

I. General

Corrective actions taken by the licensee during of the SALP assessment period included the reorganization of the corporate management structure and steps to increase staff size. A Corporate Director and Assistant Director of Security as well as a Site Security/Safety Superintendent were appointed and the contract security force was replaced with a utility employee force. Ten contract engineers were added, and approval was given authorizing forty-six more permanent engineer positions. The licensee is actively recruiting to fill these positions.

Additional steps taken to address the SALP identified weaknesses include: the revision of the implementing procedures for the plant modifications program; the development and approval of a revised Emergency Plan and implementing procedures; and the installation of facilities for security force training.

II. Specific

Contention

"The Fitzpatrick facility displayed evidence of weaknesses in eight functional areas. These areas were fire protection, design changes and modifications, radiation protection, emergency preparedness, radioactive waste management, transportation, security and safeguards, and management controls."

These contentions are addressed as follows:

- Fire Protection (See Contention A)
- Design Changes and Modifications (See Contention B)
- Radiation Protection (See Contention C)
- Emergency Preparedness (See Contention D)
- Radioactive Waste Management (See Contention E)
- Transportation (See contention F)
- Security and Safeguards (See Contention H)
- Management Controls (See Contention I)

Contention A

"The fire protection area was characterized by several items of noncompliance and a failure to meet housekeeping commitments."

1. Basis

During one inspection, it was determined that the licensee had failed to maintain adequate controls over the installation of fire barrier penetration seals. As a result, QA inspection of all penetration work was not completed and work was accomplished

References

IE Report
50-333/80-17

without the issuance of appropriate tracking forms. Also, the licensee's program for control of combustibles and the housekeeping procedures also failed to prevent the accumulation of combustible materials in safety-related areas. In addition, the NRC determined that the licensee failed to satisfy technical specification requirements resulting in a temporary degradation of a fire barrier separating safety-related areas.

2. NRC Actions

Enforcement action was taken addressing all of the items discussed above. Followup inspection actions confirming licensee corrective actions have been completed.

10/1/80
NRC letter;
IE Reports
50-333/81-06 and
81-09

3. Licensee Corrective Action

In addition to correcting identified weaknesses, the licensee instituted hourly inspections of safety-related areas. These inspections will continue for the duration of the fire protection modification program to verify the status of fire doors and penetrations. A QA inspection of all penetration seals has been completed.

10/1/80
Licensee letter;
IE Reports
50-333/81-06 and
81-09.

Contention B

"There were instances where the licensee had not made program revisions to the design change and modification area in accordance with commitments to the NRC."

1. Basis

During an October-November, 1980 inspection, the NRC determined that the Acoustical Valve Monitoring System installation was physically completed but that all the required actions stated in the modification package were not completed before declaring the system operable and that the Radwaste System was modified without the updating of controlled drawings to reflect the current "as built" conditions of the system. On a previous inspection with similar enforcement action, the NRC received licensee commitments to revise the modification program procedures.

References

IE Report
50-333/79-13;
12/11/79 NRC
letter;
1/4/80 Licensee
letter;
IE Report
50-333/80-21.

2. NRC Actions

Enforcement action was taken for drawing control

12/11/79 NRC

inadequacies and the failure to complete the paper work associated with the Acoustical Valve Monitoring System modification. The NRC continues to monitor the licensee's corrective action in design changes and plant modification.

letter;
1/22/81 NRC
letter

3. Licensee Corrective Actions

Subsequent to the assessment period, the licensee issued the required procedure revisions to improve the modification program.

1/7/80 Licensee
letter;
3/7/80 Licensee
letter.

Contention C

"Weaknesses in radiation protection, ... were identified during routine NRC inspection efforts and during the Health Physics Appraisal inspection."

1. Basis

The Health Physics Appraisal in November, 1980 identified weaknesses in the following areas: the external exposure control program with respect to the neutron monitoring methods, training of technicians in neutron monitoring, low energy beta radiation tests for whole body dosimetry, and the quality assurance program for extremity dosimetry and neutron dosimetry. The internal exposure control program was not formalized to identify, evaluate or take corrective action for personnel exposure to airborne radioactivity. A quantitative respirator fit test program and a control and issuance program for respiratory protective equipment had not been established. The surveillance program needed improvement in the areas of routine radiation and contamination surveillance. Formal guidance as to the type of radiological surveys required for radiation work permits and adequate airborne radioiodine sampling equipment had not been provided.

References

IE Report 50-333/
80-20 (Draft)

2. NRC Actions

An Immediate Action Letter (IAL 80-48) was issued addressing the specific Health Physics Appraisal findings. Continuing review of the Radiation Protection Program is scheduled as a part of the routine NRC inspection program.

11/21/80 NRC
Region I Letter
(IAL 80-48)

3. Licensee Corrective Actions

Inspection Report 50-333/80-20 has not been issued by the NRC. The licensee therefore has been unable to respond to the specific weaknesses identified during the Health Physics Appraisal. However, the licensee committed to review procedures and to review the Radiation training program. Corrective action initiated as a result of the management meeting conducted at the completion of the Health Physics Appraisal inspection will be reviewed during the next Radiation Protection inspection.

- Contention D

"Weaknesses in ... emergency preparedness ... were identified during ... the health physics appraisal inspection."

1. Basis

During the Health Physics Appraisal conducted in November 1980, weaknesses were identified in the licensee's Emergency Preparedness Program. Specific findings noted on the Health Physics Report requiring immediate licensee action were dose projections, emergency organization, and training/retraining activities.

References

IE Report 50-333/80-20 (Draft).

2. NRC Actions

The NRC issued an Immediate Action Letter (IAL 80-48) to the licensee addressing these weaknesses and confirming licensee corrective actions. The NRC Emergency Preparedness Appraisal inspection has been scheduled to assess the current licensee performance in this area.

11/21/80 NRC Region I letter (IAL 80-48)

3. Licensee's Corrective Actions

The licensee took prompt corrective actions to satisfy the commitments detailed in IAL 80-48. Additionally, the licensee has extensively revised the Emergency Plan and implementing procedures in order to update the program in accordance with 10 CFR 50 and NUREG-0654.

Contention E

"Weaknesses in ... and Radioactive Waste management were identified during routine NRC inspection efforts and during the Health Physics Appraisal inspection."

1. Basis

The Health Physics Appraisal also identified weaknesses in the Radioactive Waste Management program in the following areas: formal assignment of radioactive waste shipping responsibilities; repair and utilization of the offgas treatment system; establishment of a radioactive waste quality assurance program; and adequacy of radioactive waste staff to fully maintain and implement a radioactive waste shipping program.

References

IE Report 50-333/80-20 (Draft).

2. NRC Actions

IAL 80-48 also addressed the weaknesses in training in the radwaste area. Selected portions of the Radioactive Waste Management program were reviewed during an inspection conducted in April 1981.

IE Report 50-333/81-10 (Draft);
11/21/80 NRC
Region I letter
(IAL 80-48).

3. Licensee Corrective Actions

The licensee reviewed and revised station procedures for the operation of the Solid Radwaste System, for waste packaging and handling, cask handling procedures, and documentation of radwaste shipments. In addition, training courses were conducted for selected station personnel in the Operations, Maintenance, and Radiation Protection Departments and for contractor personnel, on the subjects of transfer, packaging and shipment of low-level radioactive waste.

IE Report 50-333/81-10 (Draft)

Contention F

"The FitzPatrick facility displayed evidence of weaknesses in eight functional areas ... transportation".

1. Basis

Four NRC inspections of waste shipments were conducted at the Barnwell, S.C. Burial Site. One item of noncompliance was identified relating to improperly marking Radioactive Waste shipments. On June 19, 1980, a shipping cask was received at the Barnwell Burial Site without the outside markings "Radioactive-LSA" to identify the contents.

References

IE Report 50-333/80-14;
PNO-II-80-131

The South Carolina Department of Health and Environ-

mental Control suspended the licensee's burial permit and imposed a \$1,000 civil penalty for violation of SC DOT rules. On July 28, 1980 a shipment of radioactive LSA waste was observed to measure 300 mRem/hr (limit 200 mrem/hr contact) at the surface on a plywood box on an open bed truck.

2. NRC Actions

Notices of Violation were issued for the NRC identified item of noncompliance. The NRC continues to monitor licensee performance in this area.

9/3/80 NRC
letter

3. Licensee Corrective Actions

A plant Standing Order was revised to provide for reading the instructions to the transport driver, which require his signature, specifying that the vehicle is to be inspected after each significant stop (rest, fuel, food, etc.), to provide for the vehicle being properly placarded, the package(s) properly labeled (if visible) and the cargo area properly sealed (when required).

9/18/80 Licensee
letter

Contention G

"In these areas there were instances of weaknesses in procedures, inadequate training, and personnel errors. The NRC issued an Immediate Action Letter to confirm the licensee's commitments to resolve weaknesses identified during the health physics appraisal."
(See Contentions C, D and E)

Contention H

"Weaknesses in security and safeguards identified during NRC inspections precipitated escalated enforcement action by the NRC, including a civil penalty and Immediate Action Letter."

1. Basis

The following inadequacies were identified through NRC inspection: NRC was not notified of a change to the Physical Security Plan which permitted improperly screened visitors to have unescorted access to the site; contractor employees were granted access without being properly screened; two security force members had not completed initial training; two Secondary Alarm Station (SAS) operators had

References

IE Reports
50-333/80-06
and 80-15

not been trained in SAS operations; a mechanical lock was operable from the outside using the door knob stem; a door, which was part of the perimeter barrier, was not alarmed; four unprotected manhole covers provided direct access to the Vital Area; the licensee failed to assign an individual responsible for the last access control function at the Auxiliary Control Point for a major portion of the inspection; an opening at the Auxiliary Access Control Point was not covered with bullet resistant material; five active security photo badges had expired; security failed to conduct hands-on searches of 5% of the licensee employees not regularly employed at the site; vehicle was escorted into the Protected Area (PA) by an unarmed employee; Central Alarm Station (CAS) security computer failed to alarm when unauthorized key cards were used to gain entrance into vital areas; the interior of the CAS was visible from outside the PA; microwave units were not properly installed; a radio transceiver provided as backup communications was inoperable; the radiation detectors and interlockers at the turnstiles into the PA were inoperable; locks had not been changed despite the loss of 5 vital area keys; visitor logs were inaccurate; security logs did not include required data; a vital area door was propped open with a brick for over five minutes; and, security personnel failed to respond to an alarm at a vital area door until ten minutes after it was called to their attention by the inspector.

2. NRC Actions

Representatives of NRC met with members of the licensee's staff in New York on April 25, 1980, to discuss the results of the physical security inspection conducted April 14-18 and April 23-25. An Immediate Action Letter was issued requiring prompt correction of the problems identified. A Civil Penalty of \$48,000 was imposed.

8/21/80 NRC Region I letter;
IE Reports 50-333/80-13 and 80-18;
10/29/80 NRC letter (Civil Penalty Order)
EA-80-44

Other NRC actions included: a followup inspection was conducted on August 18-22, 1980; a special inspection by a Region I inspector and an NRC Headquarters observer to review the contingency security force that was implemented on September 21, 1980. Routine inspections are conducted by the resident inspector.

IE Report
50-333/80-15

3. Licensee Corrective Actions

The licensee has taken action to correct each specific problem. An independent security consultant was retained to audit, recommend, and assist in implementing the Nuclear Power Plant Security Program.

9/20/80 Licensee letter

The Security organization was restructured and augmented by adding five management employees to act as Security Shift Coordinators. A security manager from the Corporate staff was assigned to the FitzPatrick site to audit and assist in implementing the physical security program. On September 21, 1980, the licensee terminated the contract guard services and initiated a security force of utility employees.

10/14/80 Licensee letter

Contention I

"The FitzPatrick facility displayed evidence of weakness in ... management controls."

1. Basis

Weaknesses in the management controls area were identified during the evaluation period as a result of routine NRC inspections. Examples of these weaknesses include: failure to establish and implement calibration procedures for the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System and the Recirculation system; failure to review surveillance procedures; failure to control procedures involved in plant operations; and failure to review maintenance procedures within the prescribed time interval.

Further indication of a weakness in management controls is shown by the degradation of the station's physical security program that was identified during the April 1980 inspection.

2. NRC Actions

As discussed in Contention G above, a civil penalty was assessed in the security area. NRC continues to monitor the licensee's corrective action in the management controls area.

References

IE Reports 50-333/80-05 and 80-21

IE Report 50-333/80-06;
8/21/80 NRC Region I letter;
10/29/80 NRC letter, EA 80-44.

3. Licensee Corrective Actions

To resolve the problems associated with the failure to establish and implement calibration procedures and the failure to review maintenance procedures, the licensee committed to revise the station procedures applicable in these situations and to conduct training to insure future compliance with the requirements in these procedures. With respect to the failure to review surveillance test procedures, the licensee revised the three applicable station procedures and conducted training in the applicable administrative procedures. To correct the problem associated with the inadequate controls of operating procedures, the licensee reviewed station operating manuals and made appropriate changes and additions. Also, the licensee began a program of quarterly manual reviews conducted by the Operations Department Superintendent to prevent use of out of date or incomplete procedures.

To further address weaknesses demonstrated in this area, the licensee strengthened management controls by the addition of staff engineers in the corporate office. The licensee also took firmer control of the Security program and has established a security force of utility employees.

6/7/80 Licensee letter;
8/7/80 NRC letter;
10/28/80 Licensee letter;
IE Reports 50-333/81-06 and 81-09;
also see
Contention G.