTENSION OF THE VENT PIPING AND INSTALLATION OF THE NEW VALVE ALLOWS VENTING OF LINE 2-1208-241-3" TO BE DONE FROM THE FLOOR ABOVE EXISTING VALVE 2-1208-X4-468.

SAFETY EVALUATION: NO NEW ACCIDENT INITIATORS WERE CREATED AS A RESULT OF THIS MODIFICATION. THE EXTENSION OF THE VENT PIPING WAS PERFORMED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PREVIOUS DESIGN CRITERIA TO ENSURE THAT THE DESIGN, MATERIAL, AND CONSTRUCTION STANDARDS APPLICABLE TO THE ORIGINAL SYSTEM WERE MET. THE NEW VENT VALVE IS SIMILAR IN TYPE AND FUNCTION TO THE PREVIOUS VENT VALVE. THE EXTENDED VENT PIPING IS SUPPORTED BY A NEW PIPE SUPPORT. A STRESS ANALYSIS OF THE VENT PIPING AND OF THE NEW PIPE SUPPORT WAS PERFORMED AND THE RESULTS WERE ACCEPTABLE. THE NEW VENT PIPING IS INSULATED AND REDUNDANTLY HEAT TRACED. THE MODIFICATION WAS EVALUATED FOR SEISMIC 2/1 EFFECTS AND FOUND TO BE ACCEPTABLE. APPROPRIATE EXAMINATIONS WERE PERFORMED FOLLOWING THE MODIFICATION TO ENSURE THAT THE INTEGRITY OF THE PIPING SYSTEM WAS MAINTAINED. EXTENSION OF THE PREVIOUS VENT LINE HAS NO ADVERSE EFFECT ON ANY COMPONENTS REQUIRED TO MITIGATE ACCIDENT CONSEQUENCES. NO NEW ACCIDENTS HAVE BEEN CREATED SINCE NO NEW FAILURE MODES HAVE BEEN INTRODUCED AND NO NEW SINGLE FAILURES HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED. THIS MODIFICATION WAS PERFORMED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PREVIOUS DESIGN CRITERIA TO ENSURE THAT THE ORIGINAL DESIGN BASIS IS MAINTAINED. VENTS TO THE BORIC ACID TRANSFER PORTION OF THE CVCS SYSTEM ARE NOT ADDRESSED IN THE BASIS OF ANY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION.

SUBJECT: DCP: 93-V2N0027, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THE DESIGN CHANGE INVOLVED THE ADDITION/MODIFICATION OF THE FOLLOWING IN THE VOGTLE UNIT 2 CONTAINMENT BUILDING: A.) A PERMANENT REACTOR VESSEL HEAD RADIATION SHIELD (PHS) ADDED TO THE REACTOR VESSEL INTEGRATED HEAD PACKAGE. THE PHS CONSISTED OF 24 CURVED PLATES, 76 INCH RADIUS, 1.5 INCH THICK, AND REPLACED THE PREVIOUS 3/16 INCH THICK PANELS THAT WERE ATTACHED TO THE LOWER COOLING SHROUD ASSEMBLY OF THE INTEGRATED HEAD PACKAGE. THE PHS SHIELD IS PERMANENTLY ATTACHED AND BOLTED TO THE INTEGRATED HEAD PACKAGE AND DOES NOT REQUIRE ANY MAINTENANCE. HINGED DOORS ARE PROVIDED FOR ACCESS TO THE REACTOR HEAD VENT VALVE AND PIPING

FLANGES, AND THERMOCOUPLE CONOSEALS. B.) HOLES WERE CUT IN THE MIDDLE COOLING SHROUD OF THE REACTOR VESSEL INTEGRATED HEAD PACKAGE TO INSTALL FOUR ACCESS DOORS. THESE DOORS WERE FORMED OUT OF THE OLD DOORS IN THE LOWER SHROUD ASSEMBLY THAT WERE REPLACED, TO PROVIDE ADDITIONAL ACCESS TO THE THERMOCOUPLE CONOSEALS DURING THE PLANT OUTAGES. C.) A REMOVABLE CONNECTION (UNION) TO THE REACTOR VESSEL LEVEL INSTRUMENTATION SYSTEM (RVLIS) TUBING WAS ADDED APPROXIMATELY 4 INCHES OUTSIDE OF THE PHS. THIS ENABLES MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL TO DISCONNECT THE RVLIS TUBING WITHOUT GOING INSIDE THE PHS BEFORE LIFTING THE INTEGRATED HEAD PACKAGE DURING EACH REFUELING OUTAGE. THE CHANGES DESCRIBED ABOVE WILL REDUCE RADIATION EXPOSURE TO THE PERSONNEL DURING MAINTENANCE OPERATIONS BY APPROXIMATELY 70 PERCENT, AND ELIMINATE THE NEED FOR TEMPORARY SHIELDING AROUND THE REACTOR INTEGRATED HEAD PACKAGE DURING EACH REFUELING OUTAGE. ALSO, THE ADDITION OF A UNION ON THE RVLIS TUBING APPROXIMATELY 4 INCHES OUTSIDE THE PHS ALLOWS RVLIS TUBING TO BE DISCONNECTED WITHOUT GOING INSIDE THE PHS BEFORE LIFTING THE INTEGRATED HEAD PACKAGE DURING EACH REFUELING OUTAGE.

SAFETY EVALUATION: A.) CALCULATION M2X5DY01311-B, REV. A1, WAS PERFORMED TO DETERMINE THE EFFECTS OF THE ADDITION OF A UNION TO THE RVLIS TUBING, INDICATED THAT THE STRESSES IN THE TUBING AND THE ASSOCIATED SUPPORTS ARE WITHIN THE DESIGN ALLOWABLES OF THE ASME CODE. B.) AS DISCUSSED IN THE ATTACHED WESTINGHOUSE SECL 93-075, PAGE 8 OF 10, AND LETTER GP-15935, THE ADDITION OF THE PHS AND MODIFICATION TO THE MIDDLE SHROUD ASSEMBLY DOES NOT INCREASE THE STRESSES IN THE REACTOR VESSEL AND CONNECTED COMPONENTS BEYOND THE ASME ALLOWABLES. ALSO, THE REACTOR VESSEL HEAD LIFTING RIG CONTINUES TO COMPLY WITH THE NUREG 0612. THE ADDITION OF THE PHS DOES NOT AFFECT THE RESPONSE OF THE REACTOR VESSEL AND CONNECTED COMPONENTS TO PREVIOUSLY POSTULATED ACCIDENT CONDITIONS. THE STRESSES IN THE RVLIS TUBING DID NOT INCREASE SIGNIFICANTLY DUE TO THE ADDITION OF A UNION, AND REMAIN WITHIN THE DESIGN ALLOWABLES. THEREFORE, THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT PREVIOUSLY EVALUATED IN THE FSAR WERE NOT BE INCREASED DUE TO THESE CHANGES. PHS AND MIDDLE COOLING SHROUD ARE NON-SAFETY-RELATED PASSIVE COMPONENTS THAT ARE SUPPORTED AND CONNECTED TO THE REACTOR INTEGRATED HEAD PACKAGE TO SEISMIC CATEGORY 1 REQUIREMENTS. THE RVLIS TUBING, WITH NEW UNION, AND ASSOCIATED SUPPORTS SATISFIES THE DESIGN REQUIREMENTS FOR SEISMIC CATEGORY 1 STRUCTURES AND COMPONENTS. IN ADDITION, THE WEIGHT OF THE INTEGRATED HEAD PACKAGE, INCLUDING THE ADDITIONAL WEIGHT OF PHS, DOES NOT EXCEED THE CONTAINMENT POLAR CRANE CAPACITY OF 225 TONS DURING NORMAL PLANT OPERATIONS. SEISMIC AND STRESS ANALYSES OF THE REACTOR VESSEL, ITS COMPONENTS, AND RVLIS TUBING WERE PERFORMED FOR THE CHANGES IDENTIFIED IN THIS DCP. THE PHS PANELS ARE COATED WITH CARBOLINE CARBOZINC 11 SG ZINC PRIMER OF 2.5-5.0 MIL DRY FILM THICKNESS. THESE PHS PANELS REPLACED THE PREVIOUS 3/16 INCH THICK PANELS FOR THE LOWER SHROUD COOLING ASSEMBLY THAT WAS PREVIOUSLY COATED WITH MOBIL 13-G-10 UNIPAK ZINC PRIMER OF 4-6 MIL THICKNESS. THEREFORE, THIS PORTION OF THE DESIGN CHANGE REPRESENTED A REPLACEMENT ONLY. THE TOTAL SURFACE AREA OF THE ZINC COATING INSIDE THE UNIT 2 CONTAINMENT REMAINS THE SAME. THUS, A REVISION TO THE HYDROGEN GENERATION ANALYSIS IS NOT REQUIRED. THE PHS IS COATED WITH Q CLASS QUALIFIED COATING. THEREFORE, THE POSSIBILITY OF THE CONTAINMENT SUMP SCREEN BLOCKAGE DURING LOSS OF COOLING ACCIDENT (LOCA) IS NOT INCREASED. BASED UPON THE ABOVE DISCUSSION AND A REVIEW OF TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 3/4.3.3.6, 3/4.4.10, AND 6.7.4.E, AND THEIR BASES, THE ACTIVITY DID NOT REDUCE THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN THE BASES OF ANY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS.

SUBJECT: DCP: 93-V2N0045, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: GEORGIA POWER COMPANY HAS UNDERTAKEN A PROGRAM TO UPRATE VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT (VEGP), UNITS 1 AND 2 TO A MAXIMUM NSSS POWER LEVEL OF 3579 MWT WHICH RESULTED IN AN ADDITIONAL OUTPUT OF APPROXIMATELY 50 MWE FOR EACH UNIT. IN ADDITION TO THE POWER UPRATE, A REDUCTION IN THE DESIGN REACTOR VESSEL OUTLET TEMPERATURE (T-HOT) WITH UP TO 10% STEAM GENERATOR TUBE PLUGGING WAS IMPLEMENTED. THIS DESIGN CHANGE PACKAGE IMPLEMENTED THE T-HOT REDUCTION WHICH CORRESPONDS TO A REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM AVERAGE TEMPERATURE (T-AVG) RANGE OF 588.4 °F TO 570.7 °F (T-HOT REDUCTION OF 16.8 °F). GEORGIA POWER COMPANY HAS ESTABLISHED A TARGET T-AVG TEMPERATURE OF 583.4 °F TO ACHIEVE THE DESIRED PLANT ELECTRICAL POWER OUTPUT FOR PLANT OPERATION.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THIS DESIGN CHANGE DID NOT CAUSE SYSTEMS TO BE OPERATED OUTSIDE OF THEIR DESIGN LIMITS. THERE WERE NO PHYSICAL PLANT CHANGES NOR ANY REDUCTIONS IN SYSTEM OR COMPONENT REDUNDANCY. SYSTEMS ARE PROVIDING THEIR SAME FUNCTIONS. THE EXISTING DESIGN BASIS FOR FLOODING LEVELS INSIDE CONTAINMENT, WHICH CONSIDERS A POSTULATED MAIN STEAM LINE BREAK OR MAIN FEED WATER LINE BREAK AS THE MOST SEVERE FLUID RELEASE CONDITION, WAS NOT AFFECTED BY THE T-HOT REDUCTION SINCE THE FLUID RELEASE IS BASED ON A STEAM GENERATOR PRESSURE CORRESPONDING TO A ZERO LOAD CONDITION WHICH BOUNDS THE STEAM GENERATOR PRESSURE FOR THE RANGE OF T-HOT VALUES ASSOCIATED WITH T-HOT REDUCTION. STEAM GENERATOR INVENTORY WAS NOT AFFECTED BY THE T-HOT REDUCTION. NO ADVERSE EFFECT ON SYSTEMS OR EQUIPMENT HAS BEEN CREATED AS A RESULT OF THIS MODIFICATION. COMPONENT AND SYSTEM INTEGRITY IS MAINTAINED AND PERFORMANCE IS NOT ADVERSELY AFFECTED. THE T-HOT REDUCTION DOES NOT EXPOSE EQUIPMENT USED IN ACCIDENT MITIGATION TO AN ADVERSE ENVIRONMENT FOR WHICH IT HAD NOT BEEN PREVIOUSLY QUALIFIED SINCE THE EQUIPMENT QUALIFICATION ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS (E.G., PRESSURE (REFERENCE 5), TEMPERATURE, DOSE) INSIDE AND OUTSIDE THE CONTAINMENT BUILDING ARE BOUNDED BY THE EXISTING EQUIPMENT QUALIFICATION ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS. SYSTEMS WITH DOSE CONTROL FUNCTIONS CONTINUE TO FUNCTION AS INTENDED AND WERE NOT ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY THIS MODIFICATION. EQUIPMENT PERFORMANCE AND INTEGRITY WERE NOT ALTERED BY THE DCP. THE DCP HAD NO ADVERSE EFFECT ON THE CAPABILITY OF SYSTEMS TO PERFORM THEIR SAFETY FUNCTION. NO NEW LIMITING SINGLE FAILURES HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED NOR HAVE ANY NEW FAILURE MODES BEEN DEFINED FOR ANY SYSTEM OR COMPONENT AS A RESULT OF THIS MODIFICATION. OPERATION WITHIN THE ORIGINAL DESIGN AND CRITERIA LIMITS FOR ALL SYSTEMS AND COMPONENTS PROVIDES FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY AND FUNCTIONAL CAPABILITIES UNDER THE REDUCED TEMPERATURE CONDITIONS. NO NEW ACCIDENT SCENARIOS, OR FAILURE MECHANISMS WERE INTRODUCED AS A RESULT OF THE T-HOT REDUCTION. CHANGES TO COMPONENTS, OR ADDITIONS OF NEW COMPONENTS WERE NOT REQUIRED FOR THE DCP. THIS DESIGN CHANGE DID NOT ADD OR DELETE INTERFACES WITH ANY SYSTEMS OR COMPONENTS NOR WERE ANY NEW OR DIFFERENT RADIOACTIVE RELEASE EVENTS CREATED. ANALYSES HAVE BEEN PERFORMED (REFERENCE 1) WHICH DEMONSTRATES THAT THE T-HOT REDUCTION DID NOT ADVERSELY AFFECT THE FUNCTION OF SYSTEMS AND COMPONENTS IMPORTANT TO SAFETY. THE TEMPERATURE REDUCTION DID NOT CREATE FAILURE MODES THAT COULD ADVERSELY AFFECT SAFETY-RELATED EQUIPMENT. NO NEW COMPONENTS WERE ADDED, NO EXISTING COMPONENTS WERE CHANGED, NOR WERE ANY INTERFACES ADDED OR DELETED FOR THE DCP. THERE WERE

NO PHYSICAL PLANT CHANGES WHICH CREATE THE POSSIBILITY OF A NEW TYPE OF MALFUNCTION. THE DCP HAD NO ADVERSE EFFECT ON THE AVAILABILITY, OPERABILITY, OR PERFORMANCE OF PLANT EQUIPMENT (REFERENCE 1). THE PLANT RESPONSE TO ANTICIPATED TRANSIENTS HAS BEEN SHOWN TO REMAIN WITHIN ANALYZED CONDITIONS FOR TRANSIENT RESPONSE AND EQUIPMENT DESIGN.

SUBJECT: DCP: 93-V2N0049, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THIS DESIGN CHANGE PACKAGE IMPLEMENTED THE POWER UP RATE FOR VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT, UNIT 1 FROM A NUCLEAR STEAM SUPPLY SYSTEM (NSSS) POWER LEVEL OF 3425 MWT TO A MAXIMUM NSSS POWER LEVEL OF 3579 MWT.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT CAUSE SYSTEMS TO BE OPERATED OUTSIDE OF THEIR DESIGN LIMITS. THERE ARE NO PHYSICAL PLANT CHANGES NOR ANY REDUCTIONS IN SYSTEM OR COMPONENT REDUNDANCY. ADDITIONALLY, SYSTEMS ARE PROVIDING THEIR SAME FUNCTIONS. FURTHERMORE, THOSE SYSTEMS AND COMPONENTS FOR WHICH POWER UP RATE HAS AN EFFECT HAVE BEEN EVALUATED (REFERENCE 1) AND IT HAS BEEN DETERMINED THAT THESE EVALUATIONS ARE BOUNDED BY THE NEW AND EXISTING DESIGN CRITERIA. ACCEPTABILITY OF THE NEW DESIGN CRITERIA HAS BEEN EVALUATED IT WAS DETERMINED THAT FOR THE BECHTEL SCOPE OF THE ACTIVITY, NSCW IS THE ONLY SYSTEM WHICH COULD HAVE THE POTENTIAL OF AFFECTING ANY FISSION PRODUCT BARRIERS. THE NSCW SYSTEM PROVIDES COOLING TO PLANT COMPONENTS DURING NORMAL PLANT OPERATION AND FOR ACCIDENT CONDITIONS, AND TRANSFERS THE HEAT REMOVED FROM THESE SYSTEMS TO THE ULTIMATE HEAT SINK. CALCULATIONS WERE PERFORMED (REFERENCES 8 AND 9) TO CONFIRM THAT THE MAXIMUM NSCW TOWER BASIN WATER TEMPERATURE REMAINS BELOW THE DESIGN BASIS BASIN WATER TEMPERATURE, AND THE NSCW TOWER BASIN INVENTORY AVAILABILITY MEETS THE REQUIREMENTS OF REGULATORY GUIDE 1.27 FOR THE INCREASED POWER LEVEL. NO ADVERSE EFFECT ON SYSTEMS HAS BEEN CREATED AS A RESULT OF THIS MODIFICATION. COMPONENT AND SYSTEM INTEGRITY IS MAINTAINED AND PERFORMANCE WAS NOT ADVERSELY AFFECTED. SYSTEMS WITH DOSE CONTROL FUNCTIONS POST-ACCIDENT CONTINUES TO FUNCTION AS INTENDED AND WAS NOT ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY THIS MODIFICATION. ADDITIONALLY, EQUIPMENT PERFORMANCE AND INTEGRITY ARE NOT ALTERED BY THE ACTIVITY. THE DESIGN BASES FOR THE LIQUID, SOLID, AND GASEOUS WASTE SYSTEMS AND THE PROCESS AND EFFLUENT RADIOLOGICAL MONITORING AND SAMPLING SYSTEMS ARE BASED ON SOURCE TERMS AND WASTE VOLUMES ASSOCIATED WITH A REACTOR CORE THERMAL POWER LEVEL OF 3565 MWT, WHICH IS THE UP RATED POWER LEVEL. ADDITIONALLY, NO CHANGES ARE MADE TO THE NSCW SYSTEM DESIGN WHICH DETECTS AND PREVENTS LEAKAGE TO THE ENVIRONMENT OF RADIOACTIVE CONTAMINATION THAT MAY ENTER THE NSCW SYSTEM FROM THE CCW SYSTEM, ACCW SYSTEM, OR THE CONTAINMENT COOLERS. NO NEW ACCIDENT SCENARIOS, FAILURE MECHANISMS, OR LIMITING SINGLE FAILURES ARE INTRODUCED AS A RESULT OF THE POWER UP RATE. CHANGES TO COMPONENTS, OR ADDITIONS OF NEW COMPONENTS ARE NOT REQUIRED FOR THIS ACTIVITY. ADDITIONALLY, THIS DESIGN CHANGE DOES NOT ADD OR DELETE INTERFACES WITH ANY SYSTEMS OR COMPONENTS NOR ARE ANY NEW OR DIFFERENT RADIOACTIVE RELEASE EVENTS CREATED. IN ADDITION, CONSIDERATION WAS GIVEN, AFTER RERATE, TO THE SPENT FUEL POOL (SFP) COOLING SYSTEM DUE TO THE POTENTIAL INCREASE IN HEAT LOAD. THE SFP COOLING SYSTEM WAS EVALUATED (REFERENCES 4 AND 5) TO DETERMINE THE SYSTEM CAPABILITY TO MAINTAIN DESIGN FUEL POOL TEMPERATURE WITH ONE TRAIN IN OPERATION. THE SFP COOLING SYSTEMS

FOR UNITS 1 AND 2 ARE THE SAME DESIGN, HOWEVER, HIGH DENSITY FUEL STORAGE RACKS HAVE BEEN INSTALLED IN THE UNIT 2 SFP. THE UNIT 2 SFP IS DESIGNED TO CONTAIN 2098 FUEL ASSEMBLIES, WHICH IS GREATER THAN THE ORIGINAL UNIT 1 DESIGN STORAGE CAPACITY OF 936 FUEL ASSEMBLIES. SINCE THE STORAGE CAPACITY FOR FUEL ASSEMBLIES IS GREATER FOR THE UNIT 2 SFP, THE HEAT REMOVAL REQUIREMENTS ARE ALSO GREATER THAN THOSE FOR THE UNIT 1 SFP. THEREFORE, THE UNIT 2 SFP COOLING SYSTEM ANALYSIS BOUNDS THE UNIT 1 DESIGN. FOR NORMAL REFUELING, THE UNIT 2 SFP TEMPERATURE REMAINS BELOW 140°F. IN ADDITION, FOR MAXIMUM NORMAL REFUELING AND MAXIMUM EMERGENCY CORE UNLOADING, THE POOL TEMPERATURE REMAINS BELOW BOILING AND THE MAXIMUM DESIGN TEMPERATURE FOR THE SFP. (FOR THE DEFINITIONS OF THESE REFUELING CONDITIONS, SEE FSAR SECTION 9.1.3.1.) THEREFORE, REFERENCES 4 AND 5 ARE IN ACCORDANCE WITH SRP 9.1.3. ANALYSES HAVE BEEN PERFORMED (REFERENCE 1) WHICH DEMONSTRATE THAT THE ACTIVITY WILL NOT ADVERSELY AFFECT THE FUNCTION OF ANY EQUIPMENT IMPORTANT TO SAFETY. NO NEW COMPONENTS ARE ADDED, NO EXISTING COMPONENTS ARE CHANGED, NOR ARE ANY INTERFACES ADDED OR DELETED FOR THE ACTIVITY. FURTHER, THERE ARE NO PHYSICAL PLANT CHANGES WHICH INCREASE THE LIKELIHOOD OF A MALFUNCTION. WESTINGHOUSE EVALUATIONS (WCAP-13001) HAVE DETERMINED THAT THE BOUNDING ACCIDENT FOR THE MAXIMUM PEAK CONTAINMENT PRESSURE IS THE LARGE BREAK LOCA INSTEAD OF THE STEAM LINE BREAK. THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS IS NOT REDUCED SINCE THE CALCULATED CONTAINMENT PEAK PRESSURE (REFERENCE 1) DOES NOT EXCEED THE EXISTING DESIGN PRESSURE OF 52 PSIG FOR THE LOCA.

SUBJECT: DCP: 93-VAN0056, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THIS CHANGE ADDED TWO FUSES IN THE CIRCUIT SUPPLYING 120V POWER TO THE TEMPERATURE CONTROLLER (1/2TI-40160 AND 1/2TI-40161) LOCATED IN THE HYDROGEN RECOMBINER CONTROL PANEL (1/2-1513-P5-ERA AND 1/2-1513-P5-ERB). THE TEMPERATURE CONTROLLER, THERMOCOUPLE SELECTOR SWITCH (1/2TS-40160 AND 1/2TS-40161), THERMOCOUPLES (1/2TE-40160A, 1/2TE-40160B, 1/2TE-40160C, 1/2TE-40161A, 1/2TE-40161B, AND 1/2TE-40161C) AND ASSOCIATED CABLES (1/2ACPERAXC, XD, XE, XF, XG, XH, AND 1/2BCPERBXC, XD, XE, XF, XG, XH) WERE RECLASSIFIED AS NON-1E (61J FOR INSTRUMENTS AND 62E FOR CABLE). THE FUSES, ASSOCIATED FUSE BLOCK, AND WIRING FROM THE EXISTING POWER SUPPLY TO THE FUSE ARE CLASS 1E. THE WIRING FROM THE FUSE TO THE TEMPERATURE CONTROLLER IS NON-1E. THE NON-1E WIRING HAS BEEN ANALYZED TO SHOW THAT INSUFFICIENT ENERGY EXISTS TO DAMAGE ANY CLASS 1E WIRING. THE THERMOCOUPLES AND THE CABLES TO THE THERMOCOUPLES WERE INSTALLED AND ARE MAINTAINED THE SAME AS SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT. THE HYDROGEN RECOMBINER CONTROL PANEL IS LOCATED ON LEVEL B OF THE CONTROL BUILDING. THE CONFIGURATION AND ELECTRICAL PROTECTION OF THE CONTAINMENT PENETRATION IS NOT AFFECTED BY THIS CHANGE.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THIS CHANGE DID NOT INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE OF AN ACCIDENT. THE TEMPERATURE CONTROLLER (READOUT) IS USED TO DETERMINE THE HYDROGEN RECOMBINER HEATER SHEATH TEMPERATURE DURING PERIODIC CHECKOUT OR TESTING OF THE RECOMBINER. IT PERFORMS NO CONTROL FUNCTION AND IS NOT REQUIRED FOR PROPER OPERATION OF THE RECOMBINER. A CLASS 1E QUALIFIED WATT METER IS PROVIDED AT THE RECOMBINER CONTROL PANEL TO DETERMINE PROPER HEATER OUTPUT. A CLASS 1E FUSE PROVIDES ELECTRICAL SEPARATION OF THE RECOMBINER HEATER/CONTROLS AND THE NON-SAFETY RELATED TEMPERATURE READOUT. FOLLOWING AN ACCIDENT, THE TEMPERATURE CONTROLLER SERVES ONLY AN INDICATION FUNCTION. RECLASSIFYING THE TEMPERATURE

CONTROLLER HAS NO EFFECT ON THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT. FAILURE OF THE CONTROLLER HAS NO EFFECT ON ANY SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT. THESE FUSES AND ASSOCIATED CIRCUITRY HAVE BEEN ANALYZED TO ASSURE THAT NO CREDIBLE FAILURE OF THE RECLASSIFIED NON-1E EQUIPMENT DEGRADES THE OPERATION OF ANY CLASS 1E EQUIPMENT. THIS CHANGE DID NOT HAVE ANY EFFECT ON THE MARGIN OF SAFETY AS DEFINED IN ANY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION. TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3/4.6.4.2 ADDRESSES THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE HYDROGEN RECOMBINERS. THESE REQUIREMENTS ARE NOT AFFECTED BY THIS CHANGE.

SUBJECT: MDD 89-V1M046,REVISION 0,SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: SOI. (STATIC O-RING) SWITCH MODEL NUMBER 102AS-AA702-RRX IS NO LONGER AVAILABLE THROUGH THE VENDOR. MODEL NUMBER 103WI-AA502-N4-C1A-RRX HAS BEEN DETERMINED TO BE A DIRECT REPLACEMENT FOR THE OBSOLETE PART. NEW SWITCH WAS INSTALLED ON THE REACTOR MAKEUP WATER PUMP FLOW SWITCH. THE NEW SWITCH DIFFERS ONLY IN MOUNTING DETAILS.

SAFETY EVALUATION: FSAR SECTION 9.2.7 DESCRIBES THE REACTOR MAKEUP WATER FACILITY. THE DISCUSSION DOES NOT SPECIFY THE REQUIRED MODEL NUMBER ASSOCIATED WITH THE RMW PUMP FLOW SWITCH. THE OPERATION OF THE REPLACEMENT SWITCH IS IDENTICAL TO THE PREVIOUSLY INSTALLED SWITCH. THE REACTOR WATER MAKEUP SYSTEM IS NOT ADDRESSED IN THE PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS NOR DOES IT IMPACT ANY OTHER SYSTEM'S FUNCTION AS REQUIRED BY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS.

SUBJECT: MDD 89-V2M047,REVISION 0,SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: AN EXISTING CLEANOUT BRANCH ON DRAIN LINE 2-1225-031-8" WAS NOT FUNCTIONAL DUE TO AN EQUIPMENT INTERFERENCE. TO RESOLVE THIS INTERFERENCE, THE CLEANOUT BRANCH WAS ROTATED 45 DEGREES FROM THE ORIGINAL DESIGN ORIENTATION TO PERMIT FUTURE USE OF THE DRAIN LINE CLEANOUT.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE EQUIPMENT AND FLOOR DRAINAGE SYSTEMS ARE DESCRIBED IN FSAR SECTION 9.3.3. THE ADDITION OF A LINE CLEANOUT DOES NOT REPRESENT A CHANGE TO THE DESCRIPTION AS PROVIDED FOR IN THE FSAR. SYSTEM FUNCTION IS NOT ALTERED BY THIS CHANGE. PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3/4.11 ADDRESSES RADWASTE. THE REORIENTATION OF A CLEANOUT DOES NOT IMPACT ANY REQUIREMENT CONTAINED WITHIN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS.

SUBJECT: MDD 89-V1M056,REVISION 0,SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THE CHANGE INVOLVED THE DELETION OF A PIPING SUPPORT AND THE MODIFICATION OF A PIECE OF DAMAGED SUPPORT STEEL ASSOCIATED WITH THE FEEDWATER SYSTEM. THE DELETED SUPPORT WAS DETERMINED NOT TO BE REQUIRED AS DEAD LOADS WERE TRANSMITTED TO ADJACENT SUPPORTS WITH NO ADVERSE AFFECTS. THE DAMAGED SUPPORT WAS REPLACED WITH A LARGER MEMBER TO PROVIDE COMPLETE LOAD BEARING SURFACE FOR THE PIPE LUG.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE DELETION OF THE SUPPORT AND MODIFICATION OF ANOTHER SUPPORT DID NOT IMPACT SYSTEM DESIGN FUNCTION OR DESIGN FUNCTION CAPABILITY. A REVIEW OF FSAR SECTION 10.4.7 ADDRESSING THE FEEDWATER AND CONDENSATE SYSTEMS DID NOT REVEAL ANY MENTION OF REQUIRED SUPPORTS. THE MODIFICATIONS DID NOT DEVIATE FROM THE ESTABLISHED CODES AND STANDARDS COMMITTED TO IN THE FSAR. THE SUPPORTS WERE NOT REQUIRED BY THE PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS TO SUPPORT SYSTEM OPERABILITY.

SUBJECT: MDD 89-V1M058,REVISION 0,SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THE FLOW ELEMENTS ORIGINALLY INSTALLED FOR INDICATION OF DIESEL GENERATOR FUEL OIL TRANSFER PUMP FLOW DID NOT PRODUCE THE CORRECT FLOW INDICATION ON 1FI-19104 AND 1FI-19105. THE NEW FLOW ELEMENTS WILL PRODUCE THE PROPER FLOW INDICATION DURING PUMP TESTING IN WHICH GPM MEASUREMENTS MUST BE TAKEN.

SAFETY EVALUATION: FSAR SECTION 8.3.1 DESCRIBES ON SITE POWER DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS INCLUDING THE DIESEL GENERATORS. THE DISCUSSION DOES NOT INCLUDE A DESCRIPTION OF THE FLOW ELEMENTS/ORIFICES TO BE USED IN THE FUEL OIL TRANSFER SYSTEM. THE CHANGE DOES NOT IMPACT DIESEL GENERATOR DESIGN OR FUNCTION. THE FUEL OIL TRANSFER SYSTEM FLOW DEVICES ARE NOT A PART OF THE STATION TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION.

SUBJECT: MDD 89-V2M076,REVISION 0,SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: ADDITION OF A 1/2" N.P.T. CONNECTION FOR USING NITROGEN GAS AS A BACKUP TO THE COMPRESSED AIR SYSTEM FOR THE UNIT 2 LOW VOLTAGE SWITCHYARD FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM (2301) IN THE EVENT THAT AIR COMPRESSOR 2-2301-C4-502 IS OUT OF SERVICE OR THE DRYER DESICCANT IS BEING REPLACED.

SAFETY EVALUATION: FSAR SECTION 9.5.1 DISCUSSES THE FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAM. THE ADDITION OF THIS BACKUP CONNECTION ENHANCES FIRE PROTECTION AVAILABILITY IN THE LOW VOLTAGE SWITCHYARD. THIS ADDITION DOES NOT IMPACT ANY DISCUSSION CONTAINED IN THE FSAR. THE CHANGE WILL NOT AFFECT SYSTEM OPERATION NOR WILL IT AFFECT THE WAY IN WHICH THE SYSTEM IS OPERATED. THE FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEMS ARE NOT ADDRESSED IN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS.

SUBJECT: MDD 89-V2M122,REVISION 0,SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THE CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK DEGASIFIER PUMP OUTLET PRESSURE INDICATORS (2PI-5058, 5062 AND 5064) WERE CHANGED FROM A 0-60 PSIG GAUGE TO A 0-100 PSIG. THE NORMAL OPERATING DISCHARGE PRESSURE OF THE CST DEGASIFIER PUMPS IS APPROXIMATELY 65 PSIG.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE CST DEGASIFIER PUMPS ARE DISCUSSED IN FSAR SECTION 9.2.6. REPLACEMENT OF THE DISCHARGE PRESSURE INDICATORS WILL NOT AFFECT SYSTEM OPERATION AS DISCUSSED IN THIS SECTION OR ANY ACCIDENT ANALYSIS CONTAINED WITHIN CHAPTER 15. THE CHANGE WILL NOT AFFECT CST EMERGENCY RESERVE LEVELS INTENDED FOR SAFETY USE. TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS (TABLE 3.4-2) REQUIRES DISSOLVED OXYGEN CONCENTRATION TO BE LESS THAN 100 PPB. THE DESCRIBED CHANGE WILL NOT AFFECT THE ABILITY OF THE SYSTEM TO MAINTAIN THIS LIMIT.

SUBJECT: MDD 90-V1M131,REVISION 0,SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: HARDWARE CHANGES WERE IMPLEMENTED ON THE PROTEUS COMPUTER TO SUPPORT THE PROTEUS COMPUTER SYSTEM RE-DESIGN. THE CHANGES INVOLVED THE ADDITION OF MEMORY CARDS, DEVICE CONTROLLER CARDS, CABLES AND A MODEM. THE CHANGES PROVIDE THE ABILITY FOR SYSTEM EXPANSION AND PC CONNECTIONS TO THE SYSTEM ALLOWING FOR DATA REVIEW, MANIPULATION, AND PROGRAMMING FUNCTIONS TO BE PERFORMED FROM A PC. PROM CHIPS WERE ALSO ADDED TO THE SYSTEM BOOTSTRAP CONTROLLER (SBC) TO SUPPORT NEW STOP LOG SOFTWARE FOR AUTOMATIC SBC OPERATION.

SAFETY EVALUATION: FSAR SECTIONS 7.5 AND 7.7 ADDRESS THE HARDWARE ASPECTS OF THE PLANT COMPUTER SYSTEM. THE HARDWARE CHANGES WERE COMPATIBLE WITH SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS AND DO NOT DEGRADE THE ABILITY OF THE COMPUTER TO PERFORM THESE FUNCTIONS. TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION FUNCTIONS PERFORMED BY THE COMPUTER SYSTEM ARE DESCRIBED IN SECTIONS 3/4.1.3, 3/4.2.1, 3/4.3.3.2 AND TABLE 4.3-1. THE CHANGES DID NOT DEGRADE THE ABILITY OF THE COMPUTER SYSTEM TO CONTINUE TO PERFORM THESE FUNCTIONS.

SUBJECT: MDD 90-V2M132,REVISION 0,SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: HARDWARE CHANGES WERE IMPLEMENTED ON THE PROTEUS COMPUTER TO SUPPORT THE PROTEUS COMPUTER SYSTEM RE-DESIGN. THE CHANGES INVOLVED THE ADDITION OF MEMORY CARDS, DEVICE CONTROLLER CARDS, CABLES AND A MODEM. THE CHANGES PROVIDE THE ABILITY FOR SYSTEM EXPANSION AND PC CONNECTIONS TO THE SYSTEM ALLOWING FOR DATA REVIEW, MANIPULATION, AND PROGRAMMING FUNCTIONS TO BE PERFORMED FROM A PC. PROM CHIPS WERE ALSO ADDED TO THE SYSTEM BOOTSTRAP CONTROLLER (SBC) TO SUPPORT NEW STOP LOG SOFTWARE FOR AUTOMATIC SBC OPERATION.

SAFETY EVALUATION: FSAR SECTIONS 7.5 AND 7.7 ADDRESS THE HARDWARE ASPECTS OF THE PLANT COMPUTER SYSTEM. THE HARDWARE CHANGES WERE COMPATIBLE WITH SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS AND DO NOT DEGRADE THE ABILITY OF THE COMPUTER TO PERFORM THESE FUNCTIONS. TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION FUNCTIONS PERFORMED BY THE COMPUTER SYSTEM ARE DESCRIBED IN SECTIONS 3/4.1.3, 3/4.2.1, 3/4.3.3.2 AND TABLE 4.3-1. THE CHANGES DID NOT DEGRADE THE ABILITY OF THE COMPUTER SYSTEM TO CONTINUE TO PERFORM THESE FUNCTIONS.

SUBJECT: MDD 91-V1M001,REVISION 0,SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: PRESSURE CONTROL VALVE IPV-41217,"STEAM GENERATOR BLOWDOWN TO CONDENSER" POSITIONER INPUT SIGNAL WAS CHANGED FROM 6-18 PSIG TO 6-30 PSIG BY REPLACEMENT OF THE RANGE SPRING. THE CHANGE WAS NECESSARY TO PREVENT IMPROPER VALVE OPERATION AND OSCILLATION.

SAFETY EVALUATION: FSAR SECTION 10.4.8 DISCUSSES THE STEAM GENERATOR BLOWDOWN SYSTEM OPERATION AND FLOW PATHS. THE PRESSURE CONTROL VALVE IS DISCUSSED AS TO ITS FUNCTION HOWEVER NOT TO THE DETAIL OF SPRING PACK SIZING.

VALVE OPERATION/FUNCTION IS NOT AFFECTED BY THIS CHANGE. A REVIEW OF TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 3/4.6 AND 3/4.7 ADDRESSING CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS AND PLANT SYSTEMS INDICATED THAT THE NATURE OF THIS CHANGE DOES NOT IMPACT ANY SPECIFICATION.

SUBJECT: MDD 91-V2M002,REVISION 0,SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: PRESSURE CONTROL VALVE 2PV-41217,"STEAM GENERATOR BLOWDOWN TO CONDENSER" POSITIONER INPUT SIGNAL WAS CHANGED FROM 6-18 PSIG TO 6-30 PSIG BY REPLACEMENT OF THE RANGE SPRING. THE CHANGE WAS NECESSARY TO PREVENT IMPROPER VALVE OPERATION AND OSCILLATION.

SAFETY EVALUATION: FSAR SECTION 10.4.8 DISCUSSES THE STEAM GENERATOR BLOWDOWN SYSTEM OPERATION AND FLOW PATHS. THE PRESSURE CONTROL VALVE IS DISCUSSED AS TO ITS FUNCTION HOWEVER NOT TO THE DETAIL OF SPRING PACK SIZING. VALVE OPERATION/FUNCTION IS NOT AFFECTED BY THIS CHANGE. A REVIEW OF TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 3/4.6 AND 3/4.7 ADDRESSING CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS AND PLANT SYSTEMS INDICATED THAT THE NATURE OF THIS CHANGE DOES NOT IMPACT ANY SPECIFICATION.

SUBJECT: MDD 91-V1M003,REVISION 0,SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: A MOUNTING BRACKET WAS ADDED TO HEATER DRAIN PUMP 1A TO PROVIDE SUPPORT FOR TWO VIBRATION PROXIMITY PROBES THAT WILL BE USED TO PROVIDE DETAILED SHAFT VIBRATION DATA. THE MOUNTING BRACKET IS ATTACHED TO THE EXISTING GLAND MOUNTING STUDS THE PROXIMITY PROBES WILL BE CONNECTED TO PORTABLE RECORDERS TO OBTAIN VIBRATION DATA. ALSO INCLUDED IN THIS ACTIVITY WAS THE ADDITION OF TUBING SUPPORTS ON THE SUCTION HEAD BEARING LUBE LINE INTERNAL TO THE PUMP.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE ADDITION OF VIBRATION PROBE MOUNTING BRACKETS AND TUBING WILL HAVE NO ADVERSE AFFECT ON THE STRUCTURAL DESIGN OF THE PUMP OR ITS OPERATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS. THE HEATER DRAIN PUMP IS DISCUSSED IN FSAR SECTION 10.4.7. THESE ADDITIONS DO NOT IMPACT ANY DESCRIPTION PRESENTED IN THIS SECTION. THE HEATER DRAIN PUMP IS NOT THE SUBJECT OF ANY PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION.

SUBJECT: MDD 91-V1M015,REVISION 0,SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THE ACTUATOR SPRING ON THE COOLING TOWER LEVEL CONTROL VALVES (1LV-27268B, 27268C AND 27268D) AND THE BLOWDOWN SUMP DILUTION VALVES (AHV-17672B, 17673B AND 17677B) WERE REPLACED WITH A LARGER SPRING TO HELP OVERCOME VALVE BINDING. IN ADDITION, THE AIR SET PRESSURE WAS INCREASED TO 33 PSIG FROM 18 PSIG.

SAFETY EVALUATION: FSAR SECTION 10.4.5 DESCRIBES THE FUNCTION AND OPERATION OF THE CIRCULATING WATER SYSTEM. MAKEUP AND BLOWDOWN IS GENERALLY DISCUSSED IN THIS SECTION HOWEVER NOT TO THE EXTENT THAT WOULD SPECIFY SPRING SIZES. THE SPRING REPLACEMENT DOES NOT ALTER THE DESIGN FUNCTION OF THESE VALVES NOR DOES IT AFFECT THE MANNER IN WHICH THE VALVES

ARE MANIPULATED. THE CIRCULATING WATER SYSTEM IS NOT THE SUBJECT OF ANY STATION TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION..

SUBJECT: MDD 91-V2M017,REVISION 0,SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THE RUNNING SPEED OF THE AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP WAS INCREASED FROM 4200 RPMS TO 4230 RPMS. THIS SPEED CORRESPONDS TO A CONTROL ROOM DEMAND SIGNAL OF 100%. SETPOINTS ASSOCIATED WITH THE OVERSPEED TRIP CIRCUITS WERE NOT CHANGED. THIS CHANGE WAS NECESSARY TO ENSURE THAT THE MONTHLY SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS FOR PUMP DISCHARGE PRESSURE (1675 PSIG) AND FLOW (145 GPM) ARE MET. THESE PARAMETERS WERE MARGINAL AT THE PREVIOUS RATED SPEED.

SAFETY EVALUATION: INCREASING THE RATED RUNNING SPEED RAISE THE PUMP DISCHARGE PRESSURE FROM 1675 PSIG TO 1715 PSIG. THIS VALUE IS WELL BELOW THE PUMP PRESSURE DESIGN OF 2000 PSIG AND LINE DESIGN OF 1975. FLOW AT THE HIGHER PRESSURE DOES NOT INCREASE SIGNIFICANTLY FROM THAT SEEN AT 4200 RPMS. THE AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM IS DESCRIBED ON FSAR SECTION 10.4.9. FIGURE 10.4.9-1 LISTS A TURBINE RPM VALUE OF 4200 RPM. THIS VALUE IS IN REFERENCE TO THE SPEED REQUIRED TO MEET THE DESIGN FLOW AND HEAD AND DOES NOT REQUIRE REVISION. PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 4.7.1.2.1.A.2 SETS FORTH THE REQUIREMENTS PLACED UPON THE AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP. THIS REQUIREMENT IS NOT AFFECTED BY THIS CHANGE.

SUBJECT: MDD 91-VCM019,REVISION 0,SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: AT THE REQUEST OF MAINTENANCE, A GATE WITH PANELS WAS PLACED BETWEEN ROOMS R140 AND R141 AND THE "HOT" MACHINE SHOP ON LEVEL 1 OF THE AUXILIARY BUILDING. IN ADDITION, A SECOND GATE WAS INSTALLED JUST INSIDE DOOR 151 IN THE HOT MACHINE SHOP AND A DOUBLE CAGE DOOR PLACED BETWEEN THE PASSAGE WAY AND ROOM RA150 (AUX BUILDING LEVEL A) TO CONTROL THE USE OF CONTAMINATED TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE ADDITION OF THE GATES AND FENCING TO PROVIDE FOR BETTER ACCESS CONTROL IN THE HOT MACHINE SHOP. THE CHANGES ARE CONSISTENT WITH THE HEALTH PHYSICS PROGRAM ADDRESSED IN FSAR SECTION 12.5.2 & 3 "HEALTH PHYSICS PROGRAM. THE CHANGES DO NOT AFFECT ANY DESCRIPTION CONTAINED IN FSAR SECTION 3.0 "DESIGN OF STRUCTURES, COMPONENTS, EQUIPMENT AND SYSTEMS". THE HOT MACHINE SHOP IS NOT ADDRESSED IN THE PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS.

SUBJECT: MDD 91-V2M024,REVISION 0,SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: A 0.25 MICRO-FARAD,600 VOLT CAPACITOR AND A 150 OHM, ONE WATT RESISTOR WAS ADDED TO THE ELECTRONIC CIRCUITRY FOR THE BORON CONCENTRATION METER PARALLEL WITH THE K5 COIL TO ACT AS A SURGE SUPPRESSER. THIS WAS NECESSARY TO REDUCE THE INDUCTIVE KICKBACK FROM THE 120 VAC HEATER RELAY DURING ENERGIZATION AND DE-ENERGIZATION ELIMINATING DAMAGE TO SENSITIVE CIRCUIT COMPONENTS.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE BORON CONCENTRATION MONITORING SYSTEM IS DISCUSSED IN FSAR SECTIONS 7.7.1.2 "BORON CONCENTRATION MEASUREMENT SYSTEM", TABLE 7.7.1.2 "BORON CONCENTRATION MEASUREMENT SYSTEM SPECIFICATIONS AND 9.3.4.1 "REACTOR MAKEUP UP CONTROL SYSTEM". THE ADDITION OF THE PARALLEL CIRCUIT DOES NOT AFFECT FUNCTION OR OPERATION OF THE SYSTEM THEREFORE THE FSAR SECTIONS ARE NOT IMPACTED. THE ELECTRONIC CIRCUITRY IS NOT ADDRESSED BY PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS COVERING THE CVCS SYSTEM.

SUBJECT: MDD 91-V2M033, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: 2UQ-14503 SUPPLIES POWER IN THE MISCELLANEOUS SYSTEMS EQUIPMENT PANEL USED FOR POWER TO VARIOUS ROSEMOUNT PRESSURE AND DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE TRANSMITTERS IN THE TURBINE BUILDING AND OUTSIDE AREAS. THE POWER SUPPLY WAS CHANGED FROM A 24 VDC SUPPLY TO A 36 VDC SUPPLY. THIS CHANGE PREVENTS EXCEEDING THE MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE LOOP RESISTANCE DURING CALIBRATION WHICH AFFECTS TRANSMITTER PERFORMANCE.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE SUBJECT TRANSMITTERS ARE CONTAINED WITHIN SYSTEMS GENERALLY DESCRIBED IN FSAR SECTIONS 9.5, 10.2 AND 10.4. THE FSAR DOES NOT PROVIDE SPECIFICS AS TO POWER SUPPLY VOLTAGE OR MODEL NUMBER. THE POWER SUPPLY OR TRANSMITTERS FED FROM THE NEW SUPPLY ARE NOT THE SUBJECT OF ANY PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION.

SUBJECT: MDD 91-V1M039, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: AS A RESULT OF SEVERAL PLANT TRIPS DUE TO THE DESIGN OF THE STEAM GENERATOR FEED PUMP SPEED CONTROLS AND OPERATOR INTERFACES, SEVERAL CHANGES WERE IMPLEMENTED TO THE CONTROL SYSTEM TO IMPROVE RELIABILITY AND OPERATOR INTERFACE. CHANGES INCLUDED DELETION OF THE "AUTO" TO "MANUAL" INTERLOCK AND BACKUP POWER SUPPLIES TO THE "SIGNAL MEMORY FUNCTION" AND THE FEED PUMP SPEED CONTROL CABINET AND ALARM RELAYS IN THE CONTROL CABINET.

SAFETY EVALUATION: DESIGN AND OPERATION OF THE STEAM GENERATOR FEED PUMP TURBINE CONTROLS ARE DISCUSSED IN FSAR SECTION 10.4.7. THE SIGNAL MEMORY FUNCTION, "AUTO" TO "MANUAL" TRANSFER AND CONTROL PANEL POWER SUPPLIES ARE NOT SPECIFICALLY ADDRESSED IN THIS SECTION. THE CHANGES ENHANCE SYSTEM RELIABILITY AND OPERATOR INTERFACE. BACKUP POWER SUPPLIES WILL NOT IMPACT CURRENT SYSTEM OPERATION. THE STEAM GENERATOR FEED PUMP TURBINES ARE NOT THE TOPIC OF ANY STATION TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION.

SUBJECT: MDD 91-V1M046, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THE TIME SYNCHRONIZE SIGNAL FROM THE ERF COMPUTER TO THE SOE HAS A NOISE ON IT CAUSING THE SOE TO RE-SYNCHRONIZE INCORRECTLY. THE NOISE CAN CAUSE THE SOE TO RE-SYNCHRONIZE EVERY 45 SECONDS. GROUNDING THE DRAIN CONDUCTOR ON THE CABLE THAT TRANSMITS THE SYNCHRONIZE SIGNAL FROM THE ERF WILL REDUCE THE NOISE AND ALLOW THE SOE TO SYNCHRONIZE CORRECTLY TO THE ERF COMPUTER. THE DRAIN WILL BE GROUNDED BY A SOE INTERNAL WIRE GOING TO AN ISOLATED GROUND BUS.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE GROUNDING OF THE DRAIN WIRES ON CONTROL CABLES OR INTERNAL WIRING OF THE ERF SOE IS NOT COVERED BY SECTION H3 OF THE VOGTLE EMERGENCY PLAN OR THE FSAR. THE ADDITION OF A GROUND WIRE WILL NOT CHANGE THE FUNCTION OF THE SYSTEM.

SUBJECT: MDD 91-V1M052,REVISION 0,SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THE 3/4" THREADED PLUG LOCATED ON THE TOP OF THE CONDENSATE FILTER DEMIN RESIN TRAPS WERE REMOVED AND REPLACED WITH A 600# GLOBE VALVE AND THREADED CAP VENTING ARRANGEMENT. THE ADDITION OF THE VALVES ALLOWS OPERATIONS PERSONNEL TO VENT THE RESIN TRAPS IN A MORE CONTROLLABLE AND SAFE MANNER WHEN PLACING THE TRAP IN SERVICE.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE ADDITION OF THE VENT VALVES REQUIRES A CHANGE TO FIGURE 10.4.6-1 TO ILLUSTRATE THE ADDED VALVES. THIS WILL BE ACCOMPLISHED UNDER LDCR FS 92-093. THE ADDITION OF THE VALVES DOES NOT IMPACT THE DISCUSSION IN FSAR SECTION 10.4.6 ADDRESSING THE CONDENSATE CLEANUP SYSTEM. THE SYSTEM WILL PERFORM THE FUNCTION TO WHICH IT WAS ORIGINALLY DESIGNED. THE CONDENSATE CLEANUP SYSTEM IS NOT THE SUBJECT OF ANY PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION.

SUBJECT: MDD 91-V2M053,REVISION 0,SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THE 3/4" THREADED PLUG LOCATED ON THE TOP OF THE CONDENSATE FILTER DEMIN RESIN TRAPS WERE REMOVED AND REPLACED WITH A 600# GLOBE VALVE AND THREADED CAP VENTING ARRANGEMENT. THE ADDITION OF THE VALVES ALLOWS OPERATIONS PERSONNEL TO VENT THE RESIN TRAPS IN A MORE CONTROLLABLE AND SAFE MANNER WHEN PLACING THE TRAP IN SERVICE.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE ADDITION OF THE VENT VALVES REQUIRES A CHANGE TO FIGURE 10.4.6-1 TO ILLUSTRATE THE ADDED VALVES. THIS WILL BE ACCOMPLISHED UNDER LDCR FS 92-093. THE ADDITION OF THE VALVES DOES NOT IMPACT THE DISCUSSION IN FSAR SECTION 10.4.6 ADDRESSING THE CONDENSATE CLEANUP SYSTEM. THE SYSTEM WILL PERFORM THE FUNCTION TO WHICH IT WAS ORIGINALLY DESIGNED. THE CONDENSATE CLEANUP SYSTEM IS NOT THE SUBJECT OF ANY PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION.

SUBJECT: MDD 91-VCM056,REVISION 0,SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: ROOM 119 IN THE CONTROL BUILDING WAS ORIGINALLY SPECIFIED AS THE PERSONNEL CONTAMINATION MONITORING ROOM. THE PURPOSE OF THE AREA WAS REDEFINED TO ESTABLISH AN AREA FOR CLEARANCE AND TAGGING. TO ACCOMMODATE THIS CHANGE, ONE FIRE DOOR WAS DELETED AND A 3-HOUR FIRE WALL DERATED. NO FIRE AREA BOUNDARY WAS IMPACTED BY THIS CHANGE.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS AND THE FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAM ARE DISCUSSED IN FSAR SECTIONS 9.A AND 9.5.1 RESPECTIVELY. THE DELETED DOOR IS NOT PART OF ANY FIRE AREA BOUNDARY AS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR. THE DERATING OF THE 3-HOUR BARRIER IS PERMITTED DUE TO THE CONTINUOUS OCCUPANCY OF THE NEWLY DESIGNATED AREA. CHANGES TO THE FSAR AS A RESULT OF

THIS CHANGE HAVE BEEN INITIATED VIA AN LDCR. THE FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAM IS NOT THE SUBJECT OF ANY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION.

SUBJECT: MDD 91-V2M058,REVISION 0,SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THE CST DEGASIFIER TRANSFER PUMP FLOW INDICATION WAS UNDER-RANGED. THE PUMP OPERATES AT APPROXIMATELY 440 GPM WHICH CORRESPONDS TO 300 IN H2O DP. EXISTING MODEL (RANGE 20 TO 200 IN H2O DP) WAS REPLACED WITH A NEW MODEL HAVING A RANGE OF 200 TO 850 IN H2O DP. FLOW INDICATOR WAS ALSO REPLACED WITH A 0 TO 500 GPM INDICATOR.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE CST DEGASIFIER TRANSFER PUMPS ARE DESCRIBED IN FSAR SECTION 9.2.6 "CONDENSATE STORAGE FACILITY". REPLACEMENT OF THE TRANSFER PUMP FLOW TRANSMITTER AND INDICATOR WILL NOT AFFECT SYSTEM OPERATION AS DESCRIBED IN THIS SECTION OR ANY ACCIDENT ANALYSIS CONTAINED WITHIN CHAPTER 15. THE CHANGE WILL NOT AFFECT CST EMERGENCY LEVELS INTENDED FOR SAFETY USE. TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS (TABLE 3.4-2) REQUIRES DISSOLVED OXYGEN CONCENTRATION TO BE LESS THAN 100 PPB. THE DESCRIBED ACTIVITY WILL NOR AFFECT THE ABILITY OF THE SYSTEM TO MAINTAIN THIS LIMIT.

SUBJECT: MDD 91-V1M066,REVISION 0,SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THE LEADS FOR THE ION CHROMATOGRAPH CONDUCTIVITY DETECTOR LOCATED IN THE PASS PANEL WERE FITTED WITH A FEMALE CONNECTOR TO FACILITATE MAINTENANCE ACTIVITIES INVOLVING THE DETECTOR AND CELL WHICH HAS A MALE CONNECTOR.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE POST ACCIDENT SAMPLING SYSTEM IS DESCRIBED IN FSAR SECTION 9.3.2. THE DETAILS OF THE WIRING CONFIGURATION OF THE DETECTOR AND CELL ARE NOT PROVIDED IN THIS DISCUSSION. THE ADDITION OF THE CONNECTOR DOES NOT IMPACT DETECTOR/CELL OPERATION OR CALIBRATION. THE CHANGE WILL NOT AFFECT OPERATIONS OF PASS AS REQUIRED IN TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 6.7.4.D.

SUBJECT: MDD 91-V2M067,REVISION 0,SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THE LEADS FOR THE ION CHROMATOGRAPH CONDUCTIVITY DETECTOR LOCATED IN THE PASS PANEL WERE FITTED WITH A FEMALE CONNECTOR TO FACILITATE MAINTENANCE ACTIVITIES INVOLVING THE DETECTOR AND CELL WHICH HAS A MALE CONNECTOR.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE POST ACCIDENT SAMPLING SYSTEM IS DESCRIBED IN FSAR SECTION 9.3.2. THE DETAILS OF THE WIRING CONFIGURATION OF THE DETECTOR AND CELL ARE NOT PROVIDED IN THIS DISCUSSION. THE ADDITION OF THE CONNECTOR DOES NOT IMPACT DETECTOR/CELL OPERATION OR CALIBRATION. THE CHANGE WILL NOT AFFECT OPERATIONS OF PASS AS REQUIRED IN TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 6.7.4.D.

SUBJECT: MDD 91-V1M070,REVISION 0,SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: ADDITIONAL PERSONNEL PLATFORM STRUCTURES AND ASSOCIATED LADDERS WERE ADDED TO ENHANCE ACCESS TO THE CONDENSATE (POWDEX)

DEMINERALIZER SYSTEM VESSEL INLET AND OUTLET VALVES. IN ADDITION, MANIPULATION OF THE MANUAL ISOLATION VALVES WILL BE VIA LOCAL HANDWHEEL OPERATOR INSTEAD OF THE FLOOR OPERATED CHAIN OPERATOR.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE ADDITION OF A PLATFORMS AND LADDERS TO ALLOW ENHANCED OPERATION OF THE POWDEX INLET AND OUTLET MANUAL VALVES DOES NOT AFFECT THE OPERATION OF THE SYSTEM AS DESCRIBED IN FSAR SECTIONS 10 "STEAM AND POWER CONVERSION", 9.3 "PROCESS AUXILIARIES" AND 9.5 "OTHER AUXILIARY SYSTEMS". THE MODIFICATION DOES NOT IMPACT ANY REQUIREMENTS STATED IN PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS (3/4.7 "PLANT SYSTEMS").

SUBJECT: MDD 91-V2M071,REVISION 0,SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: ADDITIONAL PERSONNEL PLATFORM STRUCTURES AND ASSOCIATED LADDERS WERE ADDED TO ENHANCE ACCESS TO THE CONDENSATE (POWDEX) DEMINERALIZER SYSTEM VESSEL INLET AND OUTLET VALVES. IN ADDITION, MANIPULATION OF THE MANUAL ISOLATION VALVES WILL BE VIA LOCAL HANDWHEEL OPERATOR INSTEAD OF THE FLOOR OPERATED CHAIN OPERATOR.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE ADDITION OF A PLATFORMS AND LADDERS TO ALLOW ENHANCED OPERATION OF THE POWDEX INLET AND OUTLET MANUAL VALVES DOES NOT AFFECT THE OPERATION OF THE SYSTEM AS DESCRIBED IN FSAR SECTIONS 10 "STEAM AND POWER CONVERSION", 9.3 "PROCESS AUXILIARIES" AND 9.5 "OTHER AUXILIARY SYSTEMS". THE MODIFICATION DOES NOT IMPACT ANY REQUIREMENTS STATED IN PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS (3/4.7 "PLANT SYSTEMS").

SUBJECT: MDD 91-V2M073,REVISION 0,SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THE MODIFICATION CONSISTED OF INSTALLATION OF INSULATED SUPPORTS AT THE COLLECTOR HOUSING. THE SUPPORTS PROVIDE ADDITIONAL STRENGTH TO THE EXCITATION BUSES WHEN THEY ARE DISASSEMBLED FOR GENERATOR MAINTENANCE. THE ADDITIONAL SUPPORTS WERE RECOMMENDED BY GE (TURBINE-GENERATOR SUPPLIER).

SAFETY EVALUATION: FSAR SECTION 10.2 DISCUSSES THE FUNCTION AND OPERATION OF THE TURBINE GENERATOR AND ITS AUXILIARIES. THE ADDITION OF THE SUPPORTS ON THE EXCITATION BUSES DOES NOT IMPACT THIS DISCUSSION. THE CHANGE DOES NOT IMPACT THE TURBINE TRIP CAPABILITIES AS REQUIRED BY THE PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS.

SUBJECT: MDD 91-V1M076,REVISION 0,SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: PERSONNEL BARRIERS MEETING THE SECURITY BARRIER REQUIREMENTS WERE INSTALLED AT THE OPENINGS FOR THE TENDON ACCESS SHAFT NEAR CONTAINMENT BUTTRESS NO. 2 AND AT PIPE PENETRATION ROOM RB-08 TO PROHIBIT ACCESS INTO NON-DESIRABLE PLANT AREAS DURING MAINTENANCE ON THE VSL PLATFORMS WHEN THE BUTTRESS COVER IS REMOVED WITHOUT POSTING SECURITY PERSONNEL.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE ADDED BARRIERS DO NOT RESULT IN A PHYSICAL CHANGE WHICH ALTERS THE FUNCTION OF A STRUCTURE OR SYSTEM AS DESCRIBED IN

THE FSAR. THE BARRIERS DO NOT PERFORM A SAFETY RELATED FUNCTION NOR ARE THEY REQUIRED TO SUPPORT ANY SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT. THIS CHANGE IS BEYOND THE LEVEL OF DETAIL DESCRIBED IN FSAR SECTIONS 3.2, 3.5, 3.6 AND CHAPTERS 13, 14 AND 15. THE BARRIERS ARE NOT INCLUDED AS A PART OF THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS.

SUBJECT: MDD 91-V2M077,REVISION 0,SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: PERSONNEL BARRIERS MEETING THE SECURITY BARRIER REQUIREMENTS WERE INSTALLED AT THE OPENINGS FOR THE TENDON ACCESS SHAFT NEAR CONTAINMENT BUTTRESS NO. 2 AND AT PIPE PENETRATION ROOM RB-08 TO PROHIBIT ACCESS INTO NON-DESIRABLE PLANT AREAS DURING MAINTENANCE ON THE VSL PLATFORMS WHEN THE BUTTRESS COVER IS REMOVED WITHOUT POSTING SECURITY PERSONNEL.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE ADDED BARRIERS DO NOT RESULT IN A PHYSICAL CHANGE WHICH ALTERS THE FUNCTION OF A STRUCTURE OR SYSTEM AS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR. THE BARRIERS DO NOT PERFORM A SAFETY RELATED FUNCTION NOR ARE THEY REQUIRED TO SUPPORT ANY SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT. THIS CHANGE IS BEYOND THE LEVEL OF DETAIL DESCRIBED IN FSAR SECTIONS 3.2, 3.5, 3.6 AND CHAPTERS 13, 14 AND 15. THE BARRIERS ARE NOT INCLUDED AS A PART OF THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS.

SUBJECT: MDD 91-V2M078,REVISION 0,SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: A FLOW REDUCING BAFFLE PLATE WAS ADDED INTO THE SUPPLY DUCT FOR AUXILIARY BUILDING ROOM 220 (HOUSING TRAIN B OF THE PIPING PENETRATION AREA FILTRATION AND EXHAUST SYSTEM) TO ENABLE ADJUSTMENT OF THE AIR FLOW TO WITHIN DESIGN TOLERANCE. THE DESIRED BAFFLE PLATE CONFIGURATION WAS ADDED TO DRAWING AX4DJ0005, DETAIL 29.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE DESCRIPTION OF THE PLANT VENTILATION SYSTEMS CONTAINED IN FSAR SECTION 9.4 DOES NOT EXTEND TO THE DETAILS OF DUCT SYSTEM CONSTRUCTION. THE USE OF BAFFLES/ORIFICES IS EXPLICITLY PROVIDED FOR IN THE VENTILATION DUCT DESIGN DRAWINGS. THE ABILITY TO PROPERLY ADJUST SYSTEM FLOWS WILL ENSURE THAT VENTILATION SYSTEMS ARE OPERATING WITHIN THEIR DESIGN CAPACITY. THE UNIT 2 TRAIN B PPAFES (R-220) IS MAINTAINED AT 0.25" NEGATIVE PRESSURE PER TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 4.7.7.D.3. ADDITION OF THE BAFFLE WILL PERMIT SUPPLY FLOW TO BE ADJUSTED SO THAT THIS SPECIFICATION IS SATISFIED.

SUBJECT: MDD 91-V2M080,REVISION 0,SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THE SUCTION PRESSURE INDICATOR ASSOCIATED WITH THE WASTE EVAPORATOR FEED PUMP WAS OVER-RANGED FOR ITS INTENDED OPERATING CONDITION. NORMAL OPERATING RANGE IS APPROXIMATELY 3 PSIG. THE EXISTING 0 TO 200 PSIG WAS REPLACED WITH A 0 TO 15 PSIG INDICATOR.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE WASTE EVAPORATOR FEED PUMPS ARE DISCUSSED IN FSAR SECTION 11.2 WHICH DESCRIBES THE LIQUID WASTE PROCESSING SYSTEMS. THE RANGE OF THE SUCTION PRESSURE INDICATOR ASSOCIATED WITH THE FEED PUMP WAS NOT SPECIFIED. THE INDICATOR REPLACEMENT DOES NOT IMPACT SYSTEM OPERATION.

THE WASTE EVAPORATOR FEED PUMP IS NOT THE SUBJECT OF ANY PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION.

SUBJECT: MDD 91-V1M085,REVISION 0,SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THE FLOOR DRAIN TANK STRAINER LOCATED ON THE DISCHARGE LINE OF THE FLOOR DRAIN TANK PUMP REQUIRES EXCESSIVE CLEANING. AS THE DELTA-P OF THE STRAINER APPROACHES SHUT-OFF HEAD OF THE FLOOR DRAIN TANK PUMP, THE STRAINER MUST BE CLEANED. THE STRAINER IS NO LONGER REQUIRED SINCE THE INSTALLATION OF THE IMPELL MICRO-FILTRATION SYSTEM. A NOTE WAS ADDED TO THE DESIGN DRAWING TO SPECIFY THE INSTALLATION OF THE STRAINER AS OPTIONAL AS REQUIRED BY PLANT OPERATIONS.

SAFETY EVALUATION: FSAR SECTION 11.2 DISCUSSES THE LIQUID RADWASTE SYSTEM. SECTION 11.2.2.6.6 OF THE FSAR AND FIGURE 11.2.1-1 (SHEET 3 OF 4) WILL BE REVISED TO REFLECT THE STRAINER OPTION. DELETION OF THE STRAINER WILL NOT IMPACT SYSTEM OPERATION AS THE FILTRATION ASPECTS OF OPERATION ARE BEING HANDLED BY THE NEWLY INSTALLED IMPELL MICRO-FILTRATION SYSTEM. THE LIQUID RADWASTE SYSTEM FILTRATION SYSTEMS ARE NOT ADDRESSED BY THE PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS.

SUBJECT: MDD 91-V1M089,REVISION 0,SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THE ORIGINALLY INSTALLED NUPRO JB SERIES GRAFOIL PACKED VALVES IN THE UNIT 1 PASS SYSTEM (VALVES HV-3709, 3710, 3711, 3712, 3714 AND 3717) WERE REPLACED WITH IDENTICAL VALVES WITH A UHWPE (ULTRA HIGH MOLECULAR WEIGHT POLYETHYLENE) TYPE PACKING WHICH IS BETTER SUITED TO THE TYPE OF ENVIRONMENT SEEN IN THE PASS SYSTEM.

SAFETY EVALUATION: CHANGING THE TYPE OF PACKING UTILIZED IN THE PASS VALVES DOES NOT REQUIRE A CHANGE TO THE PLANT AS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR OR A REVISION TO ANY PORTION OF THE FSAR. THE POST ACCIDENT SAMPLING SYSTEM IS DESCRIBED IN FSAR SECTION 9.3.2. THE SECTION DOES NOT MAKE REFERENCE TO NOR DOES IT SPECIFY PACKING REQUIREMENTS FOR THE VALVES. THE PASS SYSTEM IS DISCUSSED IN TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION SECTION 6.0 HOWEVER NOT TO THE DETAIL AS DEFINED BY THIS CHANGE.

SUBJECT: MDD 91-V2M090,REVISION 0,SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THE LEVEL SET DIAGRAM FOR THE SPENT RESIN STORAGE TANK ORIGINALLY PLACED THE HIGH LEVEL ALARM ABOVE THE UPPER LEVEL TAP ASSOCIATED WITH ITS DELTA-P TYPE TRANSMITTER. THIS MAKES IT IMPOSSIBLE TO REACH THE HIGH LEVEL ALARM POINT AS ONCE THE LEVEL RISES ABOVE THE UPPER TAP, NO DELTA-P WILL BE MEASURED EVEN THOUGH THE TANK LEVEL MAY BE INCREASING. THE LEVEL SET DIAGRAM ASSOCIATED WITH THE SPENT RESIN STORAGE TANK WAS REVISED TO LIMIT THE CALIBRATION RANGE TO CORRESPOND WITH THE INSTRUMENT LEVEL TAPS.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE LIQUID RADWASTE SYSTEMS ARE DESCRIBED IN FSAR SECTION 11.2. THE DESCRIPTION DOES NOT ADDRESS THE LEVEL OF DETAIL IDENTIFIED BY THIS CHANGE. THE SYSTEM WILL CONTINUE TO OPERATE AS DESCRIBED IN THIS

SECTION. PROVIDING A MORE ACCURATE SPAN FOR INSTRUMENT CALIBRATION DOES NOT IMPACT ANY PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION.

SUBJECT: MDD 91-V1M092,REVISION 0,SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: ARV HAND PUMP THERMAL RELIEF VALVES WERE REDESIGNED BY THE MANUFACTURER (ENERTECH). THE NEW VALVES ARE DIMENSIONALLY LARGER AND UTILIZE A CRIMP TYPE CONNECTION AS OPPOSED TO THE ORIGINAL FLARED CONNECTION. THIS DOCUMENT APPROVED THE USE OF THE REPLACEMENT THERMAL RELIEF VALVE ON THE ARV.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE APPROVED THERMAL RELIEF VALVE REPLACEMENT DOES NOT IMPACT THE FUNCTION OR OPERATION OF THE ARV HAND PUMPS NOR DOES IT CHANGE THE DESCRIPTION OF THE ARV'S AS DESCRIBED IN FSAR SECTION 10.3.2. THERMAL RELIEF VALVE SETTING WAS NOT AFFECTED. TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 3/4.4.4 AND 3/4.4.9 ADDRESS THE RELIEF VALVES AND TEMPERATURE/PRESSURE LIMITATIONS. THESE REQUIREMENTS ARE NOT IMPACTED BY THE CHANGE.

SUBJECT: MDD 91-V2M093,REVISION 0,SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: ARV HAND PUMP THERMAL RELIEF VALVES WERE REDESIGNED BY THE MANUFACTURER (ENERTECH). THE NEW VALVES ARE DIMENSIONALLY LARGER AND UTILIZE A CRIMP TYPE CONNECTION AS OPPOSED TO THE ORIGINAL FLARE CONNECTION. THIS DOCUMENT APPROVED THE USE OF THE REPLACEMENT THERMAL RELIEF VALVE ON THE ARV.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE APPROVED THERMAL RELIEF VALVE REPLACEMENT DOES NOT IMPACT THE FUNCTION OR OPERATION OF THE ARV HAND PUMPS NOR DOES IT CHANGE THE DESCRIPTION OF THE ARV'S AS DESCRIBED IN FSAR SECTION 10.3.2. THERMAL RELIEF VALVE SETTING WAS NOT AFFECTED. TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 3/4.4.4 AND 3/4.4.9 ADDRESS THE RELIEF VALVES AND PRESSURE/TEMPERATURE LIMITATIONS. THESE REQUIREMENTS ARE NOT IMPACTED BY THE CHANGE.

SUBJECT: MDD 91-V1M099,REVISION 0,SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THE 0 TO 60 PSI GAUGE LOCATED DOWNSTREAM OF THE PRESSURE REGULATOR ON THE BYPASS FEEDWATER ISOLATION VALVES (BFIV) WAS REPLACED WITH A 0 TO 100 PSI GAUGE. THE GAUGE PROVIDES LOCAL INDICATION OF SUPPLY AIR PRESSURE TO THE AIR PUMP WHICH POSITIONS THE BFIV. THE AIR REGULATOR MAINTAINS SUPPLY AIR PRESSURE AT 80 PSIG CAUSING GAUGES TO BE OVERPRESSURIZED.

SAFETY EVALUATION: FSAR SECTION 10.4.7,"CONDENSATE AND FEEDWATER SYSTEM" DISCUSSES THE FUNCTION AND OPERATION OF THE BYPASS FEEDWATER ISOLATION VALVES. THE DESCRIPTION DOES NOT MAKE REFERENCE TO PRESSURE GAUGE RANGE REQUIREMENTS. BFIV OPERATION IS NOT IMPACTED BY THE CHANGE. THE REPLACEMENT OF THE PRESSURE GAUGE DOES NOT AFFECT REQUIREMENTS SET FORTH IN PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 3/4.3.2 CONCERNING FEEDWATER ISOLATION.

SUBJECT: MDD 91-V1M101,REVISION 0,SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THE DC/DC CONVERTER MODULE (NWX-514-2) FOR THE MAIN GENERATOR UNDER FREQUENCY RELAY LOCATED IN PANEL 1816-U3-012 WAS REPLACED WITH A NEW MODIFIED MODULE TO REDUCE THE RISK OF FAILURE DUE TO OVERHEATING.

SAFETY EVALUATION: FSAR SECTIONS 10.0 AND 10.2 PROVIDE A DISCUSSION OF THE STEAM POWER CONVERSION SYSTEM AND THE TURBINE GENERATOR. THE UNDER FREQUENCY PROTECTION RELAY IS NOT ADDRESSED IN THESE SECTIONS. THE NEW RELAY PROVIDES THE SAME FUNCTION AS THE PREVIOUSLY INSTALLED RELAY. TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3/4.8, "PLANT SYSTEMS" DOES NOT ADDRESS THE MODEL REQUIREMENTS ASSOCIATED WITH THE RELAY.

SUBJECT: MDD 91-V2M104,REVISION 0,SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THE CAPACITANCE OF CAPACITOR "C14" ON CONTROL BOARD "A" IN 125 VDC BATTERY CHARGERS WAS INCREASED BY PARALLELING A CAPACITOR OF SIMILAR RATING WITH "C14". THIS WAS NECESSARY DUE TO OSCILLATIONS THAT HAD BEEN OCCURRING IN THE BATTERY OUTPUT WHEN ATTEMPTING TO RECHARGE A DISCHARGED BATTERY.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE MODIFICATION TO THE CIRCUIT BOARD DOES NOT IMPACT SYSTEM OPERATION OF FUNCTION AS DESCRIBED IN FSAR SECTION 8.3.2. THE CHARGERS CAPABILITY TO FULFILL ITS DESIGN FUNCTION HAVE NOT BEEN ALTERED BY THIS ADDITION OF THE PARALLEL CAPACITOR. THE ADDITION DOES NOT IMPACT PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3/4.8.2 SINCE THE CHARGER WILL CONTINUE TO FUNCTION AS ORIGINALLY DESIGNED.

SUBJECT: MDD 91-V1M105,REVISION 0,SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THE CAPACITANCE OF CAPACITOR "C14" ON CONTROL BOARD "A" IN 125 VDC BATTERY CHARGERS WAS INCREASED BY PARALLELING A CAPACITOR OF SIMILAR RATING WITH "C14". THIS WAS NECESSARY DUE TO OSCILLATIONS THAT HAD BEEN OCCURRING IN THE BATTERY OUTPUT WHEN ATTEMPTING TO RECHARGE A DISCHARGED BATTERY.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE MODIFICATION TO THE CIRCUIT BOARD DOES NOT IMPACT SYSTEM OPERATION OF FUNCTION AS DESCRIBED IN FSAR SECTION 8.3.2. THE CHARGERS CAPABILITY TO FULFILL ITS DESIGN FUNCTION HAVE NOT BEEN ALTERED BY THIS ADDITION OF THE PARALLEL CAPACITOR. THE ADDITION DOES NOT IMPACT PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3/4.8.2 SINCE THE CHARGER WILL CONTINUE TO FUNCTION AS ORIGINALLY DESIGNED.

SUBJECT: MDD 91-V2M106,REVISION 0,SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: FLOOR DRAINS IN THE RWST VALVE ROOM AND DIKE AREA WERE ORIGINALLY INTERCONNECTED AND DESIGNED SUCH THAT WATER FROM BOTH DRAINS WOULD FLOW TOWARDS THE REACTOR MAKEUP STORAGE TANK VALVE PIT. THE RWST VALVE ROOM DRAIN WAS PLUGGED AND SEALED TO PREVENT RAIN WATER ENTERING THE RWST DIKE AREA FROM FLOWING BACK INTO THE VALVE ROOM CAUSING

FLOODING IN THE VALVE ROOM. THE VALVE ROOM TO NCCW TUNNEL PIPE CHASE WAS ALSO DIKED TO PREVENT CONTAMINATION TO THE NSCW TUNNEL BY RWST LEAKAGE.

SAFETY EVALUATION: FSAR SECTION 9.3.3 "EQUIPMENT AND FLOOR DRAINAGE SYSTEMS" DOES NOT SPECIFICALLY ADDRESS THIS FLOW PATH. FSAR FIGURE 9.3.3-3 (SHEET 10 OF 11) DEPICTS THE FLOOR DRAINS IN THE RWST VALVE ROOM AND DIKE AREA. THE FIGURE WILL BE REVISED VIA LICENSING DOCUMENT CHANGE REQUEST FS-91-053 WHICH WILL ILLUSTRATE THE PLUGGING OF THE RWST VALVE ROOM FLOOR DRAIN. PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS DO NOT SPECIFICALLY ADDRESS THE FLOOR DRAINS ASSOCIATED WITH THE RWST AREA.

SUBJECT: MDD 91-V1M109,REVISION 0,SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: SHIELDING WAS ADDED AROUND AND OVER THE INSTRUMENT SENSING LINES BETWEEN THE DIESEL ENGINE BULKHEAD AND THE ENGINE CONTROL PANEL ON BOTH TRAINS OF THE EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR. IN ADDITION, A LADDER WAS ADDED TO PROVIDE ACCESS TO THE ENGINE PEDESTAL. THESE CHANGES WERE NECESSARY TO PREVENT DAMAGE TO THESE SENSING LINES DURING MAINTENANCE ACTIVITIES.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE FUNCTION AND OPERATION OF THE EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS IS DISCUSSED IN FSAR SECTION 8.0. THE ADDITION OF PROTECTIVE SHIELDING/COVERS OVER SENSING LINES DOES NOT IMPACT SYSTEM OPERATION OR THE ABILITY OF THE DIESEL GENERATORS TO PERFORM THEIR SAFETY FUNCTION. THE SHIELDING IS NON INTRUSIVE. THE DIESEL GENERATORS ARE DISCUSSED IN THE PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS HOWEVER, THE ADDITION OF PROTECTIVE COVERS AROUND SENSING LINES WILL NOT IMPACT ANY DEFINED REQUIREMENTS.

SUBJECT: MDD 91-VAM117,REVISION 0,SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: PLANT MAKEUP WATER SYSTEM CAUSTIC VALVE A-1409-U4-670 WAS RELOCATED UPSTREAM OF ITS ORIGINAL LOCATION TO PERMIT PROPER VALVE ORIENTATION (UP-RIGHT). ORIGINAL POSITION (SIDE-WAYS) PERMITTED CAUSTIC TO REMAIN IN CONTACT WITH THE VALVE'S DIAPHRAGM WHEN THE LINE WAS STATIC WHICH RESULTED IN LEAKAGE ONTO AN ELECTRICAL CONDUIT BELOW.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE LOCATION OF THE CAUSTIC VALVE IS NOT SPECIFIED IN FSAR SECTION 9.2.3 WHICH DESCRIBES THE OPERATION AND FUNCTION OF THE DEMINERALIZED WATER MAKEUP SYSTEM. THE SYSTEM WILL CONTINUE TO BE OPERATED AS BEFORE. DUE TO THE NATURE OF THE CHANGE, PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS ARE NOT IMPACTED.

SUBJECT: MDD 91-V1M119,REVISION 0,SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THE INSTRUMENT ROOT VALVES (X4-976 & 987) FOR THE MAIN TURBINE THROTTLE PRESSURE TRANSMITTERS HAD REQUIRED REPLACEMENT ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS AS A THE RESULT OF LEAKAGE AT THE BODY TO BONNET JOINT. THE VALVES APPEARED TO BE UNDER RATED FOR THE APPLICATION IN WHICH THEY WERE BEING USED. THE VALVES WERE REPLACED WITH 1500# ANSI CLASS VALVES TO IMPROVE VALVE RELIABILITY.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE MAIN TURBINE IS DISCUSSED IN FSAR SECTION 10.2. THE ANSI PRESSURE/TEMPERATURE RATING FOR THE MAIN TURBINE THROTTLE PRESSURE TRANSMITTERS IS NOT PROVIDED IN THIS DESCRIPTION. THE PRESSURE TRANSMITTERS AND CORRESPONDING INSTRUMENT ROOT VALVES ARE NOT ADDRESSED IN THE PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS.

SUBJECT: MDD 91-V1M122,REVISION 0,SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: MOTOR MOUNTING BRACKETS WITH STIFFER HEAVY ANGLE SECTIONS ALONG WITH STIFFENING ANGLE SECTIONS ALONG THE LENGTH OF THE EXISTING MOTOR SUPPORT CHANNELS HAVE BEEN INSTALLED ON THE AUXILIARY BUILDING SUPPLY FANS IN AN EFFORT TO REDUCE VIBRATION LEVELS TO AN ACCEPTABLE LEVEL.

SAFETY EVALUATION: BASED UPON A REVIEW OF FSAR SECTIONS 3.5 AND 9.4.3, THE MODIFICATION OF THE MOTOR SUPPORT STRUCTURE WILL NOT CHANGE THE PLANT AS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR SECTION LISTED. THE ADDITIONAL SUPPORTING BRACKETS DO NOT AFFECT SYSTEM OPERATION NOR DOES IT AFFECT THE WAY IN WHICH THE SYSTEM IS OPERATED. THE AUXILIARY BUILDING NORMAL VENTILATION SYSTEM IS NOT COVERED BY THE PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS.

SUBJECT: MDD 91-V2M125,REVISION 0,SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THE CHANGE INVOLVED THE REDUCTION OF THE LOW FLOW TRIP SETPOINT AND AN INCREASE IN THE TRIP DELAY TIME SETTING FOR THE AUXILIARY BUILDING NORMAL AIR SUPPLY UNITS TO REDUCE UNNECESSARY TRIPS THAT HAD BEEN OCCURRING DURING THE START UP OF A STANDBY SYSTEM FAN WHEN ONE UNIT WAS ALREADY IN OPERATION. THE CHANGE REFLECTS THE CURRENT CONFIGURATION ALREADY EXISTING ON UNIT 1.

SAFETY EVALUATION: PLANT AIR CONDITIONING, HEATING, COOLING AND VENTILATION SYSTEMS ARE DISCUSSED IN FSAR SECTION 9.4. THE CHANGE IN SETTINGS DESCRIBED DO NOT IMPACT ANY DISCUSSIONS CONTAINED IN THESE SECTIONS. THE FUNCTION OR MODE OF OPERATION OF THE AUXILIARY BUILDING NORMAL AIR SUPPLY UNITS IS NOT AFFECTED BY THE CHANGE. THE AUXILIARY BUILDING NORMAL VENTILATION SYSTEM IS NOT COVERED BY PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS NOR DOES IT AFFECT ANY OTHER SYSTEM THAT IS COVERED.

SUBJECT: MDD 92-V1M006,REVISION 0,SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THE TEST CIRCUITS FOR THE MAIN TURBINE TRIP MECHANICAL OVERSPEED TRIP DEVICE, MECHANICAL TRIP PISTON AND THE ELECTRICAL TRIP VALVE HAVE BEEN MODIFIED TO DECREASE THE PROBABILITY OF AN UNPLANNED REACTOR TRIP RESULTING FROM THE FAILURE OF COMPONENTS IN THE EXISTING TEST CIRCUIT DURING MONTHLY TESTING. THIS WAS ACCOMPLISHED THROUGH THE ADDITION OF BLOCKING SWITCHES ON THE MAIN CONTROL BOARD WHICH PERMIT ACTUATION OF THE MECHANICAL OR ELECTRICAL LOCKOUT VALVES INDEPENDENTLY FROM THE EXISTING AUTOMATED TEST INITIATION LOGIC PREVENTING SIMULTANEOUS ACTUATION OF BOTH ELECTRICAL AND MECHANICAL LOCKOUTS DURING TESTING.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE MECHANICAL LOCKOUT VALVE IS ADDRESSED IN FSAR SECTION 10.2.2 AND IS ILLUSTRATED ON FIGURE 10.2.2-6. THESE SECTIONS IMPLY A

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE ACTUATION OF THE LOCKOUT VALVES AND THE CONDUCT OF THE ASSOCIATED TESTS. THE NEW SWITCHES DO NOT IMPACT THIS RELATIONSHIP. THE SWITCHES WILL BE USED IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE LOCKOUT VALVES TO PREVENT TRIPS DURING TESTING. THE MODIFICATION DOES NOT IMPACT THE TURBINE TRIP FUNCTIONS DESCRIBED IN PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS.

SUBJECT: MDD 92-V2M007,REVISION 0,SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THE TEST CIRCUITS FOR THE MAIN TURBINE TRIP MECHANICAL OVERSPEED TRIP DEVICE, MECHANICAL TRIP PISTON AND THE ELECTRICAL TRIP VALVE HAVE BEEN MODIFIED TO DECREASE THE PROBABILITY OF AN UNPLANNED REACTOR TRIP RESULTING FROM THE FAILURE OF COMPONENTS IN THE EXISTING TEST CIRCUIT DURING MONTHLY TESTING. THIS WAS ACCOMPLISHED THROUGH THE ADDITION OF BLOCKING SWITCHES ON THE MAIN CONTROL BOARD WHICH PERMIT ACTUATION OF THE MECHANICAL OR ELECTRICAL LOCKOUT VALVES INDEPENDENTLY FROM THE EXISTING AUTOMATED TEST INITIATION LOGIC PREVENTING SIMULTANEOUS ACTUATION OF BOTH ELECTRICAL AND MECHANICAL LOCKOUTS DURING TESTING.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE MECHANICAL LOCKOUT VALVE IS ADDRESSED IN FSAR SECTION 10.2.2 AND IS ILLUSTRATED ON FIGURE 10.2.2-6. THESE SECTIONS IMPLY A RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE ACTUATION OF THE LOCKOUT VALVES AND THE CONDUCT OF THE ASSOCIATED TESTS. THE NEW SWITCHES DO NOT IMPACT THIS RELATIONSHIP. THE SWITCHES WILL BE USED IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE LOCKOUT VALVES TO PREVENT TRIPS DURING TESTING. THE MODIFICATION DOES NOT IMPACT THE TURBINE TRIP FUNCTIONS DESCRIBED IN PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS.

SUBJECT: MDD 92-V1M013,REVISION 0,SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THE MAIN TURBINE STOP VALVES ARE EQUIPPED WITH ABOVE SEAT DRAIN LINES/VALVES TO REMOVE ANY CONDENSATION THAT MAY COLLECT WHILE THE STOP VALVE IS CLOSED THEREBY PREVENTING WATER INDUCTION INTO THE TURBINE. THE VALVES WERE ORIGINALLY DESIGNED TO AUTOMATICALLY OPEN AND INTERLOCKED OPEN FOR SIXTY SECONDS ON A TURBINE TRIP. THE VALVES WOULD HAVE TO BE MANUALLY CLOSED BY THE OPERATOR TO LIMIT STEAM GENERATOR COOLDOWN. THE INTERLOCK WAS REMOVED AS THESE VALVES ONLY NEED TO BE OPENED PRIOR TO OPENING THE STOP VALVES FOR TURBINE ROLL.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE MAIN STEAM SYSTEM AND THE MAIN TURBINE ARE DESCRIBED IN FSAR SECTIONS 10.3 AND 10.2 RESPECTIVELY. NEITHER DISCUSSION INCLUDES A DESCRIPTION/FUNCTION ASSOCIATED WITH THE TURBINE STOP VALVE ABOVE SEAT DRAINS. THE PURPOSE OF THE DRAINS WILL STILL BE FULFILLED BY OPERATING THE DRAIN VALVES PRIOR TO TURBINE ROLL. THE LOGIC CHANGE DOES NOT INVOLVE THE TURBINE TRIPPING OR OVERSPEED PROTECTION FUNCTIONS REQUIRED BY THE PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS.

SUBJECT: MDD 92-VAM016,REVISION 0,SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: SECURITY DOOR C-102 WAS CHANGED FROM A LOCKED AND ALARMED DOOR TO AN ACAT DOOR TO PERMIT ACCESS FROM THE TURBINE ALLEY INTO THE UNIT 2 CONTROL BUILDING. THIS CHANGE PERMITS PLANT PERSONNEL TO ENTER THE CONTROL BUILDING/RCA FROM THE DRESS OUT TRAILERS LOCATED IN THE TURBINE

ALLEY, TO SUPPORT THIS CHANGE, THE DOOR WAS MODIFIED TO ACCOMMODATE AN ELECTRIC STRIKE LOCK, INSIDE AND OUTSIDE CARD READERS WERE INSTALLED AT THE DOOR AND NEW CONDUIT AND CABLE TO SUPPORT DOOR OPERATION INSTALLED.

SAFETY EVALUATION: PLANT SECURITY EQUIPMENT IS NOT DISCUSSED IN THE FSAR AND THE PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS. THE CONVERSION OF THE LOCKED AND ALARMED DOOR TO A SECURE ACAT DOOR DOES NOT AFFECT THE SECURITY PLAN.

SUBJECT: MDD 92-V2M017,REVISION 0,SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: ONE NORMAL LIGHT FIXTURE WAS ADDED IN FRONT OF THE UNIT 2 GENEREX PANEL LOCATED ON LEVEL 3 OF THE CONTROL BUILDING IN ROOM R-325. THE ADDITION WAS ADDED TO ADEQUATELY ILLUMINATE THE AREA SO THAT PERSONNEL COULD READILY IDENTIFY PANEL MARKINGS.

SAFETY EVALUATION: FSAR SECTION 8.3 DESCRIBES THE ONSITE POWER SYSTEMS. FSAR SECTION 9.5.3 DESCRIBES THE NORMAL LIGHTING SYSTEMS. THE ADDITION OF ONE NORMAL LIGHTING FIXTURE DOES NOT IMPACT THE DESCRIPTIONS PROVIDED IN THESE SECTIONS. THE FIXTURE IS SEISMICALLY MOUNTED. THE ADDITIONAL FIRE LOADING IS NOT SIGNIFICANT. TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3/4.8 "ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS" IS NOT AFFECTED BY THIS CHANGE.

SUBJECT: MDD 92-V1M019,REVISION 0,SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THE MAIN TURBINE EXCESS THROTTLE PRESSURE CIRCUIT WHICH WAS SUPPLIED AS PART OF THE TURBINE CONTROL CIRCUIT HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM THE CONTROL CIRCUITRY. THE EXCESS THROTTLE PRESSURE CIRCUIT DID NOT PROVIDE A PROTECTIVE FUNCTION. THE ORIGINAL CIRCUIT WAS PROVIDED TO ACCOUNT FOR VARIATIONS IN THE STEAM FLOW THROUGH THE CONTROL VALVES AS THE STEAM LINE PRESSURE DECREASES FROM NO LOAD TO FULL LOAD. THE EFFECT OF THIS CIRCUIT WAS DETERMINED TO BE NEGLIGIBLE AND WAS THEREFORE DELETED.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE MAIN TURBINE IS DISCUSSED IN FSAR SECTION 10.2. THE EXCESS THROTTLE PRESSURE CIRCUIT IS NOT ADDRESSED IN THIS DISCUSSION. THE OPERATION OF THE MAIN TURBINE IS NOT AFFECTED BY DELETION OF THIS CONTROL CIRCUIT. THE DELETION DOES NOT IMPACT THE MAIN TURBINE TRIPPING AND OVERSPEED FUNCTIONS REQUIRED BY THE PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS.

SUBJECT: MDD 92-V2M020,REVISION 0,SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THE MAIN TURBINE EXCESS THROTTLE PRESSURE CIRCUIT WHICH WAS SUPPLIED AS PART OF THE TURBINE CONTROL CIRCUIT HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM THE CONTROL CIRCUITRY. THE EXCESS THROTTLE PRESSURE CIRCUIT DID NOT PROVIDE A PROTECTIVE FUNCTION. THE ORIGINAL CIRCUIT WAS PROVIDED TO ACCOUNT FOR VARIATIONS IN THE STEAM FLOW THROUGH THE CONTROL VALVES AS THE STEAM LINE PRESSURE DECREASES FROM NO LOAD TO FULL LOAD. THE EFFECT OF THIS CIRCUIT WAS DETERMINED TO BE NEGLIGIBLE AND WAS THEREFORE DELETED.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE MAIN TURBINE IS DISCUSSED IN FSAR SECTION 10.2. THE EXCESS THROTTLE PRESSURE CIRCUIT IS NOT ADDRESSED IN THIS DISCUSSION. THE OPERATION OF THE MAIN TURBINE IS NOT AFFECTED BY DELETION OF THIS CONTROL CIRCUIT.

CIRCUIT. THE DELETION DOES NOT IMPACT THE MAIN TURBINE TRIPPING AND OVERSPEED FUNCTIONS REQUIRED BY THE PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS.

SUBJECT: MDD 92-VAM021,REVISION 0,SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THE "DEMIN WATER LOW PRESSURE" ALARM IN THE CONTROL ROOM WAS ORIGINALLY DESIGNED TO ALARM ON A LOW HEADER PRESSURE CONCURRENT WITH AT LEAST ONE OF THREE DEMIN PUMPS OPERATING. AN INTERLOCK EXISTED TO PREVENT CONTROL ROOM ANNUNCIATION ON LOW HEADER PRESSURE WITH NO PUMPS RUNNING. THIS COULD LEAD TO A SITUATION WHEREBY ALL THREE PUMPS ARE LOST AND HEADER PRESSURE DROPS WITHOUT CONTROL ROOM ANNUNCIATION. THIS INTERLOCK WAS DEFEATED (JUMPER INSTALLED).

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE DEMINERALIZED WATER MAKE-UP SYSTEM IS DISCUSSED IN FSAR SECTION 9.2.3. THE DEMINERALIZED WATER TRANSFER PUMPS ARE DISCUSSED BRIEFLY IN THIS SECTION HOWEVER THE CONTROL LOGIC ASSOCIATED WITH THE PUMPS IS NOT ADDRESSED. THE DELETION OF THE INTERLOCK PROVIDES MORE RELIABILITY FOR THE ALARM CIRCUIT TO DETECT LOW PRESSURE CONDITIONS. THE DEMINERALIZED WATER MAKE-UP SYSTEM IS NOT THE TOPIC OF ANY PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION.

SUBJECT: MDD 92-V1M025,REVISION 0,SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: A 1/2" PULSATION DAMPENER WAS INSTALLED BETWEEN ROOT VALVE 4X-947 AND PRESSURE INDICATOR PI-17377 LOCATED ON THE TPCCW SUCTION LINE. THE DAMPENER WAS ADDED TO REDUCE RAPID INDICATOR POINTER MOVEMENT INDUCED BY VIBRATION OF THE TPCCW SUCTION PIPING TO REDUCE THE INCIDENCE OF INDICATOR FAILURE RESULTING IN RECALIBRATION OR REPLACEMENT.

SAFETY EVALUATION: TPCCW SYSTEM FUNCTION AND OPERATION IS DESCRIBED IN FSAR SECTION 9.2.10. THE DISCUSSION DOES NOT PROVIDE THE LEVEL OF DETAIL TO INCLUDE A DESCRIPTION OF LOCALLY MOUNTED INSTRUMENTATION. THE ADDITION OF A DAMPENER DOES NOT AFFECT INDICATOR OPERATION. THE TURBINE PLANT CLOSED COOLING WATER SYSTEM IS NOT A SAFETY RELATED SYSTEM AND IS NOT ADDRESSED IN THE PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS.

SUBJECT: MDD 92-V2M026,REVISION 0,SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: BLIND FLANGES USED FOR LLRT CONNECTIONS FOR PENETRATION 84 WERE REMOVED AND REPLACED WITH THREADED PIPE CAPS. THIS REDUCED STAY TIMES (ALARA) IN CONTAINMENT WHICH WERE PREVIOUSLY REQUIRED DUE TO THE TORQUEING REQUIREMENTS ASSOCIATED WITH THE FLANGES. THREADED PIPE CAPS WERE INSTALLED ON UNIT 1.

SAFETY EVALUATION: FSAR SECTION 9.4.6 DISCUSSES THE FUNCTION AND OPERATION OF THE CONTAINMENT BUILDING VENTILATION SYSTEMS. THE CHANGE IMPLEMENTED UNDER THIS MDD DOES NOT IMPACT THIS DESCRIPTION. LLRT TESTING IS DESCRIBED IN FSAR SECTION 6.2. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS CHANGE DOES NOT IMPACT ANY PORTION OF THIS DISCUSSION. THE REQUIREMENTS SPECIFIED UNDER TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.6.1.2, "QUARTERLY LEAKAGE TEST" ARE NOT AFFECTED BY THE CHANGE.

SUBJECT: MDD 92-V1M027,REVISION 0,SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: FLOW TRANSMITTERS 1FT-6131, 6171 AND 6172 (MAIN STEAM FLOW TO THE MOISTURE SEPARATOR REHEATERS) HAVE BEEN RECALIBRATED TO CORRESPOND TO THE ACTUAL DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE PRODUCED BY THE ASSOCIATED ORIFICES. PREVIOUS CALIBRATION METHOD WAS INCORRECT CAUSING THE INDICATORS TO READ LOWER THAN ACTUAL. THE NEW RANGE IS 0 TO 500,000 #/HR. INDICATOR SCALES HAVE BEEN REPLACED AND PROTEUS POINTS RECALIBRATED.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE MOISTURE SEPARATOR/REHEATERS ARE INCLUDED AS PART OF THE DISCUSSION IN FSAR SECTION 10.2 ON THE MAIN TURBINE. THE HEATING STEAM FLOW LOOPS ARE NOT DISCUSSED. PLANT PROCEDURES HAVE BEEN REVISED TO ALLOW FOR PROPER CALIBRATION. THE MAIN TURBINE MSR REHEATERS AND ASSOCIATED INSTRUMENTATION ARE NOT THE TOPIC OF ANY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION.

SUBJECT: MDD 92-V2M028,REVISION 0,SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: FLOW TRANSMITTERS 2FT-6131, 6171 AND 6172 (MAIN STEAM FLOW TO THE MOISTURE SEPARATOR REHEATERS) HAVE BEEN RECALIBRATED TO CORRESPOND TO THE ACTUAL DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE PRODUCED BY THE ASSOCIATED ORIFICES. PREVIOUS CALIBRATION METHOD WAS INCORRECT CAUSING THE INDICATORS TO READ LOWER THAN ACTUAL. THE NEW RANGE IS 0 TO 500,000 #/HR. INDICATOR SCALES HAVE BEEN REPLACED AND PROTEUS POINTS RECALIBRATED.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE MOISTURE SEPARATOR/REHEATERS ARE INCLUDED AS PART OF THE DISCUSSION IN FSAR SECTION 10.2 ON THE MAIN TURBINE. THE HEATING STEAM FLOW LOOPS ARE NOT DISCUSSED. PLANT PROCEDURES HAVE BEEN REVISED TO ALLOW FOR PROPER CALIBRATION. THE MAIN TURBINE MSR REHEATERS AND ASSOCIATED INSTRUMENTATION ARE NOT THE TOPIC OF ANY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION.

SUBJECT: MDD 92-V2M030,REVISION 0,SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THE CLOCK SYNCHRONIZATION CIRCUIT BETWEEN THE PLANT COMPUTER AND THE ERF COMPUTER DID NOT FUNCTION CORRECTLY CAUSING UNDESIRABLE CALCULATIONAL INACCURACIES ON PROTEUS (ERF COMPUTER UPDATES THE CLOCK ON PROTEUS TO SYNCHRONIZE THE TWO SYSTEMS). THE CHANGE DELETED THE DESIGN FOR THE AUTOMATIC CLOCK SYNCHRONIZATION OF THE TWO COMPUTERS AND DELETED THE FIELD WIRING BETWEEN THE TWO COMPUTERS ASSOCIATED WITH THE CIRCUIT.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE CLOCK SYNCHRONIZATION CIRCUIT IS NOT ADDRESSED IN THE DESCRIPTION OF THE COMPUTER SYSTEMS PROVIDED FOR IN FSAR SECTIONS 7.5 "INFORMATION SYSTEMS IMPORTANT TO SAFETY" AND 7.7 "CONTROL SYSTEMS NOT REQUIRED FOR SAFETY". THE DELETION OF THE CIRCUIT DOES NOT INVOLVE THE COMPUTER FUNCTIONS USED TO MEET ANY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION DEFINED IN 3/4.1.3, 3/4.2.1, 3/4.3.3.2 AND TABLE 4.3-1.

SUBJECT: MDD 92-V2M032,REVISION 0,SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THE USE OF FISHER MODEL 4211 POSITION TRANSMITTERS IN PLACE OF MODEL 3552 TRANSMITTERS WAS APPROVED BY THIS CHANGE. THE TRANSMITTERS AFFECTED BY THIS CHANGE ARE ASSOCIATED WITH THE MAIN STEAM ISOLATION VALVE BYPASS VALVES (2HV-13005C, 2HV-13006C, 2HV-13007C AND 2HV-13008C). THE ORIGINALLY SUPPLIED TRANSMITTERS ARE NO LONGER MANUFACTURED AND THE VENDOR RECOMMENDS THE NEW MODEL AS A REPLACEMENT.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THIS ACTIVITY APPROVES THE USE OF AN ALTERNATE POSITION TRANSMITTER HAVING IDENTICAL PERFORMANCE CHARACTERISTICS AS ONE ALREADY INSTALLED ON THE MSIV BYPASS VALVES. THE MAIN STEAM SYSTEM IS ADDRESSED IN FSAR SECTION 10.3. THE LEVEL OF DETAIL CONTAINED WITHIN THIS SECTION DOES NOT PROVIDE INFORMATION CONCERNING POSITION TRANSMITTER MODELS TO BE USED. THE REPLACEMENT MODEL FUNCTIONS IN THE SAME MANNER AS THE PREVIOUSLY INSTALLED MODEL. THE CHANGE DOES NOT IMPACT ANY PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION.

SUBJECT: MDD 92-VAM033,REVISION 0,SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THE CARBON DIOXIDE GENERATOR GAS PURGE SYSTEM USES A REFRIGERATION SYSTEM TO MAINTAIN CO₂ IN THE PRESSURE VESSEL AT APPROXIMATELY 0 DEGREES. A PROBLEM WITH REFRIGERANT MIGRATION INTO THE SUCTION OF THE COMPRESSOR CAUSED SEVERAL COMPRESSORS TO BURN UP. TO CORRECT THIS PROBLEM, A 3/8" INCH SOLENOID VALVE WAS ADDED DOWNSTREAM FROM THE LEVEL GAUGE SIGHT GLASS AND UPSTREAM FROM THE EXPANSION VALVE. THE SOLENOID VALVE RECEIVES POWER UPON COMPRESSOR MOTOR START AND WILL OPEN ON COMPRESSOR START.

SAFETY EVALUATION: FSAR SECTION 10.2 ADDRESSES THE TURBINE-GENERATOR SYSTEM. THE GENERATOR PURGE OPERATION IS NOT SPECIFIC AS TO DETAIL OPERATION OF THE CO₂ COMPRESSOR AND CONTROL CIRCUITRY. THE CARBON DIOXIDE GENERATOR GAS PURGE SYSTEM IS NOT ADDRESSED IN THE PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS.

SUBJECT: MDD 92-V1M035,REVISION 0,SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: WESTINGHOUSE HAS PROVIDED NEW DEFAULT SET POINT VALUES FOR THE DIGITAL METAL IMPACT MONITORING SYSTEM. THESE VALUES ARE FROM A NEW BASELINE STUDY DONE AFTER SYSTEM REWORK DURING 1R3. IN GENERAL, THE SETPOINTS HAVE BEEN LOWERED, INCREASING THE SENSITIVITY OF THE SYSTEM.

SAFETY EVALUATION: FSAR SECTION 4.4.6.4 DETAILS THE FUNCTION OF THE DIGITAL METAL IMPACT MONITORING SYSTEM. THE SETPOINT CHANGE DOES NOT IN ANY WAY CHANGE THE FUNCTION OF THE SYSTEM. THE SETPOINTS ONLY AFFECTS THE SYSTEM ALARM POINT. THE SYSTEM CONTINUES TO FUNCTION AS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR. THE DIGITAL METAL IMPACT MONITORING SYSTEM IS NOT THE ADDRESSED IN TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS.

SUBJECT: MDD 92-V2M037,REVISION 0,SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: PIPING BETWEEN STEAM GENERATOR FEED PUMP TURBINE "2B" HIGH PRESSURE STOP VALVE AND THE HIGH PRESSURE STOP VALVE ABOVE SEAT DRAIN WAS REROUTED TO ELIMINATE FUTURE INTERFERENCES WITH FEED PUMP TURBINE DISASSEMBLY. PREVIOUS CONFIGURATION REQUIRED PIPING TO BE CUT OFF DURING DISASSEMBLY AND THEN REWELDED DURING REASSEMBLY.

SAFETY EVALUATION: FSAR SECTION 10.4.7 "CONDENSATE AND FEEDWATER SYSTEMS" DOES NOT ADDRESS THE ROUTING OF DRAIN LINES NOR DOES THE ROUTING OF THIS LINE APPEAR AS A PART OF ANY DRAWING CONTAINED IN THE FSAR. THE STEAM GENERATOR FEED PUMP TURBINE DRAIN SYSTEM IS NOT THE SUBJECT OF ANY PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION.

SUBJECT: MDD 92-V1M038, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THE SJAE FILTER UNIT INLET, OUTLET AND BYPASS VALVES HAVE A MANUAL OPERATOR THAT IF ENGAGED WILL INHIBIT AUTOMATIC VALVE OPERATION IN RESPONSE TO ITS RESPECTIVE RADIATION ELEMENT. TO PREVENT INADVERTENT INSERTION OF THE MANUAL ACTUATOR ENGAGEMENT KEY, A STAINLESS STEEL SLEEVE WAS INSTALLED OVER THE EXPOSED PORTION OF THE KEY PROVIDING A POSITIVE MEANS OF HOLDING THE MANUAL ACTUATOR OUT OF ENGAGEMENT THEREBY ENSURING VALVE AVAILABILITY FOR AUTOMATIC OPERATION.

SAFETY EVALUATION: FSAR SECTION 9.4.4 PROVIDES A DESCRIPTION OF THE STEAM JET AIR EJECTOR EXHAUST FILTRATION SYSTEM. AS THE ADDITION OF THE SLEEVE DOES NOT AFFECT VALVE OPERATION THE DESCRIPTION GIVEN IN THE SECTION IS NOT AFFECTED. THE SJAE EXHAUST FILTRATION SYSTEM IS NOT SPECIFICALLY ADDRESSED IN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS, ALTHOUGH SPECIFICATION 3.11.2.4 DOES DESCRIBE OPERABILITY REQUIREMENTS FOR THE "VENTILATION EXHAUST TREATMENT SYSTEM" OF WHICH THE SJAE FILTER UNIT FORMS A PART OF. THE CHANGE DOES NOT IMPACT THE ABILITY OF THE SYSTEM TO PERFORM ITS DESIGN FUNCTION TO CLOSE THE BYPASS VALVE AND OPEN THE INLET AND OUTLET VALVES UPON RECEIPT OF HIGH RADIATION IN THE TURBINE BUILDING VENT LINE..

SUBJECT: MDD 92-V2M039, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THE SJAE FILTER UNIT INLET, OUTLET AND BYPASS VALVES HAVE A MANUAL OPERATOR THAT IF ENGAGED WILL INHIBIT AUTOMATIC VALVE OPERATION IN RESPONSE TO ITS RESPECTIVE RADIATION ELEMENT. TO PREVENT INADVERTENT INSERTION OF THE MANUAL ACTUATOR ENGAGEMENT KEY, A STAINLESS STEEL SLEEVE WAS INSTALLED OVER THE EXPOSED PORTION OF THE KEY PROVIDING A POSITIVE MEANS OF HOLDING THE MANUAL ACTUATOR OUT OF ENGAGEMENT THEREBY ENSURING VALVE AVAILABILITY FOR AUTOMATIC OPERATION.

SAFETY EVALUATION: FSAR SECTION 9.4.4 PROVIDES A DESCRIPTION OF THE STEAM JET AIR EJECTOR EXHAUST FILTRATION SYSTEM. AS THE ADDITION OF THE SLEEVE DOES NOT AFFECT VALVE OPERATION THE DESCRIPTION GIVEN IN THE SECTION IS NOT AFFECTED. THE SJAE EXHAUST FILTRATION SYSTEM IS NOT SPECIFICALLY ADDRESSED IN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS, ALTHOUGH SPECIFICATION 3.11.2.4 DOES DESCRIBE OPERABILITY REQUIREMENTS FOR THE "VENTILATION EXHAUST TREATMENT SYSTEM" OF WHICH THE SJAE FILTER UNIT FORMS A PART OF. THE CHANGE DOES NOT IMPACT THE ABILITY OF THE SYSTEM TO PERFORM ITS DESIGN FUNCTION TO

CLOSE THE BYPASS VALVE AND OPEN THE INLET AND OUTLET VALVES UPON RECEIPT OF HIGH RADIATION IN THE TURBINE BUILDING VENT LINE.

SUBJECT: 92-V2M042,REVISION 0,SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THE ORIGINALLY INSTALLED KRATOS FREQUENCY RELAY SUPPLIED BY WESTINGHOUSE AND USED IN NON-1E INVERTERS IS OBSOLETE AND HAS BEEN REPLACED BY A PHAOSTRON FREQUENCY RELAY. INSTALLATION OF THE NEW RELAY REQUIRED A CHANGE IN THE WIRING CONFIGURATION FOR THE INVERTER. THE NEW RELAY FUNCTIONS THE SAME AS THE OLD RELAY BUT REQUIRES WIRING CHANGES.

SAFETY EVALUATION: REPLACEMENT OF AN OBSOLETE FREQUENCY RELAY WITH NEW RELAY WILL NOT RESULT IN A CHANGE TO THE PLANT AS DESCRIBED IN FSAR SECTION 8.3. THE NEW RELAY REQUIRES ADDITIONAL WIRING CHANGES BUT WILL FUNCTION IN THE SAME MANNER AS THE OBSOLETE PART. THE SYSTEM WILL BE OPERATED AS BEFORE. PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3/4.8 ADDRESSES ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS BUT DOES NOT PLACE REQUIREMENTS ON RELAY TYPES USED. AS SYSTEM FUNCTION IS UNCHANGED, TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS IS NOT IMPACTED.

SUBJECT: MDD 92-V1M045,REVISION 0,SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THE ORIGINAL PLANT DESIGN FOR CIRCULATING WATER CHEMICAL ADDITION CONSISTED OF AN INJECTION MANIFOLD THAT CROSSED THE CIRCULATING WATER FLUME (CANAL) TO ALLOW FOR EVEN DISTRIBUTION OF CHEMICALS. THE USE OF THIS MANIFOLD AS A CHEMICAL ADDITION METHOD HAS BEEN ABANDONED. THE INJECTION MANIFOLD HAS BEEN REMOVED TO PERMIT THE USE OF MECHANIZED EQUIPMENT TO CLEAN THE FLUME WITHOUT MANIFOLD INTERFERENCE.

SAFETY EVALUATION: FSAR SECTION 10.4.5 DESCRIBES THE OPERATION AND FUNCTION OF THE CIRCULATING WATER SYSTEM. THE DISCUSSION DOES NOT SPECIFY THE REQUIREMENTS FOR CHEMICAL ADDITION LOCATION OR METHOD. THE ORIGINAL SYSTEM HAS BEEN SUPERCEDED BY A NEW CHEMICAL INJECTION SYSTEM. IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS CHANGE DOES NOT AFFECT ANY SAFETY RELATED SYSTEM OF FUNCTION OF A SAFETY RELATED SYSTEM. THE CIRCULATING WATER SYSTEM IS NOT THE TOPIC OF ANY PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION.

SUBJECT: MDD 92-V2M044,REVISION 0,SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THE ORIGINAL PLANT DESIGN FOR CIRCULATING WATER CHEMICAL ADDITION CONSISTED OF AN INJECTION MANIFOLD THAT CROSSED THE CIRCULATING WATER FLUME (CANAL) TO ALLOW FOR EVEN DISTRIBUTION OF CHEMICALS. THE USE OF THIS MANIFOLD AS A CHEMICAL ADDITION METHOD HAS BEEN ABANDONED. THE INJECTION MANIFOLD HAS BEEN REMOVED TO PERMIT THE USE OF MECHANIZED EQUIPMENT TO CLEAN THE FLUME WITHOUT MANIFOLD INTERFERENCE.

SAFETY EVALUATION: FSAR SECTION 10.4.5 DESCRIBES THE OPERATION AND FUNCTION OF THE CIRCULATING WATER SYSTEM. THE DISCUSSION DOES NOT SPECIFY THE REQUIREMENTS FOR CHEMICAL ADDITION LOCATION OR METHOD. THE ORIGINAL SYSTEM HAS BEEN SUPERCEDED BY A NEW CHEMICAL INJECTION SYSTEM. IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS CHANGE DOES NOT AFFECT ANY SAFETY RELATED SYSTEM

OF FUNCTION OF A SAFETY RELATED SYSTEM. THE CIRCULATING WATER SYSTEM IS NOT THE TOPIC OF ANY PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION.

SUBJECT: MDD 92-V2M047,REVISION 0,SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: CONFIGURATION OF THE PROTECTIVE SHROUD ATTACHMENT CLIPS ON THE 24" EXTRACTION STEAM BELLOWS LOCATED IN THE MAIN CONDENSERS WERE CHANGED FROM FOUR EQUALLY SPACED CLIPS TO A CONFIGURATION USING SIX EQUALLY SPACED CLIPS IN AN EFFORT TO PREVENT SHROUD DAMAGE FROM STEAM FLOW INDUCED VIBRATION.

SAFETY EVALUATION: FSAR SECTIONS 1.2.4 "STEAM AND POWER CONVERSION", 10.2 "TURBINE-GENERATOR" AND 10.4 "OTHER FEATURES OF STEAM AND POWER CONVERSION" DO NOT DESCRIBE THE EXTRACTION STEAM EXPANSION BELLOWS TO THE EXTENT OF SPECIFYING SHROUD ATTACHMENT CLIP ARRANGEMENT. THE EXTRACTION STEAM EXPANSION BELLOWS IS NOT ADDRESSED IN PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS (REFERENCE 3/4.7 "TURBINE CYCLES").

SUBJECT: MDD 92-V1M048,REVISION 0,SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: UNITED ELECTRIC TEMPERATURE INDICATING SWITCHES REQUIRE REPEATED CUTTING AND RE-SPLICING OF THE FIELD WIRE DURING REMOVAL FOR INSTRUMENT CALIBRATION. THIS CHANGE ALLOWS THE USE OF AN EGS CABLE CONNECTOR TO BE USED AS AN ALTERNATE TO THE RAYCHEM HEAT SHRINK SPLICE TO FACILITATE INSTRUMENT REMOVAL. DRAWING 1X3D-AA-A00V (SHEET 2 OF 4) INCORPORATES THIS SUBSTITUTION FOR NON IE FIELD WIRE TERMINATION APPLICATIONS.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE EGS CABLE CONNECTOR, LIKE THE RAYCHEM HEAT SHRINK SPLICE, WILL PROVIDE THE INSULATING PROPERTY COMPATIBLE TO THAT OF THE FIELD WIRES. THIS ALTERNATE CABLE CONNECTOR WILL NEITHER CHANGE THE INTENT OF THE ORIGINAL DESIGN, CONCERNING FIELD WIRE TERMINATION, NOR AFFECT THE INSTRUMENT AND CONTROL FUNCTION OF THE SWITCHES. THIS CHANGE DOES NOT IMPACT ANY DISCUSSION CONTAINED IN THE FSAR DUE TO THE NATURE OF THE CHANGE.

SUBJECT: MDD 92-V2M051,REVISION 0,SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: UNITED ELECTRIC TEMPERATURE INDICATING SWITCHES REQUIRE REPEATED CUTTING AND RE-SPLICING OF THE FIELD WIRE DURING REMOVAL FOR INSTRUMENT CALIBRATION. THIS CHANGE ALLOWS THE USE OF AN EGS CABLE CONNECTOR TO BE USED AS AN ALTERNATE TO THE RAYCHEM HEAT SHRINK SPLICE TO FACILITATE INSTRUMENT REMOVAL. DRAWING 2X3D-AA-A00V (SHEET 2 OF 4) INCORPORATES THIS SUBSTITUTION FOR NON IE FIELD WIRE TERMINATION APPLICATIONS.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE EGS CABLE CONNECTOR, LIKE THE RAYCHEM HEAT SHRINK SPLICE, WILL PROVIDE THE INSULATING PROPERTY COMPATIBLE TO THAT OF THE FIELD WIRES. THIS ALTERNATE CABLE CONNECTOR WILL NEITHER CHANGE THE INTENT OF THE ORIGINAL DESIGN, CONCERNING FIELD WIRE TERMINATION, NOR AFFECT THE INSTRUMENT AND CONTROL FUNCTION OF THE SWITCHES. THIS CHANGE

DOES NOT IMPACT ANY DISCUSSION CONTAINED IN THE FSAR DUE TO THE NATURE OF THE CHANGE.

SUBJECT: MDD 92-V1M052,REVISION 0,SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THE ROTARY COMPRESSORS UTILIZE OUTLET AIR FROM THEIR RESPECTIVE SUMP/SEPARATOR TO SUPPLY CONTROL AIR FOR COMPRESSOR OPERATION. ALTHOUGH THIS AIR HAS BEEN FILTERED BY THE PRIMARY AND SECONDARY ELEMENTS ON THE COMPRESSOR DISCHARGE, A SMALL AMOUNT OF MOISTURE/CONTAMINATION PASSES THROUGH TO THE CONTROL SYSTEM RESULTING IN CONTROL SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS. THE ADDITION OF THE INLINE FILTER IN THE CONTROL SYSTEM SUPPLY WILL GREATLY ENHANCE CONTROL SYSTEM OPERATION.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE INSTRUMENT/SERVICE AIR SYSTEM IS DESCRIBED IN FSAR SECTION 9.3.1. THE ADDITION OF THE FILTER IMPROVES CONTROL SYSTEM OPERATION WITHOUT ALTERING THE SYSTEM DESIGN FUNCTION. THE PLANT IS DESIGNED SUCH THAT NO PLANT EQUIPMENT RELIES UPON INSTRUMENT AIR TO PERFORM ITS SAFETY RELATED FUNCTION. THE SERVICE/INSTRUMENT AIR SYSTEM IS NOT ADDRESSED IN THE PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS.

SUBJECT: MDD 92-V2M053,REVISION 0,SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THE ROTARY COMPRESSORS UTILIZE OUTLET AIR FROM THEIR RESPECTIVE SUMP/SEPARATOR TO SUPPLY CONTROL AIR FOR COMPRESSOR OPERATION. ALTHOUGH THIS AIR HAS BEEN FILTERED BY THE PRIMARY AND SECONDARY ELEMENTS ON THE COMPRESSOR DISCHARGE, A SMALL AMOUNT OF MOISTURE/CONTAMINATION PASSES THROUGH TO THE CONTROL SYSTEM RESULTING IN CONTROL SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS. THE ADDITION OF THE INLINE FILTER IN THE CONTROL SYSTEM SUPPLY WILL GREATLY ENHANCE CONTROL SYSTEM OPERATION.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE INSTRUMENT/SERVICE AIR SYSTEM IS DESCRIBED IN FSAR SECTION 9.3.1. THE ADDITION OF THE FILTER IMPROVES CONTROL SYSTEM OPERATION WITHOUT ALTERING THE SYSTEM DESIGN FUNCTION. THE PLANT IS DESIGNED SUCH THAT NO PLANT EQUIPMENT RELIES UPON INSTRUMENT AIR TO PERFORM ITS SAFETY RELATED FUNCTION. THE SERVICE/INSTRUMENT AIR SYSTEM IS NOT ADDRESSED IN THE PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS.

SUBJECT: MDD 92-V2M058,REVISION 0,SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THE FIELD INPUT FOR COMPUTER POINT Q2832 "MAIN GEN VARS" WAS MOVED FROM I/O CABINET 05A TO I/O CABINET 03B AND THE ORIGINAL BRIDGE NETWORK WAS REPLACED THROUGH THE USE OF A PRECISION 10K OHM RESISTOR ACROSS THE TRANSDUCER INPUT LEADS. THIS CHANGE ENABLES THE COMPUTER THE ABILITY TO PROPERLY INDICATE GENERATOR VARS.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE CHANGE AFFECTS THE COMPUTER INDICATION CIRCUIT ASSOCIATED WITH GENERATOR VAR'S. IT DOES NOT AFFECT THE FSAR DESCRIPTIONS RELATED TO THE FUNCTIONS PERFORMED BY THE COMPUTER SYSTEM IN SECTIONS 7.5.3.6, 7.7.1.3.1, 7.7.1.3.4, 7.7.1.9 AND 7.7.2. THE CHANGE ALLOWS COMPUTER POINT Q2832 TO BE CALIBRATED CORRECTLY, RESULTING IN PROPER INDICATION ON THE COMPUTER SYSTEM. THE CHANGE DID NOT INVOLVE COMPUTER SYSTEM

FUNCTIONS USED TO MEET THE REQUIREMENTS SPECIFIED IN PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 3/4/1/3, 3/4.2.1, 3/4.3.3.2 AND TABLE 4.3-1.

SUBJECT: MDD 92-V1M061,REVISION 0,SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: VENT VALVES WERE ADDED TO THE STATOR COOLING WATER DEIONIZER TANK AND FILTER HOUSING. THE VALVES REPLACED THE EXISTING VENT PLUGS. THE ADDITION WILL PERMIT SAFER AND EASIER OPERATION WHEN PLACING THE EQUIPMENT IN AND OUT OF SERVICE.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE STATOR COOLING WATER SYSTEM IS DISCUSSED IN FSAR SECTION 10.2. THE ADDITION OF THE VENT VALVES DOES NOT IMPACT THE DESCRIPTION CONTAINED IN THIS SECTION. THE STATOR COOLING WATER IS NOT ADDRESSED IN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS.

SUBJECT: MDD 92-V2M062,REVISION 0,SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: VENT VALVES WERE ADDED TO THE STATOR COOLING WATER DEIONIZER TANK AND FILTER HOUSING. THE VALVES REPLACED THE EXISTING VENT PLUGS. THE ADDITION WILL PERMIT SAFER AND EASIER OPERATION WHEN PLACING THE EQUIPMENT IN AND OUT OF SERVICE.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE STATOR COOLING WATER SYSTEM IS DISCUSSED IN FSAR SECTION 10.2. THE ADDITION OF THE VENT VALVES DOES NOT IMPACT THE DESCRIPTION CONTAINED IN THIS SECTION. THE STATOR COOLING WATER IS NOT ADDRESSED IN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS.

SUBJECT: MDD 92-V2M063,REVISION 0,SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: INSTRUMENT LOOPS 2P-2560 AND 2P-2561, ELECTRICAL PENETRATION AREA PRESSURE HAD BEEN PREVIOUSLY DELETED HOWEVER, THE ASSOCIATED CONTROL LOOPS IN THE 7300 BOP PROTECTION RACK QPP1 AND QPP2 WERE LEFT IN PLACE. THE CONTROL LOOPS SERVE NO FUNCTION AND WERE THEREFORE DELETED.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE CONTROL BUILDING ELECTRICAL PENETRATION FILTER EXHAUST SYSTEM IS DISCUSSED IN FSAR SECTION 9.4.5. THE SYSTEM WAS DELETED IN 1987. THESE CHANGES DELETE THE CONTROL LOOPS ASSOCIATED WITH THIS SYSTEM AS THEY ARE NO LONGER REQUIRED. LDCR FS 92-039 PROVIDED AN UPDATE TO THE FSAR TO REFLECT CURRENT PLANT CONFIGURATION. THE CHANGE DOES NOT IMPACT ANY PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION.

SUBJECT: MDD 92-V1M065,REVISION 0,SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THE ORIGINAL DESIGN CONFIGURATION OF THE COMBINED INTERMEDIATE VALVES (CIVS) ON THE MAIN TURBINE DID NOT INCLUDE INDIVIDUAL ISOLATION VALVES IN THE EHC LINES [FAS (FLUID ACTUATOR SUPPLY) & ETS (EMERGENCY TRIP SYSTEM)] TO PERMIT ON-LINE MAINTENANCE. 1" LOCKED OPEN BALL VALVES HAVE BEEN ADDED IN EACH ETS AND FAS LINES TO EACH INTERCEPT AND INTERMEDIATE STOP VALVE TO PERMIT VALVE ISOLATION.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE TURBINE GENERATOR IS DESCRIBED IN FSAR SECTION 10.2. THE ADDITION OF THE ISOLATION VALVES WILL NOT IMPACT THIS DISCUSSION HOWEVER FSAR FIGURE 10.2.2-4 WILL BE REVISED UNDER LDCR 92-058 TO SHOW THE ADDITIONAL VALVES. THE ADDITION OF THE VALVES WILL NOT AFFECT SYSTEM OR VALVE OPERATION. STATION TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS REQUIRE THE MAIN TURBINE TRIP AND OVERSPEED PROTECTION FUNCTIONS. THIS CHANGE DOES NOT IMPACT THIS SPECIFICATION.

SUBJECT: MDD 92-V2M066,REVISION 0,SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THE CONTROL CIRCUITRY FOR THE AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP HOUSE NON-ESF SUPPLY FAN (2-1593-B7-003)WAS MODIFIED TO ALLOW THE FAN TO BE SECURED FROM THE CONTROL ROOM FOLLOWING AUTO START ON HIGH ROOM TEMPERATURE. THE PREVIOUS WIRING CONFIGURATION PREVENTED SECURING THE FAN FROM THE CONTROL ROOM HANDSWITCH. THE FAN WOULD ONLY STOP IF ROOM TEMPERATURE DROPPED BELOW 60 DEGREES FOLLOWING AN AUTO START.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE NON-ESF AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP HOUSE HVAC SYSTEM IS DESCRIBED IN FSAR SECTION 9.4.8. THIS DISCUSSION DID NOT INCLUDE A DESCRIPTION OF THE SUPPLY FAN START/STOP INTERLOCKS THEREFORE THERE IS NO IMPACT ON THE FSAR. THE AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP HOUSE NON-ESF SYSTEM IS NOT ADDRESSED UNDER ANY PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION.

SUBJECT: MDD 92-V1M069,REVISION 0,SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THE CONDUCTORS FOR THE OPEN AND CLOSED LIMIT SWITCHES OF ATMOSPHERIC RELIEF VALVE 2PV-3030 ARE ROLLED AT THE LOCAL TERMINATION CABINET. THIS RESULTED IN THE OPEN LIMIT SWITCH CONDUCTORS FEEDING A VALVE CLOSED ERF POINT AND THE CONDUCTORS OF THE CLOSED LIMIT SWITCH FEEDING THE OPEN ERF POINT. THE CONDUCTORS WERE ROLLED TO THE PROPER POSITION TO PROVIDE THE CORRECT VALVE POSITION INDICATION.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE ATMOSPHERIC RELIEF VALVES ARE DESCRIBED IN FSAR SECTION 10.3,"MAIN STEAM SUPPLY SYSTEM". THE CORRECTION TO THE WIRING DISCREPANCY DOES NOT IMPACT VALVE OPERATION OR FUNCTION AS DESCRIBED IN THIS SECTION. THE CHANGE CORRECTED VALVE POSITION INDICATION ONLY. THE ERF SYSTEM DOES NOT PROVIDE ANY SAFETY RELATED FUNCTION AND IS NOT DISCUSSED IN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS.

SUBJECT: MDD 92-V2M070,REVISION 0,SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THE CONDUCTORS FOR THE OPEN AND CLOSED LIMIT SWITCHES OF ATMOSPHERIC RELIEF VALVE 1PV-3030 ARE ROLLED AT THE LOCAL TERMINATION CABINET. THIS RESULTED IN THE OPEN LIMIT SWITCH CONDUCTORS FEEDING A VALVE CLOSED ERF POINT AND THE CONDUCTORS OF THE CLOSED LIMIT SWITCH FEEDING THE OPEN ERF POINT. THE CONDUCTORS WERE ROLLED TO THE PROPER POSITION TO PROVIDE THE CORRECT VALVE POSITION INDICATION.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE ATMOSPHERIC RELIEF VALVES ARE DESCRIBED IN FSAR SECTION 10.3,"MAIN STEAM SUPPLY SYSTEM". THE CORRECTION TO THE WIRING DISCREPANCY DOES NOT IMPACT VALVE OPERATION OR FUNCTION AS DESCRIBED IN

THIS SECTION. THE CHANGE CORRECTED VALVE POSITION INDICATION ONLY. THE ERF SYSTEM DOES NOT PROVIDE ANY SAFETY RELATED FUNCTION AND IS NOT DISCUSSED IN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS.

SUBJECT: MDD 92-V1M071,REVISION 0,SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: INADVERTENT PUSHING OF THE CONTROL BOARD ANNUNCIATOR TEST BUTTON DISRUPTS OPERATIONS AND DISTRACTS OPERATING PERSONNEL. TO PREVENT THIS, A TEST BUTTON COVER ON THE CONTROL ROOM ANNUNCIATOR ACK., RESET AND TEST SWITCH PUSHBUTTONS WAS INSTALLED.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE ADDITION OF A COVER TO PREVENT INADVERTENT DEPRESSION OF THE ANNUNCIATOR ACK, TEST AND RESET PUSHBUTTONS DOES NOT AFFECT THE FUNCTION OR OPERABILITY OF THESE SWITCHES. THE ADDITION OF THE COVER DOES NOT IMPACT ANY STATION TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION.

SUBJECT: MDD 92-V2M072,REVISION 0,SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: INADVERTENT PUSHING OF THE CONTROL BOARD ANNUNCIATOR TEST BUTTON DISRUPTS OPERATIONS AND DISTRACTS OPERATING PERSONNEL. TO PREVENT THIS, A TEST BUTTON COVER ON THE CONTROL ROOM ANNUNCIATOR ACK., RESET AND TEST SWITCH PUSHBUTTONS WAS INSTALLED.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE ADDITION OF A COVER TO PREVENT INADVERTENT DEPRESSION OF THE ANNUNCIATOR ACK, TEST AND RESET PUSHBUTTONS DOES NOT AFFECT THE FUNCTION OR OPERABILITY OF THESE SWITCHES. THE ADDITION OF THE COVER DOES NOT IMPACT ANY STATION TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION.

SUBJECT: MDD 92-V1M077,REVISION 0,SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: LARGE AMOUNTS OF CONDENSATION COLLECT UPSTREAM OF THE CONDENSER VACUUM PUMPS ISOLATION AOV'S DURING PLANT OPERATION. SUBSEQUENT VACUUM PUMP STARTUP HAS RESULTED IN SEVERE PUMP DAMAGE. TO ALLEVIATE THIS PROBLEM, A 200 GALLON VENTABLE COLLECTION CHAMBER WAS ADDED FOR EACH PUMP. THE CHAMBER BECOMES THE NEW SYSTEM LOW POINT. CHAMBER DRAINS AND ISOLATION VALVES ARE PROVIDED TO THE TURBINE BUILDING FLOOR DRAIN SYSTEM. SEVERAL ONE INCH DRAIN CONNECTIONS WERE ADDED AT LOCATIONS WHERE CONDENSATION COLLECTS. DRAINS WERE ROUTED TO THE COLLECTION CHAMBER.

SAFETY EVALUATION: FSAR SECTION 10.4.2 DISCUSSES THE FUNCTION AND OPERATION OF THE MAIN CONDENSER EVACUATION SYSTEM. THE MECHANICAL VACUUM PUMPS ARE DISCUSSED IN THIS SECTION HOWEVER, NOT TO THE DETAIL ASSOCIATED WITH THIS CHANGE. FIGURE 10.4.2-1 WILL BE CHANGED (LDCR FS 92-093) TO REFLECT THE ADDITION OF THESE DRAIN VALVES AND DRAIN CHAMBER TO THE VACUUM PUMP SUCTION LINES. OPERATIONS PROCEDURES HAVE BEEN CHANGED TO REFLECT THIS ADDITION. THE CHANGE TO THE CONDENSER AIR EJECTION SYSTEM DOES NOT AFFECT ANY PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION.

SUBJECT: MDD 92-V2M078,REVISION 0,SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: LARGE AMOUNTS OF CONDENSATION COLLECT UPSTREAM OF THE CONDENSER VACUUM PUMPS ISOLATION AOV'S DURING PLANT OPERATION. SUBSEQUENT VACUUM PUMP STARTUP HAS RESULTED IN SEVERE PUMP DAMAGE. TO ALLEVIATE THIS PROBLEM, A 200 GALLON VENTABLE COLLECTION CHAMBER WAS ADDED FOR EACH PUMP. THE CHAMBER BECOMES THE NEW SYSTEM LOW POINT. CHAMBER DRAINS AND ISOLATION VALVES ARE PROVIDED TO THE TURBINE BUILDING FLOOR DRAIN SYSTEM. SEVERAL ONE INCH DRAIN CONNECTIONS WERE ADDED AT LOCATIONS WHERE CONDENSATION COLLECTS. DRAINS WERE ROUTED TO THE COLLECTION CHAMBER.

SAFETY EVALUATION: FSAR SECTION 10.4.2 DISCUSSES THE FUNCTION AND OPERATION OF THE MAIN CONDENSER EVACUATION SYSTEM. THE MECHANICAL VACUUM PUMPS ARE DISCUSSED IN THIS SECTION HOWEVER, NOT TO THE DETAIL ASSOCIATED WITH THIS CHANGE. FIGURE 10.4.2-1 WILL BE CHANGED (LDCR FS 92-093) TO REFLECT THE ADDITION OF THESE DRAIN VALVES AND DRAIN CHAMBER TO THE VACUUM PUMP SUCTION LINES. OPERATIONS PROCEDURES HAVE BEEN CHANGED TO REFLECT THIS ADDITION. THE CHANGE TO THE CONDENSER AIR EJECTION SYSTEM DOES NOT AFFECT ANY PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION.

SUBJECT: MDD 92-V2M080, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THE ORIGINALLY INSTALLED WHITEY SERIES TFE PACKED VALVES IN THE UNIT 2 PASS PANEL (VALVES HV-3709, 3710, 3711, 3712, 3714, 3717 AND 3726) WERE REPLACED WITH IDENTICAL VALVES WITH A UHWPE (ULTRA HIGH MOLECULAR WEIGHT POLYETHYLENE) TYPE PACKING WHICH IS BETTER SUITED TO THE TYPE OF ENVIRONMENT SEEN IN THE PASS SYSTEM.

SAFETY EVALUATION: CHANGING THE TYPE OF PACKING UTILIZED IN THE PASS SYSTEM VALVES DOES NOT REQUIRE A CHANGE TO THE PLANT AS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR OR A REVISION TO ANY PORTION OF THE FSAR. THE POST ACCIDENT SAMPLING SYSTEM IS DESCRIBED IN FSAR SECTION 9.3.2. THE SECTION DOES NOT MAKE REFERENCE TO NOR DOES IT SPECIFY PACKING REQUIREMENTS FOR THE VALVES. THE PASS SYSTEM IS DISCUSSED IN TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION SECTION 6.0 HOWEVER NOT TO THE DETAIL DEFINED BY THIS CHANGE.

SUBJECT: MDD 92-V1M081, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: AN IN-LINE, ADJUSTABLE, NEEDLE VALVE SNUBBER WAS INSTALLED IN THE SUCTION PRESSURE INDICATOR (PI-10634) FOR THE REFUELING WATER PURIFICATION PUMP. THIS CHANGE WAS NECESSARY TO PREVENT RAPID POINTER MOVEMENT DURING PUMP STARTUP WHICH HAD CAUSED INDICATOR DAMAGE ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS. THE ADDITION OF THE SNUBBER DOES NOT AFFECT INDICATOR READING.

SAFETY EVALUATION: FSAR SECTION 9.1.3 DESCRIBES THE OPERATION AND FUNCTION OF THE SPENT FUEL PURIFICATION SUBSYSTEM. THE FUNCTION OF THE SUCTION PRESSURE INDICATOR IS NOT ADDRESSED AS A PART OF THIS DISCUSSION. FURTHERMORE THE ADDITION OF THE SNUBBER DOES NOT IMPACT SYSTEM OPERATION NOR DOES IT AFFECT THE INDICATION OBSERVED ON THE INDICATOR. THE SPENT FUEL

PURIFICATION SUBSYSTEM IS NOT SAFETY RELATED AND IS NOT ADDRESSED IN THE PLANT'S TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS.

SUBJECT: MDD 92-V2M082,REVISION 0,SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: AN IN-LINE, ADJUSTABLE, NEEDLE VALVE SNUBBER WAS INSTALLED IN THE SUCTION PRESSURE INDICATOR (PI-10634) FOR THE REFUELING WATER PURIFICATION PUMP. THIS CHANGE WAS NECESSARY TO PREVENT RAPID POINTER MOVEMENT DURING PUMP STARTUP WHICH HAD CAUSED INDICATOR DAMAGE ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS. THE ADDITION OF THE SNUBBER DOES NOT AFFECT INDICATOR READING.

SAFETY EVALUATION: FSAR SECTION 9.1.3 DESCRIBES THE OPERATION AND FUNCTION OF THE SPENT FUEL PURIFICATION SUBSYSTEM. THE FUNCTION OF THE SUCTION PRESSURE INDICATOR IS NOT ADDRESSED AS A PART OF THIS DISCUSSION. FURTHERMORE THE ADDITION OF THE SNUBBER DOES NOT IMPACT SYSTEM OPERATION NOR DOES IT AFFECT THE INDICATION OBSERVED ON THE INDICATOR. THE SPENT FUEL PURIFICATION SUBSYSTEM IS NOT SAFETY RELATED AND IS NOT ADDRESSED IN THE PLANT'S TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS.

SUBJECT: MDD 92-VAM088,REVISION 0,SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THE COOLING TOWER BLOWDOWN SUMP PUMP HAD EXPERIENCED SEVERAL TRIPS ASSOCIATED WITH IT'S GROUND FAULT PROTECTION RECEPTACLES. THE OPERATING ENVIRONMENT OF THE PUMP WAS SUCH THAT THE USE OF A GFCI RECEPTACLE WAS NOT PRACTICAL AND THEREFORE ABANDONED AND A STANDARD DUPLEX RECEPTACLE INSTALLED.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE INSTALLATION OF A STANDARD DUPLEX RECEPTACLE IN PLACE OF A GFCI RECEPTACLE DOES NOT IMPACT FSAR SECTION 8.3 WHICH ADDRESSES THE ONSITE POWER SYSTEMS. THE FUNCTION OR OPERATION OF THE SUMP PUMP IS NOT AFFECTED BY THIS CHANGE. THE POWER SUPPLY TO THE SUMP PUMP IS NOT THE SUBJECT OF ANY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION AS DESCRIBED IN SPEC 3/4.8 CONCERNING ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS.

SUBJECT: MDD 92-VAM091,REVISION 0,SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: STAINLESS STEEL GUARDS WERE FABRICATED AND INSTALLED OVER THE FIVE EIGHT INCH DIAMETER VENT PIPES ON THE REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK (RWST) TO PREVENT BIRDS FROM ENTERING THE TANK AND CONTAMINATING REFUELING WATER.

SAFETY EVALUATION: ADDING A COVER AT THE VENT PIPES DOES NOT IMPACT THE OPERATION OF THE RWST AS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR. THE ADDITION OF SCREEN COVER OVER THE VENT PIPES WAS SO EVALUATED AS TO NOT CAUSE ANY RESTRICTION THAT WOULD IMPACT ECCS OPERATION WHEN THE TANK IS USED AS A SUCTION SOURCE. THE PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION DOES NOT ADDRESS THE PHYSICAL CONFIGURATION OF THE TANK VENT PIPING.

SUBJECT: MDD 92-V2M092,REVISION 0,SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: PREVIOUS METHODS OF CHECKING THE OIL LEVEL IN THE POSITIVE DISPLACEMENT PUMP WAS THROUGH A VENDOR SUPPLIED OIL INSPECTION PORT WHICH REQUIRED THE PUMP TO BE REMOVED FROM SERVICE. TO PROVIDE A MEANS OF CHECKING OIL LEVELS WHILE THE PUMP WAS IN SERVICE, A SIGHTGLASS WAS ADDED CONNECTING AT THE EXISTING OIL DRAIN PLUG. IN ADDITION, THE CONNECTION/SETUP AT THE DRAIN PLUG WAS EXTENDED TO PERMIT EASIER DRAINING.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE POSITIVE DISPLACEMENT PUMP DOES NOT PROVIDE ANY SAFETY RELATED FUNCTION AS FOR FLOW REQUIREMENTS BUT DOES CONTRIBUTE TO RCS PRESSURE BOUNDARY INTEGRITY. THE ADDITION OF THE SIGHTGLASS ON THE PUMP OIL SIDE DOES NOT IMPACT THIS FUNCTION. THE POSITIVE DISPLACEMENT PUMPS ARE DESCRIBED IN FSAR SECTION 9.3.4, "CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM". THE CHANGE DOES NOT IMPACT THIS DESCRIPTION. THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS CONCERNING THE CVCS CHARGING SYSTEM DO NOT PROVIDE THE LEVEL OF DETAIL OF THIS CHANGE.

SUBJECT: MDD 92-V1M096,REVISION 0,SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: NORMAL LIGHTING AND 120 VAC RECEPTACLES HAVE BEEN ADDED TO THE BACKFLUSHABLE FILTER PIT AREA ON LEVEL B OF THE AUXILIARY BUILDING. FIXTURES WERE MOUNTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH LIGHTING AND COMMUNICATION DETAIL DRAWINGS AND PER CATEGORY I STRUCTURE REQUIREMENTS.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE ADDITION OF TEN NORMAL LIGHTS AND FOUR 120 VAC RECEPTACLES TO THE BACKFLUSHABLE FILTER PIT AREA DOES NOT IMPACT THE PLANT AS DESCRIBED IN FSAR SECTIONS 8.3 "ONSITE POWER SYSTEMS" AND 9.5.3 "LIGHTING SYSTEMS". ADDITION OF THE LIGHTING AND RECEPTACLES DOES NOT AFFECT ANY OF THE REQUIREMENTS SPECIFIED IN TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3/4.8 WHICH ADDRESSES ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS.

SUBJECT: MDD 92-V2M097,REVISION 0,SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: NORMAL LIGHTING AND 120 VAC RECEPTACLES HAVE BEEN ADDED TO THE BACKFLUSHABLE FILTER PIT AREA ON LEVEL B OF THE AUXILIARY BUILDING. FIXTURES WERE MOUNTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH LIGHTING AND COMMUNICATION DETAIL DRAWINGS AND PER CATEGORY I STRUCTURE REQUIREMENTS.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE ADDITION OF TEN NORMAL LIGHTS AND FOUR RECEPTACLES TO THE BACKFLUSHABLE FILTER PIT AREA DOES NOT IMPACT THE PLANT AS DESCRIBED IN FSAR SECTIONS 8.3 "ONSITE POWER SYSTEMS" AND 9.5.3 "LIGHTING SYSTEMS". ADDITION OF THE LIGHTING AND RECEPTACLES DOES NOT AFFECT ANY OF THE REQUIREMENTS SPECIFIED IN TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3/4.8 WHICH ADDRESSES ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS.

SUBJECT: MDD 92-V2M100,REVISION 0,SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: MATERIAL CLASSIFICATION FOR THE DISCHARGE PIPING FROM THE NORTH AND SOUTH TURBINE BUILDING SUMPS WAS CHANGED FROM PROJECT CLASS LLO (150# CARBON STEEL) TO LL3 (150# STAINLESS STEEL) IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE VOGTLE PROJECT PIPING MATERIALS CLASSIFICATION. MATERIAL CLASS WAS CHANGED

TO PREVENT INTERNAL SURFACE CORROSION WHICH HAS CAUSED THE PUMP SUCTION LINE TO CLOG. IN ADDITION, SUCTION LINES WERE INSTALLED WITH FLANGED CONNECTIONS INSTEAD OF WELDED CONNECTIONS TO ASSIST FUTURE MAINTENANCE ACTIVITIES.

SAFETY EVALUATION: FSAR SECTION 11.5 "PROCESS AND EFFLUENT RADIOLOGICAL MONITORING AND SAMPLING SYSTEM" DOES NOT PROVIDE THE LEVEL OF DETAIL (MATERIAL CLASS) AFFECTED BY THIS CHANGE. THE SYSTEM WILL STILL FUNCTION AS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR SECTION. CHANGING THE SUCTION PIPING MATERIAL CLASS WILL NOT IMPACT ANY PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION.

SUBJECT: MDD 92-V1M101,REVISION 0,SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: WHEN REMOVING THE 4A OR 4B FEEDWATER HEATER AND ITS ASSOCIATED HEATER DRAIN TANK FROM SERVICE WITH THE UNIT ON LINE, IT WAS NECESSARY TO FREEZE SEAL THE CHEMICAL INJECTION LINE TO THE OUT OF SERVICE PAIR TO PERMIT THE OTHER HEATER DRAIN TANK TO REMAIN IN SERVICE. TO ELIMINATE THE NEED TO FREEZE SEAL THIS LINE, A MANUAL ISOLATION VALVE WAS ADDED TO ENABLE THE ISOLATION OF THE OUT OF SERVICE HEATER/HEATER DRAIN TANK FROM THE INSERVICE PAIR.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE CONDENSATE AND FEEDWATER CHEMICAL INJECTION SYSTEM IS DESCRIBED IN FSAR SECTION 10.4.10. THE HEATER DRAIN TANKS ARE GENERALLY DISCUSSED IN FSAR SECTIONS 10.2 AND 10.4.7. THE ADDITION OF THE VALVE DOES NOT IMPACT THE FUNCTION OF THESE COMPONENTS AS DESCRIBED IN THESE SECTIONS. THE SYSTEM WILL FUNCTION AS BEFORE. THE HEATER DRAIN AND THE CONDENSATE AND FEEDWATER CHEMICAL INJECTION SYSTEMS ARE NOT CONTAINED WITHIN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS.

SUBJECT: MDD 92-V1M103,REVISION 1,SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THE ECCS FLOW VERIFICATION SURVEILLANCE VENTING (OPERATIONS PROCEDURE 14460) ADDRESSES 5 ECCS FLOW-PATH VERIFICATION VENT VALVES WHICH HAVE BLIND FLANGES IMMEDIATELY DOWNSTREAM. THE BLIND FLANGES MUST BE REMOVED FOR VENTING REQUIRING PLANT PERSONNEL IN RESPIRATORS BEING ESCORTED INTO A HIGH-RAD AREA TO REMOVE THE FLANGES. TO REDUCE THE STAY TIMES IN THESE AREAS, THE EXISTING BLIND FLANGES WERE REPLACED WITH A PIPE AND PIPE CAP ASSEMBLY IMMEDIATELY DOWNSTREAM OF THESE VALVES.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE PERFORMANCE OF THE REQUIRED ECCS FLOW VERIFICATION VENTING SURVEILLANCE IS NOT AFFECTED BY THE ADDITION OF THE PIPE AND CAP ASSEMBLY. THE RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL (RHR) SYSTEM IS DESCRIBED IN FSAR SECTION 5.4.7 AND DEPICTED ON FSAR FIGURE 5.4.7-1, SHEETS 1 AND 2 OF 2. THE CHANGE DOES NOT IMPACT THIS DESCRIPTION HOWEVER THE FIGURE WILL REQUIRE UPDATING AS PART OF THE ANNUAL UPDATE PROGRAM. AS ALL SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS BEING MET, PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS ARE NOT AFFECTED.

SUBJECT: MDD 92-V2M104,REVISION 1,SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THE ECCS FLOW VERIFICATION SURVEILLANCE VENTING (OPERATIONS PROCEDURE 14460) ADDRESSES 5 ECCS FLOW-PATH VERIFICATION VENT VALVES WHICH

HAVE BLIND FLANGES IMMEDIATELY DOWNSTREAM. THE BLIND FLANGES MUST BE REMOVED FOR VENTING REQUIRING PLANT PERSONNEL IN RESPIRATORS BEING ESCORTED INTO A HIGH-RAD AREA TO REMOVE THE FLANGES. TO REDUCE THE STAY TIMES IN THESE AREAS, THE EXISTING BLIND FLANGES WERE REPLACED WITH A PIPE AND PIPE CAP ASSEMBLY IMMEDIATELY DOWNSTREAM OF THESE VALVES.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE PERFORMANCE OF THE REQUIRED ECCS FLOW VERIFICATION VENTING SURVEILLANCE IS NOT AFFECTED BY THE ADDITION OF THE PIPE AND CAP ASSEMBLY. THE RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL (RHR) SYSTEM IS DESCRIBED IN FSAR SECTION 5.4.7 AND DEPICTED ON FSAR FIGURE 5.4.7-1, SHEETS 1 AND 2 OF 2. THE CHANGE DOES NOT IMPACT THIS DESCRIPTION HOWEVER THE FIGURE WILL REQUIRE UPDATING AS PART OF THE ANNUAL UPDATE PROGRAM. AS ALL SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS BEING MET, PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS ARE NOT AFFECTED.

SUBJECT: MDD 92-VAM105,REVISION 0,SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THE CANNED TRANSFER PUMPS ASSOCIATED WITH THE LARGE COMMON WASTE MONITOR TANKS HAD A HISTORY OF FAILURE DUE TO INTERNAL MECHANICAL DAMAGE. IT WAS DETERMINED THAT AS DESIGNED, THE LEVEL IN THE LARGE WASTE MONITOR TANKS ASSOCIATED WITH THE LIQUID RADWASTE PROCESSING SYSTEM MAY FALL BELOW THE TOP OF THE SUCTION FLANGE ASSOCIATED WITH THE PUMP TAKING SUCTION FROM THE TANK LEADING TO AIR INTRUSION INTO THE PUMP AND SUBSEQUENT DAMAGE. TO PREVENT THIS, THE LOW LEVEL CONTROL POINTS FOR PUMPS TAKING SUCTION FROM THE WASTE MONITOR TANK WERE RAISED.

SAFETY EVALUATION: SECTION 11.2 ADDRESSES THE OPERATION AND DESIGN OF THE LIQUID RADWASTE SYSTEMS. THE ADJUSTMENT OF THE LOW LEVEL SETPOINT TO A POINT SUFFICIENT TO PREVENT PUMP CAVITATION DOES NOT IMPACT ANY DISCUSSION CONTAINED WITHIN THIS SECTION. THE LEVEL CONTROL SETPOINTS ASSOCIATED WITH THE WASTE MONITOR TANK IS NOT THE TOPIC OF ANY PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION.

SUBJECT: MDD 92-VIM106,REVISION 0,SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: TO REDUCE THE FAILURE RATES ASSOCIATED WITH SOLA TRANSFORMERS, SEVERAL TRANSFORMERS WILL BE DE-ENERGIZED. OF THESE TRANSFORMERS, THREE (ANDT17, ANDT18 AND ANDT19) SERVE AS BACK-UP TO INVERTERS. THE INVERTERS SYNCHRONIZE TO THE TRANSFORMER OUTPUT AND PRODUCE AN INVERTER TROUBLE ALARM (LOSS-OF-SYNC) IF THE TRANSFORMER IS DE-ENERGIZED. SINCE SYNCHRONIZATION WITH THE TRANSFORMER OUTPUT IS NOT NECESSARY IN THIS APPLICATION, THE LOSS-OF-SYNC ALARM CIRCUIT FOR THESE TRANSFORMERS WAS DEFEATED.

SAFETY EVALUATION: ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION (INVERTERS) ARE DISCUSSED IN FSAR SECTIONS 8.3.1 AND 8.3.2. THE DELETION OF THE ALARM CIRCUIT ASSOCIATED WITH THE THREE TRANSFORMERS DOES NOT AFFECT THE DISCUSSIONS CONTAINED IN THESE SECTIONS. THE PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION ADDRESSING ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS IS NOT IMPACTED BY THE DELETION OF THE LOSS-OF-SYNC ALARM CIRCUIT ON THE SPECIFIED TRANSFORMERS.

SUBJECT: MDD 92-V2M110,REVISION 0,SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: SEVERAL JUMPERS IN SWITCH GEAR 2NB02 FOE ISO-PHASE BUS COOLER FAN MOTOR WERE REMOVED. THE JUMPERS, LOCATED IN CUBICLE 2NB0213 (TERMINAL BLOCK 3) PROVIDED FOR A SPACE HEATER FOR THE MOTOR AND CUBICLE ANNUNCIATION. THE JUMPERS WERE NOT REQUIRED TO SUPPORT OPERATION OF THE ISO-PHASE BUS COOLER FAN MOTOR (NO SPACE HEATER) OR TO PROVIDE ANNUNCIATION.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE REMOVAL OF THE JUMPERS DOES NOT AFFECT SYSTEM OPERATION AS THE JUMPERS WERE INSTALLED TO SUPPORT EQUIPMENT THAT IS NOT UTILIZED ON THE ISO-PHASE BUS COOLER FAN. FSAR SECTION 8.3 AND 10.2 ADDRESS THE FUNCTION AND OPERATION OF THE ONSITE ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS AND THE TURBINE GENERATOR AND ITS AUXILIARY SYSTEM. THE DELETION OF THESE JUMPERS DOES NOT IMPACT THE DISCUSSIONS CONTAINED WITHIN THESE SECTIONS.

SUBJECT: MDD 92-V2M111, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: VALVES 2LV-6189 "MAIN STEAM DUMP HEADER DRAIN VALVE" AND 2UV-6287 "MAIN STEAM LINE HEADER DRAIN" HAD SEVERE PACKING LEAKS AND COULD NOT BE ISOLATED FOR REPAIR. THE ACTIVITY APPROVED THE DRILLING OF AN INJECTION PATHWAY INTO THE STUFFING BOXES OF VALVES 2LV-6189 AND 2UV-6287. AN LEAK REPAIR INJECTION VALVE WAS INSTALLED. THIS PERMITS THE INJECTION OF LEAK REPAIR MATERIAL INTO THE STUFFING BOX TO SEAL THE PACKING LEAK. WHEN PERMANENT PACKING IS REINSTALLED, A THE LEAK INJECTION VALVE WILL BE REMOVED AND A PLUG INSTALLED.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE ACTIVITY WILL NOT PREVENT THE REFERENCED MAIN STEAM DRAIN VALVES FROM PERFORMING THEIR DESIGN FUNCTION NOR WILL ANY OTHER PLANT COMPONENTS BE AFFECTED BY THIS CHANGE. THIS ACTIVITY DOES NOT AFFECT ANY DISCUSSION CONTAINED IN FSAR SECTIONS 10.3 "MAIN STEAM SUPPLY SYSTEM" AND 10.4.1 "MAIN CONDENSER". THE VALVES ARE NOT ADDRESSED IN THE PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS.

SUBJECT: MDD 92-V1M1.2, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: PREVIOUS METHODS OF CHECKING THE OIL LEVEL IN THE POSITIVE DISPLACEMENT PUMP WAS THROUGH A VENDOR SUPPLIED OIL INSPECTION PORT WHICH REQUIRED THE PUMP TO BE REMOVED FROM SERVICE. TO PROVIDE A MEANS OF CHECKING OIL LEVELS WHILE THE PUMP WAS IN SERVICE, A SIGHTGLASS WAS ADDED CONNECTING AT THE EXISTING OIL DRAIN PLUG. IN ADDITION, THE CONNECTION/SETUP AT THE DRAIN PLUG WAS EXTENDED TO PERMIT EASIER DRAINING.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE POSITIVE DISPLACEMENT PUMP DOES NOT PROVIDE ANY SAFETY RELATED FUNCTION AS FOR FLOW REQUIREMENTS BUT DOES CONTRIBUTE TO RCS PRESSURE BOUNDARY INTEGRITY. THE ADDITION OF THE SIGHTGLASS ON THE PUMP OIL SIDE DOES NOT IMPACT THIS FUNCTION. THE POSITIVE DISPLACEMENT PUMPS ARE DESCRIBED IN FSAR SECTION 9.3.4, "CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM". THE CHANGE DOES NOT IMPACT THIS DESCRIPTION. THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS CONCERNING THE CVCS CHARGING SYSTEM DO NOT PROVIDE THE LEVEL OF DETAIL OF THIS CHANGE.

SUBJECT: MDD 92-V2M113, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: AN ADDITIONAL 1.5 INCHES OF FIBERGLASS INSULATION WAS INSTALLED OVER THE EXISTING INSULATION ON THE STEAM GENERATOR BLOWDOWN HEAT EXCHANGER INLET PIPING AND CONDENSATE OUTLET PIPING TO ASSIST IN REDUCING ROOM TEMPERATURES. ELEVATED TEMPERATURES COULD CAUSE PREMATURE ACTUATION OF THE HIGH ENERGY LINE BREAK PROTECTION OR HAVE ADVERSE AFFECTS ON ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS CONTAINED WITHIN THE LOCAL BLOWDOWN CONTROL PANEL.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE STEAM GENERATOR BLOWDOWN SYSTEM IS DESCRIBED IN FSAR SECTION 10.4.8. THE TYPE AND QUANTITY OF INSULATION IS NOT SET FORTH IN THIS DESCRIPTION. THE OPERATION OF THE BLOWDOWN SYSTEM IS NOT AFFECTED BY THE ADDITION OF INSULATION. THE OPERABILITY OF THE HIGH ENERGY LINE BREAK PROTECTION CIRCUITS IN ROOM R-C02, REQUIRED BY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.3.3.11 ARE NOT AFFECTED BY THIS CHANGE.

SUBJECT: MDD 92-V1M118, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THE TURBINE BUILDING COOLING WATER PUMPS (TPCW) USE A SPLIT MECHANICAL SEAL WITH UTILITY WATER INJECTING INTO THE SEAL. SEAL WATER FLOW TO THE SEALS WAS INADEQUATE. FLOW WAS BEING DIVERTED (NO RESTRICTION) THROUGH THE BUSHING BLEED OFF LINE ON THE STANDBY PUMP INSTEAD OF FLOWING TO THE RUNNING PUMP. TO RESTRICT THE FLOW OF UTILITY WATER TO THE SEAL HOUSING OF THE STANDBY TPCW PUMP TO PERMIT SEAL INJECTION PRESSURE FOR THE OPERATING PUMP TO EXCEED TPCW PUMP DISCHARGE PRESSURE AND FLOW INTO THE SEAL, THE THROTTLE BUSHING BLEED OFF LINE WAS REMOVED AND PLUGGED ON BOTH PUMPS.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE TURBINE PLANT COOLING WATER PUMPS ARE DESCRIBED IN FSAR SECTION 9.2.11 HOWEVER THE DISCUSSION DOES NOT PROVIDE THE LEVEL OF DETAIL ASSOCIATED WITH THIS CHANGE. PUMP OPERATION REMAINS THE SAME. THE TURBINE PLANT COOLING WATER SYSTEM IS NOT ADDRESSED IN THE PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS.

SUBJECT: MDD 92-V1M128, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THE STEAM DUMP VALVES HAVE EXPERIENCED EXCESSIVE SEAT LEAKAGE PROBLEMS SINCE INITIAL OPERATION. TO CORRECT THIS THE FOLLOWING ACTIONS WERE TAKEN. THE BENCH SET FOR THE ACTUATORS WAS CHANGED FROM 6 TO 56 PSIG TO 9 TO 56 PSIG ALLOWING MORE SEATING FORCE APPLICATION TO THE PILOT PLUG WHEN THE VALVE IS IN THE CLOSED POSITION. ADDITIONALLY, THE "TIGHT SHUTOFF FEATURE" OF THE I/P TRANSDUCER WHICH DRIVES THE AIR OUTPUT TO ZERO WHEN THE INPUT FALLS BELOW A PREDETERMINED VALUE WILL BE ACTIVATED AT A HIGHER VALUE TO PERMIT ACTUATION OF THE FEATURE.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE TURBINE BYPASS SYSTEM IS DESCRIBED IN FSAR SECTION 10.4.4. THE ACTIVITY GOVERNED BY THIS CHANGE WILL HAVE A SMALL AFFECT ON THE INITIAL MODULATION OF THE DUMP VALVES HOWEVER THE CHANGE WILL BE INSIGNIFICANT IN REGARDS TO THE DESIGN FUNCTION OF THE VALVES AS ADDRESSED IN THIS SECTION. THE VALVES DO NOT PROVIDE ANY SAFETY FUNCTION NOR DO THEY

IMPACT ANY SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT. THE VALVES ARE NOT THE TOPIC OF ANY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION.

SUBJECT: MDD 92-V1M132,REVISION 0,SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THE CHLORIDE INVERTER (EMERGENCY BATTERY STATION) 1-1808-Q3-E00 HAD A HISTORY OF BEING UNRELIABLE WITH VENDOR SUPPORT, DOCUMENTATION AND PARTS BEING DIFFICULT TO OBTAIN. THE EXISTING STATION WAS REPLACED WITH A NEW CYBEREX UPS AND BATTERY SYSTEM. THE NEW REPLACEMENT CYBEREX UPS WILL PROVIDE THE NECESSARY 1.5 HOURS OF POWER FOR EMERGENCY AND EXIT LIGHTS AS REQUIRED BY NFPA 101 AND FSAR SECTION 9.5.3.2.3.C.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE NEW REPLACEMENT SYSTEM WILL MEET THE DESIGN INTENT OF THE EXISTING INVERTER SYSTEM. INVERTER/BATTERY REQUIREMENTS FOR THE EXIT AND EMERGENCY SIGNS IN THE BUILDINGS AS SPECIFIED BY NFPA 101 AND FSAR SECTION 9.5.3.2.3.C ARE MET BY THE NEW SYSTEM. THE TURBINE BUILDING EMERGENCY AND EXIT LIGHTING IS NOT THE TOPIC OF ANY PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION.

SUBJECT: MDD 92-VAM133,REVISION 0,SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THE ORIFICE BORE DIAMETER ASSOCIATED WITH THE MINI-FLOW RECIRCULATION LINES OF EACH LARGE WASTE MONITOR TANK PUMP WERE INCREASED TO THE FULL DIAMETER OF THE SCHEDULE 40S PIPE (1.049") THEREBY ELIMINATING THE EFFECTS OF THE ORIFICE. THIS WAS NECESSARY TO PREVENT EVENTUAL PUMP DAMAGE DUE TO THE INADEQUATE SIZING OF THE ORIGINALLY INSTALLED ORIFICE.

SAFETY EVALUATION: FSAR SECTION 11.2 DISCUSSES THE PLANT'S LIQUID WASTE MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS. THE DISCUSSION DOES NOT SPECIFY ORIFICE SIZING REQUIREMENTS. THE SYSTEM WILL CONTINUE TO OPERATE AND BE OPERATED AS BEFORE. THE LARGER ORIFICE ENHANCES PUMP PERFORMANCE. THE PUMPS ARE NOT INCLUDED IN THE PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS.

SUBJECT: MDD 92-V1M136,REVISION 0,SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: SEVERAL MINOR WIRING DISCREPANCIES WERE DISCOVERED IN MOTOR CONTROL CENTER 1ABC. SEVERAL JUMPER CONNECTIONS ON THE BOTTOM SIDE TERMINAL BLOCKS WERE FOUND TO BE DUPLICATED ON THE TOP TERMINAL BLOCK AND WERE REMOVED. THE SECOND CHANGE INVOLVED THE REMOVAL OF INTERNAL WIRING FOR THE SPACE HEATER ASSOCIATED WITH CUBICLE 1ABC30 WHICH HAD NOT PREVIOUSLY BEEN REMOVED WHEN THE LOAD WAS TRANSFERRED TO ANOTHER SUPPLY.

SAFETY EVALUATION: ONSITE POWER SYSTEMS ARE DISCUSSED IN FSAR SECTION 8.3. THESE CHANGES CORRECT MINOR WIRING ERRORS AND DO NOT AFFECT THE DESCRIPTION OR OPERATION OF THE ONSITE DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM AS DESCRIBED IN THIS FSAR SECTION. SYSTEM OPERATION IS NOT IMPACTED. TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3/4.8 ADDRESSES OPERABILITY REQUIREMENTS FOR ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS. THESE REQUIREMENTS ARE NOT AFFECTED BY THE WIRING CHANGES.

SUBJECT: MDD 92-V1M141,REVISION 0,SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THE RAD MONITORS HAVE EXHIBITED ERRATIC OPERATION AND BACKGROUND DUE TO THE LACK OF A SUFFICIENT GROUND ON THE DETECTOR. THIS RESULTED IN NOISE INTERFERENCE ON THE DETECTOR TUBE CAUSING IMPROPER OPERATION OF THE MONITOR. IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE VENDOR (WESTINGHOUSE), A GROUND STRAP WAS ADDED BETWEEN THE PREAMP ASSEMBLY AND THE CHECK SOURCE ACTUATOR MOUNTING SCREW FOR RAD MONITOR CHANNEL 1RE2562.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE DIGITAL RADIATION MONITORING SYSTEM IS DESCRIBED IN FSAR SECTION 11.5.2. THE DETAILS OF THE WIRING FOR THE PREAMP SECTIONS OF THESE MONITORS IS NOT COVERED IN THIS DISCUSSION. THE GROUND STRAP CREATES A PATH TO ELIMINATE INDUCED NOISE IN THE DETECTOR/PREAMP SECTIONS. THE ADDITION OF THE STRAP WILL NOT AFFECT DETECTOR/PREAMP OPERATION. RAD MONITOR CHANNEL 1RE2562 IS REQUIRED UNDER THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS. THE CHANGE DOES NOT ALTER THE INTENT OF THIS SPECIFICATION.

SUBJECT: MDD 92-V2M145,REVISION 0,SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THE STEAM DUMP VALVES HAVE EXPERIENCED EXCESSIVE SEAT LEAKAGE PROBLEMS SINCE INITIAL OPERATION. TO CORRECT THIS THE FOLLOWING ACTIONS WERE TAKEN. THE BENCH SET FOR THE ACTUATORS WAS CHANGED FROM 6 TO 56 PSIG TO 9 TO 56 PSIG ALLOWING MORE SEATING FORCE APPLICATION TO THE PILOT PLUG WHEN THE VALVE IS IN THE CLOSED POSITION. ADDITIONALLY, THE "TIGHT SHUTOFF FEATURE" OF THE I/P TRANSDUCER WHICH DRIVES THE AIR OUTPUT TO ZERO WHEN THE INPUT FALLS BELOW A PREDETERMINED VALUE WILL BE ACTIVATED AT A HIGHER VALUE TO PERMIT ACTUATION OF THE FEATURE.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE TURBINE BYPASS SYSTEM IS DESCRIBED IN FSAR SECTION 10.4.4. THE ACTIVITY GOVERNED BY THIS CHANGE WILL HAVE A SMALL AFFECT ON THE INITIAL MODULATION OF THE DUMP VALVES HOWEVER THE CHANGE WILL BE INSIGNIFICANT IN REGARDS TO THE DESIGN FUNCTION OF THE VALVES AS ADDRESSED IN THIS SECTION. THE VALVES DO NOT PROVIDE ANY SAFETY FUNCTION NOR DO THEY IMPACT ANY SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT. THE VALVES ARE NOT THE TOPIC OF ANY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION.

SUBJECT: MDD 92-V2M146,REVISION 0,SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THE TURBINE PLANT COOLING WATER PUMPS (TPCW) USE A SPLIT MECHANICAL SEAL WITH UTILITY WATER INJECTING INTO THE SEAL. SEAL WATER FLOW TO THE SEALS WAS INADEQUATE. FLOW WAS BEING DIVERTED (NO RESTRICTION) THROUGH THE BUSHING BLEED OFF LINE ON THE STANDBY PUMP INSTEAD OF THE RUNNING PUMP. TO RESTRICT THE FLOW OF UTILITY WATER TO THE SEAL HOUSING OF THE STANDBY TPCW PUMP TO PERMIT SEAL INJECTION PRESSURE FOR THE OPERATING PUMP TO EXCEED TPCW PUMP DISCHARGE PRESSURE AND FLOW INTO THE SEAL, THE THROTTLE BLEED OFF LINE WAS REMOVED AND PLUGGED.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE TURBINE PLANT COOLING WATER PUMPS ARE DESCRIBED IN FSAR SECTION 9.2.11 HOWEVER THE DISCUSSION DOES NOT PROVIDE THE LEVEL OF DETAIL ADDRESSED BY THIS CHANGE. PUMP OPERATION REMAINS THE SAME.

THE TURBINE PLANT COOLING WATER SYSTEM IS NOT ADDRESSED IN THE PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS.

SUBJECT: MDD 92-V1M150,REVISION 0,SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THE EHC PUMP DISCHARGE AIR REMOVAL VALVES WERE RELOCATED FROM THE TOP OF THE OF THE FLUID TANK TO THE TOP OF THE PUMP DISCHARGE PIPING. ADDITIONALLY, THE TUBING BETWEEN THE AIR REMOVAL VALVE AND TANK WAS REPLACED AND ADDITIONAL SUPPORTS WERE PROVIDED FOR THIS TUBING. THIS WAS DONE TO REDUCE THE POSSIBILITY OF TUBING RUPTURE DUE TO FATIGUE AND BEING CONSTANTLY PRESSURIZED. IN THE NEW MOUNTING CONFIGURATION THE TUBING IS NOT PRESSURIZED SO THAT ITS FAILURE WOULD ONLY RESULT IN MINOR FLUID LEAKAGE.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE EHC HYDRAULIC POWER UNIT IS GENERALLY DISCUSSED IN FSAR SECTION 10.2 "TURBINE GENERATOR". THE FUNCTION, OPERATION AND LOCATION OF THE AIR REMOVAL VALVES , ASSOCIATED TUBING AND TUBE SUPPORTS IS NOT INCLUDED IN THESE DISCUSSIONS. SYSTEM OPERATION IS NOT AFFECTED BY THE VALVE RELOCATION. THE EHC HYDRAULIC POWER UNIT IS NOT THE SUBJECT OF ANY PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION.

SUBJECT: MDD 92-V2M151,REVISION 0,SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THE EHC PUMP DISCHARGE AIR REMOVAL VALVES WERE RELOCATED FROM THE TOP OF THE OF THE FLUID TANK TO THE TOP OF THE PUMP DISCHARGE PIPING. ADDITIONALLY, THE TUBING BETWEEN THE AIR REMOVAL VALVE AND TANK WAS REPLACED AND ADDITIONAL SUPPORTS WERE PROVIDED FOR THIS TUBING. THIS WAS DONE TO REDUCE THE POSSIBILITY OF TUBING RUPTURE DUE TO FATIGUE AND BEING CONSTANTLY PRESSURIZED. IN THE NEW MOUNTING CONFIGURATION THE TUBING IS NOT PRESSURIZED SO THAT ITS FAILURE WOULD ONLY RESULT IN MINOR FLUID LEAKAGE.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE EHC HYDRAULIC POWER UNIT IS GENERALLY DISCUSSED IN FSAR SECTION 10.2 "TURBINE GENERATOR". THE FUNCTION, OPERATION AND LOCATION OF THE AIR REMOVAL VALVES , ASSOCIATED TUBING AND TUBE SUPPORTS IS NOT INCLUDED IN THESE DISCUSSIONS. SYSTEM OPERATION IS NOT AFFECTED BY THE VALVE RELOCATION. THE EHC HYDRAULIC POWER UNIT IS NOT THE SUBJECT OF ANY PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION.

SUBJECT: MDD 92-VAM155,REVISION 0,SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THE DEMINERALIZER WATER ISOLATION VALVE (2-1418-U4-071) TO THE BACK FLUSHABLE FILTER CRUD TANK IS LOCATED IN SUCH A MANNER THAT VALVE MANIPULATIONS POSE A SAFETY HAZARD. A NEW VALVE WAS INSTALLED TO ELIMINATE THE NEED TO OPERATE THIS VALVE.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE ADDITION OF A NEW VALVE DOWNSTREAM OF THE EXISTING VALVE DOES NOT IMPACT THE DESCRIPTION CONTAINED WITHIN FSAR SECTION 9.2.3. HOWEVER, THE FSAR FIGURE 9.2.3-1 (SHEET 2 OF 4) WILL BE REVISED TO ILLUSTRATE THE NEW VALVE. THE CHANGE DOES NOT IMPACT ANY PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION.

SUBJECT: MDD 92-V1M157,REVISION 0,SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THE SETPOINT FOR THE MAIN TURBINE STEAM SEAL SUPPLY HEADER UNLOADING VALVE 1PV-6159 WAS INCREASED FROM 4.0 TO 4.5 (-0.0,+0.25) PSIG. THE TURBINE GENERATOR SUPPLIER (GENERAL ELECTRIC) RECOMMENDED THAT THIS CHANGE BE MADE TO AVOID SIMULTANEOUS OPERATION OF THE SUPPLY AND UNLOADING VALVES WHICH WOULD RESULT IN A SLIGHT EFFICIENCY LOSS. IN ADDITION, TOLERANCES FOR BOTH THE SUPPLY AND UNLOADER VALVES WERE ESTABLISHED TO PRECLUDE THE POSSIBILITY OF SETPOINT OVERLAP.

SAFETY EVALUATION: IN THE ORIGINAL DESIGN, THE SETPOINT FOR BOTH THE SUPPLY AND UNLOADING VALVES WERE THE SAME. RAISING THE UNLOADING VALVE SETPOINT ABOVE THE SUPPLY SETPOINT PERMITS OPERATION OF THE SYSTEM WITHOUT BOTH VALVES OPERATING SIMULTANEOUSLY. THE DISCUSSIONS CONTAINED IN FSAR SECTIONS 10.2 AND 10.4.3 DO NOT ADDRESS THE HEADER PRESSURE AND CONTROLLER SETPOINTS GOVERNING OPERATION OF THESE VALVES. SYSTEM OPERATION HAS BEEN ENHANCED BY THE SETPOINT CHANGE. THE MAIN TURBINE SHAFT SEALING SYSTEM IS NOT THE SUBJECT OF ANY PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION.

SUBJECT: MDD 92-V2M158,REVISION 0,SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THE SETPOINT FOR THE MAIN TURBINE STEAM SEAL SUPPLY HEADER UNLOADING VALVE 2PV-6159 WAS INCREASED FROM 4.0 TO 4.5 (-0.0,+0.25) PSIG. THE TURBINE GENERATOR SUPPLIER (GENERAL ELECTRIC) RECOMMENDED THAT THIS CHANGE BE MADE TO AVOID SIMULTANEOUS OPERATION OF THE SUPPLY AND UNLOADING VALVES WHICH WOULD RESULT IN A SLIGHT EFFICIENCY LOSS. IN ADDITION, TOLERANCES FOR BOTH THE SUPPLY AND UNLOADER VALVES WERE ESTABLISHED TO PRECLUDE THE POSSIBILITY OF SETPOINT OVERLAP.

SAFETY EVALUATION: IN THE ORIGINAL DESIGN, THE SETPOINT FOR BOTH THE SUPPLY AND UNLOADING VALVES WERE THE SAME. RAISING THE UNLOADING VALVE SETPOINT ABOVE THE SUPPLY SETPOINT PERMITS OPERATION OF THE SYSTEM WITHOUT BOTH VALVES OPERATING SIMULTANEOUSLY. THE DISCUSSIONS CONTAINED IN FSAR SECTIONS 10.2 AND 10.4.3 DO NOT ADDRESS THE HEADER PRESSURE AND CONTROLLER SETPOINTS GOVERNING OPERATION OF THESE VALVES. SYSTEM OPERATION HAS BEEN ENHANCED BY THE SETPOINT CHANGE. THE MAIN TURBINE SHAFT SEALING SYSTEM IS NOT THE SUBJECT OF ANY PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION.

SUBJECT: MDD 92-V2M160,REVISION 0,SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: WESTINGHOUSE HAS PROVIDED NEW DEFAULT SET POINT VALUES FOR THE DIGITAL METAL IMPACT MONITORING SYSTEM. THESE VALUES ARE FROM A NEW BASELINE STUDY DONE AFTER SYSTEM REWORK DURING 2R2. IN GENERAL, THE SETPOINTS HAVE BEEN LOWERED, INCREASING THE SENSITIVITY OF THE SYSTEM.

SAFETY EVALUATION: FSAR SECTION 4.4.6.4 DETAILS THE FUNCTION OF THE DIGITAL METAL IMPACT MONITORING SYSTEM. THE SETPOINT CHANGE DOES NOT IN ANY WAY CHANGE THE FUNCTION OF THE SYSTEM. THE SETPOINTS ONLY AFFECTS THE SYSTEM ALARM POINT. THE SYSTEM CONTINUES TO FUNCTION AS DESCRIBED IN THE

FSAR. THE DIGITAL METAL IMPACT MONITORING SYSTEM IS NOT THE ADDRESSED IN TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS.

SUBJECT: MDD 92-V1M164, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THE PLASMA DISPLAY FOR THE DIGITAL METAL IMPACT MONITORING SYSTEM (DMIMS) IS NO LONGER MANUFACTURED BY OEM BOURROUGHS OR AVAILABLE. THE INSTALLED DISPLAY WAS INOPERABLE AND REPLACED WITH AN UPGRADED KIT FROM WESTINGHOUSE CONSISTING OF A DALE DISPLAY AND POWER SOURCE (12 VDC VS 250 VDC).

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE DMIM SYSTEM IS DESCRIBED IN FSAR SECTION 4.4.6.4. DISPLAY TYPE IS NOT SPECIFIED IN THIS DISCUSSION. THE REPLACEMENT OF THE DISPLAY TYPE DOES NOT ALTER SYSTEM FUNCTION OR OPERATION. THE DMIMS SYSTEM IS NOT DISCUSSED IN THE PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS.

SUBJECT: MDD 92-V1M167, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THE DESIGN CHANGE PERMITS THE ISOLATION OF UP TO FOUR HEATING ELEMENTS IN THE AUXILIARY BUILDING SUPPLY UNITS TO PERMIT CONTINUED OPERATION OF THE UNIT WITH THE REMAINING OPERABLE HEATER ELEMENTS. THE HEATER ELEMENTS ARE NOT EASILY ACCESSIBLE. THE REMAINING HEATING ELEMENTS HAVE ENOUGH CAPACITY TO CONTINUE TO FUNCTION AS ORIGINALLY DESIGNED.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE AUXILIARY BUILDING VENTILATION SYSTEM IS DISCUSSED IN FSAR SECTION 9.4.3. THE DISCUSSION INCLUDES A DESCRIPTION OF SYSTEM COMPONENTS. THE CHANGES ADDRESSED IN THIS DESIGN CHANGE DO NOT IMPACT ANY DESCRIPTIONS DISCUSSED IN THIS SECTION. THE AUXILIARY BUILDING FANS ARE NOT CONSIDERED A PART OF THE VENTILATION EXHAUST TREATMENT SYSTEM AS DESCRIBED IN THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS. THE SYSTEM WILL CONTINUE TO MEET ITS DESIGN FUNCTION WITH UP TO FOUR HEATERS ISOLATED.

SUBJECT: MDD 92-VAM168, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: A REWORK OF THE FAN DRIVE MOTOR SUPPORT STEEL ON THE CONTROL BUILDING NORMAL AIR SUPPLY UNIT (A-1533-A7-001) ADDED STIFFENERS TO THE MOTOR SUPPORT STRUCTURE IN AN EFFORT TO REDUCE VIBRATION LEVELS OBSERVED AT THE MOTOR BEARINGS.

SAFETY EVALUATION: FSAR SECTION 9.4.1 DESCRIBES THE FUNCTION AND OPERATION OF THE CONTROL BUILDING VENTILATION SYSTEM. THE CHANGE WAS A STRUCTURAL ENHANCEMENT AND DID NOT AFFECT THE FUNCTION OR OPERATION OF THE SYSTEM. THE CONTROL BUILDING VENTILATION SYSTEM IS NOT THE SUBJECT OF ANY PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION.

SUBJECT: MDD 92-V1M169, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: COMPUTER POINTS FOR ACCUMULATOR LEVEL CHANNELS L-950, L-953, L-954 AND L-957 WERE ADDED TO THE ERF COMPUTER AND THE PLANT COMPUTER SYSTEMS. THE PREVIOUS DESIGN PROVIDED ONLY HI AND LO LEVEL ANNUNCIATION.

THE CHANGE ALLOWS OPERATIONS PERSONNEL TRENDRING CAPABILITIES OF ACCUMULATOR LEVELS AT POWER OPERATION AND REACTOR VESSEL LEVEL AT REDUCED RCS INVENTORY CONDITIONS.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE CHANGE INVOLVED NON-SAFETY CONTROL SIGNALS CURRENTLY USED FOR LEVEL INDICATION ON THE MAIN CONTROL BOARD. THESE FUNCTIONS WILL NOT BE AFFECTED WITH THE ADDITION OF THESE COMPUTER POINTS. THE CHANGE WILL NOT IMPACT DISCUSSIONS ON INFORMATION AND CONTROL SYSTEMS REQUIRED FOR SAFETY SYSTEMS AS DEFINED IN FSAR SECTIONS 7.5 AND 7.7. THE ACCUMULATORS ARE DISCUSSED IN FSAR SECTION 6.3 WHICH ADDRESSES EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS. THIS DISCUSSION IS NOT IMPACTED BY THE CHANGE.

SUBJECT: MDD 92-V1M176,REVISION 0,SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THE MECHANICAL OVERSPEED TRIP FOR THE MAIN TURBINE WAS INCREASED FROM 108 TO 109 PERCENT OF NORMAL SPEED TO A NEW VALUE OF 110 TO 111 PERCENT OF NORMAL SPEED. THE NEW VALUE IS CONSISTENT WITH THE STANDARD GENERAL ELECTRIC SETPOINT DESIGNED FOR THIS TURBINE. THE USE OF THE NEW VALUE INCREASES THE MARGIN BETWEEN THE NORMAL SPEED AND THE TRIP SETPOINT THEREBY REDUCING THE PROBABILITY OF AN INADVERTENT TURBINE TRIP DUE TO SETPOINT DRIFT.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE NEW VALUE IS CONSISTENT WITH THE STANDARD GE SETPOINT AND THE VALUE ASSUMED IN THE OVERSPEED PROTECTION AND MISSILE GENERATION ANALYSIS. THE MAIN TURBINE OVERSPEED TRIP DOES NOT SERVE TO MITIGATE THE CONSEQUENCES OF ANY ACCIDENT EVALUATED IN FSAR CHAPTER 15. ALTHOUGH THE MAIN TURBINE OVERSPEED TRIP IS REQUIRED BY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS (4.3.4.2.C), THE SPECIFIC TRIP SETPOINT IS NOT ADDRESSED.

SUBJECT: MDD 92-V2M177,REVISION 0,SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THE MECHANICAL OVERSPEED TRIP FOR THE MAIN TURBINE WAS INCREASED FROM 108 TO 109 PERCENT OF NORMAL SPEED TO A NEW VALUE OF 110 TO 111 PERCENT OF NORMAL SPEED. THE NEW VALUE IS CONSISTENT WITH THE STANDARD GENERAL ELECTRIC SETPOINT DESIGNED FOR THIS TURBINE. THE USE OF THE NEW VALUE INCREASES THE MARGIN BETWEEN THE NORMAL SPEED AND THE TRIP SETPOINT THEREBY REDUCING THE PROBABILITY OF AN INADVERTENT TURBINE TRIP DUE TO SETPOINT DRIFT.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE NEW VALUE IS CONSISTENT WITH THE STANDARD GE SETPOINT AND THE VALUE ASSUMED IN THE OVERSPEED PROTECTION AND MISSILE GENERATION ANALYSIS. THE MAIN TURBINE OVERSPEED TRIP DOES NOT SERVE TO MITIGATE THE CONSEQUENCES OF ANY ACCIDENT EVALUATED IN FSAR CHAPTER 15. ALTHOUGH THE MAIN TURBINE OVERSPEED TRIP IS REQUIRED BY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS (4.3.4.2.C), THE SPECIFIC TRIP SETPOINT IS NOT ADDRESSED.

SUBJECT: MDD 92-V1M178,REVISION 0,SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THE AUTOMATIC TRIP OF THE MAIN TURBINE UPON THE TRIP OF BOTH CIRCULATING WATER PUMPS HAS BEEN DELETED. SINCE THE TURBINE, CONDENSER

SHELLS AND RELATED EQUIPMENT ARE ADEQUATELY PROTECTED AGAINST DAMAGE BY THE EXISTING AUTOMATIC TURBINE TRIP ON LOSS OF CONDENSER VACUUM AND THE LOW PRESSURE TURBINE HOOD RUPTURE DIAPHRAGMS, THE LOSS OF CIRCULATING WATER PUMP TRIP WAS NOT REQUIRED. THE TRIP WAS NOT INCLUDED AS A PART OF THE VENDER RECOMMENDED TURBINE PROTECTION PACKAGE.

SAFETY EVALUATION: FSAR SECTIONS 10.2 AND 10.4 DESCRIBE THE MAIN TURBINE AND CIRCULATING WATER SYSTEMS RESPECTIVELY. THE AUTOMATIC TRIP OF THE MAIN TURBINE UPON THE TRIP OF BOTH CIRCULATING WATER PUMPS IS NOT INCLUDED IN THIS DISCUSSION. THE DELETION OF THE TRIP DOES NOT IMPACT ANY ACCIDENT ALREADY EVALUATED IN FSAR CHAPTER 15.2 NOR DOES THE DELETION CREATE ANY NEW ACCIDENT SCENARIOS. THE MAIN TURBINE TRIP ON LOSS OF BOTH CIRCULATING WATER PUMPS IS NOT REQUIRED BY PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS.

SUBJECT: MDD 92-V2M179,REVISION 0,SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THE AUTOMATIC TRIP OF THE MAIN TURBINE UPON THE TRIP OF BOTH CIRCULATING WATER PUMPS HAS BEEN DELETED. SINCE THE TURBINE, CONDENSER SHELLS AND RELATED EQUIPMENT ARE ADEQUATELY PROTECTED AGAINST DAMAGE BY THE EXISTING AUTOMATIC TURBINE TRIP ON LOSS OF CONDENSER VACUUM AND THE LOW PRESSURE TURBINE HOOD RUPTURE DIAPHRAGMS, THE LOSS OF CIRCULATING WATER PUMP TRIP WAS NOT REQUIRED. THE TRIP WAS NOT INCLUDED AS A PART OF THE VENDER RECOMMENDED TURBINE PROTECTION PACKAGE.

SAFETY EVALUATION: FSAR SECTIONS 10.2 AND 10.4 DESCRIBE THE MAIN TURBINE AND CIRCULATING WATER SYSTEMS RESPECTIVELY. THE AUTOMATIC TRIP OF THE MAIN TURBINE UPON THE TRIP OF BOTH CIRCULATING WATER PUMPS IS NOT INCLUDED IN THIS DISCUSSION. THE DELETION OF THE TRIP DOES NOT IMPACT ANY ACCIDENT ALREADY EVALUATED IN FSAR CHAPTER 15.2 NOR DOES THE DELETION CREATE ANY NEW ACCIDENT SCENARIOS. THE MAIN TURBINE TRIP ON LOSS OF BOTH CIRCULATING WATER PUMPS IS NOT REQUIRED BY PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS.

SUBJECT: MDD 93-V1M001,REVISION 0,SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THE MAIN TURBINE WAS PROVIDED WITH PUSHBUTTONS ON THE TURBINE CONTROL PANEL PORTION OF THE MAIN CONTROL BOARD TO INITIATE AND/OR TERMINATE AN AUTOMATIC MAIN TURBINE RUNBACK (LOAD REDUCTION) TO APPROXIMATELY 810 MWE WHEN A RAPID LOAD REDUCTION IS REQUIRED SUCH AS ON A TRIP OF ONE MAIN FEED PUMP. ADDITION OF THESE PUSHBUTTONS WILL PERMIT CONTROL ROOM OPERATORS TO FOCUS AND RESPOND TO OTHER ACTIVITIES OCCURRING DURING THE TRANSIENT CONDITION. THE START PB. INITIATES THE RUNBACK. A STOP PB. IS PROVIDED IN THE EVENT THAT TERMINATION OF THE RUNBACK IS DESIRED.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE MAIN TURBINE AND ITS CONTROLS ARE DESCRIBED IN FSAR SECTION 10.2. NO SPECIFIC DESCRIPTION OF THE LOAD SETPOINT CAPABILITIES IS PROVIDED. THE CHANGE DOES NOT REPRESENT A CHANGE TO THE RESPONSE OF THE PLANT TO A LOSS OF FEEDWATER EVENT. ALTHOUGH A REVISION TO THE PROCEDURE USED TO OPERATE THE SYSTEM WAS NECESSARY, THE SYSTEM CONTINUES TO FUNCTION AS BEFORE. THE MAIN TURBINE LOAD CONTROLS AFFECTED BY THIS CHANGE ARE NOT THE SUBJECT OF ANY PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION.

SUBJECT: MDD 93-V2M002,REVISION 0,SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THE MAIN TURBINE WAS PROVIDED WITH PUSHBUTTONS ON THE TURBINE CONTROL PANEL PORTION OF THE MAIN CONTROL BOARD TO INITIATE AND/OR TERMINATE AN AUTOMATIC MAIN TURBINE RUNBACK (LOAD REDUCTION) TO APPROXIMATELY 810 MWE WHEN A RAPID LOAD REDUCTION IS REQUIRED SUCH AS ON A TRIP OF ONE MAIN FEED PUMP. ADDITION OF THESE PUSHBUTTONS WILL PERMIT CONTROL ROOM OPERATORS TO FOCUS AND RESPOND TO OTHER ACTIVITIES OCCURRING DURING THE TRANSIENT CONDITION. THE START PB. INITIATES THE RUNBACK. A STOP PB. IS PROVIDED IN THE EVENT THAT TERMINATION OF THE RUNBACK IS DESIRED.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE MAIN TURBINE AND ITS CONTROLS ARE DESCRIBED IN FSAR SECTION 10.2. NO SPECIFIC DESCRIPTION OF THE LOAD SETPOINT CAPABILITIES IS PROVIDED. THE CHANGE DOES NOT REPRESENT A CHANGE TO THE RESPONSE OF THE PLANT TO A LOSS OF FEEDWATER EVENT. ALTHOUGH A REVISION TO THE PROCEDURE USED TO OPERATE THE SYSTEM WAS NECESSARY, THE SYSTEM CONTINUES TO FUNCTION AS BEFORE. THE MAIN TURBINE LOAD CONTROLS AFFECTED BY THIS CHANGE ARE NOT THE SUBJECT OF ANY PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION.

SUBJECT: MDD 93-V1M010,REVISION 0,SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THE PREVIOUS HI LEVEL ALARM SETPOINT FOR THE COOLING TOWER BASIN WATER LEVEL WAS SET ABOUT THREE INCHES BELOW THE POINT AT WHICH THE TOWER WOULD OVERFLOW. THE ALARM WAS LOWERED BY THREE INCHES TO PROVIDE MORE TIME FOR RESPONSE. THE ALARM PROVIDES AN EARLY WARNING OF COOLING TOWER MAKEUP LEVEL CONTROL VALVE MALFUNCTION.

SAFETY EVALUATION: CIRCULATING WATER SYSTEM LEVEL INSTRUMENTATION IS DISCUSSED IN FSAR SECTION 10.4.5. THE HI LEVEL ALARM IS ADDRESSED IN THIS DISCUSSION AS EXISTING HOWEVER THE APPROPRIATE SETPOINT IS NOT ADDRESSED. THE CIRCULATING WATER SYSTEM IS NOT THE TOPIC OF ANY STATION TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION. THE CHANGE WAS MADE TO ENHANCE SYSTEM OPERATION. LOWERING THE SETPOINT DOES NOT IMPACT NORMAL SYSTEM OPERATION.

SUBJECT: MDD 93-V2M011,REVISION 0,SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THE PREVIOUS HI LEVEL ALARM SETPOINT FOR THE COOLING TOWER BASIN WATER LEVEL WAS SET ABOUT THREE INCHES BELOW THE POINT AT WHICH THE TOWER WOULD OVERFLOW. THE ALARM WAS LOWERED BY THREE INCHES TO PROVIDE MORE TIME FOR RESPONSE. THE ALARM PROVIDES AN EARLY WARNING OF COOLING TOWER MAKEUP LEVEL CONTROL VALVE MALFUNCTION.

SAFETY EVALUATION: CIRCULATING WATER SYSTEM LEVEL INSTRUMENTATION IS DISCUSSED IN FSAR SECTION 10.4.5. THE HI LEVEL ALARM IS ADDRESSED IN THIS DISCUSSION AS EXISTING HOWEVER THE APPROPRIATE SETPOINT IS NOT ADDRESSED. THE CIRCULATING WATER SYSTEM IS NOT THE TOPIC OF ANY STATION TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION. THE CHANGE WAS MADE TO ENHANCE SYSTEM OPERATION. LOWERING THE SETPOINT DOES NOT IMPACT NORMAL SYSTEM OPERATION.

SUBJECT: MDD 93-V1M012,REVISION 0,SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THE MACHINE GAS PRESSURE LOW ALARM IS SET FOR OPERATION OF THE MAIN GENERATOR AT 75 PSIG. THE MAIN GENERATOR CAN BE OPERATED A ANY HYDROGEN GAS PRESSURE WITHIN THE CAPABILITY CURVE. THE ALARM SETPOINT IS BEING CHANGED FROM 73 PSIG TO 63 PSIG. THE ALLOWS MACHINE GAS PRESSURE TO BE ADJUSTED PER OPERATING PROCEDURE 13810-2 DOWN TO A LOW LIMIT OF 65 PSIG.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE TURBINE GENERATOR IS DISCUSSED IN FSAR SECTION 10.2. THE DISCUSSION DOES NOT ADDRESS SPECIFIC SETPOINTS ASSOCIATED WITH MACHINE GAS PRESSURE ANNUNCIATION. THE TURBINE GENERATOR WILL STILL BE OPERATED WITHIN THE LIMITS SPECIFIED ON THE CAPABILITY CURVE AND THEREFORE WILL NOT IMPACT TURBINE GENERATOR OPERATION. THE TURBINE GENERATOR IS NOT DISCUSSED IN THE PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS.

SUBJECT: MDD 93-V2M013,REVISION 0,SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THE MACHINE GAS PRESSURE LOW ALARM IS SET FOR OPERATION OF THE MAIN GENERATOR AT 75 PSIG. THE MAIN GENERATOR CAN BE OPERATED A ANY HYDROGEN GAS PRESSURE WITHIN THE CAPABILITY CURVE. THE ALARM SETPOINT IS BEING CHANGED FROM 73 PSIG TO 63 PSIG. THE ALLOWS MACHINE GAS PRESSURE TO BE ADJUSTED PER OPERATING PROCEDURE 13810-2 DOWN TO A LOW LIMIT OF 65 PSIG.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE TURBINE GENERATOR IS DISCUSSED IN FSAR SECTION 10.2. THE DISCUSSION DOES NOT ADDRESS SPECIFIC SETPOINTS ASSOCIATED WITH MACHINE GAS PRESSURE ANNUNCIATION. THE TURBINE GENERATOR WILL STILL BE OPERATED WITHIN THE LIMITS SPECIFIED ON THE CAPABILITY CURVE AND THEREFORE WILL NOT IMPACT TURBINE GENERATOR OPERATION. THE TURBINE GENERATOR IS NOT DISCUSSED IN THE PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS.

SUBJECT: MDD 93-V1M014,REVISION 0,SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THE MODIFICATION ADDED A CHECK VALVE BETWEEN THE POST ACCIDENT SAMPLING SYSTEM (PASS) SUMP PUMP AND THE PASS SAMPLE COOLER. THE CHANGE WAS NECESSARY TO PREVENT BACKLEAKAGE THROUGH THE PASS SUMP SAMPLING PUMPS RESULTING IN PRESSURIZATION OF THE RHR SYSTEM.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE PASS SYSTEM IS DESCRIBED IN FSAR SECTION 9.3.2 AND DEPICTED ON FSAR FIGURE 9.3.2-4. ALTHOUGH SYSTEM OPERATION WILL NOT BE AFFECTED BY THE ADDITION OF THE CHECK, THE FSAR FIGURE WILL REQUIRE UPDATE TO ILLUSTRATE THE ADDITION OF THE CHECK VALVE. THIS WILL BE ACCOMPLISHED VIA THE ANNUAL UPDATE. THE ADDED CHECK VALVE DOES NOT IMPACT ANY PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION.

SUBJECT: MDD 93-V2M015,REVISION 0,SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: A PRESSURE SWITCH ASSOCIATED WITH ELECTRICAL PENETRATION 2-1818-H3-P17 WAS EXPERIENCE LEAKAGE RESULTING IN THE INABILITY OF THE PENETRATION TO PASS THE LOCAL LEAK RATE TEST (LLRT). THE PRESSURE SWITCH WAS NOT BEING USED EXCEPT FOR SUPPORT OF A PRESSURE GAUGE AND INPUT CONNECTION

AND WAS NOT CONNECTED ELECTRICALLY. THE SWITCH WAS DELETED AND THE CONNECTION FITTED WITH A SWAGE-LOK TEE CONNECTOR TO SUPPORT THE GAUGE/CONNECTION.

SAFETY EVALUATION: ELECTRICAL PENETRATIONS ARE DISCUSSED IN FSAR SECTION 8.3.1. THE FUNCTION OF THE PRESSURE SWITCH IS NOT ADDRESSED IN THIS DISCUSSION. THE ELIMINATION OF THE PRESSURE SWITCH WILL NOT IMPACT THE FUNCTION OR OPERATION OF THE PENETRATION ASSEMBLY. AS THE DELETION OF THE PRESSURE SWITCH AND SUBSEQUENT REPLACEMENT WITH A SWAGE-LOK TEE DOES NOT AFFECT PENETRATION SEALING REQUIREMENTS IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THE PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS WOULD NOT BE IMPACTED.

SUBJECT: MDD 93-V1M020,REVISION 0,SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THE MODIFICATION REPLACED THE EXISTING ONE PIECE, SLIP-ON COUPLING WITH AN AXIALLY-SPLIT COUPLING ON THE HEATER DRAIN PUMPS TO PREVENT MIS-ALIGNMENT BETWEEN THE UPPER AND LOWER SHAFTS. IN ADDITION, THE USE OF EITHER SINGLE SPIRAL GROOVE OR TRI-LAND JOURNAL BEARINGS IN THE PUMPS WAS APPROVED, SUPPORTS WERE ADDED TO THE LOWER BEARING LUBE LINE AND PROXIMITY PROBE MOUNTING BRACKETS INSTALLED.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE OPERATION AND FUNCTION OF THE HEATER DRAIN PUMPS IS DISCUSSED IN FSAR SECTION 10.4.7. THE MODIFICATION WILL EXTEND PUMP LIFE AND VIBRATIONAL MONITORING CAPABILITIES WITHOUT AFFECTING PUMP PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS. SYSTEM OPERATION IS NOT IMPACTED. THE HEATER DRAIN PUMPS ARE NOT THE TOPIC OF ANY PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION. FAILURE OF THE PUMP WILL NOT AFFECT THE OPERATION OF ANY SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT OR FUNCTION.

SUBJECT: MDD 93-V1M026,REVISION 0,SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THE SEAL OIL VACUUM PUMP INSTALLED ON UNIT 1 WAS NOT ABLE TO ACHIEVE THE SAME PERFORMANCE LEVEL AS THAT ATTAINABLE ON UNIT 2. THE DIFFERENCE IN PUMP PERFORMANCE WAS ATTRIBUTED TO AN UPDATED MOTOR AND GEAR REDUCER UTILIZED ON UNIT 2. THE UNIT 1 PUMP ASSEMBLY/GEAR REDUCER WAS REPLACED WITH THE SAME EQUIPMENT UTILIZED ON UNIT 2.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE REPLACEMENT OF THE SEAL OIL VACUUM PUMP WITH AN UPGRADED MOTOR AND GEAR REDUCER ASSEMBLY DOES NOT IMPACT THE DISCUSSION GIVEN IN FSAR SECTION 10.2, "TURBINE-GENERATOR". THE PERFORMANCE OF THE PUMP INCREASED WITH THE NEW COMPONENTS, HOWEVER SYSTEM OPERATION WAS NOT CHANGED. THE SEAL OIL VACUUM TANK AND ITS COMPONENTS ARE NOT THE TOPIC OF ANY PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION.

SUBJECT: MDD 93-V1M027,REVISION 0,SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: TO MINIMIZE THE POTENTIAL FOR VIBRATION INDUCED TUBING FAILURES ON THE EHC SKID ASSOCIATED WITH THE AUTOMATIC AIR BLEED VALVES, THE AIR BLEED VALVES WERE RELOCATED APPROXIMATELY TWO FEET DOWNSTREAM TO AN AREA SUBJECTED TO LESS VIBRATION. THE FUNCTION OF THE VALVES WILL NOT CHANGE NOR WILL THEIR ABILITY TO PERFORM THE AIR REMOVAL FUNCTION BE

AFFECTED IN THE NEW LOCATION. THE CHANGE WAS NECESSARY FOLLOWING SEVERAL VIBRATION INDUCED TUBE FAILURES RESULTING IN A LOSS OF EHC FLUID.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE EHC HYDRAULIC POWER UNIT IS GENERALLY DISCUSSED IN FSAR SECTION 10.2 WHICH DESCRIBES THE FUNCTION AND OPERATION OF THE TURBINE GENERATOR. THE AIR REMOVAL VALVES ARE NOT DISCUSSED IN THIS SECTION. THE RELOCATED VALVES REMAIN CAPABLE OF PERFORMING THEIR INTENDED FUNCTION. THE EHC HYDRAULIC POWER UNIT IS NOT THE TOPIC OF ANY PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION.

SUBJECT: MDD 93-V2M028,REVISION 0,SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: TO MINIMIZE THE POTENTIAL FOR VIBRATION INDUCED TUBING FAILURES ON THE EHC SKID ASSOCIATED WITH THE AUTOMATIC AIR BLEED VALVES, THE AIR BLEED VALVES WERE RELOCATED APPROXIMATELY TWO FEET DOWNSTREAM TO AN AREA SUBJECTED TO LESS VIBRATION. THE FUNCTION OF THE VALVES WILL NOT CHANGE NOR WILL THEIR ABILITY TO PERFORM THE AIR REMOVAL FUNCTION BE AFFECTED IN THE NEW LOCATION. THE CHANGE WAS NECESSARY FOLLOWING SEVERAL VIBRATION INDUCED TUBE FAILURES RESULTING IN A LOSS OF EHC FLUID.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE EHC HYDRAULIC POWER UNIT IS GENERALLY DISCUSSED IN FSAR SECTION 10.2 WHICH DESCRIBES THE FUNCTION AND OPERATION OF THE TURBINE GENERATOR. THE AIR REMOVAL VALVES ARE NOT DISCUSSED IN THIS SECTION. THE RELOCATED VALVES REMAIN CAPABLE OF PERFORMING THEIR INTENDED FUNCTION. THE EHC HYDRAULIC POWER UNIT IS NOT THE TOPIC OF ANY PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION.

SUBJECT: MDD 93-VAM029,REVISION 0,SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: SEVERAL INPUTS TO HEAT TRACE PANEL 1-1817-U3-001 HAVE PROCESS FLUID TEMPERATURES GREATER THAN THE HEAT TRACE ALARM SETPOINT OF 80 DEGREES F. THIS CAUSED THE CENTRAL ALARM ASSOCIATED WITH THIS PANEL TO REMAIN IN THE ALARMED STATE WHICH COULD MASK A VALID INPUT. THE SETPOINT FOR SEVERAL CIRCUITS WHICH EXHIBITED THIS CHARACTERISTIC WERE RAISED FROM 80 DEGREES F. TO 105 DEGREES F.

SAFETY EVALUATION: HEAT TRACING REQUIREMENTS ARE GENERALLY DISCUSSED IN MULTIPLE SECTIONS OF THE FSAR INCLUDING SECTION 8.3,"ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION", AND SECTIONS 9.2, 9.3 AND 9.4 ADDRESSING HEAT TRACE REQUIREMENTS FOR VARIOUS PLANT WATER SYSTEMS. THE HIGH TEMPERATURE ALARM SETPOINT IS NOT SPECIFIED IN THESE DISCUSSIONS. HEAT TRACING ALARM SETPOINTS ARE NOT THE SUBJECT OF ANY PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION.

SUBJECT: MDD 93-V1M031,REVISION 0,SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: LINE 1-1316-L4-502-11/2" LINE ASSOCIATED WITH THE MSR POCKET DRAINS EXPERIENCED A BREACH OF THE PRESSURE BOUNDARY DUE TO PIPE EROSION. THIS PROBLEM HAD BEEN UNDER REVIEW BY PERFORMANCE OF UT EXAMINATIONS AND SYSTEM/MATERIAL USAGE REVIEWS CONDUCTED BY PLANT ENGINEERING. CARBON STEEL PIPING WHICH IS MORE SUSCEPTIBLE TO EROSION/CORROSION WAS REPLACED WITH LOW ALLOY STEEL PIPING WHICH IS MORE RESISTANT TO EROSION/CORROSION.

REPLACEMENT OF THE CARBON STEEL PIPE WITH THE LOW ALLOY STEEL PIPE WILL CONSIDERABLY REDUCE THE FUTURE RATE OF WALL THINNING DUE TO EROSION.

SAFETY EVALUATION: SECTIONS 10.2, 10.3, 10.4.1 AND 10.4.7 DISCUSSES THE TURBINE-GENERATOR, MAIN STEAM SUPPLY, MAIN CONDENSER AND THE CONDENSATE AND FEEDWATER SYSTEMS. THE DISCUSSION CONTAINED IN THESE SECTIONS DOES NOT PROVIDE DETAILS SUCH AS PIPE MATERIAL SPECIFICATIONS. THE REPLACEMENT OF PIPING OF A DIFFERENT MATERIAL DOES NOT IMPACT SYSTEM OPERATION. THE MSR POCKET DRAINS ARE NOT THE SUBJECT OF ANY PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION.

SUBJECT: MDD 93-V1M032,REVISION 0,SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: AN 8" X 14" CONCENTRIC REDUCER WELDED TO THE OUTLET OF THE HEATER DRAIN PUMP DISCHARGE CONTROL VALVES WAS REPLACED WITH A NEW REDUCER OF A DIFFERENT MATERIAL. THE REPLACEMENT OF THE EXISTING REDUCERS WAS NECESSARY DUE TO WALL THINNING THROUGH EROSION. THE CARBON STEEL REDUCER WAS REPLACED WITH A STAINLESS STEEL REDUCER WHICH SHOULD CONSIDERABLY REDUCE THE PROBABILITY OF FUTURE WALL THINNING IN THIS AREA.

SAFETY EVALUATION: FSAR SECTION 10.4.7 DESCRIBES THE CONDENSATE AND FEED WATER SYSTEMS INCLUDING THE HEATER DRAIN SYSTEM. THE SUBJECT VALVES ARE NOT DISCUSSED IN THE FSAR. THE REPLACEMENT ONLY INVOLVES A CHANGE IN THE MATERIAL OF THE REDUCER AND DOES NOT REPRESENT A CHANGE IN THE DESIGN FUNCTION OF THE REDUCER. THE HEATER DRAIN SYSTEM IS NOT THE SUBJECT OF ANY PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION.

SUBJECT: MDD 93-V1M034,REVISION 0,SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: PIPE SUPPORT V1-1201-210-H603 SUPPORTING LINE 1-1201-210-1" (REACTOR COOLANT PUMP #1 OIL SPILL PROTECTION SYSTEM) IS BEING MODIFIED (SPLICE JOINT ADDED) TO PERMIT REMOVAL OF THE SUPPORT TO FACILITATE MAINTENANCE AND REMOVAL OF THE MOTOR FOR NUMBER 1 REACTOR COOLANT PUMP. IN ADDITION THE ONE INCH LINE SUPPORTED BY THIS SUPPORT WAS ALSO REROUTED TO FACILITATE THE NEW SPLICE JOINT.

SAFETY EVALUATION: ALTHOUGH SOME STRUCTURAL MODIFICATIONS AND PIPE REROUTING WERE MADE UNDER THIS CHANGE, NO SYSTEM, STRUCTURE OR COMPONENT WAS ADDED OR DELETED. THE SUPPORT WILL STILL FUNCTION AS DESIGNED AS VERIFIED BY DESIGN CALCULATIONS. THE REROUTING OF THE LINE DOES NOT AFFECT OPERATION OF THE RCP OIL SPILL SYSTEM. THIS SYSTEM IS NOT THE TOPIC OF ANY PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION.

SUBJECT: MDD 93-VAM036,REVISION 0,SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: PRESSURE INDICATORS LOCATED ON THE DISCHARGE OF THE RECIPROCATING AIR COMPRESSORS WERE EXPERIENCING DAMAGE DUE TO THE PULSATION EFFECTS FROM THE LOADING AND UNLOADING OF THE COMPRESSORS. TO RESOLVE THIS ISSUE, PULSATION DAMPENERS WERE INSTALLED AT THE INLET TO EACH OF THE DISCHARGE PRESSURE INDICATORS ON THE RECIPROCATING AIR COMPRESSORS BETWEEN THE ROOT VALVE AND THE PRESSURE INDICATOR.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE INSTRUMENT/SERVICE AIR SYSTEM IS ADDRESSED IN FSAR SECTION 9.3.1. THE ADDITION OF THE PULSATION DAMPENERS IN THE PRESSURE INDICATOR INLETS DID NOT IMPACT SYSTEM FUNCTION OR OPERATION AS DESCRIBED IN THIS SECTION. THE INSTRUMENT AND SERVICE AIR SYSTEMS ARE NOT ADDRESSED BY ANY STATION TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS.

SUBJECT: MDD 93-V1M037,REVISION 0,SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: TWO SHORT SECTIONS OF PIPE AT THE OUTLETS OF THE HEATER DRAIN PUMP DISCHARGE AUTOMATIC RECIRCULATION VALVES WAS REPLACED WITH LOW ALLOY STEEL PIPING. THE EXISTING SECTIONS OF PIPE HAD EXPERIENCED WALL THINNING DUE TO EROSION. REPLACEMENT OF THE CARBON STEEL PIPE WITH THE LOW ALLOY STEEL PIPE WILL CONSIDERABLY REDUCE THE FUTURE RATE OF WALL THINNING DUE TO EROSION.

SAFETY EVALUATION: SECTION 10.4.7 DISCUSSES THE CONDENSATE AND FEEDWATER SYSTEMS INCLUDING THE HEATER DRAIN SYSTEM. THE DISCUSSION CONTAINED IN THIS SECTION DOES NOT PROVIDE DETAILS SUCH AS PIPE MATERIAL SPECIFICATIONS. THE REPLACEMENT OF PIPING OF A DIFFERENT MATERIAL DOES NOT IMPACT SYSTEM OPERATION. THE HEATER DRAIN SYSTEM IS NOT THE SUBJECT OF ANY PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION.

SUBJECT: MDD 93-V1M038,REVISION 0,SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: PIPING BETWEEN STEAM GENERATOR FEED PUMP TURBINE "1B" HIGH PRESSURE STOP VALVE AND THE HIGH PRESSURE STOP VALVE ABOVE SEAT DRAIN WAS REROUTED TO ELIMINATE FUTURE INTERFERENCES WITH FEED PUMP TURBINE DISASSEMBLY. PREVIOUS CONFIGURATION REQUIRED PIPING TO BE CUT OFF DURING DISASSEMBLY AND THEN REWELDED DURING REASSEMBLY.

SAFETY EVALUATION: FSAR SECTION 10.4.7 "CONDENSATE AND FEEDWATER SYSTEMS" DOES NOT ADDRESS THE ROUTING OF DRAIN LINES NOR DOES THE ROUTING OF THIS LINE APPEAR AS A PART OF ANY DRAWING CONTAINED IN THE FSAR. THE STEAM GENERATOR FEED PUMP TURBINE DRAIN SYSTEM IS NOT HE SUBJECT OF ANY PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION.

SUBJECT: MDD 93-VAM039,REVISION 0,SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THIS DESIGN CHANGE ADDS NOTES TO THE MAIN STEAM ISOLATION VALVE DESIGN DRAWINGS ALLOWING THE INSTALLATION OF ADDITIONAL SIGHT GLASSES TO THE MAIN STEAM ISOLATION VALVE HYDRAULIC FLUID RESERVOIRS. THE LOCATION OF THE EXISTING SIGHT GLASSES ON SEVERAL OF THE ACTUATORS MAKES OBSERVATION OF THE RESERVOIR LEVEL DIFFICULT. THE NEW SIGHT GLASSES WILL BE IDENTICAL TO THE EXISTING SIGHT GLASSES.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE MAIN STEAM ISOLATION VALVES ARE DESCRIBED IN DETAIL IN FSAR SECTION 10.3. THE DISCUSSION DOES NOT ADDRESS THE CAPABILITY OF MONITORING RESERVOIR LEVELS VIA THE SIGHT GLASS. ADDITION OF AN IDENTICAL SIGHT GLASS AT A LOCATION ON THE RESERVOIR THAT CAN BE BETTER OBSERVED BY PERSONNEL WILL NOT AFFECT MSIV OPERATION OR THEIR DESIGN FUNCTION TO RAPIDLY CLOSE ON ISOLATION SIGNALS. THE MAIN STEAM VALVES ARE REQUIRED BY

THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS, HOWEVER THIS ADDITION DOES NOT IMPACT THEIR REQUIRED DESIGN FUNCTION OR PRESENT ANY QUESTION OF MSIV OPERABILITY.

SUBJECT: MDD 93-V1M043,REVISION 0,SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THE DESIGN CHANGE PROVIDED A METHOD TO SUPPORT THE LATERAL DISTRIBUTION EXTENSIONS LOCATED AT THE PERIPHERY OF THE COOLING TOWER TO PREVENT THE EXTENSIONS FROM SEPARATING FROM THE DISTRIBUTION HEADER. IN ADDITION, EXTENSIONS WERE ADDED TO THE FLUME DRAINS TO PREVENT CLOGGING OR ENTRY OF DIRT/DEBRIS INTO THE FRENCH NOZZLES.

SAFETY EVALUATION: FSAR SECTION 10.4.5 DESCRIBES THE FUNCTION AND OPERATION OF THE CIRCULATING WATER SYSTEM INCLUDING THE COOLING TOWER. THE CHANGES IMPLEMENTED DO NOT IMPACT THIS DISCUSSION. COOLING TOWER OPERATION IS NOT AFFECTED AS A RESULT OF THIS CHANGE. THE CIRCULATING WATER SYSTEM IS NOT THE TOPIC OF ANY PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION.

SUBJECT: MDD 93-V1M044,REVISION 0,SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THE DISCHARGE PIPING FROM THE TURBINE BUILDING NORTH AND SOUTH SUMPS WAS CHANGED FROM A PIPING MATERIALS CLASSIFICATION OF PROJECT CLASS LLO (150# CARBON STEEL) TO LL3 (150# STAINLESS STEEL) TO PREVENT PUMP SUCTION LOSSES DUE TO INTERNAL SURFACE CORROSION. ADDITIONALLY, THE EXISTING FLOW INDICATORS WERE FOUND TO BE OBSOLETE AND SUBSEQUENTLY REPLACED. TO ENHANCE FUTURE MAINTENANCE ACTIVITIES, SEVERAL FLANGES WERE ADDED TO EASE PIPE REMOVAL AS NEEDED.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE TURBINE BUILDING SUMPS AND RADIATION MONITORS ARE DISCUSSED IN FSAR SECTION 11.5. THE REPLACEMENT OF CARBON STEEL PIPING WITH STAINLESS STEEL PIPING DOES NOT AFFECT SYSTEM OPERATION OR DESIGN FUNCTION. THE CHANGE DOES NOT IMPACT THE OPERATION OF THE RADIATION ELEMENTS OR THEIR FUNCTION. THE PIPING CLASS IS NOT CONSIDERED IN THE PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS.

SUBJECT: MDD 93-V1M045,REVISION 0,SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: A ONE OHM RESISTOR WAS ADDED TO THE MOTOR BOARD ON SEISMIC MONITOR AXR-19928J TO ALLEVIATE NOISE ON THE DATA CHANNEL OUTPUT THAT WAS OCCURRING ON ALL THREE DATA CHANNELS. THE INSTALLATION OF THE RESISTOR WAS A RECOMMENDATION FROM THE SYSTEM VENDOR (KINEMATRICS). THE ADDITION WILL ENABLE A BETTER SIGNAL SUPPLY TO THE CONTROL ROOM RECORDER.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE CHANGE DOES NOT AFFECT THE CAPABILITY OF THE SEISMIC MONITORING SYSTEM TO PERFORM ITS INTENDED FUNCTION. THE REDUCTION OF CHANNEL NOISE WILL PROVIDE FOR A MORE USEFUL SIGNAL TO BE SUPPLIED TO THE CONTROL ROOM RECORDER. SYSTEM OPERATION IS NOT AFFECTED. THE ADDITION OF THE RESISTOR DOES NOT IMPACT ANY REQUIREMENTS SET FORTH IN THE PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS REGARDING THE SEISMIC MONITORING SYSTEM.

SUBJECT: MDD 93-V1M048,REVISION 0,SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THE DESIGN CHANGE PROVIDES AN AUTOMATIC TRIP OF THE MAIN TURBINE WHEN THE GENERATOR OUTPUT BREAKERS ARE OPENED AS THE RESULT OF THE DETECTION OF EXCESSIVE NEGATIVE PHASE SEQUENCE CURRENTS. THE PREVIOUS DESIGN OPENED THE OUTPUT CIRCUIT BREAKERS WITHOUT TRIPPING THE TURBINE WHICH COULD CHALLENGE THE OVERSPEED PROTECTION DEVICES AT A HIGHER POWER LEVEL. THIS CHANGE WAS INITIATED FOLLOWING A UNIT 1 STARTUP (1R4) IN WHICH THIS EVENT HAPPENED.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE MAIN TURBINE GENERATOR IS DESCRIBED IN FSAR SECTION 10.2. THE GENERATOR PROTECTIVE TRIPS ARE NOT ADDRESSED IN THIS DISCUSSION. THE CHANGE DID NOT INVOLVE OR EFFECT THE MAIN TURBINE TRIPPING FUNCTIONS REQUIRED BY THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS. THE ADDED PROTECTION DOES NOT IMPACT TURBINE GENERATOR OPERATION OR FUNCTION.

SUBJECT: MDD 93-V2M049,REVISION 0,SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THE DESIGN CHANGE PROVIDES AN AUTOMATIC TRIP OF THE MAIN TURBINE WHEN THE GENERATOR OUTPUT BREAKERS ARE OPENED AS THE RESULT OF THE DETECTION OF EXCESSIVE NEGATIVE PHASE SEQUENCE CURRENTS. THE PREVIOUS DESIGN OPENED THE OUTPUT CIRCUIT BREAKERS WITHOUT TRIPPING THE TURBINE WHICH COULD CHALLENGE THE OVERSPEED PROTECTION DEVICES AT A HIGHER POWER LEVEL. THIS CHANGE WAS INITIATED FOLLOWING A UNIT 1 STARTUP (1R4) IN WHICH THIS EVENT HAPPENED.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE MAIN TURBINE GENERATOR IS DESCRIBED IN FSAR SECTION 10.2. THE GENERATOR PROTECTIVE TRIPS ARE NOT ADDRESSED IN THIS DISCUSSION. THE CHANGE DID NOT INVOLVE OR EFFECT THE MAIN TURBINE TRIPPING FUNCTIONS REQUIRED BY THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS. THE ADDED PROTECTION DOES NOT IMPACT TURBINE GENERATOR OPERATION OR FUNCTION.

SUBJECT: MDD 93-V1M050,REVISION 0,SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THE TURBINE EHC PRESSURE SWITCH WHICH ALARMS ON LOW PRESSURE WAS SET AT THE SAME PRESSURE IN WHICH AUTO START OF THE STANDBY PUMP OCCURS. THIS DID NOT PROVIDE ADEQUATE WARNING OF THE LOW PRESSURE CONDITION. THE LOW EHC PRESSURE SETPOINT WAS RAISED FROM 1300 PSIG TO 1400 PSIG.

SAFETY EVALUATION: FSAR SECTION 10.2 DISCUSSES THE OPERATION AND FUNCTION OF THE EHC SYSTEM. RAISING THE ALARM SETPOINT TO PROVIDE EARLIER WARNING OF IMPENDING LOW EHC PRESSURE DOES NOT AFFECT THE DISCUSSION CONTAINED WITHIN THE FSAR SECTION. THE SETPOINT AFFECTED BY THIS CHANGE IS NOT ADDRESSED BY THE STATION TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS.

SUBJECT: MDD 93-V2M051,REVISION 0,SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THE TURBINE EHC PRESSURE SWITCH WHICH ALARMS ON LOW PRESSURE WAS SET AT THE SAME PRESSURE IN WHICH AUTO START OF THE STANDBY PUMP OCCURS. THIS DID NOT PROVIDE ADEQUATE WARNING OF THE LOW PRESSURE

CONDITION. THE LOW EHC PRESSURE SETPOINT WAS RAISED FROM 1300 PSIG TO 1400 PSIG.

SAFETY EVALUATION: FSAR SECTION 10.2 DISCUSSES THE OPERATION AND FUNCTION OF THE EHC SYSTEM. RAISING THE ALARM SETPOINT TO PROVIDE EARLIER WARNING OF IMPENDING LOW EHC PRESSURE DOES NOT AFFECT THE DISCUSSION CONTAINED WITHIN THE FSAR SECTION. THE SETPOINT AFFECTED BY THIS CHANGE IS NOT ADDRESSED BY THE STATION TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS.

SUBJECT: MDD 93-V1M054, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THE INLET VALVE TO THE WASTE BALL COLLECTOR ON THE "B" CONDENSER TUBE CLEANING SYSTEM (AMERTAP) HAD INTERNAL VALVE DAMAGE RESULTING IN DIFFICULT VALVE OPERATION. THE VALVE WAS REPLACED WITH A NEW BALL VALVE AND DOWNSTREAM PIPING MODIFIED TO ACCEPT THE NEW LONGER VALVE.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE REPLACEMENT VALVE FUNCTIONS IN DESIGN AS THE ORIGINALLY SUPPLIED VALVE. THE CONDENSER TUBE CLEANING SYSTEM IS GENERALLY DISCUSSED IN FSAR SECTION 10.4.1, "MAIN CONDENSER". THE DISCUSSION DOES NOT CONTAIN COMPONENT SPECIFIC INFORMATION. THE CONDENSER TUBE CLEANING SYSTEM IS NOT THE SUBJECT OF ANY PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION.

SUBJECT: MDD 93-V1M059, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THE MAIN FEEDER BREAKER ASSOCIATED WITH THE UNIT 1 TURBINE BUILDING CRANE FAILED. IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THIS PARTICULAR BREAKER WAS NO LONGER MANUFACTURED. THE CHANGE PERMITTED THE INSTALLATION OF AN EQUIVALENT FEEDER BREAKER.

SAFETY EVALUATION: FSAR SECTION 8.3 DISCUSSES THE DESIGN, FUNCTION AND OPERATION OF THE ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS. THE REPLACEMENT OF THE MAIN FEEDER BREAKER WITH AN EQUIVALENT MODEL DOES NOT IMPACT THIS DISCUSSION. THE TURBINE BUILDING CRANE AND ITS ACCESSORIES ARE NOT THE SUBJECT OF ANY STATION TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION.

SUBJECT: MDD 93-V2M060, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THE MAIN FEEDER BREAKER ASSOCIATED WITH THE UNIT 2 TURBINE BUILDING CRANE FAILED. IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THIS PARTICULAR BREAKER WAS NO LONGER MANUFACTURED. THE CHANGE PERMITTED THE INSTALLATION OF AN EQUIVALENT FEEDER BREAKER.

SAFETY EVALUATION: FSAR SECTION 8.3 DISCUSSES THE DESIGN, FUNCTION AND OPERATION OF THE ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS. THE REPLACEMENT OF THE MAIN FEEDER BREAKER WITH AN EQUIVALENT MODEL DOES NOT IMPACT THIS DISCUSSION. THE TURBINE BUILDING CRANE AND ITS ACCESSORIES ARE NOT THE SUBJECT OF ANY STATION TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION.

SUBJECT: MDD 93-VAM064, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: THE EXISTING PROBE CABLE, A COMPOSITE OF MICA/GLASS, ASSOCIATED WITH THE AQUARIAN PROBES WAS REPLACED WITH A HIGH TEMPERATURE TEFLON INSULATED CABLE. THE OLD CABLE WAS SUSCEPTIBLE TO MOISTURE ABSORPTION WHICH CAUSED IMPROPER INDICATION OF WATER INSTEAD OF STEAM.

SAFETY EVALUATION: FSAR SECTIONS 10.1, 10.3 AND 10.4.9 ADDRESS FUNCTION AND OPERATION OF THE MAIN STEAM AND AUXILIARY FEED WATER SYSTEMS. THE LEVEL CONTROL FUNCTION ASSOCIATED WITH THE AQUARIAN PROBES IS DISCUSSED BUT NOT TO THE LEVEL OF DETAIL SPECIFYING PROBE CABLE REQUIREMENTS. THE REPLACEMENT CABLE PERFORMS THE SAME FUNCTION IN THE SAME MANNER AS THE ORIGINALLY SUPPLIED CABLE BUT WILL NOT BE SUSCEPTIBLE TO MOISTURE ABSORPTION. THE STEAM CONDENSATE DRAIN POT LEVEL CONTROL SYSTEM IS NOT SAFETY RELATED AND IS NOT DISCUSSED IN THE PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS.

SUBJECT: MDD 93-V2M066, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: LIGHTING TRANSFORMER 2NBL2X1 (4160-480 GE DRY TYPE XFMR) WAS REPLACED WITH A CORE AND COIL ASSEMBLY SUPPLIED BY ABB. THE ABB SUPPLIED CORE AND COIL ASSEMBLY WAS DESIGNED TO BE INSTALLED IN THE EXISTING GE TRANSFORMER CASE. THE REPLACEMENT CORE AND COIL ASSEMBLY IS OF A LATTER DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION TECHNOLOGY AND SHOULD PROVIDE FOR A GREATER LEVEL OF RELIABILITY.

SAFETY EVALUATION: ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS ARE DISCUSSED IN FSAR SECTION 8.3. THE LIGHTING TRANSFORMER IS DEPICTED ON FIGURE 8.3.1-1 (SHEET 2 OF 2) WHICH WILL BE UPDATED DURING THE NORMAL ANNUAL UPDATE. THE REPLACEMENT TRANSFORMER HAS THE SAME ELECTRICAL CHARACTERISTICS AS THE PREVIOUSLY INSTALLED TRANSFORMER. THE TRANSFORMER INVOLVED IN THE CHANGE WAS A NON-IE CLASS TRANSFORMER AND WAS NOT THE SUBJECT OF ANY PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION.

SUBJECT: MDD 93-V2M072, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1

DESCRIPTION: A MANUALLY OPERATED ISOLATION VALVE WAS INSTALLED IN THE DISCHARGE LINE OF EACH OF THE MAIN TURBINE ELECTRO-HYDRAULIC CONTROL (EHC) FLUID HIGH PRESSURE PUMPS. THE VALVES ARE NORMALLY OPEN AND DO NOT AFFECT THE OPERATION OF THE SYSTEM. THE BALL VALVES WERE ADDED TO ELIMINATE THE USE OF AN EXISTING CHECK VALVE IN THE DISCHARGE LINE AS AN ISOLATION BOUNDARY DURING PUMP MAINTENANCE WHILE THE UNIT IS AT POWER.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THE MAIN TURBINE AND GENERATOR ARE DESCRIBED IN FSAR SECTION 10.2. A DISCUSSION OF THE EHC SYSTEM IS CONTAINED WITHIN THIS DESCRIPTION. THE ADDITION OF THE VALVES DOES NOT IMPACT SYSTEM OPERATIONS AS DESCRIBED IN THIS DISCUSSION. THE EHC SYSTEM IS NOT THE TOPIC OF ANY PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION.

SUBJECT: MDD 93-VAM075, REVISION 0, SEQUENCE 1


DESCRIPTION: THE FILTER ELEMENT ASSOCIATED WITH THE LAUNDRY AND HOT SHOWER TANK (LHST) REQUIRED FREQUENT CLEANING AND WAS REMOVED. THE

FUNCTION THAT WAS BEING PROVIDED FOR BY THIS FILTER IS NOW BEING PROVIDED THROUGH THE RECENT INSTALLATION OF THE IMPELL MICROFILTRATION SKID LOCATED IN THE ALTERNATE RADWASTE BUILDING.

SAFETY EVALUATION: FSAR SECTION 11.2 DISCUSSES THE FUNCTION AND OPERATION OF THE LIQUID RADWASTE SYSTEM. THE DESCRIPTION CONTAINED WITHIN THIS SECTION AND FSAR FIGURES WILL BE UPDATED TO INDICATE THAT THE FILTER ELEMENT HAS BEEN REMOVED. AS THIS FUNCTION IS BEING PROVIDED VIA AN ALTERNATE METHOD, SYSTEM OPERATION IS NOT AFFECTED. THE LHST IS NOT THE TOPIC OF ANY PLANT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION.

10 CFR 50.59(B) REPORT of
TESTS & EXPERIMENTS.
JUNE 1, 1992 THRU OCTOBER 22, 1993

**VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT
UNITS 1 & 2**



SUBJECT: T-OPER-93-003

DESCRIPTION: THIS PROCEDURE ALLOWS USE OF FIRE PROTECTION WATER HEADER PRESSURE TO PERFORM A HYDROSTATIC TEST ON NSCW TRAIN B. THE TEST WAS PERFORMED IN CONJUNCTION WITH PROCEDURE 84003-C TO SATISFY ASME CODE REQUIREMENTS. THE FIRE PROTECTION WATER HEADER WAS CONNECTED VIA FIRE HYDRANT TO THE NSCW HEADER AND BOTH JOCKEY PUMPS WERE STARTED TO SUPPLY THE TEST PRESSURE. THE PROCEDURE GAVE ADDITIONAL PROVISIONS FOR OPERATING A MOTOR DRIVEN FIRE PUMP IF JOCKEY PUMPS DID NOT SUPPLY THE APPROPRIATE TEST PRESSURE. THIS PROCEDURE WAS APPROVED FOR ONE-TIME USE WITH THE UNIT DURING COLD SHUTDOWN.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THIS TEST DOES NOT DEVIATE OR CREATE AN ACCIDENT OR MALFUNCTION DIFFERENT FROM THE FSAR ANALYSIS. DURING THE TEST, THE FIRE PROTECTION WATER TANKS WERE MONITORED AND CONTINUOUS MAKEUP CAPABILITY PROVIDED TO ENSURE THE MINIMUM LEVELS WERE MAINTAINED. IN ADDITION, TWO FIRE PUMPS WERE AVAILABLE DURING THE TEST. THEREFORE, SINCE THE MINIMUM FIRE PROTECTION REQUIREMENTS WERE MET, THE MARGIN OF SAFETY IS MAINTAINED.

SUBJECT: 93270-C REV 14T

DESCRIPTION: A TEMPORARY PROCEDURE REVISION WAS MADE TO THIS PROCEDURE TO PROCEED WITH THE UNIT TWO FUEL OFF-LOAD IN A SAFE MANNER WITH A NON-FUNCTIONAL DISENGAGED LIMIT SWITCH. TO DISENGAGE A FUEL ASSEMBLY, THE FUEL GRIPPER DISENGAGED LIMIT SWITCH MUST BE MADE UP, THE FUEL GRIPPER DISENGAGED ENGAGED LIMIT SWITCH MUST BE OPEN, MAST HEIGHT REQUIREMENTS MUST BE SATISFIED, AND THE LOAD MONITOR MUST INDICATE THAT THE WEIGHT OF THE FUEL HAS BEEN REMOVED. THEREFORE, AN EXTERNALLY SUPPLIED SIGNAL WAS SUPPLIED TO THE SIGMA CONTROL CONSOLE WHEN THE FUEL WAS OVER THE UPENDER TO SIMULATE THE SWITCH DISENGAGING. THE LOAD MONITOR WAS RELIED UPON TO INDICATE DISENGAGEMENT OF THE FUEL ASSEMBLY.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THIS REVISION DOES NOT INCREASE PROBABILITY, DEVIATE, OR CREATE AN ACCIDENT OR MALFUNCTION DIFFERENT FROM FSAR ANALYSIS. STRICT ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS WERE USED TO PROHIBIT DISENGAGEMENT OF A FUEL ASSEMBLY OVER THE CORE. THROUGH VISUAL VERIFICATION AND LOAD MONITOR INDICATION, THE FUEL ASSEMBLIES WERE VERIFIED AS DISENGAGED PRIOR TO CONTINUING THE OFF-LOAD.

SUBJECT: SPECIAL TEST - (T-ENG-93-18) UNIT 1

DESCRIPTION: DURING PERFORMANCE OF T-ENG-93-04 THE SEQUENCER PANEL EXPERIENCED AN UNPLANNED LOAD SHED WHILE PERFORMING THE "U/V" MANUAL TEST IN THE "SYS" TEST MODE. THE SPECIAL TEST WAS TO IDENTIFY THE CAUSE OF THE INADVERTENT LOAD SHED WHICH OCCURRED DURING PERFORMANCE OF T-ENG-93-04 ON APRIL 10, 1993. IN ADDITION, THIS TEST WAS USED TO VERIFY THE ADEQUACY OF ANY REPAIRS/MODIFICATIONS RESULTING FROM THE PERFORMANCE OF THE TEST. THIS TEST RECREATED THE CONDITIONS PRESENT WHEN THE LOAD SHED OCCURRED.

SAFETY EVALUATION: FSAR CHAPTERS 3.0, 5.0, 6.0, 8.0, 13.0, 15.0 WERE REVIEWED AND IT WAS FOUND THAT THE TESTING DOES NOT REPRESENT A CHANGE TO THE PLANT AS DESCRIBED BY THE FSAR. ALTHOUGH TRAIN "A" 4160 SWITCHGEAR WAS DE-

ENERGIZED DURING TESTING, ALL LOADS REQUIRED TO SUPPORT THE PLANT IN ITS INITIAL CONDITIONS WERE TRANSFERRED TO THE TRAIN "B" 4160 SWITCHGEAR. THIS PROCEDURE WAS IMPLEMENTED IN MODE 6. THEREFORE, THE TEST COMPLIED WITH TECH SPEC 3.9.8.1. TECH SPEC 3.8.1.2 WAS ALSO SATISFIED SINCE TRAIN "B" 4160 SWITCHGEAR AND ITS ASSOCIATED DIESEL GENERATOR WAS OPERABLE.

SUBJECT: SPECIAL TEST - (T-ENG-92-09) UNIT 1

DESCRIPTION: THE ATI FUNCTION WAS DEFEATED BY A TEMPORARY MODIFICATION TO ALLOW THE SEQUENCER TO PERFORM ITS SAFETY FUNCTION FOR ALL ACCIDENT CONDITIONS. THIS MODIFICATION PREVENTS THE SEQUENCER MAIN TIMING BUS FROM RESETTING ON AN ATI SIGNAL IF THE PLANT RECEIVES A SAFETY INJECTION SIGNAL(SI) WHILE ATI IS AT STEP 61 OR 72. THIS TESTING IS NOT REQUIRED TO SUPPORT SEQUENCER OPERABILITY, BUT IS A COMPENSATORY ACTION WHILE ATI IS DEFEATED. THIS TEST DOES NOT OPERATE ANY PLANT COMPONENTS OTHER THAN THE SEQUENCER INTERNAL LOGIC. IF AN SI OR UV OCCURS DURING THE TEST, THE SEQUENCER IS DESIGNED TO AUTOMATICALLY RESET FROM TEST MODE AND PERFORM ITS SAFETY RELATED FUNCTIONS.

SAFETY EVALUATION: SEQUENCER OPERATION IS DISCUSSED IN FSAR SECTIONS 8.3.1.1.2, 8.3.1.1.3, TABLE 8.3.1-2, TABLE 8.3.1-3, AND FIGURE 8.3.1-2. THIS TEMPORARY PROCEDURE PROVIDES GUIDANCE FOR THE OPERATION OF AN ORIGINALLY SUPPLIED SEQUENCER TEST CAPABILITY. THIS TESTING IS NOT SPECIFICALLY ADDRESSED IN THE FSAR. FOR THIS REASON, THE PROCEDURE WILL BE REGARDED AS A SPECIAL TEST, EVEN THOUGH THIS PROCEDURE OPERATES ALL COMPONENTS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THEIR ORIGINAL DESIGN. THE TESTING DOES NOT CHANGE THE PLANT AS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR. THIS SPECIAL TEST DOES NOT AFFECT ASSOCIATED PLANT TECH SPECS 3/4.3(ESFAS INSTRUMENTATION) OR 3/4.8(EMERGENCY POWER SUPPLY).

SUBJECT: SPECIAL TEST-(T-ENG-92-10) UNIT 2

DESCRIPTION: THE ATI FUNCTION WAS DEFEATED BY A TEMPORARY MODIFICATION TO ALLOW THE SEQUENCER TO PERFORM ITS SAFETY FUNCTION FOR ALL ACCIDENT CONDITIONS. THIS MODIFICATION PREVENTS THE SEQUENCER MAIN TIMING BUS FROM RESETTING ON AN ATI SIGNAL IF THE PLANT RECEIVES A SAFETY INJECTION SIGNAL(SI) WHILE ATI IS AT STEP 61 OR 72. THIS TESTING IS NOT REQUIRED TO SUPPORT SEQUENCER OPERABILITY, BUT IS A COMPENSATORY ACTION WHILE ATI IS DEFEATED. THIS TEST DOES NOT OPERATE ANY PLANT COMPONENTS OTHER THAN THE SEQUENCER INTERNAL LOGIC. IF AN SI OR UV OCCURS DURING THE TEST, THE SEQUENCER IS DESIGNED TO AUTOMATICALLY RESET FROM TEST MODE AND PERFORM ITS SAFETY RELATED FUNCTIONS.

SAFETY EVALUATION: SEQUENCER OPERATION IS DISCUSSED IN FSAR SECTIONS 8.3.1.1.2, 8.3.1.1.3, TABLE 8.3.1-2, TABLE 8.3.1-3, AND FIGURE 8.3.1-2. THIS TEMPORARY PROCEDURE PROVIDES GUIDANCE FOR THE OPERATION OF AN ORIGINALLY SUPPLIED SEQUENCER TEST CAPABILITY. THIS TESTING IS NOT SPECIFICALLY ADDRESSED IN THE FSAR. FOR THIS REASON, THE PROCEDURE WILL BE REGARDED AS A SPECIAL TEST, EVEN THOUGH THIS PROCEDURE OPERATES ALL COMPONENTS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THEIR ORIGINAL DESIGN. THE TESTING DOES NOT CHANGE THE PLANT AS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR. THIS SPECIAL TEST DOES NOT AFFECT ASSOCIATED PLANT TECH SPECS 3/4.3(ESFAS INSTRUMENTATION) OR 3/4.8(EMERGENCY POWER SUPPLY).

SUBJECT: SPECIAL TEST - (T-ENG-92-11) UNIT 1

DESCRIPTION: THIS TEST RAN THE CVCS POSITIVE DISPLACEMENT PUMP(PDP) AT VARYING DISCHARGE PRESSURES. THIS TEST WAS PERFORMED AFTER THE COMPLETION OF PD PUMP PACKING REPLACEMENT IN ORDER TO PROPERLY "BREAK-IN" THE PUMP'S PACKING. THIS PROCEDURE SHOULD PREVENT PREMATURE FAILURE OF THE PACKING.

SAFETY EVALUATION: FSAR SECTION 9.3.4 DESCRIBES THE CVCS (PD PUMP). THE PROCEDURE DOES NOT REQUIRE ANY REVISION TO THE FSAR SINCE ALL MODIFICATIONS TO THE PLANT ARE TEMPORARY AND WILL BE RESTORED WITHIN ONE SHIFT. THIS SPECIAL TEST DOES NOT REQUIRE ANY CHANGES TO THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS NOR ANY PORTION OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION PLAN.

SUBJECT: SPECIAL TEST - (T-ENG-93-9) UNIT 2

DESCRIPTION: THIS TEST RAN THE CVCS POSITIVE DISPLACEMENT PUMP(PDP) AT VARYING DISCHARGE PRESSURES. THIS TEST WAS PERFORMED AFTER THE COMPLETION OF PD PUMP PACKING REPLACEMENT IN ORDER TO PROPERLY "BREAK-IN" THE PUMP'S PACKING. THIS PROCEDURE SHOULD PREVENT PREMATURE FAILURE OF THE PACKING.

SAFETY EVALUATION: FSAR SECTION 9.3.4 DESCRIBES THE CVCS (PD PUMP). THE PROCEDURE DOES NOT REQUIRE ANY REVISION TO THE FSAR SINCE ALL MODIFICATIONS TO THE PLANT ARE TEMPORARY AND WILL BE RESTORED WITHIN ONE SHIFT. THIS SPECIAL TEST DOES NOT REQUIRE ANY CHANGES TO THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS NOR ANY PORTION OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION PLAN.

SUBJECT: SPECIAL TEST - (T-ENG-93-20) UNIT 2

DESCRIPTION: THIS TEST RAN THE CVCS POSITIVE DISPLACEMENT PUMP(PDP) AT VARYING DISCHARGE PRESSURES. THIS TEST WAS PERFORMED AFTER THE COMPLETION OF PD PUMP PACKING REPLACEMENT IN ORDER TO PROPERLY "BREAK-IN" THE PUMP'S PACKING. THIS PROCEDURE SHOULD PREVENT PREMATURE FAILURE OF THE PACKING.

SAFETY EVALUATION: FSAR SECTION 9.3.4 DESCRIBES THE CVCS (PD PUMP). THE PROCEDURE DOES NOT REQUIRE ANY REVISION TO THE FSAR SINCE ALL MODIFICATIONS TO THE PLANT ARE TEMPORARY AND WILL BE RESTORED WITHIN ONE SHIFT. THIS SPECIAL TEST DOES NOT REQUIRE ANY CHANGES TO THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS NOR ANY PORTION OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION PLAN.

SUBJECT: SPECIAL TEST - (T-ENG-93-21) UNIT 1

DESCRIPTION: THIS TEST RAN THE CVCS POSITIVE DISPLACEMENT PUMP(PDP) AT VARYING DISCHARGE PRESSURES. THIS TEST WAS PERFORMED AFTER THE COMPLETION OF PD PUMP PACKING REPLACEMENT IN ORDER TO PROPERLY "BREAK-IN" THE PUMP'S PACKING. THIS PROCEDURE SHOULD PREVENT PREMATURE FAILURE OF THE PACKING.

SAFETY EVALUATION: FSAR SECTION 9.3.4 DESCRIBES THE CVCS (PD PUMP). THE PROCEDURE DOES NOT REQUIRE ANY REVISION TO THE FSAR SINCE ALL MODIFICATIONS TO THE PLANT ARE TEMPORARY AND WILL BE RESTORED WITHIN ONE SHIFT. THIS SPECIAL TEST DOES NOT REQUIRE ANY CHANGES TO THE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS NOR ANY PORTION OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION PLAN.

SUBJECT: SPECIAL TEST - (T-ENG-93-04) UNIT 1

DESCRIPTION: THE PROPOSED TEST IS REQUIRED TO TEST THE SAFETY FEATURES SEQUENCERS AFTER THE CORRECTION OF THE ATI STEP 61 TIMING ANOMALY UNDER DCP 93-V1N003. THIS DESIGN CHANGE PACKAGE PREVENTS THE SEQUENCER MAIN TIMING BUS FROM RESETTING ON AN ATI SIGNAL IF THE PLANT RECEIVES A SAFETY INJECTION SIGNAL(SI) WHILE ATI IS AT STEP 61 OR 72. ADDITIONALLY, THIS TEST VERIFIES THE CORRECT DESIGN AND INSTALLATION OF THE AUTOMATIC RESET CAPABILITY INSTALLED UNDER DCP 92-V1N0171. THIS TESTING IS REQUIRED TO SUPPORT SEQUENCER OPERABILITY. THIS PROCEDURE MUST OPERATE THE SEQUENCER AND DG OUTSIDE ITS NORMAL DESIGN BY DEFEATING THE DG TO SIMULATE A MID-STEPPING SEQUENCE TRIP. THE OVERALL TEST INCLUDES:

1. MANUAL SEQUENCER TESTS, AND ATI INSERVICE
2. INITIATE MID-STEPPING SEQUENCE TRIP OF THE DG AND VERIFY AUTOMATIC RESET OCCURS AFTER 60 SECONDS
3. INITIATE MID-STEPPING SEQUENCE TRIP FROM QEAB AND VERIFY NO AUTOMATIC RESET OF THE SEQUENCER OCCURS. VERIFY MANUAL RESET FUNCTIONAL.
4. VERIFY SUCCESSFUL COMPLETION OF SI/UV, SI, AND UV ACTUATIONS IN ESFAS WITH THE SI SECTION INITIATED AT ATI STEP 61.

SAFETY EVALUATION: FSAR SECTIONS 6.0, 7.0, AND 8.3 WERE REVIEWED AND IT WAS CONCLUDED THAT THIS TEST DID NOT CHANGE THE PLANT AS IT IS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR. THE CHANGES MADE IN DCP'S 93-V1N003 AND 92-V1N0171 ARE CHANGES TO THE PLANT BUT THE FUNCTIONAL TESTING DESCRIBED IN THIS TEMPORARY ENGINEERING PROCEDURE DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A CHANGE TO THE PLANT AS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR. THE TECH SPECS ADDRESSING THE AFFECTED EQUIPMENT, 3/4.3 ON ESFAS INSTRUMENTATION, AND 3/4.8 ON EMERGENCY POWER SUPPLY ARE UNAFFECTED BY THE TESTING.

SUBJECT: SPECIAL TEST - (T-ENG-93-05) UNIT 2

DESCRIPTION: THE PROPOSED TEST IS REQUIRED TO TEST THE SAFETY FEATURES SEQUENCERS AFTER THE CORRECTION OF THE ATI STEP 61 TIMING ANOMALY UNDER DCP 93-V1N003. THIS DESIGN CHANGE PACKAGE PREVENTS THE SEQUENCER MAIN TIMING BUS FROM RESETTING ON AN ATI SIGNAL IF THE PLANT RECEIVES A SAFETY INJECTION SIGNAL(SI) WHILE ATI IS AT STEP 61 OR 72. ADDITIONALLY, THIS TEST VERIFIES THE CORRECT DESIGN AND INSTALLATION OF THE AUTOMATIC RESET CAPABILITY INSTALLED UNDER DCP 92-V1N0171. THIS TESTING IS REQUIRED TO SUPPORT SEQUENCER OPERABILITY. THIS PROCEDURE MUST OPERATE THE SEQUENCER AND DG OUTSIDE ITS NORMAL DESIGN BY DEFEATING THE DG TO SIMULATE A MID-STEPPING SEQUENCE TRIP. THE OVERALL TEST INCLUDES:

1. MANUAL SEQUENCER TESTS, AND ATI INSERVICE
2. INITIATE MID-STEPPING SEQUENCE TRIP OF THE DG AND VERIFY AUTOMATIC RESET OCCURS AFTER 60 SECONDS
3. INITIATE MID-STEPPING SEQUENCE TRIP FROM QEAB AND VERIFY NO AUTOMATIC RESET OF THE SEQUENCER OCCURS. VERIFY MANUAL RESET FUNCTIONAL.

4. VERIFY SUCCESSFUL COMPLETION OF SI/UV, SI,
AND UV ACTUATIONS IN ESFAS WITH THE SI
SECTION INITIATED AT ATI STEP 61.

SAFETY EVALUATION: FSAR SECTIONS 6.0, 7.0, AND 8.3 WERE REVIEWED AND IT WAS CONCLUDED THAT THIS TEST DID NOT CHANGE THE PLANT AS IT IS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR. THE CHANGES MADE IN DCP'S 93-VIN003 AND 92-VIN0171 ARE CHANGES TO THE PLANT BUT THE FUNCTIONAL TESTING DESCRIBED IN THIS TEMPORARY ENGINEERING PROCEDURE DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A CHANGE TO THE PLANT AS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR. THE TECH SPECS ADDRESSING THE AFFECTED EQUIPMENT, 3/4.3 ON ESFAS INSTRUMENTATION, AND 3/4.8 ON EMERGENCY POWER SUPPLY ARE UNAFFECTED BY THE TESTING.

SUBJECT: SPECIAL TEST - (T-ENG-93-13) UNIT 1

DESCRIPTION: THIS TEST IS REQUIRED TO SATISFY SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.3.1.1 (TABLE 4.3-1 F/U 7 AND 8) AND 4.3.3.6.B (TABLE 3.3-8 F/U 2 AND 3). THIS PROCEDURE WAS DEVELOPED FOR REFUELING OUTAGE 1E4. THE PROCEDURE IS VERY SIMILAR TO THE EXISTING RTD CROSS CALIBRATION SURVEILLANCE PROCEDURE.

SAFETY EVALUATION: BEING THAT THIS PROCEDURE IS SO SIMILAR TO THE EXISTING RTD CROSS CALIBRATION PROCEDURE, IT WILL IMPLEMENT THE REQUIREMENTS IMPLIED IN FSAR SECTIONS 7.2.2.3.2 AND 7.2.2.5. NO CHANGE TO ANY PROCEDURES DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR IS REQUIRED. THIS PROCEDURE DOES NOT REPRESENT ANY CHANGE TO EITHER THE TECH SPECS OR THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION PLAN.

SUBJECT: SPECIAL TEST - (T-ENG-93-11) UNIT 1

DESCRIPTION: THIS TEMPORARY ENGINEERING PROCEDURE WILL OPERATE THE STRONGER CCP IN COLD LEG INJECTION MODE, THE "B" SI PUMP IN HOT LEG INJECTION MODE WITH CONCURRENT MINIFLOW, AND THE STRONGER SI PUMP IN COLD LEG INJECTION MODE AND SUBSEQUENT COLD LEG RECIRCULATION MODE. MOV DIAGNOSTIC TEST DATA WILL BE OBTAINED FOR NUMEROUS VALVES. ALL VALVES WILL BE STROKED IN BOTH DIRECTIONS AGAINST SYSTEM OPERATING PRESSURE AND FLOW CONDITIONS.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THIS PROCEDURE OPERATES THE CHARGING SYSTEM AS IT IS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR. THIS TEST OPERATES THE SI SYSTEM IN A CONFIGURATION SOMEWHAT DIFFERENT FROM ITS OPERATIONAL DESCRIPTION IN THE FSAR. THIS PROCEDURE MAKES ONLY A TEMPORARY CHANGE TO EQUIPMENT. THEREFORE, NO CHANGE TO THE FSAR IS NECESSARY. FSAR SECTIONS 3.9, 5.4.7, 5.4.12, 6.3, 7.3.2, 7.4, 9.3.4, 13.5, AND CHAPTER 15 WERE REVIEWED. REVIEW OF TECH SPECS 3/4.1.2.1, 3/4.1.2.3, 3/4.1.2.5, 3/4.8.4.2, 3/4.9.8.1, AND 3/4.9.8.2 CONCLUDE THAT NO CHANGES TO THE TECH SPECS ARE NEEDED.

SUBJECT: SPECIAL TEST - (T-ENG-93-10) UNIT 1

DESCRIPTION: THIS TEMPORARY ENGINEERING PROCEDURE WILL OPERATE THE "A" TRAIN CCP ON MINIFLOW AND THROUGH THE SAFETY GRADE CHARGING FLOW PATH. DURING THIS TIME FRAME, FLOW WILL ALSO BE AVAILABLE FOR SEAL INJECTION TO

ANY RCP'S WHICH ARE NOT ON THEIR BACKSEAT. MOV DIAGNOSTIC TEST DATA WILL BE OBTAINED FOR TWO VALVES. THEY WILL BE STROKED IN BOTH DIRECTIONS AGAINST SYSTEM OPERATING PRESSURE AND FLOW CONDITIONS.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THIS PROCEDURE MAY OPERATE THE CHARGING SYSTEM IN A CONFIGURATION THAT IS NOT SPECIFICALLY DESCRIBED IN THE SYSTEM OPERATIONAL DESCRIPTION IN THE FSAR. A REVIEW OF FSAR SECTIONS 5.4.7, 6.3, 7.4.1.3, 9.3.4, 13.5, AND CHAPTER 15 CONCLUDE THAT A PERMANENT CHANGE TO THE PLANT AS DESCRIBED IN THE FSAR IS NOT APPLICABLE SINCE THIS IS A TEMPORARY EQUIPMENT CONFIGURATION. NO CHANGE TO THE TECH SPECS OR THE EPP IS NEEDED FOR THIS PROCEDURE.

SUBJECT: SPECIAL TEST - (T-ENG-93-01) UNIT 1

DESCRIPTION: THIS TEMPORARY ENGINEERING PROCEDURE WILL OPERATE THE TURBINE DRIVEN AUXILIARY FEEDWATER (TDAFW) PUMP ON MINIFLOW IN ORDER TO OBTAIN MOV DIAGNOSTIC TEST DATA FOR TWO VALVES. ONE OF THE VALVES WILL BE STROKED IN THE CLOSED DIRECTION AGAINST NORMAL SYSTEM OPERATING PRESSURE AND FLOW CONDITIONS. THE OTHER VALVE WILL BE STROKED BOTH OPEN AND CLOSED AGAINST SYSTEM OPERATING PRESSURE AND FLOW CONDITIONS.

SAFETY EVALUATION: THIS PROCEDURE DOES NOT MAKE ANY PERMANENT CHANGES TO THE PLANT AS DESCRIBED IN FSAR SECTIONS 7.3.7, 10.4.9, 13.5, 15.0, AND APPENDIX 10A. THIS TEST OPERATES BOTH VALVES WITHIN THEIR DESIGN BASIS PARAMETERS. THE PERFORMANCE OF THIS TEMPORARY PROCEDURE HAS NO IMPACT ON PERMANENT PLANT PROCEDURE. THIS TEST WILL BE PERFORMED IN MODE 3 UNDER LCO 3.7.1.2 AS IS REQUIRED BY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS. AFTER REVIEW OF TECH SPEC 3/4.7.1.2 AND 3/4.7.1.3 IT IS FOUND THAT NO CHANGES TO TECH SPECS OR THE EPP IS NECESSARY.