

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

AEOD/E210

FEB 2 3 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: Ronald C. Haynes, Regional Administrator Region I

FROM:

Carlyle Michelson, Director Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data

SUBJECT:

INADEQUATE SWITCHGEAR COOLING AT BEAVER VALLEY, UNIT 1

Two events occurred at Beaver Valley during the past summer of potential safety significance regarding adverse environmental effects on safetyrelated equipment. The enclosed LERs (81-59/03L and 81-71/03L) report that the Number 2 battery charger output breaker tripped on thermal overload during surveillance testing. The switchgear rooms are provided with the same flow-through ventilation system circulating outside air. The chargers are located in the switchgear rooms and contribute to increasing the room temperature when operating. Similar breakers in the rooms have not tripped. Portable fans have been used to increase the airflow around the battery charger.

The potential for tripping the output breaker would increase if more than one battery charger is operating during elevated ambient temperatures because of increased heat load. For a loss-of-offsite power event, the heat contribution of the operating battery charger could potentially affect other safety-related switchgear equipment. The ventilation system is not safety related and would not be available during this event.

Corrective actions taken by the licensees include rebalancing the ventilation flow in the switchgear rooms and revising the surveillance procedure for testing the battery chargers, to prevent more than one charger operating at the same time. In addition, a station modification request has been made to increase the ventilation flow in the switchgear rooms. The licensee has tested the breakers under full load (without high ambient temperatures) and believes that there is no problem with the breakers.

Our evaluation of the events indicated that the licensee had not expanded his investigation to verify the environmental qualification of the breaker. Since the breaker was not found defective, the qualification of the breaker for mild environments should be evaluated by the licensee to ascertain the root cause for the failures.

8210060432 820628 PDR FOIA UDELL82-261 PDR

A160

- 2 -

We recommend that the licensee complete the appropriate analyses and modifications to prevent recurrence of this type of failure before the summer of 1982. The current refueling outage may be an appropriate time for modifications. The resident inspector is following the licensee's investigations into the problem.

The implications of this event suggest that the loss of the ventilation system could have potential safety significance requiring additional generic review by the NRC. Operational occurrences at other plants have already attuned this office to possible inadequate ventilation design and performance situati is which could result in subjecting electrical equipment to adverse mild environmental conditions. As a result of IE Bulletin 79-01, 79-01B and others related to environmental gualification of electrical equipment. it is our understanding that the staff is reviewing in detail the adequacy of equipment to withstand accident environments. We were not able to confirm that the same level of review will be performed for non-accident conditions exemplified by the Beaver Valley events and events involving inadvertent actuation of the fire protection system addressed in another AEOD memorandum. In responding to the Bulletin, it may not be apparent to the licensees to address gualification of electrical equipment which are required to operate, but not exposed to postulated accident conditions. These occurrences may be useful in evaluating the scope of the licensee's response to the bulletins.

This effort has been coordinated with the Environmental Qualification Branch, Division of Engineering, NRR. The AEOD contact is Wayne Lanning.

Carlyle Michelson

Carlyle Michelson, Director Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data

Enclosures: As stated

cc w/enclosures: HDenton, NRR DBeckman, RI, Beaver Valley ZRosztoczy, NRR RDeYoung, IE VStello, CRGR

IPLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION CONTROL BLOCK: 1 1 1 10 - 10 10 10 0 0 1- 10 10 34 12 12 12 12 0 P | A | B | V | S | 1 (2) 2 1 LICENSEE CODE CON'T 0 7 1 3 8 1 9 1 6 0 1 5 1 0 1 0 1 3 1 3 1 4 7 0 1 6 1 1 5 1 1 (3) 81 REPORT 0 1 SOUACE DOCK EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10 On 6/15/81 at 0730 hours with reactor power at 95%, the battery charger supply to 0 2 125 VDC bus No. 1-2 was lost when the No. 2 battery charger output breaker trippe 1013 open. The charger was declared inoperable while power operation continued withir 1014 the limitations of Technical Specification 3.8.2.3. The health and safety of the 015 public was not jeopardized as the No. 2 battery remained operational. OS 07 6101 COMP CAUSE VALVE CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT CODE (16) 2 7 17 (13 X (12 C 0 9 EV'SION COURRENCE SEQUENTIAL NO. CODE REPORT NO. 0 0 3 0 15 19 8 2520BT NUMBER CONPONE IN'E COMP VPAD-SUBMITTED MET-OD HOURS (22) EFFECT ON PLANT ACTION 2 9 9 9 N 24 Z (25) 0 10 0 10 Y (3) F (19 (20) Z (18) CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND COPRECTIVE ACTIONS (27) Excessive heat in the emergency switchgear area caused the breaker to trip on 110 thermal overload. A portable fan was placed in the vicinity of the battery cha: :11 to cool the breaker. At 1120 hours the charger was returned to service. Futur 1 2 actions will be to investigate improvements to the ventilation system on the 113 battery charger: 1 4 METHOD OF DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32) OTHER STATUS 30 ACILIT S POWER Control Room Alarm A (31) 9 5 29 N/A 22) 1 5 0 CONTENT LOCATION OF RELEASE (16 ACTIVITY AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY 35 11/2 ::/A 2 (:3) Z (34 6 11 SONNEL EXPOSURES DESCRIPTION (39) 0 0 (37) Z (38) N/A 0 1 1 7 PERSONNEL INJURIES DESCRIPTION ::/A 0 0 (:0) 0 12 DES OF OR DAWAGE TO FACILITY (2) N/A 2 (42) .1 2 810713 5000334 FDR 8107240335 PDR ADDCK RC USE CNL 0 PUBLICITY LESEPIPTION (-5 1AUT 11111 N Ga ::/A 12 . 412-6-3-8525 W. S. Lacev 2-0%E MAVE OF PREPARES > Arm Snemy suit Tal inv.

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULS CRY COMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT IPLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFC=WATION $(\mathbf{0})$ FOL BLOCK. - 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 0 4 1 1 1 1 LICENSE NUMBER 25 26 LICENSE TY 3 V S 1 2 0 0 015101010131314 (7) 018 10 15 1811 (3)019101-8 1 1 (9). Ko ROBABLE CONSECULNCES (10) E-ENT DESCRIPTION AND P On 8/5/81 at 0231 hours with the reactor at 99% power the battery charger supply to 125 VDC bus No. 1-2 was lost when No. 2 battery charger cutput breaker tripped open. The charger was declared inoperable while tower operation continued within the limitations of Technical Specifications 3.8.2.3. The health and safety of the public was not jeopardized as the batters remained operational. This is the second reported event. SYSTEM CAUSE CAUSE COMPONENT CODE 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 21 2 (13) X (12) REVISION OCCURPENC SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. CODE NO 0 013 0 1 7 1 1 18 NPRD-COMPONENT BAITTED METHOD HOURS (22) FCRM SUR N 24 19 0 0 0 0 0 Z (25 (36) :8 SE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27) Excessive heat in the charger enclosure area caused the breaker == trip on a thermal overload. A portable fan was used to remove the hear and at 0333 hours the charger was back in service. The station engineering group has begun an investigation looking towards improving the present area or battery charger ventilation system. OTHER STATUS 30 METHOD OF DESCRIPTION (32) POWER A (31) Control Room Alarm 0 0 0 (29) CONTENT LOCATION OF RELEASE 36) AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (25 N/A N/A 11 XPCSLRES DESCRIPTION (39) Z (35) N/A 2116 DESCRIPTION (41 N/A 0 (40 B109210060 B10904 PDR ADOCK 05000334 B DAVIAGE TO FACILITY (45 ESCRIPTICN N/A TC USE ONLY BLIC TY PESCA PTION (45) 111 N/A 412-6-2-3525 W. S. Lacey PHONE -