

I. General

A major reorganization is underway (in response to the December 1980 SALP and a NRC Management Meeting on March 19, 1981) to provide more management attention, resources, and capabilities to deal with problems. The licensee's recognition of the need for and initiation of this broad-based action is a necessary major step in improving long-term effective management control of licensed activities. The new organization, approved by the DLC Board of Directors on March 24, 1981, established a new Nuclear Division, consisting of four departments.

Each department has a manager reporting directly to the on-site Vice President, Nuclear. These managerial positions were filled on April 22, 1981. Several other senior staff assignments were made on June 16, 1981 (Plant Superintendent, Chief Engineer, Supervisor of Licensing and Compliance). Progressive transfer of functional groups from the old to the new organization will continue through calendar year (CY) 1981. The Nuclear Engineering Department, due to its complex nature, is expected to be complete after the Spring 1982 refueling outage. The new organization will add about 60 new positions on the site staff, some of which are already filled. Continuing review of the licensee's reorganization efforts by the resident inspectors indicate substantial improvement of management control has occurred.

II. Specific

Contention

"The Beaver Valley 1 facility displayed evidence of weaknesses in nine function areas. These areas were plant operations, maintenance, surveillance, quality assurance, committee activities, fire protection, design changes and modifications, security, and management controls."

These contentions are addressed as follows:

- Plant Operations (See Contention F)
- Maintenance (See Contention I)
- Surveillance (See Contention J)
- Quality Assurance (See Contention K)
- Committee Activities (See Contention B)
- Fire Protection (See Contention H)
- Design Changes and Modifications (See Contention A)
- Security (See Contention G)
- Management Controls (See Contention A and C)

Contention A

"A low corporate engineering staff manning level led to a lack of design control over some contractor activities."

1. Basis

Inspections identified noncompliances and regulatory issues including inadequate as-built information, use of uncontrolled information for development of procedures for modified systems, inadequate turnover control for modified systems, failure to maintain procedures for modified systems, and inadequate safety evaluations for modified systems/equipment. The licensee entered the outage with inadequate interface control procedures for the installation, testing and turnover of modified systems and as-built information.

Three inspections and one investigation during the evaluation period addressed design and construction deficiencies. The recurrent identification of design deficiencies has frequently involved escalated NRC and licensee management attention to attain correction. These issues have included:

- Environmental qualification of Class 1E electrical equipment*;
- Construction deficiencies in safety-related tanks;
- Anomalous NDE data for the reactor containment;
- LHSI Pump NPSH deficiencies;
- Containment Spray Chemical Addition deficiencies;
- ESF Equipment reset circuitry deficiencies;
- Seismic Analyses and As-built system deficiencies*.

(*Generic to all licensees)

Inadequate management controls over and a lack of sufficient resources for licensed programs appeared to be a central factor in the licensee's problems in making design changes and modifications. However, the licensee's planned corrective actions do appear to be capable of being developed and applied to future design changes, albeit at the expense of outage extensions.

2. NRC Action

An enforcement conference was held on September 25, 1979 to address licensee implementation of the design control program. Two special inspections were conducted to fully evaluate the licensee's Design Control and Modification program. An Immediate Action Letter (80-18) was issued on June 26, 1980 addressing construction deficiencies in the refueling water storage tank and the demineralized water storage tank. The IAL required the licensee to confirm the adequacy of construction of the containment liner and the Boron Recovery System Tanks because they were constructed by the same contractor as the deficient refueling water storage tank and demineralized water storage tank. The NRC continues to monitor the effects of the licensee's management reorganization.

References

IE Report 50-334
79-21, 80-14,
81-07;
6/26/80 NRC Regi
I letter
(IAL 80-18)

3. Licensee Corrective Action

The licensee revised Procedure No. 3.7.3, System Release Turnover Procedure, and Procedure No. 2.3, Design Change Coordination, to ensure coordination and control of all station activities related to design changes. In addition, an individual has been assigned to coordinate and control system turnover to operations personnel. A detailed design change control and modification inspection conducted March 2 through 6, 1981 confirmed that changes implemented by the licensee were effective. A recently initiated reorganization incorporating a new Nuclear Engineering Department is expected to improve the licensee's in-house engineering and his capability for contractor control.

References

IE Report 50-334/
80-09
Licensee letters
of 8/16/80,
4/10/80,
6/30/80
IE Report 50-334/
81-07

Contention B

"The onsite safety review committee was overburdened and some reviews were inadequate."

1. Basis

References

The Onsite Safety Committee was overly burdened by both routine and non-routine review tasks. During the weeks of November 3 and November 10, 1980, the committee was in several marathon sessions to review numerous procedure changes and other issues necessary to support plant restart. Such lengthy sessions were not uncommon and removed key station supervision from their normal duties. The committee appeared to shoulder the primary burden of problem resolution and operational reviews with less than adequate technical support, again resulting in removal of plant supervision from their normal tasks to support committee activities.

In two cases (IEB 80-06 and IEB 79-27) the quality of Onsite Safety Review Committee review and oversight was deficient, and resulted in inadequate bulletin implementation by the licensee. Inspection 80-24 identified 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluations which were deficient due to the failure to recognize the need for TS revisions thus invalidating the original safety evaluations.

IE Report 50-334/
80-24;
Licensee letters
of 3/4/80,
10/21/80,
6/4/80,
7/31/80

2. NRC Action

The resident inspectors communicated their findings and concerns to plant management through formal meetings throughout the evaluation period.

Resident inspectors have noted a reduction in overall committee workload since the 1979-1980 outage and increased licensee sensitivity to obtaining necessary technical support for committee activities.

3. Licensee Corrective Action

References

The Offsite Review Committee was reorganized in early CY 1979 as part of the organizational changes discussed in Contention C. The Onsite Safety Committee was reorganized in CY 1980.

2/11/81 (TS Amendment #39); Licensee letters of 4/10/81 and 6/30/81

The licensee reorganization appears to acknowledge and provide for improvement in this functional area. Permanent positions providing full-time direction and support of committee activities have been provided. Interim licensee measures regarding committee/subcommittee composition have also improved the situation.

Contention C

"Management control problems involved control of routine activities, resolution of technical and regulatory concerns, correction of deficient areas, implementation of security plan requirements, and scheduling of required surveillance activities."

1. Basis

References

Several inspections resulted in four items of noncompliance and one deviation. The noncompliances and unresolved technical issues in this and related functional areas (plant operations, security and safeguards, etc.) were communicated to the licensee during three management meetings. Indicated management control weaknesses were:

IE Reports 50-334
79-21, 80-04,
80-21, 80-26

-- Technical problems and regulatory issues appear to require detailed attention from key senior personnel. Even with this attention, numerous problems still resulted in enforcement action, management meetings with IE/NRR, and enforcement conferences. Key managers (Plant Superintendent, Director of Nuclear Operations, Superintendent of Licensing and Compliance) frequently had to take personal control to ensure that safety concerns or regulatory requirements are properly addressed. The failure of support and engineering organizations to produce acceptable results without detailed and personal attention from these managers placed

IE Reports 50-334
80-12, 79-20,
80-09, 79-24,
80-20, 80-16,
80-18

the licensee's management in a reactive role, diluting their ability to plan and implement their activities. Examples are resolution of outstanding IEB 79-14 seismic issues to support outage restart, resolution of Rod Position Indication anomalies, implementation of TMI Lessons Learned items, Physical Security Plan modifications and program implementation.

-- The licensee failed to implement commitments to the NRC on time. Specific examples include:

- Review/reanalyses required by IEB 79-14 were not completed prior to completing the 1979-80 outage as stated by a DLC letter of October 30, 1979. 10/30/79 Licensee letter
- Equipment installations required by the Physical Security Plan for compliance with 10 CFR 73.55 were not completed on schedule as required by an IAL dated July 21, 1980. Construction activities were to be essentially complete by November 1, 1980; NRC was notified of the schedule slippage by a DLC letter. 7/21/80 NRC Region I letter (IAL 80-22) 10/30/80 Licensee letter
- Design changes in fire protection systems were not submitted for NRR review prior to their implementation as required by commitments documented in the NRC Safety Evaluation Report. 12/23/80 NRC letter
- Licensee preventive action commitments to track maintenance surveillance test records were not implemented as required. IE Report 50-334/79-20
- Commitments for implementation of NUREG 0578, Category "A" TMI Lessons Learned items (Reactor Subcooling Instrumentation and PORV Acoustical Monitoring System) were incompletely implemented, resulting in the issuance of IAL 80-46. 10/31/80 NRC Region I letter (IAL 80-46)
- Commitments made pursuant to IEB 79-01B during an inspection and in a licensee submittal were not implemented. Limit switches which provide post accident equipment control func- IE Report 50-334/80-12

tions but which are not qualified for harsh environments were not replaced as committed.

- Two incidents during the evaluation period indicated a need for additional management attention to operator performance, training and professional attitude.
 - Operator errors and administrative control breakdowns disabled both HHSI subsystems in November 1979. LER 79-46
NRC Orders of 11/27/79 and 12/5/79
 - A second incident in April 1980 resulted when a licensed operator performed a safety-related valve manipulation in disregard of verbal direction from the SRO Supervisor.
- Intensive site management involvement in issues made the key site managers and on-site department heads unavailable for normal management of daily operations and planning for future tasks. This appeared to have contributed to several items of noncompliance. (Control of modifications and related activities, Inspection 80-09; Radiation Monitor operation, maintenance, and corrective action, Inspection 79-24; Inadequate submittals to NRC, Inspection 80-20; and, Failure to implement corrective actions for noncompliances, Inspection 80-16). Station department heads were frequently unavailable for routine departmental operations and upgrading of previously identified problems because of participation in protracted Onsite Safety Committee meetings or staff meetings (discussed in Contention B). IE Inspection 50-334/80-09, 79-24, 80-20, 80-16
- Much of the existing technical and engineering support was available only through contractors and consultants. The interface problems with these external organizations appeared to affect the quality and timeliness of actions and to require extensive management attention which diluted the management attention available for other tasks. IEB 79-14
IEB 79-01B
IEB 79-02
- Inadequate licensee submittals were identified in Enforcement Conference 79-21 and IE Report 50-334/79-21

resulted in further absorption of DLC and NRC management time and attention in a reactive fashion. Key managers appeared to need additional direct engineering and technical support to prevent unnecessary escalation of tasks to major management issues, e.g., IEB 79-14, IEB 79-01B.

- Scheduling and economic pressures appeared to contribute to this problem by imposing deadlines which did not permit available resources to address both routine and reactive tasks adequately. For example, licensee followup to NRC noncompliances was found to be inadequate during Inspection 80-15, licensee followup and management of physical security matters as discussed in Inspection 80-18 and Enforcement Conference 80-26, and followup to problems and deficiencies identified during incidents via Licensee Event Reports.

IE Report 50-334/
80-16, 80-18

IE Reports 50-334
80-26, 80-16 and
80-18

2. NRC Action

Enforcement Conference on September 25, 1979 (Report No. 50-334/79-21). Special enforcement conference regarding licensee implementation of the design control program, the effectiveness of licensee management controls, and the facility's recent enforcement history.

References

IE Report 50-334/
79-21

Civil Penalty issued December 5, 1979, operation with both HHSI ECCS Subsystems inoperable on November 27, 1979.

NRC Orders 11/27/
12/5/79

Order Modifying License issued December 5, 1979 requiring licensee action in response to power operation of facility with both HHSI ECCS subsystems inoperable on November 27, 1979. Order required independent verification of redundant safety systems when a train is removed from service and detailed procedure review to insure only one safety system is removed from service during maintenance or surveillance.

IE Reports 50-334
79-21, 80-04,
80-21, 80-26

Public Enforcement Meeting on January 22, 1980. Special public enforcement meeting convened by the Director, OIE, to discuss the licensee's actions pursuant to an Order Modifying License, issued on December 5, 1979, as a result of facility power operation with both HHSI ECCS subsystems inoperable.

IE Report 50-334/
80-04

Order Modifying License issued May 23, 1980 requiring the licensee to submit information which fully and completely responded to staff information requests for IE Bulletin 79-01B, Environmental Qualification of Class IE Electrical Equipment, by November 1, 1980. (generic to all licensees)

NRC Orders 5/23/80
and 11/1/80

A special Enforcement Meeting was held on July 18, 1980, to discuss the reasons for continued extension of security compensatory measures in lieu of aggressively pursuing installation of security related equipment. Additional areas discussed were licensee implementation of administrative controls, licensee action taken in response to recent incidents involving outage recovery activities and plant staff work hours.

IE Reports 50-334/
80-21 and 80-26

Order Modifying License issued August 29, 1980 requiring licensee to establish and maintain a repository for data developed per IEB 79-01B. (generic order to all licensees)

NRC Order 8/29/80

IAL No. 80-22 - 7/21/80 - Physical protection program, requiring the licensee to upgrade the security program to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 73.55.

Licensee requested
Management Meeting
4/3/81

IAL No. 80-34 - 11/3/80 - Status for plant restart. Seismic analysis for "as-built" safety-related piping systems.

Licensee letters
of 4/10/80 and
6/30/81 (TS amend-
ment request)

IAL No. 80-46 - 10/31/80 - Status of TMI Lessons Learned Category "A" Items.

10/31/80 NRC
Region I letter
(IAL 80-46)

3. Licensee Corrective Action

References

In recognition of these factors and in response to the deficiencies identified by SALP, the licensee has initiated a major reorganization. The new organization establishes a new, separate Nuclear Division and appears to provide more management attention, resources, and capabilities than are presently available. (see "General")

Licensee letters
4/10/81 and
6/30/81

The licensee's activities relative to reorganization and staffing have not been fully evaluated by Region I but generally appear to be responsive to the deficiencies identified. The licensee's recognition of need for and initia-

tion of need for and initiation of broad based, extraordinary action is a major step in achieving improved regulatory performance.

Contention D

"Many items of noncompliance concerned personnel errors, indicated instances of insufficient training, and revealed instances of poor supervision of personnel."

These areas are addressed in Contention "C" and "F".

Contention E

"The licensee experienced difficulties in meeting some technical commitments to NRR and lacked an adequate technical support staff."

These areas are discussed in Contention "C".

Contention F

"The Beaver Valley 1 facility displayed evidence of weakness in the area of plant operations."

1. Basis

Three items of noncompliance were identified during several inspections. Major issues in the plant operations area were:

- Administrative control breakdown and operator errors resulted in both HHSI suction flow paths inoperable (Order, Civil Penalty, and Public Enforcement Conference).
- Additional issues include: operation without an operable boric acid flow path (administrative control breakdown and operator error), inadequate jumper control, failure to control temporary and permanent procedure changes, inadequate surveillance tests, use of uncontrolled information for procedure development, marginally adequate requirements for operating procedure adherence, and inadequate turnover control for modified systems.
- During the refueling outage, three RHR flow losses occurred because of airbinding while operating with the RCS loops drained to the hot leg midpoint. Frequent venting and more careful flow changes were only partially successful remedies. Design change remains in the conceptual stage.

References

IE Report 50-334/
79-25, 79-30, 81-01

- Failure to solve old problems and comprehensively address new ones, and to optimize professionalism and error free operation, appeared due to inadequacies in: 1) direct management attention to control room and facility operation; 2) understanding of quality assurance requirements and implementation by operations personnel; and, 3) technical/engineering support for operational problem correction. Management of operations appeared to be largely reactive. These problems may have been side effects of failure to muster the managerial and technical resources to solve problems before they seriously affect plant operations.

Operational problems were also reflected by several operational LER(s).

LER(s)
79-43, 79-45,
79-46, 79-49,
80-02, 80-04,
80-05, 80-07,
80-12, 80-22,
80-23, 80-24,
80-26, 80-31,
80-33, 80-46,
80-64

2. NRC Action

Increased inspection in this area. About 300 hours in a six month period, was provided by the resident inspectors.

3. Licensee Corrective Action

Licensee management has taken positive action and become more sensitive to operator professionalism and attitude and has implemented or has under consideration programs and plans to improve communications, attitude and the operator career path.

References

Licensee letters
of 4/10/81 and
6/30/81

Most significant licensee changes are being implemented by the new management organization and increased staffing efforts. These changes include a formal management information system to provide management awareness and assurance that significant or potentially significant operational problems are identified and corrected. The revised organization will also establish an assessment function of plant operations, maintenance, and instrument department activities.

Contention G

"The Beaver Valley 1 facility displayed evidence of weakness in the area of security."

1. Basis

The licensee's Security Plan was effective February 23, 1979. The licensee requested relief from portions of 73.55 until December 1979, in order to obtain and complete installation of security hardware. This extension was granted, however, the licensee did not complete all of the system upgrade within the allotted time due to licensee scheduling, construction management, and equipment supply problems. A physical security inspection conducted June 16-20, 1980, disclosed that the December 1979 deadline had not been met and that the licensee had not notified NRC.

References

Beaver Valley Power Station Unit No. 1 Physical Security Plan, February 23, 1979

IE Report 50-334/80-18

2. NRC Actions

Following the June 16-20 inspection, NRC Region I held an enforcement meeting with licensee management personnel. As a result of the meeting, an IAL was issued to confirm commitments made by the licensee regarding installation of security equipment. The licensee was given new deadlines of November 1, 1980, for completion of security equipment installation, and December 31, 1980, for completion of pre-operational testing of this equipment. A followup inspection in March 1981 verified that all security systems were installed and operational.

References

IE Report 50-334/80-26

NRC Region I Letter July 21, 1980 (IAL 80-22)

IE Report 50-334/81-06

3. Licensee Corrective Action

Immediately upon being apprised that NRC was unaware that the December 1979 deadline could not be met, the licensee sent notification to the Commission. The Attachment, a supplement to the Security Plan, stated that the delay resulted from the selection of a new security system vendor, a need to increase the original guardhouse space allocation, and longer materials delivery times than originally anticipated. The licensee requested that the Physical Security Plan upgrade deadline be extended to December, 1980, with the then current compensatory measures to continue until that time.

References

June 20, 1980 licensee letter and Attachment

In a response letter to IE Inspection Report 50-334/80-18, the licensee stated that all future security-related correspondence would be submitted through the Superintendent of Licensing and Compliance to prevent recurrence of failure to notify the NRC in a timely manner. In addition, the licensee established a system of bi-weekly reports to be submitted to the Vice President, Operations relative to the status of each of the commitments made at the July 18, 1980 enforcement meeting.

August 21, 1980
licensee letter
and attachment

In a status report to Region I, dated October 30, 1980, the licensee informed the Commission that nearly all of the equipment was installed as required, with 100% of the systems expected to be in operation by December 31, 1980. Engineering modifications and late delivery of certain key electrical equipment were cited as causes for delay in completion of the work.

October 30, 1980
licensee letter

A special inspection conducted March 2-5, 1981 revealed that all security systems were installed, operational, and in use.

IE Report 50-334/
81-06

Contention H

"The Beaver Valley Unit 1 facility displayed evidence of weakness in the area of fire protection."

1. Basis

Inspections during the evaluation period resulted in two items of noncompliance (failure to perform housekeeping tours and failure to maintain fire doors).

A number of LER(s) during the evaluation period identified repeated failures of the permanently installed fire pumps. In addition, a portion of the yard fire main spontaneously ruptured during system testing. The repetitive nature of these failures without successful corrective action raises concern about the preventive and corrective maintenance programs (see Contention I). Routine maintenance is currently conducted on a reactive basis as failures or equipment outages occur. In addition, the licensee implemented design changes without prior submittal to NRR for approval.

References

LER(s) 80-01SP,
80-30, 80-18,
80-34, 80-52,
80-59

IE Inspection
50-334/80-03,
80-06

2. NRC Action

A followup inspection was conducted in April

References

IE Report 50-334/

1981. A Notice of Violation was issued to the licensee for failure to conduct preventive maintenance on the diesel fire pump. Within the scope of the same inspection the design changes to the fire protection program were reviewed and those completed were found acceptable. These modifications remain to be completed (manually activated suppression system for containment penetration area, hose stations inside containment, automatic water suppression system for the RHR pumps) and will be completed during the next refueling outage.

81-11

3. Licensee Corrective Action

The licensee has devoted considerable management and technical attention to resolve fire protection system problems including the performance of two system failure and reliability studies as well as implementation of corrective actions. Study results were submitted as revision 2 to LER 80-069 on January 30, 1981.

References

LER 80-069/01T2

Contention I

"The Beaver Valley 1 facility displayed evidence of weakness in the area of maintenance."

1. Basis

Inspections during the evaluation period identified inadequate control of maintenance activities including inadequate procedure, use of unapproved vendor procedures, use of out-of-tolerance test equipment and inadequate control of procedure revisions. The maintenance department staff was undermanned due to assignment of Maintenance Engineers as Shift Technical Advisors.

References

IE Report 50-334/
80-01, 80-05, 80-15

Four LERs were issued concerning vital bus inverter failures without permanent corrective maintenance being effected.

LERs 79-38, 79-39,
79-40, 80-42

Several Fire Protection System LERs were issued relative to maintenance. (see Contention H)

Several other LERs issued may be Maintenance or Preventive Maintenance related.

LERs 79-44, 79-47,
80-10, 80-11, 80-14,
80-15, 80-16, 80-26,
80-38, 80-41, 80-47

2. NRC Action

Resident and region based followup inspections identified two items of noncompliance, use of unapproved vendor procedures and failure to calibrate safety-related equipment at the scheduled frequency. Resident inspector follow-up has verified licensee activities and correction of specific deficiencies and problems.

A region based inspection conducted in February 1981 found the licensee's program acceptable.

3. Licensee Corrective Action

The licensee has developed and partially installed vital power inverter modifications to eliminate the cause of inverter failures. Preventive Maintenance programs have been revised and improved to allow identification and replacement of failure prone equipment to eliminate predictable failures.

In recognition of maintenance department problems one of the prompt actions initiated under the licensee's reorganization is the addition of supervisory personnel to the plant maintenance staff.

Contention J

"The Beaver Valley 1 facility displayed evidence of weakness in the area of surveillance."

1. Basis

Inspections during the evaluation period identified four surveillance noncompliances: procedures not current; use of out-of-tolerance test equipment and non-documentation of test equipment calibration; failure to record surveillance testing; radiation monitor surveillance not done.

Several LERs issued during the reporting period concern missed surveillances.

2. NRC Action

Followup inspections by the resident inspectors (about 85 inspector-hours) identified five items of noncompliance: failure to perform airlock surveillance when required; performance of NI-IR

References

IE Report 50-334/
80-27, 81-03

References

IE Report 50-334/
79-25, 79-27, 80-05,
80-09

LERs 79-43, 80-12,
80-24, 80-64

References

IE Reports 50-334/
80-28, 80-27, 80-30

surveillance test under inappropriate conditions; improper performance of IR-NI surveillance test procedure; failure to maintain IR-NI surveillance test procedure records; and, failure to document IR-NI surveillance activities in station logs. One region based inspection (about 25 inspector-hours) reviewed licensee preventive and corrective actions for other, prior inspection findings. LERs during the period reported surveillance related problems (missed surveillances, surveillance acceptance criteria not met, and equipment failures detected via surveillance).

3. Licensee Corrective Action

The licensee has assigned review and evaluation of the results of the surveillance test program to the Technical Advisory Group (STAs).

Surveillance test schedule performance has improved; routine reviews by the resident inspectors have identified no scheduling problems since October 1980. Review of surveillance results by the Shift Technical Advisors and Operations Department personnel appears to be consistently identifying problems and resulting in initiation of corrective action.

On March 8-13, 1981, deficiencies were identified in the test methods and baseline data for Residual Heat Removal Pump inservice testing: inability to duplicate test conditions to achieve test result repeatability; inability to meet TS acceptance criteria (inappropriate criteria); and erroneous test data assumptions. Action was initiated by the Technical Advisory Group (STAs) on March 8-13, resulting in comprehensive review and corrective actions. The capabilities evidenced during this period are indicative of improvements resulting from the assignment of surveillance program assessment functions to the STAs.

References

IE Report 50-334/
80-30

IE Report 50-334/
81-08

Contention K

"The Beaver Valley 1 facility displayed evidence of weakness in the area of QA/QC."

1. Basis

Inspections conducted during the evaluation period reviewed selected outage activities and both programmatic and implementation aspects of modification activities identified

References

IE Reports 50-334/
80-09, 80-16, 80-20

three items of noncompliance: (failure to implement document control measures for system modifications; failure to implement and document corrective actions; and, failure to maintain adequate records of safety reviews). Program indicated a lack of understanding of QA requirements by onsite departments.

2. NRC Action

An enforcement conference was held in September 1979 which addressed inadequacies in design control and related QA/QC activities. Subsequent followup inspections indicated substantial improvement in areas addressed at the enforcement conference. Inspection of this area by the resident inspectors have resulted in one NRC identified noncompliance, failure to implement and maintain procedures for calibration of safety-related instrumentation.

3. Licensee Corrective Action

The licensee has completed a review of QA training programs and has implemented additional training for all groups performing work at BVPS-1 and includes customized training based on the needs of each group. Training periods range from 4 hours to more than a week depending on the group.

The licensee has authorized and is acquiring additional QA and QC engineers and inspectors for assignment to respective department staffs.

References

IE Report 50-334/
79-21

IE Reports 50-334/
80-02, 80-08, 80-14,
80-24, 81-07

References

8/6/80 Licensee
letter