

GULF STATES UTILITIES COMPA

NIVER BEND STATION POST OFFICE BOX 220 ST FRANCISVILLE. LOUISIANA 70775. AREA CODE 504 635-6084 345-8651

> November 26, 1990 RBG- 34068 File Nos. G9.5, G9.25.1.3

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555

Gentlemen:

## River Bend Station - Unit 1 Docket No. 50-458

Please find enclosed Licensee Event Report No. 90-035 for River Bend Station - Unit 1. This report is being submitted pursuant to 10CFR50.73.

Sincerely,

W. H. Odell

Manager-Oversight Rivei Bend Nuclear Group

TAE/PDG/DEJ/DCH/JIM/PG

cc: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 1000 Arlington, TX 76011

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Mr. C. R. Oberg Public "Itility Commission of Texas 7800 Shoal Creek Blvd., Suite 400 North Austin, TX 78757

PDC

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)								APPROVED OME NO 3180-0104 EXPIRES 4/30/92 KATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WTH THIS RMATION COLLECTION REQUEST 500 HRS FORWARD RENTS RECARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P.530), U.S. NUCLEAR JLATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555 AND TO PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT 1150-01941, OFFICE ANAGEMENT AND BUDGET WASHINGTON, DC 20503.			
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NRC Form 366 (6-89)

NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED CIME ND. 3180-0104 EXPIRES 4/30/92 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WTH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REDUEST 500 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-530). U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON DC 20585. AND TO THE FAREWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3)50-0104). OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET. WASHINGTON DC 20503. LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LEP NUMBER (6) PAGE (3) NUMBER NUMBER YEAR RIVER BEND STATION 0 5 0 0 0 4 5 8 9 0 - 0 3 5 - 0 0 0 2 OF 0 1 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 966A's) (17)

#### REPORTED CONDITION

At 1437 on 10/27/90 with the unit in Operational Condition 5 (Refueling), shutdown cooling was lost when valve (\*20\*) 1E12\*MOVF009 isolated. The isolation occurred during maintenance activities in which a cable (\*CBL3\*) was disconnected from control room panel (\*PL\*) H13-P692. This event constitutes an engineered safety features (ESF) actuation; therefore, this report is submitted pursuant to 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv).

# INVESTIGATION

Electrical maintenance personnel were implementing a modification on the panel jacks in the main control room (\*NA\*). To perform the required tasks, the cables (\*CBL3\*) had to be disconnected. Engineering reviewed the possible effects on the plant caused by disconnecting each cable (\*CBL3\*) involved, and prepared a list for use by electrical maintenance personnel. This list indicated that disconnecting cable (\*CBL3\*) B21H-XX-253 from jack J0005 in panel (\*FL\*) El3-P692 would result in a 1/4-isolation signal; however, it resulted in the isols ion of valve 1E12\*MOVF009.

The root cause of this event was that the responsible engineer did not recognize that removal of the cable (\*CBL3\*) would result in the isolation of valve 1E12\*MOVF009, and the loss of shutdown cooling. The cable (\*CBL3\*) was reconnected and shutdown cooling was restored within two minutes.

### CORRECTIVE ACTION

The cable (\*CBL3\*) was reconnected and operations personnel restored shutdown cooling within two minutes. An independent review of the cable-effects list was performed to assure that the information was accurate. All system engineers will receive training on this event with emphasis on attention to detail. This training will be completed by February 15, 1991.

### SAFETY ASSESSMENT

The system responded as designed during this event. No increase in reactor vessel temperature was observed, nor did the event prevent the restart of the residual heat removal pump to restore shutdown cooling. Therefore, the safety of the plant and the health and safety of the public were not adversely affected by this event.

NOTE: Energy Industry Identification System Codes are identified in the text as (\*XX\*).