GULF STATES UTILITIES COMPANY

RIVER BEND STATION POST OFFICE BOX 220 ST. FRANCISVILLE, LOUISIANA 70775

AREA CODE 504 635-6094 346-8651

November 26, 1990
RBG- 34068
File Nos. G9.5, G9.25.1.3

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Gentlemen:

River Bend Station - Unit 1
Docket No. 50-458

Please find enclosed Licensee Event Report No. 90-035 for River Bend Station - Unit 1. This report is being submitted pursuant to 10CFR50.73.

Sincerely,

W. H. Odell
Manager-Oversight
River Bend Nuclear Group

JTE ADT DES DCH
LAE/PDG/DEJ/DCH/JIM/pg
EJH

cc: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 1000
Arlington, TX 76011

NRC Resident Inspector
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Atlanta, GA 30339-3064

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7800 Shoal Creek Blvd., Suite 400 North
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NRC FORM 366 (6-89)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104
EXPIRES: 4/30/92

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (P-530), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503.

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	PAGE (3)
RIVER BEND STATION	0 5 0 0 0 4 5 8	1 OF 0 2

TITLE (4): Loss of Shutdown Cooling due to an Engineer Failing to Recognize the Effect of Cable Removal

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)					REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR		SEQUENTIAL NUMBER		REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES	DOCKET NUMBER(S)
												0 5 0 0 0
1 0	2 7	9 0	9 0	-	0 3 5	-	0 0	1 1	2 6	9 0		0 5 0 0 0

OPERATING MODE (9)		THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)			
	5	20.402(b)	20.405(c)	X 50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)
POWER LEVEL (10)		20.405(a)(1)(i)	50.36(c)(1)	50.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(c)
	0	20.405(a)(1)(ii)	50.36(c)(2)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)
		20.405(a)(1)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	
		20.405(a)(1)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	
		20.405(a)(1)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(x)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER
	AREA CODE
L. A. England, Director-Nuclear Licensing	5 0 4 3 8 1 - 4 1 4 5

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)		EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	X NO				

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

At 1437 on 10/27/90 with the unit in Operational Condition 5 (Refueling), shutdown cooling was lost when valve 1E12*MOVF009 isolated. The isolation occurred during maintenance activities in which cable B21H-XX-253 was disconnected in control room panel H13-P692. This event constitutes an engineered safety features (ESF) actuation, therefore, this report is submitted pursuant to 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv).

Engineering reviewed the possible effects on the plant caused by disconnecting each cable involved, and prepared a list for use by electrical maintenance personnel. The root cause of this event was that the responsible engineer did not recognize that removal of the cable would result in the isolation of valve 1E12*MOVF009, and the loss of shutdown cooling. The cable was reconnected and operations personnel restored shutdown cooling within two minutes. As corrective action, an independent review of the cable-effects list was performed to assure that the information was accurate.

The system responded as designed during this event. No increase in reactor vessel temperature was observed, nor did the event prevent the restart of the residual heat removal pump to restore shutdown cooling. Therefore, the safety of the plant and health and safety of the public were not adversely affected by this event.

REPORTED CONDITION

At 1437 on 10/27/90 with the unit in Operational Condition 5 (Refueling), shutdown cooling was lost when valve (*20*) 1E12*MOVF009 isolated. The isolation occurred during maintenance activities in which a cable (*CBL3*) was disconnected from control room panel (*PL*) H13-P692. This event constitutes an engineered safety features (ESF) actuation; therefore, this report is submitted pursuant to 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv).

INVESTIGATION

Electrical maintenance personnel were implementing a modification on the panel jacks in the main control room (*NA*). To perform the required tasks, the cables (*CBL3*) had to be disconnected. Engineering reviewed the possible effects on the plant caused by disconnecting each cable (*CBL3*) involved, and prepared a list for use by electrical maintenance personnel. This list indicated that disconnecting cable (*CBL3*) B21H-XX-253 from jack J0005 in panel (*PL*) H13-P692 would result in a 1/4-isolation signal; however, it resulted in the isolation of valve 1E12*MOVF009.

The root cause of this event was that the responsible engineer did not recognize that removal of the cable (*CBL3*) would result in the isolation of valve 1E12*MOVF009, and the loss of shutdown cooling. The cable (*CBL3*) was reconnected and shutdown cooling was restored within two minutes.

CORRECTIVE ACTION

The cable (*CBL3*) was reconnected and operations personnel restored shutdown cooling within two minutes. An independent review of the cable-effects list was performed to assure that the information was accurate. All system engineers will receive training on this event with emphasis on attention to detail. This training will be completed by February 15, 1991.

SAFETY ASSESSMENT

The system responded as designed during this event. No increase in reactor vessel temperature was observed, nor did the event prevent the restart of the residual heat removal pump to restore shutdown cooling. Therefore, the safety of the plant and the health and safety of the public were not adversely affected by this event.

NOTE: Energy Industry Identification System Codes are identified in the text as (*XX*).