

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I

Report Nos. 50-289/90-19
50-320/90-10

Docket Nos. 50-289
50-320

License No. DPR-50
DPR-73

Licensee: GPU Nuclear
100 Interpace Parkway
Parsippany, New York 07054

Facility Name: Three Mile Island Units 1 and 2

Inspection At: Middletown, Pennsylvania

Inspection Conducted: October 29 - November 1, 1990

Inspectors:

G. C. Smith 11/21/90
G. C. Smith, Senior Physical Security Specialist date

Edward B. King 11-21-90
E. B. King, Physical Security Inspector date

Approved by:

R. R. Keimig 11-21-90
R. R. Keimig, Chief, Safeguards Section,
Facilities Radiological Safety and Safeguards
Branch date

Inspection Summary: Routine Unannounced Physical Security Inspection on
October 29 - November 1, 1990 (Combined Inspection Nos. 50-289/90-19
and 50-320/90-10)

Areas Inspected: Onsite Follow-up of Previously Identified Items; Management Support and Audits; Protected Area Physical Barriers, Detection and Assessment Aids; Protected and Vital Area Access Control of Personnel, Packages and Vehicles; Alarm Stations; Testing, Maintenance and Compensatory Measures; Security Training and Qualifications; and Land Vehicle Bomb Contingency procedure Verification.

Results: No items of non-compliance were identified. Four previously opened items were reviewed and closed.

DETAILS

1. Key Persons Contacted

Licensee

M. Pastor, Nuclear Security Director
J. Stacey, Security Manager
G. Skillman, Plant Engineer
R. Goodrich, Senior Site Protection Supervisor
S. Mervine, Lead Protection Training Instructor
B. Knight, Licensing Engineer, TMI-1
M. Press, QA Lead Auditor

USNRC

F. Young, Senior Resident Inspector

The inspectors also interviewed other licensee security, medical and training personnel.

2. Follow-up of Previously Identified Items

- a. Closed (UNR 89-22-01) - Weakness in the control of vital area authorizations. The inspectors reviewed the vital area authorization process and determined that, through the use of a new access control system, the licensee was able to reduce the number of personnel authorized for vital area access significantly and further reductions were expected. This item is closed.
- b. Closed (UNR 89-22-02) - Failure of an armed security officer to meet physical qualifications. The inspectors reviewed the procedures in place to ensure that all armed security officers meet the physical qualifications and reviewed selected medical records for armed officers. The inspectors determined that this matter had been adequately resolved. This item is closed.
- c. Closed (UNR 89-22-03) - Review quality assurance (QA) audit of NRC-required medical documentation for security and other site personnel. The inspectors reviewed QA audit S-TMI-89-20, which was conducted on October 13 to November 28, 1989 to ensure that all regulatory required personnel medical documentation was available and complete. The audit was found to be very comprehensive. The audit found no apparent violations relative to testing; however, some documentation deficiencies were identified and promptly corrected. The licensee has revised the medical forms to ensure that all required testing is appropriately documented.

- d. Closed (UNR 90-09-01) - Access to Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) Fuel oil tanks. The inspectors' review disclosed that all EDG fuel oil fill and sample openings had been locked with security locks. This item is closed.

3. Management Support and Audits

- a. Management Support - Management support for the licensee's physical security program was determined to be adequate by the inspectors. This determination was based upon the inspectors' review of various aspects of the licensee's program during this inspection, as documented in this report.

The inspectors noted that security force members (SFM) are very knowledgeable of their post duties, contents of procedures and their responsibilities, and exhibit a very professional demeanor. Onsite security managers and supervisors appear to be effectively implementing a quality program and corporate support is evident.

4. Protected Area Physical Barriers, Detection and Assessment Aids

- a. Protected Area Barriers - The inspectors conducted a physical inspection of the protected area (PA) barrier on October 30, 1990. The inspectors determined that the barrier was installed and maintained as committed to in the Plan.
- b. Protected Area Detection Aids - The inspectors observed the PA perimeter detection aids on October 30, 1990. The inspectors determined that the detection aids were installed, maintained and operated as committed to in the Plan.

The inspectors requested the licensee to test the detection aids at several locations. All test results were acceptable. No discrepancies were noted.

- c. Isolation zones - The inspectors verified that the isolation zones were adequately maintained to permit observation of activities on both sides of the PA barrier. No discrepancies were noted.
- d. Protected Area and Isolation Zone Lighting - The inspectors conducted a lighting survey of the PA and isolation zones on October 30, 1990. The inspectors determined, by observations, that lighting in the isolation zones and PA was adequate.

However, the inspectors found that, although the lighting requirements were being met, a large percentage of the lighting was temporary. This matter was discussed with licensee management who stated that actions are being considered to reduce the use of temporary lighting. This matter will be reviewed during subsequent inspections.

- e. Assessment Aids - The inspectors observed the use of assessment aids and other security equipment in operation at the CAS, during day and night hours, on October 29 and 30, 1990. The inspectors determined, by observation, that the assessment aids were installed, maintained, and operated as committed to in the Plan.

5. Protected and Vital Area Access Control of Personnel, Packages, and Vehicles

- a. Personnel Access Control - The inspectors determined that the licensee was exercising positive control over personnel access to the PA. This determination was based on the following:

- 1) The inspectors verified that personnel were properly identified and authorization was checked prior to issuance of badges and key cards. No discrepancies were noted.
- 2) The inspectors verified that the licensee was implementing a search program for firearms, explosives, incendiary devices and other unauthorized materials as committed to in the Plan.

The inspectors observed personnel access processing during peak and off-peak periods. The inspectors interviewed members of the security force and licensee's security staff about personnel access procedures. No discrepancies were noted.

- 3) The inspectors verified that the VA access list was revalidated at least once every 31 days as committed to in the Plan and that access to VAs is limited to only those personnel with a valid need. No discrepancies were noted.
- 4) The inspectors determined, by observation, that individuals in the PA and VAs displayed their access badges as required. No discrepancies were noted.

- b. Package and Material Access Control - The inspectors determined that the licensee was exercising positive control over packages and material that are brought into the protected area. The inspectors reviewed the package and material control procedures and found that they were consistent with commitments in the Plan. The inspectors also observed package and material processing and interviewed members of the security force and the licensee's security staff about package and material control procedures. No discrepancies were noted.

- c. Vehicle Access Control - The inspectors determined that the licensee properly controls vehicle access to and within the PA. The inspectors verified that vehicles are properly authorized prior to entering the PA. Identification is verified by the SFM at the vehicle access point. The inspectors also reviewed the vehicle search procedures and determined that they were consistent with commitments in the Plan. This determination was made by observing vehicle processing and search, inspection of vehicle logs, checking

vehicles in the PA, and by interviewing members of the security force and licensee's security staff about vehicle search procedures. No discrepancies were noted.

6. Alarm Station and Communications

The inspectors observed the operation of the Central Alarm Station (CAS) and Secondary Alarm Station (SAS) and determined they were operated as committed to in the Plan. CAS and SAS operators were interviewed by the inspectors and found to be knowledgeable of their duties and responsibilities. The inspector verified that the CAS and SAS did not contain any operational activities that would interfere with the assessment and response functions. No deficiencies were noted.

The licensee has recently upgraded the operational capabilities of the CAS and SAS by the installation of a new computer software package. The new systems is "state of the art" with rapid retrieval of information, graphic capabilities, on the CRT's advanced keyboard functions, and expanded alarm storage capabilities. The inspectors observed a demonstration of the new system's capabilities and determined that the upgrade has greatly enhanced the effectiveness of the security program.

7. Testing, Maintenance and Compensatory Measures

The inspectors reviewed testing and maintenance records and confirmed that the records committed to in the plan were on file and readily available for licensee and NRC review. The Security Department had dedicated an instrumentation and controls (I&C) technician to conduct preventive and corrective maintenance on security equipment. A check of repair records indicated that repairs, replacements and testing were being accomplished in a timely manner. No discrepancies were noted.

The inspectors also reviewed the licensee's use of compensatory measures and determined them to be as committed to in the Plan. No discrepancies were noted.

8. Security Training and Qualification

The inspectors randomly selected and reviewed training and qualification records for nine SFMs. The physical qualification and firearms requalification records were inspected for armed and unarmed site protection officers and security supervisors. The inspectors determined that the training had been conducted in accordance with the security training and qualification (T&Q) plan and that it was properly documented.

Several SFMs were interviewed to determine if they possessed the requisite knowledge and ability to carry out their assigned duties. The interview results indicated that they were very professional and knowledgeable of their job requirements. No discrepancies were noted.

9. Land Vehicle Bomb Contingency Procedure

The inspectors conducted a review of the licensee's Land Vehicle Bomb Contingency Procedure. The licensee's procedure details short-term actions that would be taken to protect against attempted radiological sabotage involving a land vehicle bomb if such a threat were to materialize. The procedure appeared adequate for its intended purpose. No discrepancies were noted.

10. Exit Interview

The inspectors met with the licensee representatives indicated in Paragraph 1 at the conclusion of the inspection on November 1, 1990. At that time, the purpose and scope of the inspection were reviewed, and the findings were presented. The licensee's commitments, as documented in this report, were reviewed and confirmed with the licensee.